Territories and Identities in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe
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### Acronyms and abbreviations

- **ASSR**: Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
- **CEE**: Central and Eastern Europe
- **CIA**: Central Intelligence Agency
- **CEPS**: The Center for Empirical Political Studies
- **CIS**: Commonwealth of Independent States
- **CMEA**: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
- **CO₂**: carbon dioxide
- **COMECON**: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
- **DNA**: deoxyribonucleic acid
- **D. Phil.**: Doctor of Philosophy
- **DSc**: Doctor of Science
- **EaP**: The Eastern Partnership
- **EBRD**: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- **EC**: ethnic culture
- **ENP**: European Neighbourhood Policy
- **ESDP**: European Spatial Development Plan
- **ESPON**: European Spatial Planning Observation Network
- **ETH**: Die Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (Zurich)
- **FDI**: foreign direct investments
- **G**: town of Glukhov, Ukraine
- **GIS**: geographical information system
- **ICA**: Commission on Atlases
- **IMF**: International Monetary Fund
- **NATO**: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- **NCSGN**: United Nations Conferences for the Standardization of Geographical names
- **NGO**: non-governmental organization
- **NKVD**: People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs
- **HPGC**: The House for Polish-German Co-operation
- **NPP**: Nuclear Power Plant
- **NUTS**: Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
- **OECD**: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
- **PhD**: Doctor of Philosophy
- **P**: city of Poltava, Ukraine
- **PKK**: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party
- **RAŚ**: The Silesian Autonomy Movement (Ruch Autonomii Śląska)
- **ROW**: The Rybnik Coal District (Rybnicki Okręg Węglowy)
- **RSFSR**: The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
- **RI**: regional identity
- **S**: city of Sumy, Ukraine
- **SEE**: Southeastern Europe
- **SGH**: Warsaw School of Economics (Szkoła Główna Handlowa)
- **UAM**: Adam Mickiewicz University (Poznań, Poland)
- **UDAR**: Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform
- **UŁ**: University of Lodz
UMCS – Maria Curie-Skłodowska University (Lublin, Poland)
UN – United Nations
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGEGN – United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names
Univ.-Doz. – Universitätsdozent (academic title)
USSR – The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V4 – Visegrad Four (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic)
ZUNR – West Ukrainian People’s Republic
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Valentin Mihaylov,
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Preface

In this volume the reader will find a diversity of approaches to the appraisal of territory as a source and stable marker of human identity as well as of power of consciousness in making symbolic or political divisions of the geographical space. Taking into account these multidirectional theoretical bases for the study of identity in a geospatial aspect, and inviting colleagues from different countries to take part in this book project, with papers’ topics of their own choice, the editor wanted to achieve three ambitious purposes:

1. Presentation of chosen theoretical and methodological concepts developed by authors from Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, corresponding to the matter of consciousness and identity on a geospatial scope.

2. Discussion of the results from selected empirical investigations of territorial consciousness and identity on various spatial scales – from the local, to regional, national, and up to the supranational.

3. Encouraging exchange of viewpoints – in some aspects controversial and contradictory – of scientists from different national schools, concerning geopolitical and ethnopolitical dimensions of territorial identity. For that purpose, chapters which include examples of what the inhabitants of investigated countries, regions and metropolitan areas think of themselves and of the position and significance of their own place in the world are especially relevant.

In most cases, the collected articles deal with different aspects of the transformation of the national and regional identities under the conditions of post-socialist transition, e.g. disintegration of the former multinational federal states, globalization, and European integration.

The authors represent leading academic institutions in different countries from Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, not just ex-socialist ones. Regarding the author’s nationalities, they come from Austria, Poland, Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. Most of them are well-known experts in the field of human geography, political science and sociology, but among them there are also many promising young researchers.

As indicated previously, one of the purposes of this book is to present chosen theoretical perspectives of authors from Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe on territorial consciousness and identity. As of now, there is lack of theory and methodology of identity in a geospatial dimension, as well as a commonly accepted conception of human identity in every dimension – not just territorial, but political, national, cultural, and so on. This volume has no ambition to solve such an important issue, but still, readers who are interested in theoretical questions are able to become familiar with several standpoints on selected problems of spatial consciousness and identity, discussed in Part I.
The chapter of Dmitry Zamyatin Co-spatiality, Territorial Identity and Place: To the Comprehension of Postmodern Politics, which opens Part I, reveals the significance of spatiality and co-spatiality for the establishment of territorial identities on different hierarchical levels – from the local to the civilizational. Modernity and postmodernity issues are examined in connection with “floating” territorial identities and in the context of imaginary and mental spaces. The concept and image of the place are studied through the perspective of different types of policies. Imaginary and mental spaces are represented as territorial identities projections. One of the valuable contributions of Zamyatin’s paper is the consideration of the question of geophilosophies of local civilizations and the establishment of peculiar meta-geographies.

An overview of the category territorial identity is presented by Zbigniew Rykiel in the chapter Territorial Identity in Sociology and Human Geography. Summarizing his long-decades of professional experience, Rykiel intends to underline the interdisciplinary character of territorial identity’s study. For that reason, the author analyses territorial identity within the context of social identity. Rykiel also highlights the tendency of mythologization of territoriality, and emphasizes the relations between territorial and non-territorial collectivities.

The contribution of Peter Jordan The Role of Place Names for Space-Related Identity attempts to answer the question why geographical names have obviously such a symbolic meaning and why they are so important for territorial identity. Geographical names are strong symbols and identity builders, because they mark the relation between human community and territory. The author emphasizes the role of the local human community in the naming process, and also exemplifies separate theoretical statements of many appropriate cases, e.g. from East-Central Europe.

Valentin Mihaylov’s chapter Territorial Consciousness as an Identity Component of National and Ethnic Communities discusses the meaning of the term “territorial consciousness” and justifies its importance in forming the identity of national and ethnic communities. The main aspects of territorial consciousness are presented in the study – the spatial/territorial, the social and the historical (time-related), as well as the author’s definition of the category “territorial consciousness”. Some of the author’s theses are illustrated by selected examples from Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

Chosen supranational perspectives on geographical space, territorial identity and power are included in Part II of the book.

During the last few centuries, the territory of the countries in East-Central Europe remains a subject of geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural rivalry between Russia and the Western powers. In the first chapter of the second part entitled Regionalism and Identities in the Common Neighbourhood: European and Russian Discourses Andrey Makarychev presents different patterns of regional-
ism, which hopefully can elucidate the variety of role identities between the EU, Russia and their common neighbours.

Kostis Plevris undertakes an attempt to reveal the connections between the spatial identity and spatial planning by supranational formations, based on selected examples of Southeastern Europe. The author of the chapter *Uneven Development Spatial Representations. Spatial planning in Southeastern Europe as shaped by supranational formations* offers an original structuralist apprehension of space–power relations suggesting that territorial consciousness and identity should be approached as being closely connected to the material reproduction of the social systems of Southeastern Europe. Plevris assumes that the reduction of space is a process of eclectic promotion of certain places inside space, producing a pattern of uneven and combined development of space. The author studies those representations and their material analogues through the territorial policies of supranational institutions, such as the European Union, the World Bank and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development.

In the last chapter of the second part – *The Tourist Image of Place*, Viliyan Krastev raises the issue of forming the tourist image of different geographical places. He discusses the theoretical dimensions of that category as well as its applied functions by critical consideration of the role of mass media and geopolitics for creating positive or negative tourist image of a given destination in the consciousness of potential tourists. Viliyan Krastev’s chapter offers a fresh viewpoint on the tourist image of a place, which is an important part of contemporary human perceptions of geographical reality where subjective images shape a great deal of people’s spatial preferences and behaviour.

Four chapters shape the content of Part III entitled *Identity on a National Level. Between Geography, Consciousness and Geopolitics*. The second part of the title of this section suggests that the studies included here examine the links between geographical reality and its collective human perceptions in various ways, sometimes instrumentalized for (geo)political purposes.

Every subject of geopolitics and international relations possesses its own geopolitical consciousness, its own vision or geophilosophy that contains formed geographical images of the main characteristics of one subject of global or regional geopolitics or another. As Jakub Potulski claims in his contribution on *Polish Geopolitical Visions. Poland as Intermarium*, geopolitical visions are a component of knowledge of the world around us, giving us a kind of “world map” and thereby strongly influencing the actions we take. In the history of Poland’s statehood, specific visions of Poland’s place in the world were created, playing an important role in the legitimacy of a particular foreign policy. In his chapter, based on not so popular in Central and Eastern Europe critical geopolitics, Potulski argues that one of the most influential and sustainable concepts is the one of Intermarium which refers to the old traditions of the Polish political and geo-strategic thought.
The political and cultural identity of the residents of independent Ukraine constitutes the main point of Miroslav Dnistrianskyy and Oksana Skliarska’s chapter entitled *Ukrainian Ethnic and Political Identity: Regional Divergences in the Consolidation of Ukrainian Society in the Context of External Geopolitical Influences*. The contributors deal with fundamental problems which are of importance for the current practice of international relations as well as for the so-called internal geopolitics of Ukraine. In the discussed chapter, a conclusion is made that the Ukrainian territory – being a part of different states over the past two centuries – has caused regional, cultural, and mental differences. Although, according to the vision of the authors, there are enough objective pre-conditions for the shaping of the new Ukrainian political identity in combination with preservation of regional identity and intensification of territorial and political consolidation of the Ukrainian society, but they cannot be implemented due to absence of adequate state policy.

The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 brought transformation and crisis of the civilizational identity of Russia. In the contribution on *Dilemmas of Russian Civilizational Identity*, Gracjan Cimek draws attention to philosophical and scientific dilemmas of Russia’s civilizational identification. It is a survey on the supranational identity of the Russian people and the Russian country, in particular, highlighting both the traditional and modern aspirations of concepts such as Slavianophilism, Occidentalism, Eurasianism, the idea of “Common European Home” introduced by the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, etc. As Cimek stresses, contemporary Russia is looking for a new civilizational identity corresponding with its geopolitical aspirations.

In the last chapter of Part III *The Geographical Position – an Indicator of Turkey’s Geopolitical Identity*, Marin Roussev and Aisun Avdjiev have made empirical research on the issue of geographical position of Turkey and its importance for the contemporary geopolitical identity of this state. As the study shows, the contemporary geographical position (and its different components) of Turkey is a strong factor for creating a new geopolitical identity of that country. This factor provides self-confidence to the Turkey’s foreign policy by being more active on the international scene and being one of the most influencing regional powers in Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus region, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

Part IV comprises four chapters devoted to the influence of cultural and political identity on the territorial development of various spatial units – states, regions, and metropolitan areas. All the contributions here have had a solid empirical background. The separate chapters are distinguished by the authors’ approach to identity, all respecting in varying degrees not only the role of the self-identification and that of the individual, but also the intervention of the state in the “identity-territory” relations.

The issue of regional cultural differences and the existence of spatial-related identities in Russia, as well as their political and economic significance,
attracts the attention of many scholars all around the world. The revival of cultural regionalism is a new and extremely important trend of regionalization in Russia after the collapse of the USSR as Vladimir Streletskiy stresses in his analysis of ethnic, linguistic, confessional and cultural patterns of regional development. Among other considerations, the author emphasizes that cultural regionalism is something quite different from regional separatism.

The question of “otherness” remains rather topical after the Cold War, where the globalization and the increasing migration processes led to the formation of new immigrant communities in Central and Eastern European countries. A spatial analysis of new ethnic minorities in Romania formed under the conditions of globalization which gives opportunities to travel and work outside the native country, is the focus of Radu Săgeată’s chapter *Globalization and New Ethnic Minorities in Romania*. These new ethnic communities, such as the Chinese, the Arabs, the Turks, and the Nigerians, have settled in various places throughout the territory of Romania, mostly in the capital city of Bucharest, bringing new elements into the traditional cultural landscape.

The next issue in part IV is the *Spatial Diversification of Territorial Identity of the Residents of the Rybnik Conurbation (Poland)* presented by Monika Kurpanik. She studies territorial consciousness and identity, applying a questionnaire method in selected spatial units in the Rybnik conurbation in Southern Poland, well-known for its coal industry. That contribution is a good example which confirms the significance of geographical space in shaping the human identity. Demonstrating active position and emotional attitude, the inhabitants of the Rybnik conurbation associate their place of residence with different spatial markers: coal mining, coal, mines, heap, important buildings, “Silesian” dialect, a certain kind of landscape, meaningful places, characteristics of people, etc.

Artem Gusev summarizes the regional identity studies on different administrative entities of Russia. His chapter *Bases, Problems and Prospects of Regional Identity Formation in Federal Subjects of Russia* contains case studies of various units of the Russian Federation, including the Perm province, the Krasnodar province, the Altai province, the Republic of Tatarstan, the Tomsk region, the Tyumen region, etc. In his study, Gusev pays particular attention to the cultural constituent of territorial and regional identity, as well as to the actions taken by the elites in different federal subjects with regard to the latter.

In Part V, four chapters are presented. The chapters deal with problems of manifestation of the territorial consciousness and identity in multicultural territories, e.g. in the borderland areas which have had a number of specific features and changeable geohistorical destiny. The chapters offer analyses of the difficult identity issues facing the population in four borderland territories in East-Central Europe. A number of uneasy and unsolved dilemmas, another question is whether it is possible to solve them with political and ideological tools or not, charac-
terize identity issues of borderland regions such as Silesia, Russian-Ukrainian borderland, and Zakarpattia.

The contribution of *Regional Identities in Russia and Ukraine: Examples of Research Practice*, presented by Mikhail Krylov and Anton Gritsenko, is based on the results of field studies by the authors in Central Russia and in Left-Bank Ukraine. One of the patterns elaborated is called the “cultural trinity of regional identity”. This pattern describes three independent aspects of regional identity (transtraditional, traditionalist and nontraditional) which characterize the local community’s attitude towards tradition in three different ways in the specific environment of cultural, political, and economic regional development of the Russian-Ukrainian borderland.

In the last two decades, the question of Silesian regional identity has provoked many disputes in Polish society concerning its essence, historical, political and cultural aspect. In the current book, this problematic borderland identity is presented from the viewpoint of human geography (Jerzy Runge) as well as political science (Mateusz Hudzikowski). While Runge looks critically at the promotion of Silesian identity, especially in the point of its ethno-national aspirations, Hudzikowski makes a review of the factors which shape the political aspects of regional identity of Upper Silesia.

As Roman Lozynskyy states in his chapter *Territorial and Ethnic Identity Issues in the Zakarpattia Region*, Zakarpattia is one of the most peculiar regions of Ukraine in both geopolitical and geocultural aspects. The author considers the chief factors influencing the forming of territorial identities in that region and explains the complex historical process of forming several territorial identities, including the so-called “Zakarpattian rusynism”. It is a valuable sample of ambivalent regional identity – a phenomenon which is typical for many borderland areas in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe.
1

Introduction

Consciousness and Identity of Human Communities in a Geospatial Dimension: An Interdisciplinary Sphere of Developing Ideas, Approaches and Research Perspectives

VALENTIN MIHAYLOV

1.1. Geographical space, mental-geographical spaces and deterritorialized places: Competition of ideas and searching for common approaches

The relationship between human society and its environment is a traditional focus of attention in philosophy, geography and history. In geography such a relation has been considered mostly in its material aspect, namely – the morphology, quantitative and qualitative characteristics of geographical objects, their distribution, density, and distances between them. The issue of the perception mechanisms of the territory/geographical space by individuals and social groups became a subject of scientific reflection in a relatively recent historical stage.

Over the last decades of the 20th century, the humanistic interest in this matter turned into a trend and even “fashion” which is regarded as a “spatial turn in social sciences”. The ideas of Foucault (1984) have served as a stimulus for overcoming the traditional negligence of space and favouring of time, typical for a number of philosophers and social scientists. As Kapralski writes (2010: 7), space gradually overlaps time and history as fulcrums for perception of the world and the formation of our identity. In various ways this shift has been articulated in sociology, critical geography, humanistic geography, structuralist, and post-structuralist studies as well as in heterogeneous post-modern interpretations of
space. Influenced by critical science, critical geography emerged as a current that counteracts positivist views and schemes of the world. It was also an answer “... against naturalisms, empiricisms, and positivisms which proclaim physical determinations on history apart from social origins; against religious and ideological fatalisms...” (Soja 1989: 15).

As regards structuralism, it does not provide a single coherent set of concepts, and a distinction is drawn between approaches which regard “structure as construct” and those viewing “structure as process” (Goodall 1987: 456). The structuralism, in brief, “is not the self that creates cultures, but culture that creates the self” (Cahoone 1996: 5). Although the exact boundary between “structuralist” and “post-structuralist” works and ideas is difficult to be outlined, in general, post-structuralism differs by describing social and cultural systems as open and dynamic ones, constantly in the process of “becoming”, so, its task is to trace the resulting trajectories of change (Murdoch 2006: 10–11). As a reaction to structuralism, the post-structuralist understandings emerged as an intellectual movement “countered the perceived rigidities, certainties and essentialisms thought to characterize structuralism” (The Dictionary of Human Geography 2009: 572). Furthermore, the influential Lefebvre’s concept of spatial triad was adopted and interpreted in many studies on social and urban space (Harvey 1989; Soja 1989). As an effect, social, territorial, and political considerations of human identity were enriched by terms such as production of space, spatial practices, space of representations, and representations of space (see Lefebvre 1991).

Simultaneously, an increasing number of geographers, frustrated by the highly formalized and abstract positivist knowledge, deepened their interest in matters of humanism, phenomenology and existentialism. All of them had contributed to focus attention on the role of consciousness in the behaviour and in the process of man’s decision-making in the geospace. The latter process shapes out the so-called “social” and “cultural” turn in geography. This turn is quite visible in the shift from the traditional interest in distribution of “objects”, which was enriched by the study of the behaviour of “active agents” (Hampf 1999: 15). In its classic work “Space and place” Tuan drew geographers’ attention on the fact that
people living in a different cultural environment tend to differ in the ways and approaches they use to divide the world, as well as in the values they attribute to the various parts of the world (Tuan 1987: 51). Essentially, there is not so much about the description of physical arrangement of the geographical space, as for the social space regarded as a sphere of human relations and human activity, which essence is profoundly conceptualized by Jalowiecki (1988), Soja (1989), Lefebvre (1991), Liszewski (2003), and other scholars. The innovative side of the humanistic approach is the element of subjectivity which considers both physical and spiritual dimension of space (Buttimer and Seamon 1990, cited in Mirošević and Faričić 2011: 20), so that issues, including such as what and how people think, how they interact in the real and mental space, became of major interest for the current generation of culture-geographers (Streletskiy 2002: 26). In the Anglo-Saxon academic literature a notable attention has been dedicated to debates on fundamental notions, serving as primal spatial keystones of framing the territorial consciousness, such as “space”, “place” and “region”, apprehended as primordial or by other scholars as subjectively constructed units. A lot has been said about the dialectical relations and the contradiction between the “global” and “local” dimension of spatial experience of contemporary society. The essence and the peculiarities of the above-mentioned notions, including their ties with space-related identities of the individuals or groups on different spatial levels are included in the works of many prominent scientists (Tuan 1975, 1976, 1987; Zelinsky 1973; Buttimer 1976; Entrikin 1976; Sack 1983; Agnew 1987; Harvey 1989; Claval 1999; Kaplan and Herb 1999; Paasi 2003, etc.).

The aforementioned tendencies stimulate some revision and, in some cases, deconstruction of outdated thinking schemes and paradigms (mainly the natural and economic determinism) in the development of human society and culture. Those new trends open up opportunities for creating new concepts and ways of explaining the multidimensional relations between man and the geographical environment, and what is more, the new trends provide ways of making real or symbolic division of the limited sources of the geographical space, e.g. territory. The new ideas, however, do not always manage to push aside the old paradigms; on other occasions the competition between the two antitheses leads to a knowledge synthesis or to a birth of new spatial perception paradigms. The complex dialectics of the interdependencies between geographical and social space, considered and interpreted from diverse points of view, is what namely lies in the fundament of the future scientific explanation of the human territorial consciousness and identity.

A significant distinction between the postmodern and the traditional perception of space as a material environment is being formed in the academic geography. The geographical thought regards the space as a product of both the natural processes and the human activity and, in a general aspect, of their inter-
action. For centuries, those ideas have been typical not only for geographers, but have also been discussed and adopted by philosophers and historians.

When considering an identity in a geospatial dimension, let us keep in mind that in the sphere of the abstract scientific notions and also in a real everyday life, different kinds of space do exist – cosmic, geographical, geological, philosophic, virtual, the space of our home and office, and many others. However, greater preciseness is observed in the works of authors who use the category geographical space or geospace. At the same time, in geographical, sociological, and cultural-anthropological publications, the notions territory/territorial and space/spatial are both applied as synonymous ones, as they are used in the current collective book. Nonetheless, there are definite meaning distinctions: contrary to the abstract-geometrical term “space”, the term “territory” comprises geographical concreteness (Golubchik at all 2004: 121).

The notions such as social or cultural space are products of the human consciousness. The latter categories often deal with fictional spaces – “designed”, “created” and “imagined” by the subject. A number of cultural anthropologists and literary critics emphasize on the construction of fictional, literary and virtual spaces which often have no direct relation to the geographical space, regarded as a basis for formation of territorial identities. Probably that is what Kyosev means when he problematizes the studying of various mental maps in non-scientific discourses, based on the public’s opinion in the media and on public discussions, journalism and literature. In this case it is not cultures which are placed in space, but it is rather spaces that are being placed in cultures, where images of space, landscapes, fantasized places and ones having identical cultural aureoles (Kyosev 2009: 12–13).

The existing attempts of imaginative geography and metageography for interdisciplinary synthesis of relations between subjective perception and imagination on the one hand, and geospace on the other, seek to combine two different approaches of interpreting space. According to Mitin, the first approach is the cultural-geographical one dealing with the impact which real geographical objects or images, perceptions, interpretations of what is “out the window” have on human consciousness. The second approach is the psychological, culturological, literary, which deals with the imagined spaces of artists and writers or, in other words, with what is “in the head” (Mitin 2009). Through the power of their message, the imagined spaces certainly affect the way we perceive the physical objects and our tendency to attach spiritual features to them.

Throughout the whole human history the territory remains a necessary condition for political, economic, and cultural development of every political and social community. Reducing the importance of territory in conditions of expanding globalization, as well as the ideas of postmodernism, have been reflected in theses such as “the end of geography”, “deterritorialization” of human culture and human relations, “time-space compression” (Harvey 1989), as well as in New-
man’s „the end of the nation state” or the end of “territorial absolutism” theses (1999: 3). Each of those concepts, euphorically embraced by many scientists, are linked to a trend of thinking according to which, in recent decades “the territory has been neglected”, first of all because “the turn away from reflection on the state, especially by poststructuralist approaches, seems to have rendered suspect attention on these issues” (Elden 2010: 801). We cannot, however, overlook the fact that until now no country in the world, even the biggest and less populated ones, do not retreat a span of its own territory and such a thing hardly ever happens (Mihaylov 2011: 36). Considering the changing nature of international boundaries under the condition of globalization, Newman (2001: 138) stresses that even “a brief glance at the map of the world shows that, despite the discourse of new world orders, the basic territorial compartmentalization of the globe remains strongly based on the existing pattern of sovereign states”.

Thanks to the development of global capitalism and global media, as well as to the diversification and pluralization of the public life, transcultural communities are being formed. The latter are regarded as deterritorialized, i.e. having no specific areas, such as the national and the local cultures do (Petkova 2013: 39–40). However, as it turned out this undoubtedly new phenomenon is far from being a major tendency in the development of mankind.

Although the concept of “deterritorialization”, meaning a detachment of a given community from the geographical environment, is quite popular among scholars working in the area of social sciences, a whole direction towards studying the “territorialization” and “reterritorialization” is also developing as well as “the resurgence of territory” (Painter 2010). In his popular geopolitical article in “Foreign Affairs” journal, R. D. Kaplan (2009) provides some geopolitical arguments for “the revenge of geography”.

The explanation of territorialization and deterritorialization of local cultures, as well as other entities, always occurs in a comparative aspect – not only in publications in the field of cultural anthropology, but also in a geopolitical scope (see, for instance, O’Tuathail and Luke 1994). In geopolitical and in international relations’ context, the deterritorialization plot, considered attractive by well-structured theses or frivolous intellectual speculations, is being problematized mainly in connection with the critique of modernist understanding of state and government which sovereignty only extends to a specific territory and is delineated by definitive political boundaries. We encounter the one-sided, inapplicable to all parts of the world thesis that in postmodern times borders “disappear”, although it was in the same era where concrete walls along the Greek-Turkish or the American-Mexican border were built. Territoriality, however, is inherent not only in state communities, but it is also a constitutive feature of regional and local communities, which identities are being revived and become increasingly important, thus opposing the unifying globalization (see, for example, Castells 2010).
1.2. Schools, directions and themes in the study of territorial identity

Territorial identity is a multi-layered phenomenon, having intersections with a wide range of belongings, including political, social, ethnic, religious, class identity, etc. It is intertwined with categories of the individual worldview of people with their belonging to certain social groups, including geographically defined ones.

Despite the growing number of articles, where the term *territorial identity* has been used, up till now, no systematic and thorough definition of that complex term has been elaborated. The occasions when one researcher or another mixes the notion *territorial identity* with several other categories, such as *territorial* and *regional consciousness, spatial consciousness, perception of space, geographical awareness, territorial identity, geographical identity, social identity*, etc., are not rare. These concepts are certainly more or less related to one another, but mixing them sometimes raises confusions and obstructs the scientific analysis.

In studies on territorial identity, two basic approaches to the understanding and interpretation of this phenomenon are used. The first is the socio-centric approach. In that case the territorial identity is perceived as a spatial representation of social identity and of other social processes (Zamyatina 2011: 204). The second approach, according to Zamyatina, is the space-centred approach, where territorial identity is formed by the direct identification of people with the territory.

According to Freud, the belonging as well as the identification with group members and the differentiation from others outside its borders, are the three key elements that underpin collective identity (Petkova 2013: 17). Same psychological processes apply in the formation of territorial identities in which, from a humanistic geography research perspective, the geographical space is the code for the territorial identity formation. As Borgatta and Montgomery have argued (cited in Nijakowski, 2004: 100) belonging to the territory is a form of social belonging – the so-called socio-territorial belonging. „Classification according to scale is a critical aspect of ordering and particularly important in helping to organize human identities“, as D. H. Kaplan (2005: 31) points out. Thus, the territorial component is present in the definition of identity constructions of varying geospatial scales – universal (global), civilizational (supranational), national, regional, local, and so forth. Imagining our place in the world, we base our judgments and mental maps of the images on pillars and symbols for that world. As Nagorna argues, its weight and importance is growing when we are “closer to the ground” where the socialization of the individual and group interests crystallizes. The “territorial imperative” in people’s life is not just striving to preserve the legacy of ancestral identity. Very strong motivation also emerges when we realize that within the territory, the most favourable conditions for self-expression, self-determination and self-organization exist (Nagorna 2008: 44–45).
Until now, for numerous Eastern European authors, the basic sources of theoretical models in territorial consciousness and identity have been the achievements of western schools in humanistic geography, as well as in sociology, philosophy, and political science. From a historical perspective, in the former socialist countries humanistic geography as well as non-positivist scientific approaches and conceptions, appear in the science with some delay. Yet, that process flows despite the resistance of supporters of the conventional research paradigms.

During the Communist era, Russian human geography was dominated by empirically centred economic geography, but the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century represented a true compensation period for the humanistic and non-positivist researches of space. Dozens of authors published a great deal of unconventional and innovative ideas and conceptions, most of which, according to Mitin (2011), were elaborated in an independent intellectual environment. Among the numerous theoretical and empirical research on territorial identity in the specific Russian context, in the light of its relations to the ethnic, political and cultural identity, the works of Shmatko and Kachanov (1998), Kuveneva and Manakov (2003), Smirniagin (2007), Krylov (2010), Zamyatin (2011), Zamyatina (2011a), Goncharik (2011), and other authors, not just geographers, stand out. Emblematic achievements of the humanistic geography in Russia, closely related to spatial awareness and identity, could be regarded as follows: studies of the symbolic aspects of the post-Soviet cultural landscape, the landscape metaphysics; the well-structured theory of geographical images; the ideas of mental-geographical location; mithogeography which includes conceptualization of local myths as well as of legendary cities and spaces.

Poland is a Central European country whose scientific community has always had narrow contacts with the Anglo-Saxon world. Due to such circumstances in the socialist period, Polish geographers and sociologists accepted and introduced the innovative ideas of mental maps and the human perceptions of the geographical space, e.g. the conception of territorial consciousness and identity. Many of Polish works and concepts on this scientific direction are largely presented and discussed in the volume (including chapters by Rykiel, Mihaylov, Potulski, Cimek, Kurpanik, and Hudzikowski). Additionally, it is worth mentioning the contribution to the current book of Professor Zbigniew Rykiel who, in the 1980s, published papers devoted to regional consciousness of the residents of the Katowice region (Rykiel 1985a; 1985b).

Current studies and discussions on territorial identity and the closely related conception of territorial consciousness make up an informal interdisciplinary sphere which represents a field of dynamic development and fusion of various research ideas, approaches, concepts, and paradigms. In science all over the world, that sphere comprises the works of the authors from several scientific disciplines which sometimes differ in regard to the methodological approaches and
in the way of interpretation of identity on a spatial level. The main reason for that is not only the lack of accurate research framework of the territorial identity, but also the constant emergence of new conceptual nuances, while other ideas are still in process of ripening.

National identity is considered as one of the most prominent types of collective identity in the modern era. Issues of ethnic and national identity have traditionally been key research questions for sciences such as history, ethnology, cultural anthropology, sociology, and human geography, each of those having their own methodological standpoints and approaches. For instance, recognition of the territorial factor in the life of modern nations and ethnic groups in sociology, as well as in the so-called nationalism studies, deviates from that of geography, mainly because geographical environment is perceived as something “external” in the life of the ethnic community, while geographers maintain that a “territory is so inextricably linked to national identity, that it cannot be separated out” (Kaplan and Herb 1999: 2). Territory situates the nation, giving its roots and boundaries (Herb 1999: 17).

Regional identity, positioned between the national and the local level, is the hierarchical type of territorial identity which is most often the subject of scientific debate.

The variety of narratives of regional identity, are based on elements such as: ideas on nature, landscape, the built environment, dialects, culture/ethnicity, economic success/recession, periphery-centre relations, marginalization, stereotypic images of a community, both of “us” and “them”, actual/invented histories, utopias and diverging arguments on the identification of people (Paasi 2003). According to their internal structure, regional identities can be monocultural (full or high dominance of one element) as well as multicultural that overlap the identification weight of territorial, ethnic and religious markers of identity. In terms of spatial factors, border identities, arisen on geopolitical or civilizational borders, are regarded as specific ones. Those are a part of the so-called borderland studies, studying mainly cultural belonging of the inhabitants of border regions separated by political boundaries.

In our contemporary world, formation of regional type of identity is associated with the active role of free choice of regional consciousness, regarded as a “product of feelings, thoughts and the activities of the territorial community” (Gladkiy and Chistobaev 2002: 152). At the same time, the identity of regions is affected by the policies of the central government or the local elites pursuing their own economic, cultural or political intention. The regions’ identity has its own, clearly defined sphere of organization of the individual and social identity, its own methods of utilization of space, its restrictive coordinates – the regional relations and the regional interests (Nagorna 2008: 54–55).

In Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, both national and regional identity has been very long under the control of the centralized state. As long as
it existed at all, regional identity, although named differently, was based on the economic regions, which were defined by the industrial specialization. Those types of regional identity were organized “from above”. Following the democratic changes and the pluralization of the social life, new horizons emerged and enhanced the self-organizing elements and the autonomy in the life of territorial communities, including seeking foothold in cultural-historical heritage and local economic traditions. Zarycki (2008) writes about a renaissance of regionalism over the past two decades in Europe, when the belief that the model of homogenization of the state’s territory ceased to be considered attractive. Important place in literature has just been devoted to regional identity as an object of political instrumentalization by both the centralized state structures striving for political, administrative and cultural homogeneity of the national territory, and also by local communities relying on values such as “local patriotism”, emotional attachment to the “small homeland”, and own economic interests. In turn, scientists and politicians prone to conformity associate the manifestations of regional identity, which de-homogenize the unity of the civic nation, with regional political separatism, or at least – with a potential for taking the path of political autonomy.

A significant influence on the formation of the subjective aspect of space-related identities has the territorial consciousness. That analytical category reflects a condition of the cognitive sphere that is shaped by perceptions, images, stereotypes and myths, connected to various geographical objects, their location, borders, internal structure, cultural and political meanings. Consciousness, as well as the emotionally charged sense of territoriality, is modeled by the adopted tradition, and in the same time seeks to cultivate the territorially defined traditions, or as Pollice (2003: 108) has put it – identity can be considered as both a consequence and a cause of the territorialization processes.

The study of territorial consciousness and identity is a part of the geography of perceptions/imaginations which studies “the specifics and the regularities in forming of geographical images, their structures, specifics of modelling, ways and types of representation and interpretation” (Zamyatin 2010: 27). In the English language literature the concept of imaginative geographies, introduced by Palestinian-American literary critic Edward Said (1978), is well-affirmed. This concept explicitly emphasizes the multiplicity of views about perception and interpretation of space (Gregory 1994; Wolff 1994; Kristof 1994; Anderson 1996; Lewis and Wigen 1997; Jezernik 2004; Todorova 2008; Light 2012; Clowes 2011). Said’s concept of orientalism has established itself as an inspiring model for critical understanding of the perceptions of foreign cultures and spaces at the example of imaginations, rooted in the minds of the former colonial powers, acting from the position of strength, and yet, regarding their own image of the space of “the other” as the only right and logical image.

Said specifies that “Imaginative geographies sustain images of “home” as well as “abroad”, “our space” as well as “their space”: “Imaginative geography and
history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away” (The Dictionary of Human Geography 2009: 370). The old dilemma of the human self is rooted in spatial consciousness and identity – I am what others are not. Speaking the language of space – in order to realize the scale of “my” space and to make it meaningful, I need to oppose it to the space of the “other”, in the manner in which it is shaped by the imaginations and the stereotypes of my own native culture, education, and media.

The critical reading of the questions about the mental maps, the subjective perception and assessment of the identity of certain territorial-political entities increasingly become a part of the geopolitics theory and of the international relations (Henricson 1980; Newman 1999; Eberhardt 1999, 2006; O'Tuathail 2000; Dergachev 2004; Zamyatin 2004; Roussev 2005; Kidak and Shevchenko 2006; Batuman 2010; Potulski 2010; Mihaylov 2012). Classical geopolitics appeared and developed as a struggle (including by military means) for command and control over territories, while in the postmodern conditions that struggle is being transformed with an emphasis on controlling the national markets linked by the emerging new “trans-territorial organization of society” (Druzhinin 2010). However, there is a growing acknowledgment that each subject of geopolitics and of international relations has its own geopolitical consciousnes or according to Dergachev (2004) – geophilosophy. Geopolitical consciousness contains key perceptions / geographical images of a given subject of regional, European and global geopolitics. Such a subject could be a sovereign state, regional military alliance, economic association, ethnopolitical movement, etc. As Newman stresses, the geopolitical imagination follows on from notions such as “imagined communities” and “banal nationalism” which relate to the national imagination held by the citizens of the state (Newman 1999: 4). Therefore, geopolitical images have hermetic nature. They are determined by the culture and the civilizational traditions of a given society and are generously colored by nationalistic rhetoric, making them ideologically unacceptable, hostile and sometimes impossible to understand in a foreign cultural environment.

The relations between public memory and the modelling of spatial identities is a study subject of contemporary sociology, history and cultural anthropology. Occurring before our eyes, globalization creates conditions in which we are forced to define ourselves in different contexts and towards different subjects. Our identity is hybrid, infirm and variable, and does not engage us as hard as traditional identities (Kapralski 2010: 7).

Collective memory is embedded in the nation's space, that of the city, of the local and regional community. As pointed out by Prodanov, memory is embodied in public artifacts such as the urban environment, cemeteries, museums, monuments, names, statues, ceremonies, anniversaries, celebrations, etc. Those are kind of sacred spaces with various degrees of value charge or sacredness,
opposed to the rest of the environment that does not bear such sacred meanings (Prodanov 2006: 62). According to Czepczyński (2008: 2) “Cultural landscapes can be interpreted as an announcement (revelation) exposure of information about local societies. Sometimes landscape, decoded of hidden meanings, exposes more information than we are prepared to hear”. Transformations of the memory, as well as the changing fashion of the sociocultural values, are reflected in the cultural landscape, which forms a separate module in the study of space-related identities. The study of landscape in the new cultural geography, sociology and cultural anthropology is based not on the seeking of objective and inherent laws of physical-geographical objects, but on the way they are perceived, evaluated and interpreted by man.

1.3. Main issues of territorial identity study – an attempt of recapitulation

In scientific literature, the study of the “geographical space – identity” problem is developing in different directions. Currently, the theory of territorial identity is at a stage of refinement of its basic concepts and search for a holistic understanding of its essence. A discussion on this matter, conducted in the form of interdisciplinary debate, contributes to find intersections between geography, political science, sociology, cultural anthropology, etc. Without claiming any thoroughness and strict generalization, we can conclude that the diverging perceptions of the phenomenon referred to as territorial identity in both the English language literature and in the works of authors from Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, revolve around several main issues of territorial identity presented below.

First of all, conceptualization of space-related identities is associated with rational and critical understanding of identities which represent a projection of the connection between mind and territory or geographical space, and to some extent – the connection between mind and interactions in the social space. The term “geospatial dimension” of human consciousness and identity, implied in the introduction title, was chosen to distinguish territory, as a physical or mental-geographic product, from virtual spaces, fictional places or fantasized realms.

Second, territorial identity is just one of the many varieties of individual and group human identity, which specificity is expressed in affiliation of the individual or the group to a given fragment of the geographical space called “socio-territorial” affiliation. Being also psychological, social, geographical (i.e. projectable on the geographical map), cultural and political category with complex internal nature, territorial identity has different mechanisms of formation and complex relations with the other types of identities.

Third, territorial identity may be a product of both the activity performed from the position of authority and power, or the initiative of local communities to
promote the specificity of their own group, profiled by the territory they inhabit and to which they are emotionally attached, through identification with vivid symbols and icons of the landscape. Territorial identity is not just a product of self-identification, imagination, memory, and cultivation of local traditions. As it happens, not only in closed totalitarian societies, territorial identity can be defined and shaped from the “outside” as a result of established cultural heterostereotypes, but also as the effect of targeted policies or administrative regionalization of the central government.

Fourth, the social, economic and institutional dimensions of territorial identity all crystallize based on living together within a territorial unit where people are in close social relationships with one another and where they have common problems and aspirations. The interdisciplinary and the multidisciplinary importance of territorial identity is expressed in its inherent quality to refract (through the prism of territory) the political, ethnic, religious, professional and other types of collective belonging. The geographical space represents an integrator and also a factor of solidarity for the whole amalgam of the various types of social belonging of the individuals and the groups, immersed in their different worlds, but yet communicating as inhabitants of a common area. Divided by religious doctrines or nationalist ideologies, the residents of a particular country or region have a common territorial identity, although it could be more preferred – in some cases, or less preferred in other – form of human community.

Fifth, in terms of geographical scale and borders, group membership to a certain territorial community can be positioned in comparison to spatial units of different nature: administrative territorial units (municipalities, departments, regions, autonomous districts); cultural and historical regions within the state or beyond political borders or even shared between two or more countries; informal macroscale spatial units with varying stridency of their territorial extent. The latter may be both subnational (the Italian North and South, the American West, the Russian Far East, Eastern Ukraine) and supranational (the Balkans, Northern Europe, West Asia, the Middle East, Southern Africa, etc.).

To summarize, the question of the dialectics of geographical space and social space, posed at the beginning, awaits its interdisciplinary scientific synthesis, which could be the basis for future interdisciplinary theory of human spatial consciousness and identity.

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PART I

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES OF TERRITORIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND IDENTITY
2

Co-spatiality, Territorial Identity and Place: To the Comprehension of Postmodern Politics

DMITRY ZAMYATIN

2.1. Space and civilization: to the problem of spacialism genesis

There are at least several transparent content-related subjects that seem to go through all the complex of concepts on relation between geographical space and civilization. Among these subjects, we can mark local knowledge ground (Moss 1996; Levi-Strauss 1985; 1994; 1999; 2000; Lynch 1982; Burd’e 2001, 2005; Geertz 1983; 2004); cultural landscapes phenomenology ground (Stepun 2000; Muratov 1993, 2000; Faure 2002; Ortega y Gasset 2000; Eisenstein 2004, 2006; Foucault 1980, 2006; Gold 1990; Podoroga 1995; Wolff 2003; Kagansky 2001; Lavrenova 2003; Tuan 1977, 2003; Soja 1990; Schama 1996; Jackson 1997) or an issue of local civilizational identity in a broader sense. The later question discusses how one-civilization members adapt in hostile cultural and geographical space or in cultural-geographical space that is to be mentally “settled” or “colonized” (the problem of local civilizational identity in general sense) (see, for example: Rashkovsky and Horos 1988; Barabanov 1991; Groys 1992, 2003; Shchukin 1992; Meldon 1992; Cantor 2001; Rashkovsky 2001, 2005; Tsymbursky 2007; Fishman 2003). We can to some extent represent and examine these questions in each model given above. Still the way we interpret the questions and the results received in the end can differentiate greatly, partially due to the fact that the researchers themselves can belong to different local civilizations with their specific cultural, mental and scholastic traditions and orientations (Castree 2001).

Let us briefly describe given subjects in various methodological perspectives. The local knowledge issue is quite steadily formulated and examined in the frame of three geo-civilizational methods. The method of geo-determinism studies it gives more examples of material culture. Geo-possibilism makes accent on possibilism and methodological flexibility, on variative character of local knowledge itself. Geo-spacialism turns to concentrate its attention on civilizational and
special shift and diffusion, and on transformations of local knowledge depending on geographical dynamics of civilizations. At the same time cultural landscape phenomenology ground can be interpreted in different methodological traditions and so many ways that its transformations and theoretical positing can lead to mutual cultural misunderstanding. Nevertheless, here we can also find some common “nerve” of the whole subject. We shall represent this particular “nerve” with the role and ratio between material and mental culture; that is how artefacts and mentifacts, everyday life visions and “elite”-culture visions combine and show themselves in the process of cultural landscape establishment. Finally, cultural and civilizational heritage issue that is quite well articulated in all methodological systems appears to be most effective in its theoretical and applied statements in the very frames of dynamically and broader understood phenomenology of cultural landscapes. The latter includes all current cognitive achievements in geodeterminism, geo-possibilism and geo-spacialism.

The questions of civilizational local identity seem to be most many-sided and most extential, as far as it deeply touches the ontological essence of methodological discourses described above. The problematics of “ours/their” (invariation of “civilization/barbarism” opposition) is always actualized through the fact that it belongs to some place, territory or landscape. It can be marked in different ways depending on a particular culture and civilization. Taking in mind that the concept of civilization itself is an absolute scholastic and ideological construct which appeared to be quite effective in certain historical epoch, we can presume that the concept of local identity is broadened and made larger under “civilizational magnifier” and comes forward due to ample opportunities of spatial vision and of civilizational identity image and projection.

Anyway, the ground of geo-space and geo-spatial imagination makes us think of civilizations in images, imagine them in key visions, which establish dynamically changing image-civilizations, all the time diminishing in size and more importantly in the meaning. These images’ symbolism, semiotics and phenomenology can be to a big extent based on the status of the place, territory or landscape seen ontologically. Here geo-spacialism practically coincides “in spiral” with geographical determinism in its ideology, makes “the full circle round” and turns into “imaginary-geographical determinism”. Hereafter in the frame of this imaginary-geographical determinism, local civilizations are almost fully self-determined with the help of relevant systems of specific geographical images. Images-civilizations, being in their mental genesis specially broadening, do “push up” in the actual discursive field, the ground of special imagination and spatial (local, regional) identity (Virt 2003; Rokkan and Urwin 2003; Assmann 2004; Attias and Benbassa 2002; Krylov 2001, 2004, 2005; Kuveneva and Manakov 2003; Sverkunova 2002; Bassin 1991; Geography and National Identity 1994; Ayers, Limerick, Nissenbaum, and Onuf 1996; Ely 2002).
In its turn, special imagination is “civilized” actively working on the borders of those ideological, cultural and scholastic formats given by civilization concept.

2.2. Geo-spacialism: genesis and development

Some prerequisites for the establishment of that scholastic paradigm that can be called geo-spacialism first appeared and started to develop in the last fourth of 20th – early 21st centuries. It seems that the concepts of postmodernity and globalization are the correlates necessary for geo-spacialism concept. However, geo-spacialism here is considered to be a wider and at the same time narrower phenomenon than the two mentioned well-known concepts. Speaking of the examined problematic question, in its strict sense geo-spacialism greatly and evidently separates and emphasizes civilizational and cultural elements of geographical factor and geographical space. Therefore, it appears to be senseless to speak of the geographical factor role in civilizations genesis and dynamics. Geographical space as it is seems to be in some way a mental product of a particular civilization that manipulates its own characteristic geographical images (Zamyatin 2002, 2003a; Said 2006). It does not mean that in the frame of such paradigm we cannot speak of any adaptation of local civilizations to particular environmental and climatic conditions and to geographical position. In other words, any local civilization cannot be born without initial typical only of its specific spatial perceptions, that already include “codes” of such an adaptation.

Geo-spacialism is defined as ideological, civilizational, and cultural shift to special forms used to re-produce basic kinds of human activity. Even the human mentality itself turns to specific spatial images that represent and interpret externally evident processes of civilizations and cultures development (cf. by analogy see quite the Marxist approach to the problem of the reproduction of space: Lefebvre 1991). The beginning of this period dates back to the Renaissance epoch at least. A critical shift to the basic forms and impressions of geo-spacialism takes place in the first four decades of the 20th century. It was then that processes of political-geographical and political-ideological contrast went into overdrive and combined with conceptual “bursts” in science, art, literature, philosophy, where the spatial problematic and spatial interpretations moved forward to the front (see, first of all: Florenskiy 1993, 2000; Ukhtomskiy 2002; Panofskiy 2004; Heidegger 1997; Genon 2003, 2004; Yunger 2000; Ben’iamin 1996; Artaud 1993; Bakhtin 1975, 1986, etc).

We will not deeply examine geo-spacialism genesis and its contents in the broader sense, but it is worth saying that the main conceptual elements of modern geography and its disciplinary matrix were the ones to begin to solidify in the early 20th century (James and Martin 1988). Around the same time horologic concept in geography is first formulated theoretically. This concept first emerged in
the first part of the 20th century and became one of the most influential geographical conceptions, and has remained so since the 1920s and till the present (see: Ritter’s ideas on the comparative geosciences, 1853; Hettner 1930; Zamyatin 1999). Here we can say that fundamental issues in modern geography are the result of that critical civilizational shift to geo-spacialism. At the same time, it can be fixed as one of its essential traits.

Turning back to the subject of geo-spacialism in its strict sense in connection with civilization and geographical space interaction, we should mention three main aspects. The first one can be formulated as an issue of methodological “scissors”. It means that the outward observer or researcher will represent and interpret the images of such civilization contextually and formally, in different ways with the members of civilization or material/mental monuments of ancient civilization, that can reconstruct its dominating geographical images (see, for example: Klassicheskii fenshui: Vvedenie v kitaiskuu geomantiu 2003; Granet 2004; G. Frankfort, G. A. Frankfort, Wilson, and Jacobsen 1984; Campbell 2002; Knabe 1985; Toporov 1993; Osheroff 2001; Podosinov 1999, 2000). Mind that this outward researcher can be a contemporary to civilization or otherwise live in a later epoch when the civilization itself has already disappeared leaving behind only material and mental traces and the remnants of its activity. In these conditions of cognition, we can speak of transitive geographical images, hybrid in their character. They contain the interpretations of geographical space in disappeared or strange civilizations seen with the eyes of other civilization representatives. Anyway geo-spacialism presumes that there exist and develop mediative inter-civilizational spaces with flexible mental structure, that allows to fix, examine and use geographical beliefs, images, symbols of different cultures and civilizations – all at the same time.

The second aspect is: in the frame of geo-spacialism any local civilization is seen as the one that spatially expands and not only or mainly politically (though it is often so) but in economic and cultural aspect as well. Some patterns and stereotypes of particular civilizational behaviour, certain civilizational orientations (often based on sacral beliefs and the leading religion) gradually overrun their original territory (civilizational nuclear). They gain different modifications and start to spread into boundary inter-civilizational zones (often reformatting them). Sometimes they even enter the spheres of traditional cultural influence of other local civilizations. As a rule, it can be vividly reflected in the classic travel notes and descriptions of journeys when the traveller during his trips finds himself in a different cultural and civilizational environment (Darwin 1975; de Cus-tine 1996; Hollander 2001).

We can control this process just partially as far as mental products of independent civilization usually possess particular spatial synergy. That means that they may occur in some region, on a territory, the ones that are in the state of cultural-civilizational “deficit” or civilizational “hunger”. Anyway, local civiliza-
tions most often have a bent for spatial expansion. It is so despite the fact that there can come periods and epochs of conscious political isolation as it happened in Japan in Tokugawa epoch. Let us take into account that this isolation cannot be full due to different circumstances. This expansion can be expressed by appropriate geographical images that tend to “pack”, to represent and pushing forward the original civilization to its new spatial borders.

The third aspect accentuates our attention on the issue of geo-spatial relativism of local civilizations. As part of geo-spatialism, the space of any civilization can be adequately represented not traditionally in maps, but in geographical images. That implies that there are some systematic key civilizational-geographical images (imaginary-geographical maps, see Zamyatin 2006), that in their turn can be presented as spatial configurations. This mental multi-variant cartography assumes that usual steady traditional civilizational borders that often coincide with political borders, have fractal character (see Zamyatin 2000, 2001, 2003b). Civilization in a geo-spatial context is a spatial image of geographical space. This geographical space marks themselves with the help of most representative cultural, social, economic, political markers, that show the outside observer evident specifics of particular imagination (Anderson 2001). In other words, any local imagination displaying itself in steady series and systems of spatially constructed and built images, can be considered as independent civilization. Imagination, having included spatiality as ontological basis is for sure civilization. For example, let us take European civilization that without any doubt can be represented with the help of all kinds of mental markers. Physical geographical coordinates of these markers can refer to state territories of Russia, the Argentine and Japan.

2.3. Modernity project and geo-spatialism: an attempt of ideological interpretation

The ideological break-up of the modernity project that became evident by 1910s and 1920s, resulted in chaotic political, social and economic grounds, where certain autonomic (independent) network schemes and inter-linkages rested in their development on autochthonous semiotic-symbolic hierarchies and boundary mental markers (see, for example, diametrically opposed ideological discourses: Genon 2003; Yunger 2000; Ben’amin 1996; see also: Elias 2001; Smith 2004). These ideological conditions had led to mental “gaps”, “cracks” between particular ideological discourses, ignoring one another. Discourses borders assume that here we most often face natural decrease of their sociocultural influence depending on the fact how powerful the ideological resources are and on quantitative/qualitative characteristics of the discourse audience. On the contrary, we do not see these discourses to come out into the area of direct and indirect inter-discursive interaction.
The ideological conditions that preserved during the entire 20th century have resulted in the establishment of numerous imaginary worlds with their sociocultural norms, rules and discursive images. The imaginary world-spaces have been originally developing resting on traditional geocultural, geopolitical and geoeconomic beliefs of modernity epoch (the classic study on this subject: Anderson, 2001). Essential ontological contradictions between traditional modernity world vision and many images of other sociocultural and mental spaces were found to be there only by late 20th century. It was when existing bipolar political-ideological system that was artificially complemented with an image of the Third World countries has finally crashed.

Globalization as an ideological project had to substitute that “cracking” modernity world, but by the early 21st century it has still failed to. Globalization was not able to “glue”, support and preserve the remnants of discursive space, actual for most of regional and local communities. It happened despite the development of such powerful additional discourses and concepts as postmodernity, postcolonialism, multiculturalism and the new concept of glolocalization (R. Robertson). The main cognitive problem around globalization project is that consciously or unconsciously we strive to succeed in modernity project that was not fully realized by early 20th century, though its realization was seen to be practically possible and sociocultural and economic tendencies showed that there were conditions to carry it out. It was the phenomenon of so-called initial globalization in the late 20th – early 21st century (Sintserov 2000a; 2000b). Due to it, some archaism in globalization project displays itself mostly in the presumption that it is possible to socially and culturally synchronize the development of different spaces, regions and territories. However, mind that these spaces do construct, produce their own images and beliefs non-connected to others. These images in turn spread out the limits of their own physiographic and political-geographical borders (Culture, Globalisation and the World-System... 1997).

Mental and imaginary plurality of terrain spaces can be called co-spatiality, the term first offered by German conventional romantic Martin Muller (Ionin 2000). Later the concept of modernity has pushed it out and co-spatiality phenomenon was forgotten. The ideological conditions in early 20th century contribute to the revival of this concept and its potentially active usage in order to find out possible conditions to cognitively build interactive inter-discursive and inter-civilizational spaces.

Interpretation of co-spatiality image deals with the idea of plurality and uniqueness of the times, which develop inside particular imaginary spaces. The spaces can be different: European or Buddhist civilizational space, inter-civilizational limitrophe space (for instance, the Caucasus). It can be also some network community space, its physical (human) element fixed in various coordinates of traditional geographical space. Certain times would not come together and would even part as it comes out for Western and Islamic civilizations times.
Recognition of this phenomenon should become an initial topos used to complete modernity project mentally and socio-culturally. It is also useful in order to construct a new ideological project that would base on co-spatiality, not co-temporality. Interwoven and interpenetrative co-spatiality of Western and Islamic civilizations show anti-modernity, non-modernity and a-modernity of these civilizational discourses interaction, discourses themselves still preserving deep mental traces of their religious bases.

We can find or formulate a possible solution to the given problem in the frame of geo-spacialism. It is a methodological approach presuming that ontological statuses of spatiality and its imaginary representations are the obligatory part of any social or sociocultural phenomenology. In other words, certain vision and perception of space is mentally localized as a “bunch” of social images seen as reality.

The process of ideological shift from modernity project to a new one can be called spatialistic or geo-spacialistic. This shift is about automatic and spontaneous clash of discourses, differentiating ontologically. The discourses in turn work and develop in different civilizational and sociocultural times. These ideological clashes lead to the situation when discursive space spreads out without any control on the part of significant sociocultural and political actors, groups or entities. The discursive space becomes a field for extensively co-existing imaginations. The imaginations sources possess self-contained periods and in spatial context are “spread” or “dissolved” due to the original net constructions of such spaces (Bart 2004; Soja 1990; Nadtochii 1991; Wolff 2003; Todorova 1997; Neumann 2004; Filippov 2007; Etkind 2001; Zamyatin 2007b).

Spacialistic project is actually (geo)spacialistic ideological project that uses cognitive opportunities of postmodernity and post-structuralism. It means that traditional geographical space in the form in was “built” and “packed” by modernity, is not used political, economic and social aim, as it should be. Instead, it is used as metaphorical image allowing us to work out all possible combinations and co-existences of various unique discourses and visions. Their localization seems evident in the context of modernity project. In other words any terrain location (of actor, group, community) as part of (geo)spacialism is cognitively seen with doubt, as far as certain original or even secondary discourse immediately creates a situation of co-spatiality, of being in several spaces as it could be seen according to traditional modernity views (see more: Zamyatin 2003c, 2004a, 2004b, 2006).

Imaginative geographies become necessary for any significant and influential sociocultural and political discourses. They are one of the conditions of existence and support for imaginary imperialism that can be in time transformed into a kind of cognitive tool or way of mental differentiation of various spaces in order

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1 Not to be confused with the concept of spatialism (direction in the art in the 20th century).
to form meta-space. It is the field where co-spatial discourses are positioned relative to one another in order to develop their own views on routes and ways of intended expansions (Zamyatin 2007a). Then, these significant sociocultural scholastic concepts of the late 20th – early 21st century as postmodernity, orientalism, multiculturalism appear to be particular cases of the first stage of (geo)spacialism development. At this stage, imaginative geographies are just side mental product of imaginative imperialism, but not regular (imaginary-deterministic, rationalistic) result of the clash and struggle between/among civilizational discourses. As soon as modernity concept and image together with globalization phenomenon are recognized as local ideological discourse, co-spatial to any other significant discourses, the ones broadening their phenomenological space, the imaginary imperialism will become “pure” operational image. In addition, this image will only support the visible extension of co-spatiality phenomenon “technically” on the level of cognition.

“The unconscious” of original modernity, as it was represented with the development of European capitalism, the Age of Discovery, Renaissance art and culture dealt with absolute theology of terrain space, that, thus, became quite visible, expressible, imaginable (Braudel 1992, 2002; Francastel’ 2005; Damish 2003; Sloterdaik 2007). This re-appearing terrestrial space imagery phenomenologically rested on the classical concept of empire, as some absolute politically and metaphysically natural spatial body. The development of this spatial body automatically levelled and balanced (in the frame of Christian metaphysics) all possible cultural anachronisms (from the European imperial point of view), that could be met by European cultures in their purely geographical extension and expansion (Sloterdaik 2007; Il’in 1997).

No doubt that such original spatial-phenomenological approach has greatly facilitated civilizational expansion of European states overboard their traditional territory, sustaining it with highly metaphysical Christian messianism. This re-discovered imperial vs. imperialistic pathos was gained again and again through cognitive development of colonial and then post-colonial discourse. It was usually veiled with traditional religious policy, different versions of civilizing missions and with Kulturtragers’ activity. All the same, it had another, metageographical side. Imperialism as a powerful image, born and fostered by European civilization in the modernity epoch, appeared to be an imaginary-geographical “landmine” or an imaginary-geographical boomerang for the European modernity itself. It encouraged the establishment and development of quite archaic imperial-political forms in Europe and in its civilizational peripheries even when political-cultural project of nation-state became fully evident as a discourse (Geography and National Identity 1994; Kaspe 2001).

Nonetheless, the very early modernity represented imperialism image as syncretically united with the problematics of spatiality, that first became (in semiotically meaningful forms) one of vividly expressed dominating civilizational
discourses. This is to say European modernity realized itself as “modernity” greatly due to differently expressed/presented and interpreted discourses of spatiality (Panofskiy 2004; Florenskiy 2000; Bakhtin 1975, 1986; Organika... 2000). On the contrary, it was rather local European modernity, that seemed to be good at powerful and thus unique spatial expansion, based on cognitively enrooted and religiously worked out concept and image of empire, and then imperialism. Both the golden age and decay of modernity appeared to go with intensive discursive usage of empire image, whose external cognitively secondary spatial connotation (the natural size of the empire being important but not the main factor) gradually became its nuclear element (Filippov 1992, 2002; Cosgrove and Atkinson 1998; Gilbert 1998).

Needless to say that the Age of Discovery and European colonial empires establishment were at the same time the greatest victory and the biggest figment, a metageographical error, if we speak of imaginary-imperialistic interpretation of these historical events (Cea 1984; Tri karavelly... 1991; Utopia i utopicheskoe myshlenie... 1991).

Basic “schizophrenia” of modernity is in positive operating of European spatiality discourse (Deleuze and Guattari 2007); the spatiality itself being constantly localized in different variants of imaginary imperialism. It is clear that this space – American, African or Asian, as it was seen by European merchants and conquerors in the 16th and 17th centuries, for them all has always been imaginary projected into Christian eternity, has been European, Western in general sense. Cognitive conditions in the late 20th – early 21st centuries have not changed much. The imaginary imperialism has evolved, become more complete in terms of cognition, when it passed through to informational-cultural sphere (Castells 2000; Geographies of global change... 1995). However, all local, non-European (non-Western) marking of any historical/para-historical time, meet powerful external discriminating political-cultural discourses, the ones ignoring any local-spatial autochthonous images that can appear as autonomous discourses (Kasbarian 1996; Hall 1997).

1 In painting it is the origin and development of Cubism, Futurism, Suprematism, Constructivism, art by Picasso, Kandinsky, Chagall, Malevich, Filonov, a group of “Zor-Veda” (M. Matushin and his followers). In music it is first of all Schoenberg. Among movies here comes the work of S. Eisenstein, L. Buñuel, in photography – the creativity of E. Atget, Alexander Rodchenko. For architecture, it is the product of Wright and Melnikov. In literature we should name the works of Proust, Kafka, Joyce, Platonov, etc. It is worth to separately look in the context of sociocultural geo-spatialism into such a phenomenon as the Russian avant-garde and Surrealism (the most important interpretations: Foucault 1980, 2006; see also: Turnbull 1996).
2.4. Geo-spacialism in the context of civilizational analysis

In connection with this issue, in narrow sense geo-spacialism implies the strongest and the most evident civilizational and cultural mediation between the notions of geographic factor and geographical space. Thus, at root it is pointless to pose a question about the role that geographic factor plays in the genesis and dynamics of civilization. We can say that geographical space as it is appears to be a kind of mental product of particular civilization that operates its characteristic geographical images (Zamyatin 2002, 2003a; Said 2006). It does not mean that in such paradigm we cannot speak about the adaptation of local civilizations to concrete natural and climatic conditions and to geographic position. It means that any local civilization in its genesis is not possible without initial spatial beliefs, specific for it, beliefs that are already included in that adaptation “codes”. Speaking of interaction between civilization and geographical space, we should touch upon three main points. The first one concerns a question of methodological “scissors” that deal with contextual and formal differences in presentation and interpretation of geographical images in any civilization. Ambient observer/researcher who can be a contemporary to the civilization or live much later, in the epoch when civilization itself has already disappeared leaving behind only material and mental traits and the remnants of its activity, will appraise civilization in one way. The member of this civilization or material and mental monuments of ancient civilization, the ones we can use to reconstruct its dominative geographic images, will help to see this civilization in another way (Klassicheskii fanshui: Vvedenie v kitaiskuyu geomantiu 2003; Grane 2004; G. Frankfort, G.A. Frankfort, Wilson, and Yakobsen 1984; Campbell 1985; Toporov 1993; Osheroff 2001; Podosinov 1999, 2000).

Such cognitive situation allows us to mention borderline, hybrid images, including interpretations of geographical space in already vanished or barbarous civilization in the way the other civilization member sees them possible to exist. Anyway methodologically geo-spacialism implies that there exist and develop mediative inter-civilizational spaces with flexible mental structure, that allows them at the same time to fix, examine and use geographic beliefs, images and symbols of different cultures and civilizations.

The second question runs on the following: in the frames of geo-spacialism any local civilization is comprehended as spatially expanding not mainly politically (though it also happens quite often1) but more economically, culturally. It means that some patterns and stereotypes of particular civilizational behaviour, specific civilizational paradigms (often basing on sacral beliefs and dominating religion) with time break borders of their initial “habitat” (civilizational core). They acquire different modifications and start to penetrate border-

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1 See the classic examples of such “geomessianism”: Istoriia USA, 2005.
line inter-civilizational zones (often reformatting them) or sometimes they trespass into spheres of traditional cultural influence coming from other local civilizations. This process can be controlled just partially, as far as mental products (results) of independent civilization usually possess a particular spatial synergy. They can be potentially useful in some region, on the territory that is a kind of “hungry” for civilizational and cultural-civilizational characteristics. This way or another, local civilizations more often show the traits of spatial expansion. Sometimes, though, they have periods and epochs of deliberate political isolation as it happened in Japan in Tokugawa period. However, due to different circumstances such isolation is never full (Zamyatin 2006). This expansion mentioned above can be conveyed in proper geographic images that “pack”, represent and advance the original civilization to its new spatial borders.

The third issue touches upon the subject of geo-spacial relativism of local civilizations. In the framework of geo-spacialism space of any civilization can be adequately displayed not only in a traditional cartographic way, but also via geographical images with the help of systematic key civilizational-geographical images (imaginary geographical maps, see Zamyatin 2006) that can also be represented as spatial configurations. This mental multidimensional “cartography” assumes that usual, traditional and stable civilizational borders that often coincide with political borders (Zamyatin 2000, 2001, 2003b) are fractal. Civilization in a geospatial context constitutes mainly a spatial image of geo-space. The latter manifest itself with the help of most representative cultural, economic, political markers that “explain” the ambient observer these obvious, demonstrative specifics of a particular imagination (Anderson 2001; Gruzinsky 1993).

In other words, any local imagination, displaying itself as stable series and systems of spatially constructed and built images, can be considered as independent civilization. Imagination that has absorbed spatiality, making it its ontological basis becomes an absolute civilization. For instance, European civilization, without any doubt can be represented with the help of different mental markers and their physiographic position can refer to state territories of Russia, Argentina and Japan.

2.5. Co-spatiality and politics

Any policy in no time deliberately or not appears to mentally or pragmatically form certain specific identities as well as spatial beliefs. Political actor whether he is a public politician, common elector, oppositionist or even a partisan faces a situation when he should somehow identify himself in space, simply

\[\text{As a rule, it can be vividly reflected in the classic travel notes and descriptions of journeys when the traveler during his trips finds himself in a different cultural and civilizational environment. For example, see: Darwin 1975; de Kyustin 1996; Hollander 2001.}\]
called political-geographical or in a more preferable variant – metageopolitical. The difference here is quite clear: policy is realized in rather specific spaces that just partially deal with classical images of physical, geographical or political space.

Metageopolitical space constitutes a live world (Lebenswelt) projection of a political actor on archetypic mental-geographic spaces of thinking, decision or action that he himself imagines. It becomes difficult to imagine metageopolitical space because it is necessary first to unit and connect together those geographical images that are very different in their origins and most often exist in people’s minds on an unconscious level. Another difficulty is that these images should turn into a kind of discourse, comprehensible to the ambient, outer world. Usually, metageopolitical space can consist of all sorts of geographical images dealing with the actor’s occupation, his everyday activities, reminiscences and lasting memory. These images can coincide one with another and form quite strange points of view in the observer’s head. Naturally, the most representative appear to be the metageopolitical spaces of public politicians or famous sociocultural actors. At the same time, spaces of ordinary, common political actors often remain “offscreen”.

Meantime we have to correlate these or those metageopolitical spaces, especially if they are connected with public/professional political actors. Whereupon, various metageopolitical spaces dealing with the key “players” in the political sphere cooperate one with another. Due to evident differences in imaginary-geographical background of the given “players”, there emerges a new phenomenon of co-spatiality. Political interaction appears to be segmented into a number of mental-spatial elements that create a particular metageopolitical narrative/discourse, the one that is not expected by any of the actors.

In this case we should speak of a political actor’s spatial identity that is represented or shows up in the form of metageopolitical spaces.

2.6. Basic cognitive models of territorial identity

Let us formulate the simplest original cognitive “platform” important for our further research. It is considered, that any territory possesses a certain amount of information and there exists some “information bank” and “knowledge bank” for a given territory. In turn, the concept and phenomenon of identity claims that it always belongs to somebody, deals with something or somebody and includes particular emotions, feelings and images (imagination) and is probably able to rationalize these feelings and emotions. Finally, the elementary phenomenon of territorial identity pops up when the concepts of territory and identity logically cross over and begin to cooperate. We will not mention here phenomenology of territorial identity in a broad sense; we speak in the frame of formal logic.
Thus, here we can suppose that identity concept is active over territory concept that remains passive. That is to say, a territory concept looks like a bedding, a background, whereas identity concept transforms, changes and finds itself in particular territorial context. This view is probably a basic one and in the future this elementary cognitive model can be made more complicated or even recast. Anyway, territorial identity according to this cognitive model is a result of some purposeful relations. Follow up is also possible: perception of the territory changes as far as territorial identity can transform and become a synthetic and dynamic concept in the process.

Let us now pass to a bit more complicated cognitive model of territorial identity. Supposedly territory concept includes not only a certain amount of information and knowledge (let it be “physical” territory model), but also engulfs some views about the concept that have little or nothing to do with any kind of information or knowledge. In other words aside from the “physical” territory there now exists also a “metaphysical” territory. Exactly in this layer local myths and geographic images-archetypes are stored and cultural landscape view is formed. It is worth mentioning that “metaphysical” territory often or more often is imagined by separate people and communities, that are either alien to the territory (a case of an immigrant or a diaspora) or physically do not stay on the territory (a case of emigration). One way or another we can state here that people’s mobility as well as human communities’ mobility help to establish metaphysical territories. When people stay far from their native land, it can give birth to the local myth about this land. When people arrive at a new territory and settle down to live there, it can add to the development of new geographical images and myths, necessary for their successful existence there. Territory concept remains cognitively static in this complicated model. Metaphorically speaking the territory is seen in “passive voice”.

Geographical image is a system of interconnected and cooperating signs, symbols, archetypes and stereotypes that clearly and vividly characterize some territory (a place, landscape, region, country). Geographical image is a central phenomenon of imaginary geography. Usually particular geographical images can in turn form imaginary-geographical systems or metasystems.

Geographical (territorial) image is a cultural phenomenon characterizing stadial (general aspect) and unique (specific aspect) society condition. This phenomenon is an important criterion of civilizational analyses of any society. Qualitative characteristics of geographical images in culture, ways of representation
and interpretation of geographical images, structures of artistic and political thinking in the categories of geographic images are essential for geographic, culturological, historical, and politological analyses of society development.

Local myths, being one of the stable types of spatial beliefs during at least all known written histories (Freidenberg 1998; Eliade 1987, 2000; Levi-Strauss 1985; Campbell 2002; Hyubner 1996; Bart 2000; Meletinskii 1976; Ven 2003; Neklyudov 2000; Assmann 2004; Torshilov 1999; Terebikhin 1993, 2000; Abashev 2000a, 2000b; Mitin 2004), in modernity epoch undergo such essential system-structural change that appears to be not only quite traditional mental narratives describing and characterizing particular places and territories, but also become vitally, existentially important components that help to see not the past and the present, but the future as well. At the same time this future “gets fixed” with appropriate legendary events and stories that are steadily projected in the space of still unrealized, but possible and desirable. If we take local myths as a system of specific stable narratives, spread out on particular territory and characteristic of corresponding local and regional communities and quite regularly reproduced by them both for inner sociocultural demands and for well-aimed representations addressed to the outer world, then, in this case the very core of cognitive changes taking place in local myths in modernity epoch in their original and most vulgar form can be seen as visual mental transformations of spatial ontology of local myths, their assumed chthonic basis (McLean 1999; Crouch 2001; Zamyatin 2008). In other words local myths space begins to quickly expand in tempts impossible before. It happens so not because basic archetypical storylines are reproduced in different civilizations and cultures on territories far one from another and in clearly different natural and cultural landscapes (Levi-Strauss 1985; Campbell 2002), but because they semantically and imaginably fill out into the spheres of mental and material life of regional societies that were unreachable before.

2.7. Generic cognitive model of spatial images and territorial identities

So, the phenomenon and concept of territorial identity “works” in the frames of humanistic geography together with the phenomenon of geographic image, local myth and cultural landscape; it is its humanistic geographical context. Let us put these concepts in hierarchical order on different levels of spatial views. Territorial identity shall be placed upon geographical images and local myths, it absorbs and uses them. At the same time it appears to be a reflexive basis for revelation and fixation of particular cultural landscapes, typical for the given territory. Besides, as a relative mental product territorial identity finds itself influenced by certain cognitive-geographic contexts. They concern the examined territory and “genius and place” subject that personalizes and thus simplifies the “technologies” of territorial identity imagining. “Cognitive-geographic context”
and “genius and place” concepts represent a sort of vertical mental “lifts” that add to effective cooperation among all the “stores” of conceptual “building” of humanistic geography.

If we mentally structure main notions that describe spatial images reproduced and supported by human communities on different hierarchical levels, of different civilizational background and location, then we can stand out on a relative vertical looking up axis (where unconscious is down and conscious is up) four strata-layers forming a triangle (or a pyramid for 3D system) and placed on a horizontal basis. The lowest and the longest horizontal strata drowning in the unconscious represent geographical images. Above it, a bit higher there comes a “local-mythological” stratum, a shorter one. Above it again, closer to the level of ideal consciousness there is a stratum of territorial (regional) identity. And, finally, at the top there stands a “curfew” of this spatial images triangle – cultural landscapes that due to their dominating visuality are the closest to conscious representations and interpretations of different local communities and their members (see: Toporov 1995; Lyusyi 2003; Geopanorama… 2004).

It is clear that other schemes are possible that put given concepts in different proportions. However, it is important to emphasize that all existing original local and regional myths mainly lay on geographical imagination itself. The process of local myth development and arrangement is represented by “half-conscious” or “half-unconscious” cognitive “extract” of selected geographical images that are a part of “unconscious platform” for the given territory or place. Most probably trying to interpret this scheme, we will see the ontological problem of geographical images and local myths cooperation goes as follows. Relative imaginary-geographical mass (“dough”) does not imply any logical sequences as far as spatiality here exists as the essential element of spaces and it is not necessary to correlate these spaces’ images. That is why it seems problematic to try and form some geographical “chains” in their implicit (and possibly unbelievable) consequence and then basing on them try and tell definitive local story, probably mythological in its context. Otherwise speaking when geographical images pass through to local myths and mythologies, we can await a kind of mental shift, meaning that any local myth is created as a gap between geographical images put in one row, as cognitive “filing” of imaginary-geographic lacuna, this filling constituting appropriate legendary, fairy tale and folklore narrative.

If we go on with the mental scheme of spatial images given above and concentrate on positioning it in the local myths frames, it is worth mentioning that obviously local myths and even local mythologies can be a foundation for corresponding regional identities. It is clear that in the case when turning to more conscious and “representative” space images, we are facing certain mental shift. From our point of view it can be displayed with “unexpected” (depending on the local myths content itself) imaginary-logical and often quite simplified interpretations of these stories; interpretations that are determined by modern re-
gional political, sociocultural and economic contexts and conditions. In other words territorial identities formed by particular well-aimed events and manifestations\(^1\) on the one hand, kind of straighten up local myths cognitively and we use them “to serve” certain local and regional communities. On the other hand, the very existence, reproduction and development of regional identities seem to be possible only under the following conditions. It is obviously necessary to expose, reconstruct or deconstruct the old well-known regionally and mentally fixed myths (Elistratov 1997; Kon’kova 2006). Moreover, we need to start and work out new local myths. A part of them can possibly take hold of regional consciousness. The other part will poorly correlate with local geographic archetypical images and real demands, such as necessity to support regional identity, and will, therefore practically disappear.

2.8. Common methodological approaches in regional identity studies

Now let us try to formulate some common methodological approaches in regional identity studies, important for further comprehension of the appropriate humanistic-geographic discourses specifics. These approaches are not strictly disciplining, though they, without doubt, are of particular cognitive background.

Here we can set aside three approaches: pluralistic, phenomenological and ontological ones. The first is based on “plurality” concept (A). The second deals with particular identity and sees it “here-and-now” (B). Finally, the last one focuses on the researches studying whether it is possible/impossible for identity to emerge; whether it exists or not (C).

A. Pluralistic approach

The pluralistic approach uses the belief that there exist a number of territories, where these or those individuals, groups or communities can identify themselves on the territories as their part. First, regional identity subjects can see the same territories in different ways and these regional views can have their own dynamics. Second, the identity subjects themselves can change, develop, transform or even disappear and it leads to some changes in the general “world view” of regional identities. Whatever, the plurality of territorial identities contributes into new and new antagonisms and contradictions between individuals and communities and crossover regional identities. This approach seems obvious to be of mainly sociological origin; it allows building quite complete initial descrip-

\(^1\) For instance: a memorial or monument construction, city festival, restoration of old or building of new cathedral; an interview with regional political or cultural actor in local mass media and so on.
tions of territorial identities bound to traditional, post-traditional and modern societies. It also groups up the basic issues of national identities and nationalism that are in many ways connected with particular territories and certain goals to physically and metaphysically delimitate these territories (the subject of “blood and land” in its traditional and post-traditional discourses) (Geography and National Identity 1994; Smith 2004).

At any rate even in the early 21st century the space serves as a natural imaginary foundation for any kind of identity projects, especially linguistic identity that in late modernity epoch is closely connected with ideologically-nationalistic projects referring to “blood and land” construct. Modernity ideological heritage being mainly a “child” of European culture and civilization undergoes obvious sociocultural metamorphosis on those territories and spaces where civilizational foundations do not or hardly ontologically correlate with the key “demands” of modernization process (See, for example: Appadurai 1996, 2000; Sokolovsky 2001).

Such metamorphosis can be quite effectively represented specifically on geocultural or geocivilizational basis, when a particular space / territory / region / country is characterized with specific imaginary markers that expand ideologically rather “narrow” culture-typological matrixes (Zamyatin 2003a; Shnirel’mann 2003, etc.). This methodological approach allows speaking of Asian modernity, Russian modernity, post-Soviet modernity and so on not taking any risk to be “engulfed” in Eurocentric or West-centric ideological discourses.

Verbal and written language usage greatly depends on the structure of everyday communication and those images that emerge on dominating cultural landscapes. Both formation of language identity background and these identities structures depend on the speech we most often hear in the streets, crowds, cafes, from shop sellers, on TV and at business meeting, on those texts we read on shop windows and signs, in press, on information stands in state institutions and at Internet websites. It is quite characteristic that in turn language identities can determine the context and structures of everyday cultural landscapes, thus influencing the formation of the territory’s or country’s dominating geographical images.

Practically, the agony of modernity epoch led to the strongest differentiation among cultural and ideological discourses that have not or have just barely touched one upon another. Globalization space in the way it exists in developed western countries often constitutes a relatively autonomous mixture of various local identities, cultural landscapes and geographical images, whose communion can be registered just partially, fragmentary, “at the moment” (see Malahkov 2000; Mapping Multiculturalism 1996).
B. Phenomenological approach

The phenomenological approach in the first place works out mental schemes used to instrumentally describe relations between and individual, a person and a particular place or territory. Mind that the main question here is in the shift from physical to metaphysical view of the territory that can be practically seen as a sort of “second body” for the territorial identity subject. It is worth mentioning also that a clear border between the subject and the object of regional identity is much blurred in the case. At the same time, it seems that certain separate individual or personal regional identities cannot come in contradiction one with another even if contextually they cross the ways. They come to exist in different phenomenological fields or “regions”. In terms of this approach there pops up an important problem of territorial/geographical imagination that is pushed out by quite rational mental schemes of definite territorial interpretations.

Territory or place does not exist without a myth or a mixture, system of myths that support and “explain” it. In other words, geographic imagination in its phenomenological-narrative context in the end provides us with real geography and topography of the region (Cf.: Terebikhin 1993, 2004). In this respect we can content ourselves with quite a simple local-mythological formula where place plus (mythological) event equals co-existence of place. It is possible here to add relative cognitive adjustments to mythologism or legendary state of the event itself, that is not verified with exact historic facts (or vice versa is well verified), though these adjustments do not actually determine the local myths effectiveness.

Effective functioning of phenomenological model is subject to the concept stating that objective reality responsible for the reality phenomenon cannot be described with the help of any images or archetypes that would be used by individuals or the whole society in general (Cf.: Pelipenko 2002).

Geographical imagination in modernity epoch has practically “disposed of” univariate spatial views encircled in the borders of one particular culture of civilization. Alongside this numerous mental constructions and mental phantoms of modernity and postmodernity “are packed” into specific western covers – thus Euro-Atlantic or Euro-American civilizational society (community) controls the main phenomenological process dictating limitrophe civilizational communities their metacivilizational rules of such mental covers creation and functioning. Nevertheless, ontologies of new but still typical mental constructions remain to be a kind of place for existential freedom and original existential strategies.
C. Ontological approach

The ontological approach works on the ontological aspects of territorial identity. Eminently, here “genius and place” subject is concentrated. Genius is a creative individual who transforms the place and adopts it to himself. Place is seen as a powerful ontological necessity that verges on not-being. Therefore, in the context of the ontological approach territory stops being a “passive” concept. It gains ontological status meaning that this certain territory cannot be visualized out of a particular and ontologically interpreted discourse. “Metaphysical” territory coalesces with “physical” and as a result, there rises a question of territorializing and deterritorializing. “Physical” territory steps back and though it cannot be called just a geographic image or a “clear” geographic image, it still mentally melts into the composite unique territory discourse seen as possibility-and-necessity. It leads to the state where dualism of “physical”/“metaphysical” territories cognitively disappears.

2.9. Territorial identities and spatiality concept

In either way, territorial identities in their cognitive basis are founded on spatiality concept. Generally, cultural-geographical discourses of late 20th century deal with the binary opposition “place-space” where a concept of place is associated with conditions under which the territory is fully defined, fixed, conquered and explored, clearly scaled. At the same time, the concept of space is aimed at opposite conditions when territory is undefined, does not have exact territorial borders, is just a bit settled or unsettled at all. Whereupon these rather obvious methodological views, taking root in language without any doubt possess a sort of cognitive flexibility. This, region concept on the one hand originated from the concept of place and has some territorial frames or borders. On the other hand, it still does not have well set forms and features. Side by side with this, methodological views greatly depend on the usage of any given sociological “keys”, specific cognitive “prisms” that through interpersonal and inter-group relations help to create phenomenon usually defined as territorial image or even better geographical image. Consequently this or that accurately outlined, limited territorial entity (for example: a house, yard, settlement, district, and so on) at the same time outwardly marks certain regional identity and has its own original geographical image ontologically caused by a natural spatiality of the place we are interested in. Virtually, interpreting spatiality phenomenon this way, we can define the territory as a space possessing some amount of geographic images as well as some number of people and communities that show their attitude to it either explicitly or latently, consciously or unconsciously, even if they themselves do not permanently or just temporally live on the given territory.
Modern methodological and theoretical interpretations of regional identities rest on consistent renderings of space and spatiality phenomena. First of all, we can speak of two key ideological approaches that make a direct influence on these interpretations. These approaches are represented by Marxism and post-modernity which are united with post-structuralism in a number of versions.

In the frame of modern Marxism space is seen as one of the most important elements of capitalistic production. Properly speaking on the one hand the space can and should be reproduced, on the other hand it represents the most essential institution providing stability of the whole capitalist system in general (Lefebvre 1991). Powerful technological innovations associated with computer revolution, conceptual development of virtuality and virtual space concepts, cyberspace, webspace have altered Marxist approaches, but have not transformed them greatly yet. Struggle (including class struggle) for space, for the ways it is envisioned and imagined goes on in web and virtual spaces context as well. Dual anonymity of web agents in the Internet gives rise to impersonal spaces that at the same time have clear well-represented images. It is particularly vivid when it comes to modern urbanized spaces that form or create a feeling of deserted, wasteful land, a feeling of anonymity, standards, faceless frequency (Soja 2007). In such conditions regional identities seem to be a kind of “antic”, worth struggling for, worth producing and redistributing, cause it helps to build territorial identities economy.

Typically post-Marxist view of space subject given in sociological theory by P. Bourdieu has to use spatial categories as its “capital” or resource. Bourdieu’s methodological fight against Marx heritage results only in aggravation of the symbolic aspects of space imagining that remains equivalent to a sort of metaphysical body, the one possible to be in either way violated (Burd’e 2007). However, in Bourdieu’s concept we see that he comes back to neo-Platonic interpretations of spatiality where corporality combined with dynamic emotional perturbations is quite successfully transformed into habitus phenomenon. Therefore, territorial identities now can be also seen as people and communities’ mental schemes used in the case when these or those symbolic or/and cultural spaces are “conquered and settled down”.

Postmodernistic spatiality and territorial identity discourse does not seem homogeneous. It rather constitutes a mixture of methodological and theoretical practices and devices aimed to crush the modernity view of space and at the same time to create an ideological basis for sociocultural process of globalization and regionalization in the modern world. In this respect, we can mark a steady post modernistic interest to shifting, dynamic, frontier or transfrontier spaces where clear borders and limited symbolic interpretations just do not exist (Culture, Globalization... 1997; Bauman 2008). Tourism, travelling, rising mobility and terri-

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1 Quotations by translator.
torial flexibility, “fluidity”, the fact that both spaces and regional identities are relative – all these themes and concepts lead to ideological bias of postmodernistic spatiality versions and to unchangeable relativity of methodological constructs, dealing with a well-known concept of glocalization, for example. In fact, territorial identity in postmodernistic description is defined by Levi-Strauss as a “bricollage” of geographic images, local myths and cultural landscapes, all of them building up a sort of mental mosaic at a moment of time. So we cannot speak of steady, truthful and fully correct territorial identity here.

2.10. Imagining territorial identity

By all appearances, contextually hierarchization of social contacts together with detailed scaling of territory allow us to speak in parallel keys (sociological and geographical) of territorial identities forming. On the one hand, we can fix the size and scope of social contacts on different levels – in international communication, inside or among professional or social groups, adjusting to random communication. On the other hand we can bind these levels to particular territorial entities – a house, yard, street, settlement, town, locality, district and so on. Thus, we will gain an original communicative matrix where we can separate certain social-territorial nucleases and in this way do well-aimed researches on territorial identity. This view appears to be quite positivistic unless we add to this simplified model a concept of territory image or geographical image. We suppose that in this case it (the model) becomes considerably deductive as far as it is logic to assume that in the course of social communication on different regional levels there appear definite territorial images that furtherly undergo a process of specific undular interferention. In the case, if we add to the model a concept of geographical image, it will obtain both physical and metaphysical character so long as the model supposedly becomes mainly explicit and what is even more important, it includes the researcher himself, who shares here his own view of the problem (consequently the model also becomes inductive). In other words, in any case we should deal with cognitively inhomogeneous model where the process of mixing social and territorial components is dependent on imaginary-geographic accelerator that is necessary to introduce.

2.11. Spatiality and co-spatiality role in the creation of territorial identities on different hierarchical levels

Territorial identities of different hierarchical levels are usually formed basing on a powerful ontological understratum, implying that there exist specific spatialities characterizing the most important spatial images-archetypes that accompany more major territorial communities (as in: n + 1, 2, 3 and so on). In the case of small regional communities (villages, several rural settlements, a town
with its surroundings) spatiality displays itself with the help of stereotype cultural landscapes and through a particular place personification (using its famous and outstanding people). At the same time, we can find examples of local myths and geographic images that stand on a higher hierarchical level and allow us to speak of archetypal spatial images that come to be general for the larder regions on country level (for instance Bavaria in Germany and the Urals in Russia). Thus, any separate spatiality becomes a meta-algorithm of territorial identities creation in the context of wider frames.

Co-spatiality subject comes out at a certain moment of time (in widely historic meaning) when it becomes relatively clear that there exist heterogeneous, different in genesis and functioning regional identities bordered by some regional communities, social groups or just separate individuals. In our opinion, this problem turns to be actual on the stage of late modernity – first it is implicit, and then becomes quite visible and sharp. The main content of sociocultural processes concerning co-spatiality (co-spatialities) creation we can characterize in the following way. Territorial communities together with territorial identities begin to steadily transform into more flexible socio-mental structures. For these structures territorial markers of all kinds as well as spatial images-archetypes can be very uncoordinated or even contradictory to each other, speaking in the frame of traditional formal logic. At the same time, these features can be “fleeting”, not obvious, blurred and flickering. Still they are displayed quite roughly in frontier/liminal psychological, sociocultural and political situations. Thus, for instance by birth a person can be a Picardian but at his middle age live in the Ukraine and see himself as a cosmopolite and it does not abolish his exact socio-psychological reactions in this or that situation. It is also important to mention that co-spatiality as an ontological category can be considered (in phenomenological aspect) a spatial co-existence of spatial views, particular blocks forming semiotic-symbolic “concentrations”, of meanings of different places and territories. These “concentrations” are united by original ontological and existential “manifestation”. In other words, co-spatiality is created in result of semiotic mixture of territorial identities that traditionally are never combined together. Their spatialities are coordinated one with another and thus create individual, “private” here-and-now metaspace.

2.12. Politics of place / Place of politics

In the context of spatiality/co-spatiality problem we can speak of politics of place and dealing with it place of politics issues. Place here is understood as generic ontological category that semiotically units such concepts as territory, region, country, area and so on, and also “dictates” discursively contextual strategies and scenarios used to imagine and percept these or other locuses, basing on already given ontologically “inner” intensions. Thus, place can serve as original
ontological “point” helping to work out certain political narratives. According to this approach place turns to be a political “usage” that allows to create both strategies of political analyses and wider existentially aimed sociocultural strategies.

Politics of place is a well-aimed cognitive discourse that broadcasts from inside a certain place out some images, myths, values and stereotypes, describing the place. Politics of place represents a most necessary element of modern politics, especially of identity politics. Expanding this concept we can state that American, Chinese, French international policy can be interpreted as place policy, meaning that it is of local-civilizational discursive background. In other words, place policy can be also defined as a well-aimed local-civilizational discourse.

Taking into consideration what we have just said above, we shall try to find politics place as a specific sociocultural activity intrinsic for local civilizations on certain stages of their development. In a spatial respect, politics constitute a rational cognitive activity aimed at extensive reproduction of images, symbols, and signs of the place. It means that “real” politics star when separate individuals and/or communities are so evidently connected to the place, become so clearly settled there, that start to feel necessity to imaginary and symbolically seize the place and furtherly expand it. This characteristic does not conflict with other politics definitions, describing the concepts of power, violence and domination. All these three elements as ontological concepts deal with spatiality. Space is a direct field used to realize relations of power, arena for violence and a subject of domination. Politics here appears to be a mental process of spatial concentration, differentiation and segregation of power, first of all in its imaginary aspect that results in all other aspects.

Place of politics turns to be quite blurred, vaguely defined when territorial identities formation process actively goes on. Newly forming hierarchies of regional identities show us breakdown and contamination of traditional place policy as far as now growing number of regional political actors create far-reaching discursive-communicative channels that distribute, divide and dilute power at place. The place is seized by numerous people and at the same time place imagining boosts up and extends, becomes a good condition to establish co-spatialities. Here we can also speak of discursive-communicative allocation of physically different places by one and the same territorial community or same social groups. Therefore, growing ontological processes that blur, mist traditional politics places in late modernity epoch results in co-spatiality creation. These co-spatialities mark numerous mental borders of separate communities/people in terms of particular places and their imaginative strategies. In such conditions “the host” of political discourse can be a political actor who on the one hand does not have any place (formally he shall pretend he does, but actually the discourse will show a lacuna in place here), and on the other hand he can considerably influence crea-
tion of numerous separate policies of place and places themselves. It seems these processes are the key ones when we think over postmodern politics.¹

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¹ The chapter is translated from Russian into English by Darya Panarina.


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3

Territorial Identity in Sociology and Human Geography

ZBIGNIEW RYKIEL

3.1. Culture vs. social space

In the broadest sense, culture is all what people do, think, and possess as members of a community (Bierstedt 1963). In the narrow sense, culture is a sphere of inter-communication, in which socially accepted meanings that have value (Filipiak 1996) or, rather, values (Rykiel 2010a) are important. Importantly, however, the two approaches are not only consistent but also contain basically the same information. It results from both of them that culture is a set of learned phenomena, i.e. their elements are transmitted by socialization (Filipiak 1996).

It was frequently pointed to that culture is an integral or complex whole (Malinowski 2000; Golka 2007), i.e. a system with its own structure and logic, the elements of culture compose therefore a whole that cannot be reduced to a set of products of culture (Filipiak 1996).

In science, the notion of culture is contrasted to that of nature. It may thus be argued that the ability to adjust an aspect or part of the world to human expectations, and thus also the very existence of the expectations or norms, determines the element of culture (Bauman 1996).

Culture is a certain – cultural – code, which is a system of references (Bauman, 1996) to the containment, values, and ideas, also including other “symbolically meaningful systems” fulfilling the formative function of human behaviour (Kłoskowska 1981: 24). The cultural formation of individuals lies in the inculcation of knowledge about the cultural code, i.e. the ability of reading signs, as well as their selection and presentation (Bauman 1996: 156). The opposition between signs rather than a single isolated sign is therefore the carrier of meanings. Meanings are thus included in the system of signs, i.e. the whole cultural code, rather than the link between the sign and its designate (Bauman 1996). In this context, signs are arbitrary in relation to individual excerpts of the world.
A conclusion follows from this observation that the aspiration to monopolize the right to create social order by values and norms is specific for cultures. There is a risk that the existence of an alien culture may disclose the arbitrariness of the basis of the superimposed internal order. This is why proselytism, i.e. a sense of civilizing mission (Rykiel 2010a), is appropriate of culture (Bauman 1996).

As far, however, as the norms superimposed by culture seem to be the only ones that exist, culture may be treated as nature, i.e. the natural state of things, to which humans have no impact. This applies to closed social systems, i.e. not only primitive peoples, as Bauman (1996) suggests, but also to isolated totalitarian systems (Rykiel 2010a).

The greatest wealth of cultural content is associated with territorial collectivities (Sztompka 2005). In sociology it is traditionally assumed that “external cultural distinctiveness and internal cultural community” are elements of the identity of these collectivities (Sztompka 2005: 234). Such an approach suggests, however, that society is a static structure. If, on the contrary, one assumed more realistically that society is a system, the identity of social collectivities would have to be based on the notion of closure of cultural relations with their milieu (Rykiel 2008, 2009, 2010a). In this approach it should thus be stated that the social group, including territorial community, is a relatively self-contained cultural system.

Three main approaches to social space were proposed in sociological literature, viz. ecological, culturalist, and metaphorical. In the first of them, space is identified with the area occupied and used by a given collectivity; in the second one space is understood either as a material entity or as a metaphor; in the third approach social space is a pattern of social positions and distances between them (Goldyka 1976). It is worth noting, however, that in fact the first approach provides a trivialization of the notion of space by reducing it to that of geodetic space (Rykiel 2008). The second approach misidentifies the substantial with relational understanding of space rather than provides a metaphor. The third approach is close to the notion of the space of characteristics, i.e. a set, being therefore a mathematical rather than metaphorical approach (Rykiel 2008).

It is from the relational understanding of social space that a multiplicity of the spaces results, besides non-isomorphic to each other and n-dimensional (Rykiel 2008). The territory, i.e. a two-dimensional space, is one type of space. As was indicated further on, however, the consideration of the territory in relational rather than substantial terms seems more promising cognitively for sociology, if not social sciences in general.
3.2. Social vs. territorial identity

The term *identity* is frequently used interchangeably with *consciousness* (Lewandowska 2003b). It may, however, be argued that *identity* is an established, and thus relatively stable, form of *consciousness*.

Building of social identity is related with the social network of interrelationships, i.e. solidarity and group ties providing a sense of security (Trąbka 2010). The overall social identity consists of various social identities of individuals and this fact may cause internal conflicts which arise from a multiplicity of individual characteristics.

Upon individual or individual’s identity, social identity is superimposed as collective consciousness (Lewandowska 2003a). Social consciousness is understood as “an interrelated and integrated whole of the containment of the spiritual life, views, values, ideas, attitudes, and beliefs characteristic of the given collectivity, social group or society as a whole; it also includes certain established, institutionalised manifestations of activity and social creations, science, art, law, ethics, etc.” (Olechnicki and Załęcki 1998: 215). It is a result of the roles played by individuals or social positions occupied by them in the given collectivity. The social identity is a multiplied individual identity (Lewandowska 2003b) formed on the basis of the common axio-normative system. It contains elements of ideal culture, including habits, customs, language, and a territory (Bokszański 1989). All these elements may be values or norms. Social identity is therefore a supra-individual set of auto-definitions irreducible to an individual’s auto-definition. It is based on the experienced and internalised tradition, present, and common for the group defining of the future, it is thus close to the notions of collective consciousness, representations, and images (Banaszczuk 1989).

Social identity usually includes more than one characteristic and this fact makes a multiplicity of social identities of an individual possible, the multiplicity being a potential source of internal conflict (Giddens 2005). Even then, however, social identity is a system rather than a sum of individuals’ identities, creating a group identity as a new quality in relation to those identities (Lewandowska 2003b). Social identity applies to the characteristics attributed to the individual by others rather than to the self-image (Giddens 2005). The individual, on the contrary, realizes the identity or, rather, feels it. It can thus be argued that identity is a pattern of auto-definitions, which is stable and confirmed by the individual’s social milieu (Bokszański 2006).

Two main types of social identity may be distinguished, viz. emotional and functional (Szczepański 2006). The former, otherwise referred to as experienced, applies to everyday activities, work, and experience, and is associated with the immediate environment. The latter, on the contrary, is related to the wider public interest. The emotional type is now in decline because of high mobility of individuals.
Among many forms of social identity, cultural identity may be distinguished (Lewandowska, 2003a). It is to be characterized by relatively stable identification of the social group and its individual members (Lewandowska 2003b) with the given cultural pattern, i.e. ideas, beliefs, opinions, customs, morals, values, and laws. The conceptual identification of social identity and cultural identity may, however, be argued. This result from the identification of the socialization and acculturation processes. It is because socialization outside a concrete culture is as hard to imagine as an acculturation outside society (Rykiel 2000a).

It can be stated that the identification of an individual with a group and the territory are two basic elements of identity (Zandecki 2003). Cultural identity may, however, apply to collectivities and groups on different spatial scales – from a local community to global society in the philological meaning of the latter term. In this context, territorial identity is a part of cultural identity. The identity in question is thus one in which relationally understood territory is an important reference point and the very relationality is a part of the cultural system. What it requires is a limited spatial mobility of the collectivity as a whole despite the spatial mobility of individual members of this collectivity may be considerable. Different forms and types of attachment to one’s own territory can be observed in all settled cultures (Malmberg 1980). Interestingly, the traditional pre-modern nomads are not lacking of a territorial identity since they roam a defined territory they recognize as their own (Tuan 1987; Ramos 2011). On the contrary, who are lacking a territorial identity are the postmodern nomads, referred to as tourists (Bauman 2000) or super-mobile eternal wanderers (Rykiel 2006a).

### 3.3. Region and regional identity

According to Ossowski (1947: 73–74), region in the sociological sense is a correlate of the regional collectivity, which is usually a component of a national collectivity. As a synonym of the regional collectivity, the region is one type of territorial communities. Its relation to the sense of separateness and the tie based on the emotional relationship with the inhabited territory is the nature of the community (Kwilecki 1992). The cultural specificity of the region is that a specific structure of the characteristics exists, which can be found separately elsewhere. The cultural identity of the region is composed of not only objective facts but also the attachment to them, marked in the consciousness of the inhabitants. The cultural identity is thus the basis of the existence of the given region and the related regional community (Sakson 2006).

The cultural identity of the region is an important type of the collective identity of its inhabitants. It depends on historically conditioned means of the support by the given regional collectivity of its existence and biopsychological balance as a separate part of national society. According to Kwaśniewski (1993), the identity is composed of (1) the elements, even outdated, of the regional con-
tribution in the national cultural heritage; (2) the nature and proportions of old and new components of the given regional culture; (3) the external context of the contacts with the identities of other regions and nations.

It is important to distinguish the regional collectivity and regional community. In the case of the former, the source of the tie is a similar relation to the earth (Sakson 2006), i.e. territory or space, as a common value. It is an emotional tie combined with certain convictions concerning the territory. The regional community is, on the contrary, a specific type of a regional collectivity with the advanced processes of cultural and social integration (Gumula 1990).

3.4. Ethnicity vs. territoriality

Ethnic identity should not be misidentified with territorial identity (Lewandowska 2003b), they may not be opposed to one another, either. Territory, understood in substantial terms, i.e. as a part of physical space, need not be an element of ethnic identity, which is said to be characteristic of ideological rather than ecological community (Kłoskowska 2005). Yet understood in relational terms – as a part of social space (i.e. space of values rather than space as a value), territory is certainly an element of ethnic identity, because within the relational approach territory is a correlate of social relations.

In this context, the opposition of ethnic and regional identity (Lewandowska 2003b) is thus a misconception simply because the bases of the identification of either of the two are different (Rykiel 2010a). The regional identity refers to the notion of a region in the sociological sense (Rykiel 2008, 2009), it is therefore of an explicit spatial scale and implicitly subordinated to the more general national identity. The ethnic identity, in turn, can be of different spatial scale – from local to global, the diasporal communities being good examples, it is thus neither less nor more general than the national identity but simply different – non-national.

Integral identities, understood as the feeling of the individuals’ tie with only one social group, are extremely rare. They are a part of the spectrum from univalence, through bivalence and polyvalence, to ambivalence (Kłoskowska 2005), in which the first of the terms means the very unequivocal integral identity, the second one – a split identity, third – one divided between ties with many social groups, and the fourth – an equivocal and uncertain identity. This spectrum concerns, however, merely social identity applicable to the same level of territorial organization. In the context of non-territorial identities, univalence or even bivalence does not happen in the complex social world of the modernity and, especially, postmodernity. In the context of the social identity concerning different levels of territorial organization, univalence applies basically to pre-modern societies. Typical for the contemporary world is a territorial identity applying to different levels of the spatial organization at the same time (Smolicz 1990): local, regional, national, continental, and global, while the strength of the
ties on the individual hierarchical levels is an empirical question. Hybrid identities are thus often found (Bagnoli 2007), where hybridization is understood as an assimilation of only selected common elements to a culture (Wnuk-Lipiński 2004).

3.5. Intensity of territorial consciousness

Four degrees of territorial consciousness can be identified (Shamai and Kellerman, 1985), which, generalized, can be presented as: (1) attachment to the territory, (2) a sense of belonging to the territory, (3) an ability to identify the territory, and (4) territorial indifferentism.

In the context of hybrid identities one can talk about the intensity of territorial identity (Szyfer 1996) on the given level of the territorial organization. The (1) active, (2) passive, (3) indifferent, and (4) negative relation to the inhabited territory can thus be identified (Szyfer 1996; Rykiel 1999).

The active relation is characterized by the awareness of one’s territorial origin, the aware deepening of knowledge about it, engagement in activities for the territory, and the related positive emotions. The passive relation is characterized by the reception of knowledge about one’s territory, originating from different – both formal and informal – sources, yet with the absence of both a search for this knowledge and its deepening, and a reflection on the territorial culture and its cultivation while positive emotions are expressed schematically. The indifferent relation (Rykiel 1999) is characterized by a lack of an emotional relation to one’s territory, its culture, and heritage. The negative relation, in turn, is characterized by a denial of the need to identify with the territory of one’s residence, or even show interest in it (Lewandowska 2003a), which is related either with the identification with another territory on the same hierarchical level, one of the higher level or a non-territoriality of social ties and identity (Rykiel 2010a).

Since the positive territorial identity is neither obvious nor given once forever, one can talk about the process of its formation and development. Four stages can be identified in this process, i.e. of (1) negative, (2) positive, (3) explicit, and (4) weak identities (Rykiel 1985a, 1985b). They refer to the relations between the objectively existent cultural differences between the given territory and its surroundings, on the one hand, and the subjectively perceived and inter-subjectively validated differences in social consciousness, on the other.

The first stage of negative territorial identity is characteristic of the situation when the objective cultural differences are not explicitly perceived. At this stage, territorial identity is usually manifested by the opposition of one’s own socio-territorial group to its milieu. The territorial identity is then built upon the separation of aliens, the self-identification is thus defined by the indication who you are not, and if any positive indicators appear at all, they are rather general, e.g. the local.
The second stage of positive territorial identity is characteristic of the situation when the objective cultural differences are perceived in this very way. At this stage, the sense of cultural separateness is supplemented by the acceptance of a specific name of one’s own territory or socio-territorial group.

The third stage of explicit territorial identity is characteristic of the situation when the cultural differences are perceived as explicit, if not troublemaking, despite the fact that objectively they are to a great extent obliterated. At this stage, the objective differences of the given socio-territorial group are decreasing while the subjectively perceived and inter-subjectively validated differences persist. This pattern is especially manifested in the attachment to the name of one’s own territory or socio-territorial group.

Finally, the fourth stage of weak territorial identity is characteristic of the situation when the objectively overcome cultural differences are perceived in this very way (Rykiel 1989a, 1989b). At this stage, the developing integration process is responsible for the blurring of the sharp differences identified by the prevailing territorial names, i.e. the blurring of the unequivocalness of these names. The basic difference between the first and fourth stages is that at the first stage the explicit territorial identity applies to the smaller spatial scale than that in question while at the fourth stage it applies to the larger scale. When regional identity is concerned, local identity thus dominates at the first stage and national or supranational identity at the fourth stage.

3.6. Dimensions of territorial identity

Three basic dimensions of cultural, and thus also territorial, identity can additionally be revealed, viz. inherited, shaped, and felt (Nikitorowicz 2000). The first one is assigned by being born in a given social group, the second is acquired in the socialization and acculturation processes while the third one is consciously chosen as an element of self-identity.

The notion of territorial collectivity should be distinguished from that of territorial community (Sakson 1998; Lewandowska 2003a). In the case of the former, a relationally understood territory as a common value and correlate of social relations is the basis of social ties. What is considered here is the emotional tie correlated with beliefs applying to the territory as a part of social space. The territorial community, on the contrary, is such a territorial collectivity which is characterized by an advancement of the cultural and social integration processes. The territorial community is thus an ideological group while the territorial collectivity is an ecological group.

In this context, territorial collectivities may be classified according to the degree of their rooting. The latest term may be understood as the identification of an individual with a place or a relationally understood territory, i.e. in fact with its characteristic culture as a foundation for building one’s own identity and col-
lective memory. Members of territorial collectivities may thus be divided in (1) indigenous, (2) native, (3) rooted, and (4) visitors (Rykiel and Żerebecka 2007).

The *indigenous residents* live on the given territory for generations; they are bound with it sentimentally, the sentiment is, however, internalised enough not to require continual externalisation. Their cultural identity is assigned genetically.

The *native residents* are born, or at least grown up, on the given territory; they are bound with it emotionally, and the emotions require manifestations, sometimes violent. Their cultural identity is acquired in the socialization and acculturation processes.

The *rooted residents* were neither born nor grown up on the territory they live now, they yet have been living there long enough to adapt and integrate with the local territorial community, which they accept and are accepted by. Their cultural identity is thus a result of informed choice.

All the three groups compose the territorial community. The *visitors*, on the contrary, differ from the former groups not so by the duration of stay on the given territory but rather by the emotional relation to it. Their cultural identity is a result of informed choice; it was their choice to remain *alien* there: non-adapted, not accepting the territorial community with its social space, and being unaccepted themselves by. They are a part of the territorial collectivity but not community. Their new place is provisional psychologically even if most of their lives are being lived there. The visitors do not wish to stay there, reside, adapt to or integrate with, nor wish they to be buried there. For various reasons, they are spiritual outlaws (Łapiński 2004).

### 3.7. The transcultural vs. the transborder

In the attributive approach, culture is considered as an attribute of the mankind as a whole. In the distributive approach, culture is a set of different cultures (Filipiak 1996). Their typology can be based on different characteristics, including territoriality.

The multiplicity of the existing cultures, their overlapping, and interactions are responsible for the development of not only multicultural but also transcultural patterns. The latter, related with the existence of the, already mentioned, hybrid identities (Wnuk-Lipiński 2004; Bagnoli 2007), is too hastily identified by sociologists with transborder patterns (Zielińska 2003). The latest term cannot, however, be abstracted from the notion of *border*, which is related to the transcultural pattern of territorial groups, yet merely some of them. This is because the notion is related to territorial collectivities as ecological collectivities but not to territorial communities as ideological collectivities. Moreover in the considerations of the “transborder”, limits or barriers rather than borders are the point. As a rule, however, the transcultural is under consideration. It is thus hard
not to notice that a considerable part of sociologists’ considerations of the “transborder” applies not to borders but rather to limits or, even not necessarily spatial, barriers while considerations of the “transborder” apply in fact to the trans-cultural.

3.8. The symbolism and mythologization of territoriality

The symbol is an indicator of a certain state of affairs based on a convention accepted within the given collectivity (Sztompka 2005). The symbol is therefore a distinction as a product of culture or a pattern of behaviour for which a conscious reaction of identification or repulsion arises on the basis of mental associations, i.e. either an identification and acceptance as one’s own or a rejection as alien (Damrosz 1988). The common convention allows to assign common meanings to symbols, i.e. such an association of symbols with objects that allow interpersonal communication (Sztompka 2005), especially social communication, related to the cultural adequacy which is important in the process of the formation of the identity of an individual (Lenik 2002) and especially a community (Rykiel 2010a). What are important or even essential symbols for territorial communities are totems, flags, coats of arms, crowns, crosses, the “royal” animals (especially lions and eagles in the European culture) but also space (Jałowiecki 1988), and especially the territory to which symbolic for the given culture, if not mythic, meanings are attributed.

Mythology is an important part of social, including territorial, identity (Gellner 1991) since the territorial community is an imagined collectivity (Anderson 1997; Rykiel 2006b). In cultures of a considerable part of Europe, if not Eurasia, generally east of the Rhine axis – from Brandenburg up to the Sea of Okhotsk – own identities, including territorial, are often built upon the vision, if not myth, of the suffering, besieged by wild neighbour defenders of Western culture. The “western”, i.e. mostly west European, characteristics of one’s own cultural identity are highlighted and opposed to the stigmatising “eastern” characteristics, being denied from one’s own cultural heritage (Zarycki 2005). The orientalization of frontiers in a considerable part of Europe results from this phenomenon (Rykiel 2006b). This is a result of the fact that, from a long historical perspective, the civilization vacuum has always been located in the east and it was there that this part of Europe found the source of her cultural superiority.

The identification of the meaningful aliens is important for territorial identity and, especially, for mythology. In the occidentalist context, the meaningful aliens from East and West are under consideration. While both of them can be oppressors, only the aliens from the east are barbarians as well, i.e. those oppressing primitively (Zarycki 2005). In this context, therefore, a tendency appears not only to manifest one’s own membership in the West but also to conceal or minimise one’s relations to the culture of the East (Zarycki 2005).
This phenomenon is related to the Freudian dialectic of the sadistic efforts to overcome, subordinate, acquaint, and dominate – on the one hand – and masochistic self-pity the one’s own effort, sufferings and losses – on the other (Kwaśniewski 1997). As was indicated in the literature, victimization is an element of any national and regional culture (Zarycki 2005), and even any territorial identity (Rykiel 2010a). The peripheriality of the respective territorial communities, i.e. their dependence on external centres, stimulates the exposing of suffering in the place of other elements of the identity of those communities. This phenomenon can be considered in terms of the substitution of slight economic capital by social and cultural capital (Zarycki 2005). If the cohesion of such communities cannot be based on the – weak – economic or institutional potential, it is reinforced by victimization. The historical suffering is then an important symbolic resource or capital (Zarycki 2005), necessary to defend one’s own norms and values. Under the pressure from external threats, mutual trust, intra-group solidarity, and thus also integration increases that breaks intra-group social barriers (Zarycki 2005).

The victimist strategy also includes the increase of the self-esteem of group members by proving their moral superiority to the environment. To defend their identity, the group members are ready to suffer and this fact means their symbolic investment, i.e. social capital, which the mutual trust of the group members contributes to. The real, if not ostentatious, torments are the important evidence of the actual existence of the traditional community (*Gemeinschaft*), in which the very social capital dominates.

The victimist strategy also contributes to the accumulation of cultural capital. The sacrificed history of the suffering of the group contributes to its high culture (Zarycki 2005) and becomes an element of art, historiography, and mythology. The very ethos of suffering may also be the base of high culture of the given group.

In Poland, this trend can be seen in the context of the national, regional, and local communities. On the national level, the concept of messianism, which dominated the nineteenth-century romantic literary art, if not politics, is the most glaring example of this; on the regional level, the myth of the Upper “Silesian injustice” can by pointed to; on the local level, the concept of the Zielona Góra post-colonialism (Maksymczak 2007) is one example of this phenomenon. The perpetrators of all the – de facto or imagined – torments are not simply *aliens* but rather eastern aliens. For the messianistic concept, the anti-prayer to God identified with Tsar in the Great Improvisation by Adam Mickiewicz is indicative. In the myth of the “Silesian injustice”, it is not the German oppression that resulted in the three uprisings of 1919–1921 but rather the massive immigration of the “highlanders” from the east that was the case. In the syndrome of the Zielona Góra frustrations it was Warsaw or, more precisely, those in Warsaw, as the sym-
bol of the exploratory centre that is perceived as an “alien civilization” (Chmielnił 2005), which ignores and does not foster.

It is worth noting that victimist-occidentalist myths are generally a symptom of social frustration of marginalized territorial groups: national, regional, and local. In the context, the myth of the “Silesian injustice” its analogy to the syndrome of the “German injustice” after the two world wars can be found. After the first of them, the syndrome included the myth of the stab in the back (Dolchstoslegende), the Versailles dictate (Versaillesdiktat), and the iconography of the bleeding eastern border, as well as the myth of the expulsion (Heimatvertrieb) after the Second world war.

Against this social background, occidentalist mythologies of territorial communities develop. Myths are the means of giving meaning to life (Uliasz 1997) while mythology is related to the culture of the past (Rykiel 2006a), i.e. the mythologization of the “good old times”. In the Polish case, it was the myth of the returning to Europe or finding own place in (Western) Europe, which Poland was always to be one part of. In the Upper Silesian case, it was the myth of hard manual work in the era of the second Toffler wave when the basic form of capital was economic rather than intellectual capital – as it is in the third wave (Drucker 1999; Toffler 2006; Castells 2007). In the Zielona Góra case, it is the escape to the myth of the Prussian order (Ordnung) and the Prussian tradition of the town (Chmielnił 2005), if not its Brandenburgian tradition (Fularz 2005), even though the latter has few, if anything at all, in common with the social reality.

In this context, the question of the recognition of the specificity of the weaker partner’s suffering appears in the sphere of victimization, i.e. the uniting rather than dividing suffering (Zarycki 2005).

3.9. Territoriality vs. non-territorial communities

According to Sack (1986: 19), human territoriality is “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area”, whatever the “geographic area” may mean. Relations between territorial and non-territorial ties may be considered in the context of the classical division in communities (Gemeinschaften) and associations (Gesellschaften). The history of human societies can be described in terms of the diminishing role of the former for the latter.

In modern societies, which are the subject of sociology, the traditional village was the classical example of a basic territorial community, in which local territorial ties dominated. The strength of these ties resulted basically from a lack of a serious competition from external social relations. The extra-local ties were limited and non-territorial local ties identified with territorial, for which they created no competition. A limitation of the freedom of choice, and thus a com-
pulsion of contacts with neighbours, if not excess of those contacts on which one
was forced (Rykiel 2010a), was one result of this situation.

In the small town, a possibility of external social relations also appears, re-
sulting from the supra-local urban functions. In the large city, social ties have
even stronger competition, i.e. the citywide territorial ties, supra-local territorial
(regional, nationwide, and international), as well as non-territorial ties within
associations.

The urban, or, more precisely, metropolitan, way of life, of which the mul-
tiplicity of social ties on different spatial scales is characteristic, is an important
element of modernity (Wirth 1938). In the large city as a nursery of modernity,
a prevalence of non-territorial or at least supralocal territorial over local ties can
be observed. In modernist, especially large anonymous, housing estates a patho-
logical trend can be observed of a disintegration of any social ties. A question
arises whether or not is it a presage of postmodernity, in which such tendencies
come to dominate (Rykiel 2010a).

3.10. Conclusions

It can be argued that cultural identity is the constitutive element of terri-
torial communities (Wieruszewska 1989). The identity is based on values and
norms fixed in tradition. A precondition of the existence of the community as a
separate whole is the realisation of the common characteristics of the group by
individuals (Lenik 2002). Social identity results from the division of the others in
own ones and aliens. This division is a part of the process of socialization-
acculturation. The territory performs two functions in this process. The first of
them, resulting from the substantial approach of territory, is the function of the
arena of social processes, while the other, resulting from the relational approach
to territory, performs the function of the correlate of the axio-normative system
of the territorial community. The durability of the territorial community results
therefore from sharing by members of the group the norms, values, and ways of
perception of social space. The territorial symbolism and mythology of the terri-
tory is a part of this axio-normative system. Because the system is a part of cul-
ture, territorial identity is a question of the degree of the participation in this cul-
ture (Rykiel 2008a).

Importantly, territorial identity is not only developed but also shaped.
This duality provides socio-technical possibilities to not only manipulations
(Rykiel 1999, 2008b) but also indoctrination (Rykiel 2005). This applies not only
to the territorial identity in the city but also the nation creation processes (Ioffe
2008).

Postmodernity, which considerably increased social mobility, both vertical
and horizontal, i.e. spatial, created the impression of a de-territorialization of
social contacts. The phenomenon of non-territoriality or non-spatiality of these
contacts and ties had, in fact, always existed, postmodernity extended, however, the scale and intensity of this phenomenon. It can be argued this is a part of a more extensive process that consists in the growing spatial scale of interactions over history. In Postmodernity therefore the de-territorialization is the question of the spatial scale of observation, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, it applies to the highest level of the social stratification under globalization, i.e. the metropolitan class (Jalowiecki 2000) or creative class (Florida 2010).

Social identity is a classical subject of social sciences. Territorial identity became a subject of sociological interest relatively late. The sociologists’ opinion that this stratum of social identity is obvious, if not trivial, seems the reason of this fact. The elements of territorial identity were therefore implied rather than explicated in sociology, the Chicago school of social ecology being a good illustration of this fact. Social anthropology had been interested in territorial identity earlier while territorial, especially regional, consciousness was interesting for social geography (Rykiel 1985a, 1985b, 1989a, 1989b). Each of the three disciplines considered, however, territorial identity or consciousness from another point of view. The place of territorial identity in the social system was important for cultural anthropology. Sociology concentrated its interest on the role of territorial identity in the relation to other types of communal identities. Social geography was interested in the spatial extent of territorial consciousness but also, interesting for sociology, its hierarchical levels.

In this context, a question arises about the relation of sociology to the achievements of other sciences, including human geography, for which territoriality is a key conceptual category. Generally, the achievements are poorly known to sociologists, if not deliberately ignored, and this fact results from a deeply rooted belief that few inspirations, categories, concepts, and theories useful for sociology can be found in the achievements of geography, even though this belief has been slowly changing recently. A number of conceptual questions can be, however, identified common for sociological and human geographic theories, yet overlooked by sociologists (Rykiel 2010b). The contemporary social geography, stemming originally from urban geography, merges inevitably with urban and regional sociology by contributing its important and noteworthy theoretical and methodological input.

References


4

The Role of Place Names for Space-related Identity

PETER JORDAN

4.1. Introduction

Place names or geographical names have a symbolic meaning like flags, coats of arms and logos, and often they are in the focus of political conflict, although they are usually only indicators of underlying conflict reasons. Thus, the conflict between Japan and Korea, mainly the Republic of Korea (South Korea), on the name of the sea between the Asian mainland and Japan is based on the emancipation need of a young state against the former colonial and hegemonic power in eastern Asia and the refusal of the latter to give in to it. And the Greek resistance against the name Republic of Macedonia for a Yugoslavian successor state can be explained by Greece's claim to be the exclusive heir of ancient Greek traditions.

The administrative responsibilities for place names are usually carefully regulated, right due to this symbolic power. Thus, owners are usually entitled to name their house or property. In Austria (as in many other countries) communes have the right of defining the names of settlements with the exception of minority names, which is a matter of federal legislation. It is also precisely regulated, who has the power to define the names of water bodies, mountains and other relief forms. Place names are a range of national sovereignty. A foreign country has not the right to intervene – even not as regards place names of co-national minority groups. In many countries, place-name laws are implemented and place-name boards established, which dispose sometimes not just over consultative functions, but have also the power to decide.

The world's supreme body in matters of place names is the United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names (UNEGN), one of (only) six active permanent expert groups of the United Nations, which is organized by the practices of the United Nations and cares for the standardization of geographical
names on the international level. That the United Nations maintain this Group since 1960, shows the importance they assign to place names and their importance for international conflict management. UNGEGN is divided into thematic working groups and into geographically or linguistically defined divisions. By them and by UNGEGN plenary meetings recommendations to UN member countries are elaborated, which are passed by the five-yearly United Nations Conferences for the Standardization of Geographical names (NCSGN).

The existence of all these bodies indicates the political and social significance of geographical names. It also shows how important it is for political authorities to exercise control on geographical names. This is because geographical names support group identity and enforce the relationship between sociocultural communities and territory.

This contribution will explore the question of why geographical names have this symbolic power and identity-strengthening effect. It will first analyse the process of naming and then investigate into the roles of geographical names in the relationship between man and territory. Related to this is the attempt of a theoretical justification of the distinction between endonym and exonym.

Several authors have already emphasized the important contribution of place names to the relation between man and territory or space, to space-related personal and group identity building as well as the sociolinguistic aspects of place names – among them Poirier (1965), Dauzat (1971), Coromines (1975), Dorion (1984), Querol (1995) and most recently Tort-Donada (2010). Coromines illustrates the role of place names, more specifically of endonyms, in relating man to territory very well, when he says:

These names refer to the land of which we are the owners, and to the mountain that fills our horizon, and the river from which we draw the water to irrigate our fields and the village or town in which we have been born and which we love above all others, and the county, country and states, in which we live out our communal lives (1965: 7).

This chapter is based on these works, but departs also from the theoretical framework set by Sauer (1925, 1941) and Tuan (1974, 1977) as regards the principal (not confined to place names) relations between man (and his culture) and space from a cultural-geographical point of view, adapts this framework and tries to determine the role of place names in it. So it attempts to arrive at a convergence of toponymic and sociolinguistic views on the one hand and cultural-geographical views on the other. Very inspiring in this respect has been the work of the linguist Helleland (2009) on place names as means of landscape identity.

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1 See the website http://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/ungegn/
4.2. The process of naming

In order to understand why geographical names relate people and territory, it is first important to consider which factors are involved in the naming process. There are three of them: (1) the local population, (2) their culture and language, (3) geographical space, divided into geographical features (see Figure 4.1.).

Figure 4.1. Factors of the naming process

Source: Elaborated by the author.

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1 Naming process: both in the sense of attributing a name to a feature for the first time as well as of a repeated use of names.

2 Culture is understood here in the most comprehensive sense “both as lifestyle – including ideas, attitudes, practices, institutions, power structures – and as a series of cultural techniques: artistic expressions, texts, documentations, architecture, commodities, a.s.o.” (Nelson, Treichler, and Grossberg, 1992: 5).

3 Geographical space is a term interpreted in various ways. It is understood here in the sense of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz as the totality of all relations between physical-material features and bodies.
The only actor in this process is the local human community. It resides in a certain section of the geographical space and has developed a specific culture with a language. On the background of its culture and worldview, it structures complex geographical reality into features. To these features it attributes geographical names by the means of its language.

Names of geographical features on the community’s own territory are endonyms (“names from within”). Endonyms in this sociological sense are symbols of appropriation. Who owns a feature has the right to designate it. Who is eligible to name it, usually also has power over the feature, or is at least responsible for it.

The community may vary by size and type – from the global community (“cosmopolitans”) via the language community and nation down to a commune and family. Naming is effectuated by convention within the community or by an authority that represents the community and is legitimized by the community to attribute names. Of course, also a single person can assign a name to a feature. But this name only endures if it is accepted and used by the community. Therefore, it is always ultimately the community that is the real actor in the naming process.

The different cultural background of communities, their respective specific interest situation, which is often due to different economic orientations, can lead to different classifications of geographical space into features and thus – even with communities of the same language – to different naming practices. Communities practicing predominantly arable farming, e.g., have found other characteristics of geographical space remarkable and noteworthy than maritime cultures, industrialized societies or our modern service-oriented economies, which could lead to different divisions of space and naming practices.

Even for the same communities – or rather, for communities in socio-cultural-historical continuity – the perspective on geographical space and in consequence their need to structure it into features and to name them, can change over time. Thus, the perception of mountains by the communities living in the Alps has changed significantly from the 16th century to the present. Were they then perceived as threatening and repellent and hardly noticed since they were economically unproductive, with the development of Alpine tourism in the 19th century perception intensified and appreciation grew (see Stremlow 1998). While earlier at the best mountain ranges had received names, now every single peak got its name. Geographical space was thus much more intensively structured into features and accordingly vested with names.

It is also important to note that reference to space, to territory, is essential for each type and size of communities. Human communities strive to exercise

1 In the simple sense of local population.
2 A very instructive comparison of various naming motives applied by different communities in the Bohemian Lands is presented by Sperling (2008).
control over a part of the geographical space, to have this part for themselves, to call it their property. Reference to geographical space, to its own territory, is important for the identity of the community, since a community’s identity is not only defined by its specific cultural characteristics, such as language or religion, but also by its territory – and this in contrast to other identities. Group consciousness cannot exist without distinction from others. Group consciousness includes, but excludes at the same time.

As much as linguistic characteristics – such as an individual language or just the variant of it – make the members of a group recognizable, include them into the group and exclude speakers of another language or language variant, also a territory contributes to identity formation. Members of a certain group can make use of this territory and usually feel responsible for it whereas non-members have at least not the same right on it.

Small groups such as families or partnerships inhabit their own flat or home, which they identify by door signs. Has it a garden, will it very likely be delimited by a fence. Larger communities at higher spatial aggregation levels like the populations of historical provinces and landscapes, linguistic and ethnic minorities, nations and language communities do the same – just in a somewhat different kind, e.g. by signposts, name plates at provincial or country boundaries. Territoriality is typical for human beings, and is also a characteristic for identity groups or communities.

Proper names in general, but especially geographical names, therefore, always and inevitably have a political dimension. Under normal circumstances, a community would never claim the right for itself to assign endonyms, i.e. primary names, to features outside of its territory. It does so only, if it is aggressive and expansive – as it was the case with Nazi Germany, when it renamed the Polish city of Łódź into Litzmannstadt.

For geographical features outside its territory, a community usually takes existing names, translates them into its own language or adapts it to it phonetically or morphologically. These are exonyms (“names from the outside”) needed by a community to make names of geographical features more important for it easily pronounceable and communicable.

Unlike endonyms they are not expressions of possession or territorial claims. They point rather to the special importance of these features for this community and to the community’s transborder relations. Exonyms help to integrate an external feature into the community’s own cultural sphere and to avoid exclusion and alienation. Nevertheless, it is also true that exonyms are sometimes understood as an expression of ownership claims. This is especially true if they correspond to historical endonyms, i.e. names that were once used by a local community – such as current German exonyms for many formerly German-populated areas of East Central Europe. But to associate exonyms with property
claims is actually a misinterpretation that should be avoided – also by the politically sensitive use of exonyms.

Figure 4.2. Multiple space-related identities

Source: Elaborated by the author.

However, there is also no completely homogeneous community. Every community and culture is composed of one dominant and (several) non-dominant currents. This is true even for the smallest group, the partnership. Also here, there is usually a dominant and a subdominant part. Thus, geographical names can also be imposed by the dominant part of a community without the agreement of all community members. Names changes in the time of communism, maybe also some renamings after the fall of it, probably correspond to this category.

We are also often not only part of one community and identity group, but have multiple affiliations/identities (Figure 4.2.). These different communities usually have different spatial reference, feel responsibility for different sections of spatial reality.

We are global citizens, if we are for example committed to issues of climate change or global developmental disparities. Global institutions and organi-
zations like the United Nations support this community. We form the community of a continent, when we feel particularly responsible for it. We are citizens of a multinational political entity such as the European Union, members of a language community like the English, members of a nation and citizens of a state. It is quite possible to have a strong emotional relation to a state (for example, when singing the national anthem, at sporting events) and at the same time not to know parts of that state, or to disagree with the behaviour and attitudes of some fellow citizens. We are also inhabitants of a region, a town, a commune or village and may well feel to be members also of these communities. All these communities are more or less organized and feel responsible for a certain section of geographical space. But there can be communities that relate to the same section of space and differ only by cultural characteristics (language, religion, etc.) – such as in minority situations, where a particular territory is inhabited not only by one, but by several communities.

All these communities are also active in naming. But they can award endonyms (“names from within”) only to geographical features on their own level of competence, as the responsibility for the allocation of endonyms follows the principle of subsidiarity. It is always the smaller community, the community closer to the geographical feature and the one that is actually responsible for this feature, which has the right to award the primary name, the endonym.

Thus, the name for the Earth is certainly an endonym in all languages. But names of individual features on Earth are not anymore endonyms in all languages – even if we all feel to be global citizens. Because there is always and everywhere a smaller community that is closer to the feature, has developed a closer emotional tie with it and feels responsible in a more specific way than we do. We as the more distant must not deprive this community of its right on the primary name, the endonym.

Transmitted to the level of a country like Bulgaria, this means that certainly the names for the country in the languages of all cultural communities resident in Bulgaria for generations can be considered as endonyms (e.g., besides the Bulgarian also the Turkish name for Bulgaria), but not the corresponding names for Bulgaria’s capital, because at least the Turkish community is not autochthonous in Sofia.

The subsidiary principle applies also within a particular language, for it is not uncommon that a place is called differently by inhabitants and non-residents of the same language. A case in point can be found in Romanian Transylvania (Ardeal), where the local Germans (Saxons) call the river Mureş Mieresch, while German speakers outside of Transylvania call it Marosch – derived from the Hungarian name Maros. It is then always the name of the local population the endonym and the name from the outside the exonym, even if it belongs to the same language.
However, it is yet so that this inside/outside distinction within a language relates much more frequently to pronunciation than to spelling. So it is more frequently an endophon/exophon difference than a distinction between endonym and exonym.

No doubt we have the right to name our own house as we wish, to assign the primary name, the endonym, to it. This is of public importance, e.g., with names of individual farmsteads in an area of scattered settlements or with names of restaurants and accommodation facilities. If the neighbour, speaking the same language, calls our house differently, his name is an exonym.

Based on these considerations, an endonym can be defined as a name for a geographical feature used by the population autochthonous in the feature’s location. An exonym would then be a name for a geographical feature not used by the population autochthonous in the feature’s location and differing from the endonym in the same script.

This understanding of the endonym/exonym divide corresponds exactly to the divide between “space“ and “place” in the sense of Tuan (1977), i.e. the distinction between a (still) neutral territory (“space”) and a territory, to which an individual, a group or community has established a relation (“place”). “Naming turns space into place” (Watt 2009: 21) hits the point, although admittingly not only names contribute to this transformation.

4.3. Roles of geographical names  
as mediators between man and space

Geographical names play in the relationship between man and space, community and territory, essentially four roles which are listed below.

1. Names emphasize spatial characteristics important for a community. Names often describe natural characteristics of a geographical feature such as location, relief, hydrography, vegetation, climate or soil. Pomorie (“At the sea”), Bijelo Polje (“White Basin”), Cernavodă (“Black water”), Studenica (“The cold one”) are cases in point.

Sometimes also historical or still active functions performed by a feature are taken up, such as bridge functions (Innsbruck, “bridge over the river Inn”), port functions (Bremerhaven, “port of Bremen”), pass functions (Cluj, “at the narrows”), border and customs functions (Hranice, “border”), fortress, administrative or central place functions (Salzburg, “salt fortress”; Škofija Loka, “bishop’s field”) or economic functions (Srpsko rudogorje, “Serbian ore mountains”).

Names emphasize what appeared meaningful to the name donors – on their cultural background and in view of their interests. The importance of these characteristics may have changed by now, and some of the characteristics highlighted by naming may seem trivial to us today. It can be assumed, however, that no name donor has emphasized in his opinion minor or negligible details and
that the characteristics reflected by the name were always significant from a contemporary perspective.

However, it may happen that the meaning of a name is no longer recognizable ("transparent") for us today, since geographical names are relatively persisting elements of the language. Many of them correspond to earlier stages of a current language or even to other languages that were spoken in the same place earlier in history.

So we use today, especially for important natural features such as large rivers, names often derived from Celtic, partly even from pre-Indo-European languages, whose significance is no longer transparent for us, but "opaque" – like the name Danube and its various endonyms. In the Balkans, Romanesque and Slavonic names have frequently been assimilated by populations speaking other languages.

2. Geographical names mark the territory of a community. This role of geographical names, which is similar to that of flags, coats of arms or logos has already been discussed in detail in the chapter on the naming process and does not need to be explained once more.

3. Geographical names structure the territory of a community. Each geographical feature in the sense of a subunit of geographical space is a mental construction. Even in our view very distinctive and clearly limitable features like a mountain or an island do not turn out by themselves as subunits of geographical space, but achieve this quality only against the background of a certain disposition and cultural perspective.

The actively structuring role of man and the constructed nature of space-related concepts are especially obvious with landscapes, cultural regions and so-called macro-regions – with geographical features or space-related concepts, for which is little concrete evidence such as administrative boundaries, "natural" boundaries in the form of mountain ranges or rivers. Where Europe ends in the East, where the boundaries of Central Europe are, how far Dalmatia (Dalmacija) or Slavonia (Slavonija) extend, is obviously only the result of a convention. Such spatial terms are also often interpreted differently by different people. Their spatial scope can also vary over time (diachronic).

This can be demonstrated very well by the example of the Austrian Salzkammergut, which was the property of the Imperial Court Chamber in Vienna and could by definition only cover previously Austrian territories, i.e. parts of Austria above the Enns (Upper Austria [Oberösterreich]) and Styria (Steiermark). Today, however, frequently also parts of Salzburg are attached to it – for example the area around Lake Fuschl (Fuschlsee) – although Salzburg was independent up to the early 19th century and became for the first time in 1805 and finally in 1816 a part of the Austrian Empire. So it could never host a property of the Imperial Court Chamber.

The spatial concept Salzkammergut has thus been developed for a once
clearly delineated area that later lost its administrative function and limits, whereby the spatial scope of the term became flexible. But the term has been preserved with all its contents (“lakes, mountains, rainy, imperial residence”) or even been compressed (“tourism, White Horse Inn [Weißes Rössl], classic second home area”). This space-related concept is also deeply rooted in the consciousness of the inhabitants and the outside world. It is also a tourism brand and repeated in the names of hotels, restaurants, food, ships, newspapers, etc. that take advantage of its prestige. No one would argue that there is no such landscape. But it exists actually only by its name.

Geographical names are thus not only carriers of space-related concepts and enable communication about spatial structures. They also contribute to the mental structuring of space. With their help subunits of space cannot only be described, but also be formed, modified and preserved.

4. Geographical names support emotional ties between human beings and geographical space and thus promote the formation of space-related identity. This role relates only to a limited group of people, namely to people who are familiar with the place; so firstly, to inhabitants of the place; secondly to people, who were grown-up and socialized there, but have left the place later without losing their relation to it; and, thirdly, to foreigners, who acquired familiarity with the place only later in their life (e.g., frequent visitors or amenity migrants). If they hear, mention or memorize the name of the place, a whole world of imagination opens up for them, which is filled with personal memories of places, people and events.

The emotionally binding effect of geographical names is particularly evident with immigrants, who often take the name of their place of origin to their new home – as a last tie to their former home or to make the new place more familiar. New York and its former name New Amsterdam as well as New Orleans are prominent examples, but there are many more of them.

Geographical names support in this way space-related identities, both of individuals and of communities. This is important, because spatial reference is – as should have become clear from section 4.2. – in addition to cultural characteristics such as language or religion an essential part of a community’s cultural identity.

A section of geographical space, having been transformed by the elements of the culture of a certain community (religion, language, house forms, modes of settlement, land use, etc.) into a singular cultural landscape, affects in turn the community that inhabits it. It works as an almost daily reminder of the community’s own culture (Tuan 1977: 183). It is inherited – but probably also renewed repeatedly, thus changing – from generation to generation. In this way it conveys values of this culture as much as stories of grandparents are able to do. It appeals all senses through the combination of visual impressions (including churches, cemeteries, typical architecture, forms of land use, place names, inscriptions), smells (such as the typical smell of a bakery) and sounds (like the ringing of church bells at certain times of the day).
If somebody has left his/her domestic cultural landscape for some time and returns to it later, he/she feels spontaneously a sense of familiarity and security. Even similar landscapes, vegetation types or smells elsewhere can give rise to a feeling of being home, can let a sentimental reminder of once’s domestic cultural landscape arise. Just a few people are not affected by such feelings.

Tuan expresses this relationship between humans and their domestic cultural landscape, this feel of place or being at home very aptly in this way: „[Place] is made up of experiences, mostly fleeting and undramatic, repeated day after day and over the span of years. It is a unique blend of sights, sounds, and smells, a unique harmony of natural and artificial rhythms: such as times of sunset, of work and play. The feel of a place is registered in one’s muscles and bones.” (Tuan 1977: 183).

Geographical names are certainly also an element of space-related identity building by being visible in the cultural landscape, representing it symbolically like a logo and facilitating communication about it. This aspect has special significance for non-dominant sociocultural groups, i.e. ethnic and linguistic minorities. A separate chapter will therefore be devoted to this topic.

4.4. The specific significance of publicly visible geographical names for non-dominant communities

In areas that are inhabited by more than one sociocultural community, several communities compete for the public, official designation of a geographical feature. Mostly it is a community dominant in the wider geographical space and a community non-dominant in the wider geographical space, but locally both by number in the majority and dominant in the social and political sense.

With their strive for public recognition of their names both communities want this place to be designated as theirs, wish to relate their identities to it and express that they feel responsible and accountable for this place.

Without conflict between the communities this is only possible if each of the communities accepts the claim of the other and feels comfortable with a shared or common identity of the place. A conflict – as it has happened and happens in many cases – indicates that such mutual acceptance is not (sufficiently) given and that the dominant community is not ready to give in or to share. The dispute over the name (the public signpost) is – as said earlier – only an expression of deeper conflict reasons.

For the non-dominant community it is usually more important than for the dominant to see its relationship to the place recognized by an official name – right because it is the minority and non-dominant, and because it is not always obvious for the outside world that it is to be found there. A minority also requires a higher level of self-assurance. Minority group members face almost every day a challenge to their identity.
Figure 4.3. Bilingual and bисcriptual signpost of Rona de Sus in the Romanian county [județ] Maramureș

Source: Peter Jordan (2008).

When non-dominant communities strive for public recognition of their place names, they strive – abstractly formulated – for the symbolic function of marking their territory, for the opportunity of demonstrating their presence, but also for support of their emotional attachment to the place. If a member of a non-dominant community reads the place name in his/her own language on a signpost or on a map, a sense of familiarity develops.

Since only communities established in a place for generations have developed own place names for the features in their surroundings, they regard the public presentation of their geographical names also as an acknowledgment of their presence for generations, as recognition of the fact that their group has helped to shape culture and cultural landscape. Public rendering of minority place names means for the members of this community in the first line that they can regard this place as theirs, that it is the place of their group. Information to the outside world is just a secondary function.

The geographical name in the minority language – usually, but not necessarily, this is in spite of what has been said earlier a name in another language – should therefore be written in the orthography of the minority language, with all
the diacritics and special characters. An alienated notation adapted to the pronunciation habits of the majority language does not satisfy this purpose.

If linguistic minorities are used to write their names in a script different from the majority, it is for the same reason also appropriate to use this other script and not to convert it. This is, e.g., so practiced since the places-names law of 2001 in Romania, where names of Ukrainian and Russian minorities\(^1\) are reflected on signposts in their respective Cyrillic alphabet (Figure 4.3.) (for details see Jordan 2006). Would they be converted to Roman script, speakers of these languages would regard them as alienated and hardly as their names.

4.5. Conclusions

1. Geographical names are strong symbols and identity builders, because they document and mark the relation between human community and territory.

2. Endonyms in the sense of names for a geographical feature used by the population autochthonous in the feature’s location are indicators of possession and have for this reason inevitably a political, sociological and juridical function. They form a potential source of political conflict.

3. Geographical names support space-related identity of communities by
   (a) highlighting characteristics important for a community, (b) marking the territory of a community, (c) contributing to the mental structuring of space and (d) enforcing emotional ties between a community and a subunit of geographical space, by turning “space” into “place”.

4. The endonym/exonym divide reflects the divide between “ours” and “theirs” – a divide essential in all fields of human activity, throughout all human cultures and historical periods. Related to space, it corresponds to the distinction between “space” and “place”.

5. The essential criterion for the distinction between endonym and exonym is the relation between (local) population and the geographical feature named. While the distinction between endonym and exonym is in many cases duplicated by a difference in language, it can also occur within the same language.

References


\(^1\) The Bulgarian minority in the Romanian Banat applies – exceptionally for Bulgarian speakers – the Roman script.


<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/ungegn/>[Accessedon: 15.08.2013]
Territorial Consciousness as an Identity Component of National and Ethnic Communities

VALENTIN MIHAYLOV

5.1. Introduction

In the last 2-3 decades, the constructivist theories of the nation (Gellner 1983; Billig 1995; Hobsbawm 1996; Anderson 1996; A.D. Smith 1998; Hroch 2003) have gained considerable weight and influence on the social sciences. These theories reject the primordialist understanding of the nation, which is filled with a number of methodological limitations trying to explain the complex genesis and structure of ethnic groups and nations. At the same time, we are witnessing lack of criticism in considering nations as “constructed”, “imagined”, “created” or “invented”, without paying attention on the methodological one-sidedness of constructivist interpretations. It is beyond a doubt that one should not ignore the role of political methods, which enforced and catalyzed the process of forming one national ideology and history or another, as in the case of former Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in order to establish the most complete scientific picture of the genesis of the modern nations we need to avoid underestimation of the important objective circumstances. Modern East European nations have their roots in characteristics such as their ethnic history, language or stereotype of behaviour. Their original cultural achievements are embedded in the landscape and in thousands of artifacts. The creative impulse which was submitted to the scientific debate by the postmodernist interpretations of a nation stimulates us to rethink and question the rigidity of the nationalist doctrines, thus helping us see through the explanations of one aspect of the evolution of the nation in time and space or another, and to watch out for moments of hyperbolization. The latter also applies to the range of the “fair” historical territory, but such an approach, in which the subject overestimates its own achievements and beliefs
in its supremacy over the others, is typical for the human psyche in general, not only for nationalist thinking.

In general, national and ethnic identity represents the belonging – declared not just by national self-identification, but also encoded in a set of objective signs, such as language, cultural and political traditions, mentality and other ethnic identifiers. Ethnic and national identities are considered by sociologists as a variety of the social identity of people. However, many ethnologists, e.g. from Eastern Europe (see, for instance, Gumiliev 2001), regard the ethnic groups as a part of the ethnosphere – an autonomous, self-regulating system, subordinate to its own laws. Such a system cannot be matched to the laws that regulate the functioning of the social and political structures.

In spite of the fact that there has been no consensus among the scientists so far, a lot has already been written about the nature of nationalism. In this domain, one of the main contradictions is related to the issue of the presence or absence of historical continuity between the ethnic and the national community. In the international scientific debate, multiple theses coexist. Some of them insist that the nation is a product of modernity, therefore it differs from the traditional ethnic group. While some concepts explain the nation as a social / cultural community which has a state, others talk about “civic” and “cultural” nations or argue that nations exist even without states (including members of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization). Other theories argue that ethnic groups are identical to the nations as cultural phenomena or at least they represent a historic step prior to the formation of nations, regarded by Altermat (1998: 63–66) as “politically recognized ethnic communities.” Without delving too deeply into such a scientific dispute, which is not the subject of this study, we can say that the development of a universal and generally applicable definition of nation and ethnicity is almost an impossible task, at least because of the significant differences in their formation in space and time. The differences are in terms of scale, cultural and political composition of what is the subject of “nationalization.” For that reason, research in this area should adhere to the contextual approach. In the context of the “national question” in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, described in detail and discussed in the academic literature, we assume that national and ethnic communities are genetically linked, they have both cultural and political features; they are products of both self-identification, and also of possessed characteristics such as language, religious affiliation, cultural heritage, and territory. For instance, during stateless periods, the ethnic group often has its own structures whose nature varies widely: from illegal political-military organization, through the form of cultural and linguistic autonomy to its own national republic within multinational states. Different types of political differentiation serve as the primary basis for the future development of ethno-national states, including East-Central Europe.
The main objective of the current chapter is to consider some methodological and terminological issues related to the essence of territorial consciousness regarded as a part of identity of national and ethnic communities. In relation to the above-mentioned considerations, the author has adopted the following geospatial specifics of national and ethnic identity as starting points of this study. First of all, national and ethnic identities are both not territorial identities. Second, the existence of each national/ethnic community is associated with a territorial dimension, including territorial consciousness, in other words – a realistic or idealized perceptions of “own” territory with its spatial and cultural characteristics. Third, the territorial differentiation of a given human community, including the ethnic one, has always been one of the fundamental factors in the process of ethnogenesis, as well as for the crystallization of human groups with common ethnic/national consciousness and identity. Finally, the status of an ethnographic group within a larger ethnic and national community can, in many cases, be changed into its own ethnic/national identity, as a result of ethnic evolution processes, stimulated by the territorial particularism and also by the formation of regional/ethnographic features in certain parts of the ethnos.

5.2. Territory as a physical condition for life and a mental construction in the consciousness of national and ethnic communities

Throughout history and in modern times, the significance of territory for the humankind has been a study topic for philosophers, historians, geographers, ethnologists, sociologists, and political scientists. The recent interest towards geographical space is related to the growing attention paid to the cultural-symbolic meaning of territory, as well as to its contextual interpretations by individuals and groups. Sacralization and mythologization of the territory in the culture and in the community’s memory is also a current in the study of the human perception of spaces and places. As D. M. Smith (2004: 415) points out “Place can be a source of strong emotional attachment, and of personal or group identity, which may be expressed as a sense of place. Loss of place can be an awful experience, involving deep feelings of grief.” Those issues are a priority subject of study for imaginative geographies as well as for metageography (see Lewis and Wigen 1997; Zamyatin 2004, 2010). Metageographies play a leading role in national imaginations of the world political map. They are, in accordance with O’Loughlin and Talbot (2005: 25), formed mostly by the context in which people develop political values and ideas, most if not all strongly influenced by media images, as well as personal travel experiences.

At the same time, modern human geography does not contradict to the notion of territory as a physical space and as a resource for economic development of countries, nor does it contradict the influence of geographical location in geopolitics and international relations. The general scientific and philosophical

Although the recognition of the geographical environment as a factor in the formation of nations varies across scientific disciplines, it is generally accepted that the existence of each group of people, including the historically formed ethnic communities (family, tribe, people, nation), is associated with a certain area, featured by definite natural and anthropological characteristics. The territory is treated as a basis for providing the existence and is also a scene of all life cycles of a given ethnic group. As in all other types of human groups, the territory is an important source of collective identification and is an object of emotional projections and feelings. In this regard, territory has various dimensions such as political, ideological, economic, cultural-educational, aesthetic, patriotic, and so on. Thus, the idealized image of the Fatherland/Motherland always has some geographical concreteness. Moreover, in purely economic aspect, it could be said that “the land provides the bread”, as well as the survival of the community. In that line of thinking, one could not disagree with the observation of Herb and Kaplan (1999: 2) that “… the preservation of the territory that is occupied and sometimes controlled by the nations is the goal of the nationalist mission – arguably even more than preservation of the people”. It is no coincidence that the issues of sovereignty and the exclusive control that the nation-state has on the land itself, which contradicts the liberal principles of the EU, were raised by nationalist formations, including the Bulgarian “Ataka” party present in the Bulgarian parliament. Those formations follow the emotionally potent slogan, close to the heart of the average citizen, “if we lose our Bulgarian land, we lose everything.”

The physical features of the Fatherland – its morphology, soils, waters, flora and fauna, mineral wealth – all influence the material culture (housing, clothing, economy) and the way of life in general, as well as the character of the population itself. The Fatherland represents the land of the ancestors, who have ploughed it, cropped it, and defended it against enemies. The past of the land is evidenced by remnants, archaeological discoveries, burial grounds, and monuments. On a number of occasions, the natural boundaries of the Fatherland (rivers, mountains, seas) separate it from other Fatherlands and peoples (Lewandowski 2004: 40). The physical landscape turns into an element of the consciousness, the feelings, and of the memory. Their importance from a patriotic viewpoint is stressed by Lowenthal (1994: 17): “Countries commonly depict themselves in landscape terms; they hallow traits they fancy uniquely theirs. Every national anthem praises special scenic splendors of nature’s unique bounties”. While problematizing the semiotic sphere of the nation, Timofeev discusses the importance of nature for the national identity, speaking of attempts to its “nationalization” by
the use of images of the environment in the process of creation of nationalist artifacts, giving meaning to natural sites of national importance and their inclusion in the national picture of the world. The search for links between the landscape and the “national character” stimulates the search for “the true”, “primordial” country, in places where we can meet its “instant people”, the bearers of the “national spirit” (Timofeev 2005: 177–178).

Nijakowski (2004: 99) specifies that the “territory” is a category closely related to the ethnic/national identification, because the basis for this identification implies the connection with a certain type of area (starting with the well-known – the local type – and moving on to the abstract type – the national one). As the author stresses, sociology of territorial groups regards the territory as a constructive element of the community and of the institutional relations. From the point of view of the relational concept of space, in sociology territory is considered as a “social space” – or even “space of values” rather than “the space itself as a value”, nevertheless, it is regarded as an element of ethnic identity (Rykiel 2010: 20).

Another essential point of interpreting territory as a mental construction is that of the boundaries – not only the actual ones fixed on the political map and demarcated in the terrain, but also the imaginary ones – subject of the so-called mental maps. The study of mental maps of individuals and groups is a well-developed issue which is also in the scope of interest of authors from East-Central Europe (Słodczyk 1984; Klemenčić 2006; A. Runge and J. Runge 2007; Awramiuk, 2010; Mirošević and Faričić 2011, among others). Mental maps represent a spatial image of the geographical space which exists in the human mind, as well as the location of different elements in it and the subjective reflection of the spatial relations between those elements. Mental maps are more or less precise and possess various degrees of schematics and complexity (Słodczyk 1984: 82). As far as nationalists are concerned, the image of the Fatherland is based on schematically constructed mental maps that omit embarrassing details, such as foreign national and religious minorities, unrecognized ethnic groups, most often by understating their share in the total population.

5.3. Territorial consciousness and territorial identity of human communities. Essence and main dimensions

Before moving on to the search of an adequate explanation of the geospatial aspect of identity and consciousness, let us peer at their psychological concept. Identity itself is being perceived as a term which is used to express the ability or the feeling for self-identification of the individual and the community, as an awareness of difference. The identity is a pursuit of clarity, identicalness, and preciseness about us, which helps us find the meaning, aim and direction of life (Zagorov 2006: 15). Unlike the general perception in psychology and sociology, focusing solely on the subjective aspect of human identity, in this study identity is
regarded as a cluster of constant or/and variable objective and subjective features which characterize the originality and the uniqueness of a particular community. An essential question here is the sense of belonging – being a part of that community – on the basis of social relations and shared values. A. Runge and J. Runge consider that “consciousness is a philosophical and psychological term, which stands for the way people percept the surrounding reality”. The consciousness of the individual or the group not always overlaps the identity. One can be aware of certain facts, phenomena, processes, and yet to express a different type of beliefs, positions and emotions about them” (A. Runge and J. Runge 2007: 314–315).

What are the characteristics of consciousness in a geospatial aspect, and what are the basic nuances of terms such as territorial consciousness and territorial identity? Rykiel (1999: 7), in particular, regards territorial consciousness as “a part of the social consciousness, which refers to the sense of differentiation of an own territory, and next – of own social group”. Another appropriate definition of territorial/spatial identity is the one given by Łukowski. He formulates this category as „an intellectual representation and emotionally-affective evaluation of a certain part of the environment, which the individual adjoins himself to and regards it as a part of him” Łukowski (2002).

Gustafson (2001, cited in Chromý and Janu 2003: 108–109) defines several principles of identity in a territorial dimension. These are used by people to formulate their identity. Among them are: the principle of differentiation of ourselves from others on the basis of the place we live in (the border delimitation of this place/territory is another issue); the consciousness of our own life continuity – that we have lived through in the same place for a long time, or the fact that we came from a similar place, contributes to defining ourselves; the principle of self-esteem – when we have a feeling of being proud of the place we live in. The last of the quoted opinions focuses on the identification of our group with the territory through the principle of conscious and purposeful differentiation, categorization and delimitation in regard to residents of other parts of the geographical space.

Territorial consciousness is an elaborate, complex and polysemantic category which is in an intrinsically dialectical interaction with territorial identity. The relations between those two terms can be interpreted from two viewpoints at least. According to the first one, both terms are identical since without consciousness there could not be self-identification of the individual or of the group as a whole; according to the second viewpoint, territorial identity is the broader term, which conditionally includes the consciousness and imagination of the geographical reality. This occurs because the consciousness of belonging to a certain territory could be just one of the components of ethnic and national identity. Moreover, consciousness can vary in broad limits. On the other hand, however, group’s identification with the territory is impossible without the mainstay, without a clear and recognizable “place of their own” in the world, without some
comprehension of its size and contents, morphology and symbols of the national landscape, every ethnic community has the sense of being homeless.

The author has tried to develop the fullest possible understanding of territorial identity and consciousness, and to provide a model for describing and understanding their scale and structure. Figure 5.1. shows that territory is just one of the components of identity of the national/ethnic communities. The genesis and the evolution of ethnic groups around the globe, together with their consciousness, provide many examples which illustrate that territoriality and „sense of territory” („sense of space”) are some of the most stable pillars of national identity.

The author stands behind the thesis that the study of human identity should be based on a complex interdisciplinary approach which does not prioritize, nor does it hyperbolize, the importance of one component of the identity or another, but always takes into consideration the dialectical interrelations between them. As mentioned above, identity is viewed as a phenomenon which possesses subjective, as well as objective features. The objective ones contain elements such as ethnonym, language, religion, customs, symbols, material and spiritual culture, social organization (from ethnocultural societies to ethn-national states). The subjective sphere of ethnic and national identity includes self-identification, historical memory, mentality, myths and legends, images, stereotypes, etc. Among these elements we include consciousness and identity in both cultural and geospatial perspective. Obviously, it is a complex theoretical task and in the same time – it is impossible to divide purely „objective” from purely „subjective”, or primordial from politically constructed sides of national identity.

Territorial consciousness and identity are not only objects of impartial academic reflection, but they are also objects of purposeful political manipulations which cause the identity construction of places, regions and countries in the desired shapes and directions. Nagorna (2008: 53–54) highlights that the identificational dimension of territoriality is highly politicized and ideologically influenced. Giving the example of Ukraine, Nagorna points out that the ideologization of regional identity is a result of the Ukrainian, Russian and Crimean-Tatar nationalisms. The author adds that because territorial identity has not been a subject of any special scientific interest, “the rules of the game” in that field have been actually imposed by opinion journalism, which fact has led to strong mythologization and stereotypization of thinking.

Realizing the complexity of such a task, the author of the current study undertakes an attempt for providing a brief definition of the category territorial consciousness of the human communities. It represents an interconnected set of historically arisen, affirmed collective beliefs and perceptions of territorial differentiation of a certain group in the geographical space, as well as a notion of the real and symbolic meaning of that space and its components in history, and also in the contemporary cultural and socio-political life of the group.
The above-mentioned definition means that the territorial consciousness of each ethnic entity has a complex character, but yet – it is detectable and measurable. Applying a more complex scientific approach which synthesizes knowledge on that matter from ethnology, human geography, sociology and other scientific disciplines which deal with the human-space relations, the author believes that the formation of identity is based on the combination of three primal dimensions. These are geospatal/territorial, social, and time-related (see Figure 5.2.).

Figure 5.1. Objective and subjective features of national and ethnic identity

Each human identity is social and is developing under the influence of numerous factors which have a social nature. At each stage of its evolution, human identity is characterized by concrete geospatal and time-related coordinates. If the dynamism is relevant to a number of social and cultural identities, the territory as a physical space with its natural, political or administrative boundaries provides a relatively stable in time, and yet, fluctuating base for ethnocultural identification. In reality it is very difficult, if not impossible, to separate one of the three aspects from the others into some sort of a sterile frame, since these domains represent an intrinsic ontological unity. Their conditional delimitation is only required in order to achieve a better clarity in the theoretical conceptualization process.
Territorial consciousness can refer to various elements of the geographical environment (geomorphology and hydrological objects, settlements, roads, border zones, resort localities, cemeteries, cultural-historical monuments, etc.) or to their spatial compositions. According to Tuan (1987), the individuals and groups communicate within the geographical space, perceived not as a geometric structure, but as a space of subjective perceptions, evaluations, preferences and symbols – all reflected in the territory.

Among the ever topical matters of ethnocultural identification with geographical space are the issues of scale and hierarchy of identities in a specific space-time dimension, which scale and hierarchy are associated with real and imaginary boundaries between national groups. Kaplan (2005: 31) claims that national identity is situated within a hierarchy of geographically-based identities that coexist and sometimes compete with it. On that account, the following geospatial dimensions have been derived (Figure 5.2.): global, continental, national, regional, local and the space of our home. Between the national and continental level, another level is formed – the subcontinental (supranational) one, where the political or the cultural (civilizational) identity of certain international regions is constructed. In some cases, such regions cover territories in two or three continents. The identification on national level stands out (at least as far as Europe is
concerned) with the brightest features, including the strongest cultural and psychological homogeneity and strength of political-institutional relations. A separate research narrative is formed by the relation between the states and the nations, which, according to Kaplan, are symbiotically linked, but they have “asymmetrical identities”, including the spatial one. As the same author points out, the territorial identity of the state is much cleaner, explaining that statement by such facts as the jurisdictional aspects of the state, the maintenance of internal order, and vigorous demarcation and control of the border (Kaplan 1999: 34–35).

Another integral characteristic of territorial consciousness is its time-related aspect, connected to the dynamicity and the redefining of outdated images, beliefs and perceptions of the surrounding world. This means that one of the features of the territorial consciousness is its resilience and its steadiness. As Petkova (2013: 36) notes, while all political, religious and ideological processes contribute to a change in the cultural context, the collective memory is one of the mechanisms that conserve that cultural context, opposing any changes.

Thus, supporters of every nationalism believe in continuity of the cultural and the political domains of the nation from time immemorial, justifying the current policy with historical arguments that should serve the future. Kristof (1994: 223) differentiates a specific category in the nation’s consciousness: a vision of the Fatherland which is forward-oriented: “It is not an idealized past but idealized future, not what our idealized ancestors built but what we idealists, worthy sons of our fathers, are going to build. The vision of the Fatherland assumes that the Golden Age is ahead of us, not in the past”. In reality, however, all the ambitious projects of the small and medium (in terms of population number) Eastern European nations, initiated by intellectuals and politicians of the 19th century (Greater Serbia, Greater Romania or Greater Ukraine), nowadays combine the future with the glorious past – whether real, exaggerated or just imagined.

The established symbolic and cognitive models of the geospace can be subjected to a dramatic impact of abrupt political-ideological turbulence. For instance, Petrović deals with changing perceptions of ex-Yugoslavs of the only common geographical space between Triglav and Gevgelija, and between Djerdap and the Adriatic Sea. The author pays attention to the existence of various approaches towards the reorganization of the former common space: “While national elites were neglecting any possible value of the common Yugoslav past and insisting on the erasure of the memories related to this common past in their national projects, many individuals were not ready to throw away their Yugoslav experience and feelings attached to that experience” (Petrović 2007: 263).
5.4. Chief components of territorial consciousness of national and ethnic communities

The territorial consciousness of each ethnic and national community represents a multifaceted complex of rational knowledge, together with irrational perceptions which remain in the sphere of the idealistic, outside the frames of the direct empirical experience. Information about the status, the parameters, and the dynamics of the spatial images and aspirations of different social groups is available in various documents, maps, atlases, textbooks, history chronicles, geographical and ethnographic descriptions, as well as in the media, in legal acts, in declarations of patriotic organizations, of political parties, etc. Furthermore, a rich source of such knowledge is the national literature, which often tells us about events that took place in the background of places considered sacred by a given nation. Undoubtedly, many authors would take a stand against such an approach, which puts in common discourse the ideas of political leaders, and the scientific studies which pretend to be “objective” in making their conclusions, and the cartographic images from school atlases and national literature works of different authors, too. Having said that, the search for universal knowledge requires that researchers, who do not self-isolate themselves into the institutional frames of their narrow scientific field, seek links between the geopolitical, scientific, educational, ideological, as well as other factors that shape imaginative models and visions of space.

Below, the author tries to outline the essence of the chief and most meaningful in both cultural and political aspect components of the territorial consciousness. The next components are going to be discussed: an ethnolinguistic system of geographical names, historical-geographical perceptions and myths of a nation about its “own” ethnic and historical territory, geographical images and perceptions of various geospatial objects and places, including the image of the Fatherland/Motherland, and the geospatial levels of self-identification. Those components have the highest cognitive, scientific, political, and cultural-educational significance in forming the geographical domain of national identity.

1) The ethnolinguistic system of geographical names is related to the existing, among each ethnic group, own names of the various geographical objects. This system is a result of a specific ethnolinguistic and sociolinguistic picture of the world formed in the culture and embedded in the collective self-awareness.

Every culture includes a number of specific names (toponyms) which a certain human community (ethnic, religious, state-political, regional, etc.) has given to a particular fragment of the geographical space. Such a fragment can be physical-geographic (a river, a sea, a continent, an island, a peninsula, a river valley, a mountain, a forest, or a field, among others) but also anthropogenic or natural-anthropogenic (such as roads, reservoirs, canals, settlements, residential
areas, burial grounds, historic battle sites, sacral architecture objects, and so forth). It is worth mentioning the existence of two types of relation between the name of a particular fragment of the geographical space, on the one hand, and the ethnic communities, on the other. A number of territorial political units, including modern or existing in the past ethno-national states, obtain their toponym from the name of a certain ethnic group, for example, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, Russia, etc. On the second occasion, several modern Eastern European nations derived their names from already named geographical areas and existing regions – the case of the Montenegrins, the Macedonians, as well as of the Bosnian Muslims.

The geographical imagination as a part of every hermetic cultural tradition is also reflected in the toponyms, which the members of a given community use and promote, and, as a result, they consider the name of a given area as the only correct and logical one. For instance, all around the world, the phenomenon “one area – many names” is widely spread and therefore it can serve as an example of different ways of perception and attitude, which the different societies have towards one and the same fragment of the geographical space. Thus, the term “Old Serbia” is in use and it is understandable for only a limited circle of people, who have been raised in the spirit of the Serbian national ideas. The category „Western Outlands“, for example, reflects the perceptions and the traditions of the Bulgarian geopolitical and geohistorical consciousness, but that category is incomprehensible for the Serbian people, in whose modern national territory, the above-mentioned former Bulgarian areas have been located since 1919. On the other hand, „Kresy Wschodnie“ (“Eastern Frontiers”) is a Polish term for what is now parts of modern-day Lithuania, Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, which areas once were parts of The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita) and also of Poland during the interwar period (1919–1939). Simultaneously, in modern Polish historical literature the wording “so-called Western Ukraine” and “so-called Western Belarus” are often found, which terms, deprived of territorial claims and political intentionality and take us into the deep layers of the national memory of the Polish people, including perceptions of historical territory.

In the geographical space of each nation, a certain part of the toponyms are subject to changes and historical revision, imposed by the historical policy of the state. An appropriate example is the post-socialist period when in all countries across Eastern Europe, the names of numerous towns and villages, administrative divisions, streets, squares, etc. were changed because the old ones did not comply with the national identity ideals of the new elites. Another illustrative example is the removal of hundreds of monuments, which was accompanied by severe ethnic and/or ideological disputes, especially in the former Soviet republics and those of former Yugoslavia.

2) The historical-geographical perceptions and myths of the nation are encoded in its national memory. These include spatial myths about the “own”
ethnic and historical territory of the ethnos, as well as perceptions of the geographical distribution of “other” ethnic groups and political entities in the past. They are being conserved in memories, myths, legends, stories and in the system of knowledge contained in the scientific studies on history or in the knowledge passed on from generation to generation within the family. Seen as elements of the spatial consciousness, of the collective memory, and also of the historical policy of the state, ethnic and historical territory both are a part of one and the same semantic field, together with categories such as image and vision of the homeland, legendary and mythical space, local myth and metaphysical territory (the latter term is used by Zamyatin 2011).

Among the notions which seem to be important for current considerations is also the notion of ethnic territory. In common, it is regarded as an area of distribution of the ethnos in the geographical space, within which the ethnos represents relative or absolute majority. According to Sadokhin (2001: 84) „the ethnic territory not only represents the necessary condition for the formation of the ethnic community, but in time it also turns into a basis for crystallization of the ethnic consciousness and identity”. In East-Central Europe, the objective processes of formation of ethnic territories ceased at the end of the 19th and the early 20th century. The decades to follow are characterized by mass intervention of the states in the ethnopolitical processes, accompanied by deportations, religious prosecutions and sometimes by ethnocide, which all lead to radical changes in the ethnic areas (Dnistrianskyy 2006: 24–25).

The above-mentioned definition, as well as other scientific concepts and criteria for the establishment of ethnic territory, all sound relatively transparent and logical. But this clarity is only in theory, because the real world, including ethnic geography, geopolitics and ethnopsychology, rarely offer ideal situations, despite the efforts of each ethno-national school to present the relationship between the people and the land as an eternal and continuous historical process. The key, and yet the most controversial aspect of the territorial consciousness, is the perception which a given community has of its “historical”, “just” and “natural” ethnic boundaries. The roots of such over-interpretations are primordial and essentialist. The critical reading of such nationalist myths by constructivists is fully justified. As pointed out by Hobsbawm (1996: 83), the popular protonationalism has forced modern nationalists to return back in history way farther than the real memory of their people goes. A good example of the latter case is the modern Macedonian historiography – politically and financially supported at the highest state level – which nationalized on a large scale, historical territorial-political entities, statesmanship traditions, national heroes and events from the Greek and the Bulgarian history.

The sheer speaking about the “historical territory of the ethnos” has, to a certain extent, a selective character and is based on one-sided and ideologically influenced perceptions of “the great national state” or of “the traditional ethnic
space”, which both had their place in the past geopolitical times. That fact generates diametrically opposite points of view and clashes of the nationalistic memory. Some of the main reasons for the existence of rival attitudes and misunderstandings of difficult historical questions, can be presented as follows: firstly, a certain “historical state” of a given ethnos existed in a fixed territory, usually for a very short period of time; second, that territory has changed its ethnocultural, religious, economic, and other characteristics as a result of political transformations, migration, ethnic consolidation / separation, etc. When in the course of history, a particular community has lost political control over certain territory (e.g. Constantinople for the Greeks; Kosovo for the Serbs or Lviv for the Poles, and so on and so on), that territory becomes an element of the national ideology, thus starting a new life in the new historiography schemes – a life of memories, tales, myths, and legends. Regardless of the historical remoteness of a territorial loss and the real opportunities for a physical regaining of that territory, the symbolic function of the myth in the “memory – nation – own geographical space” triangle, is to keep the memory of past glory alive. The presence of that lost territory nowadays is especially bright in the occasions, when a certain part of the fellow-countrymen have remained in that territory. In its own interpretive discourse, however, the community preserves a symbolic control over the lost space by feeling it as an integral part of its national identity, relying on convenient facts, justifying their cause.

In the cases of heterogeneous ethnic and national population’s structure of a given area, several scenarios of political identification and control are possible. First scenario – the members of the different groups recognize the existing multi-ethnicity and seek mutual agreement through establishing a common national-territorial identity, which is also institutionally approved, e.g. in the form of federation (former Yugoslavia, Belgium, Switzerland). Second scenario – the case of Kosovo or Bosnia and Herzegovina – where two or more autochthonous ethnic groups co-exist, after the break-up of former Yugoslavia – an example of hardening of the nationalistic type of territorial consciousness is being observed. Each ethnic group is trying to prove its “right of possession” on the land and also on applying political sovereignty in accordance with its nationalistic interpretations of the ethnic history and of the ethnic geography. In those and other similar cases, such as the South Caucasus and Ukraine, the territorial rights are “proved” and asserted through several traditional nationalist arguments. These are the so-called historical right, the “blood right” (the right of the demographic majority), the democratic right of the population in a given area to choose the country which to live in, inviolability of states and their borders, and the most commonly applied principle – the right of power. Based on the example of the conflicts in the post-Yugoslavian space, the issue is thoroughly discussed by Woodword (1995). Thus, the continuing, century-old Serbian-Albanian competition for Kosovo, occurs in both the war front and the field of diplomacy, but also in the
field of ideology and mythology. As Grčić (2003: 8) states, Kosovo of the local Albanian differs from Kosovo, seen through the eyes of some Serbs or foreigners, which is to confirm that the attitude towards a certain territory or a region has a certain symbolic side to it, which applies to the cultural stereotypes, but also to the ways of life.

3) Geographical images and perceptions of various geospatial objects and places. Ethnic and national groups, just like any other kind of human community, have elaborated a system of symbols and “prominent locations” (in accordance with Zamyatin 2010: 34–35), situated in a certain fragment of the Earth’s space. The geographical image is a component of the human imagination and represents “a system of interconnected and interacting signs, symbols, archetypes and stereotypes, which characterize brightly and briefly enough a certain territory (a location, a landscape, a region, a country)” (Zamyatin 2011: 189).

The most prominent images and perceptions of certain countries, regions or landscapes have the features of clearly affirmed social norms, deeply embedded and reproduced by the national educational systems. In connection with the significance of the landscape for shaping collective identities and self-determination, Hooson (1994: 1) remarks: “Communities have come to inhabit particular places and, over the centuries of occupation, have gradually come to identify with their regional environments, perceived as archetypal, endowed with love and celebrated in song and poetry, as well as understood in terms of appropriate land use and economic development”.

The notion of the archetypal territories is related to the notion of topophilia – a key research tool for humanistic and symbolic geographies, allowing us to peek into the inner world of human reflections, beliefs, and feelings concerning space. The term topophilia, introduced by Tuan, reflects the human’s attitude towards a certain place, object or historical fact, and thus charging it with an emotional value. Topophilia fills in the certain place with “spirit”. Without it, the different fragments of a particular place – its architecture and history – are deprived of their “spirit” and thus turned into lifeless nature (Pirveli 2010: 221). Such a role of sacred places, which are sources of pride and unabated national spirit and energy, play the Athens Acropolis for the Greeks, The Rila Monastery for the Bulgarians, Jasna Góra in Częstochowa for the Poles, or Segriev Posad – one of the most prominent spiritual centres for the Russians. The opposite term of topophilia – topophobia, refers to negative spatial associations in people’s minds, with shadows and traumas which the past has left on a given locality. On the memory of European nations such places represent locations of severe human suffering and loss, such as the Nazi concentration camps Oświęcim (Auschwitz), Mauthausen-Gusen, etc.

In the culture of different nations and civilizations, same spatial objects can be seen in the opposite light. That is why imaginative geographies always operate with the term territory in plural. Thus, since the beginning of the 19th
century, as far as the Western World is concerned, the term “Balkans” has turned into a byword for a space charged with insecurity, lack of civilization, barbarism, technological and economic underdevelopment, irrational ethnic and religious conflicts (see more in Todorova 1997; Jezernik 2004; Mihaylov 2010). At the same time, in the historical memory of the Bulgarians and in their everyday life too, the Balkan Mountains represent a real geographical object. The Balkan is a symbol of manhood, a stronghold of the national spirit, a mountain, which has protected the community from the enemies through the ages, and which has sheltered hundreds of revolutionists and freedom-fighters during the Ottoman oppression.

In a patriotic upbringing, the image of the Fatherland / Motherland stands out with its extreme emotional burden. Each human individual and each ethnos have their sacred Fatherland/Motherland – an issue which has been thoroughly discussed in scientific literature on ethnopsychology and nationalism studies. The Fatherland is their “own” place where the individual and its community find support and security and is also a robust landmark in the big world. As Gumiliev states, the Fatherland is so deeply rooted in human consciousness that „despite that, wherever the destiny takes away the Russian man, he knows, that he has his “own place” – “Motherland” (Gumiliev 2001: 215).

The image of the Fatherland is a cluster of rational geographical knowledge and subjective-emotional evaluations of the homeland’s beauty and uniqueness. Identifying with the homeland is a basic element of imagined ethnic communities, even at a regional level – e.g. The Biblical Holy Land to the Jewish Diaspora, or the numerous local homelands to the Roma people (Nijakowski 2004: 108). Tuan highlights that the requirement for turning the space into homeland is the emergence of identification with the objects which compose the same geographical space (cited in Nijakowski 2004: 108). Those objects may be natural, architectural, natural-anthropogenic, etc. and they all have an important moral, ethical and patriotic meaning, consolidating the group members on the basis of emotional and spiritual attachment to common landscape symbols.

Furthermore, a certain relation to the homeland is visible in the already mentioned category of ethnic landscape, which represents an original model of adaptation and also of composition between the national culture and the natural landscape, which have been remodeled in accordance with the practices of settlement arrangement, nature utilization, habits, diligence, and the aesthetic preferences of each ethno-national community. Various elements of the landscape represent objects of worship which are considered sacred by the ethnos/nation. Beside mountains, peaks, rivers, lakes, valleys, often declared “holy”, man and his activeness creates different objects of memory, such as monuments, memorials, mausoleums, shrines dedicated to the national heroes from military and political circles, church leaders, influential writers and artists, etc. Those objects and sites have turned into places of worship and adoration, and represent important markers and value-landmarks in the national memory and culture. Since an early age,
the members of a given community have been raised with the idea that the participation in periodic (most often annual), celebrations and visiting such places, represents an important moral-patriotic duty.

4) Geospatial levels of the community’s self-identification. As it was shown in Figure 2, the geospatial levels of territorial consciousness are: global, continental, subcontinental, national (matching the national borders), regional, local, and home. Therefore, an important aspect of territorial consciousness is the spatial hierarchy of the community which we identify ourselves with. Using those geospatial scales for relating any given ethnos to certain supranational communities, each nation has developed and affirmed a certain degree of affection to one frame of geographical belonging or another.

Within the frames of the nationalistic discourse there are two main ways of interpreting “our own” territory: the first way is the moral-symbolic, and the second way is the ideological one, with clear or obscured geopolitical expansionist ambitions. These two approaches are only conditionally separated from one another, since within a definite national community, numerous national images in the spheres of education, science and art, are ideologically influenced by the official ethnopolitical course of the state and often actually serve its interests. On the other hand, the political leaders usually build their causes upon emblematic images of the national territory and its unity, which images are created and produced within the frames of mythology, literature and art. Therefore, the geopolitical meaning of the territorial consciousness is a proof that this category is related not only to a passive registration of geospatial facts or to the imaginations about the features of one territorial object or another. The geospatial perceptions also provoke the real actions towards possession and control over certain territory and towards imposing sovereign power, a cultural model, legislation, and the language of a given nation, across that territory.

Dnistrianskyy stresses that “the bond between the ethno-national community and the geographical space finds reflection into the system of images, stereotypes, and into the system of knowledge of their own land, most of all – of its size and nature.” As an illustration, important circumstances assisted maturing of the ethno-national and the ethnopolitical consciousness of the Ukrainians at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century, were the promoted cartographic images of the Ukrainian ethnic territory (Dnistrianskyy 2006: 26). That conclusion can be fully applied to all modern-day nations in Central and Southeastern Europe.

As elements of territorial consciousness of nations are considered not only the subjective mental maps in the minds of the individuals, which maps have a purely cultural meaning, but also the various products of the nationalistic cartography, pretending to represent a scientific and objective depiction of ethno-territorial structures. For instance, Klemenčič has provided an analysis of the Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian ethnic maps in the context of the civil war of the
1990s in the territory of former Yugoslavia. As the author remarks “the majority of these maps were produced for propaganda purposes, the maps themselves did not contribute to ethnic cleansing, the term which came to be used for the forced large scale transfers of population”. However, the author has stressed that these maps were not always entirely “‘innocent’, because their design was sometimes intentional” (Klemenčić 2006: 377).

Subnational level of territorial consciousness and identity. As far as the nation-states are concerned, the subnational scale of territorial consciousness is usually related to the sense of belonging to a distinct cultural-historical region, as well as the existence of objective linguistic, folkloric, and cultural features of the way of life. It is at this level of territorial identity, where ethnographic communities and groups shape out. In multinational states, comprising of ethnic territories of several autochthonic population groups, the situation is more complex. In that case, local identity is tied to the sense of affection and solidarity to a territory smaller in scale whose inhabitants share a common space and common social values. An example of such a smaller territorial unit can be a city or a village, a municipality, a suburb, a natural locality.

The traditional nation-state seeks to control the processes of cultural, political, and institutional emancipation of its regions. In contrary, in the conditions of democracy and decentralization of power, regionalism (ethno-regionalism is just one of its variants) has emerged as an important hierarchical link in the spatial development, which implements policies that are closer to the real problems and needs of the population. At that level, the different kinds of regional identity are developed in dependence on political, economic, cultural, ethno-regional or other forms of regionalism. From the perspective of a nation-state, regional identity may be associated with the promotion of a certain region as a tourist destination, including reconstruction practices of “authentic” cultural heritage sites, but may also be associated with separatism and desire for autonomy, raising of federalist demands or even ambitions for statehood.

The supranational level relates to the geospatial projection of the national identity in the coordinate system of human civilization. As key terms here are considered panideology and pan-nationalism. The traditional panideological concepts use the frame of distribution of supra-ethnic and linguistic communities as a fundament of their build-up in the geospace. Okunev defines panideology as “an idea pointed to the formation of a new structure of the world’s political map, which structure would unite the existing smaller elements”. The main varieties of panideology are the panethnism, panhistorism, pancontinentalism and panglobalism. For example, panethnism is an idea for uniting the territories inhabited by one and the same ethnic group (panalbanism, panmongolism, pankurdism) or by similar in origin ethnic groups (panturkism, panslavism) (Okunev 2008: 174).

Globalization, the opening of borders, the increasing number of common economic and environmental issues and interdependencies, the interstate inte-
gration, the spread of global communications, all create conditions for formation of transnational communities and a global level of identity, or even for a global government. The sense of a common human civilization, which is not something fundamentally new to philosophers and social utopians, today comes down more to the global identity of the “transnational elite” (Bauman 1998; Brzezinski 2004) modeled by solidarity with the representatives of the narrow circle of the global elite, which representatives have been detached from their ethno-national and local roots.

The public manifestation of ambivalent supranational awareness is typical for all nations located on “civilizational crossroad”. The lines of civilizational division penetrate the state territories and oppose various state-forming groups of population on a civilizational principle, including population of certain municipalities, towns, villages, and neighbourhoods. This generates conditions of instability in the manifestations of that supranational element of spatial consciousness, and also generates gravitation towards various external centres of identification as well as potential discord in the internal geopolitics.

According to the narratives of national mythology, all Eastern European nations are located on a fateful crossroad between the East and the West, between Western Europe and Russia. Thus, the Bulgarians inherited from their long historical traditions several intermixing cultural macroelements, which the national geohistorical code was built upon – those are the (Proto)Bulgarian, the Slavic, the Thracian, the Christian-Orthodox, the Balkan, the European and the Eastern European macroelements. This implies that in different civilizational discourses, the Bulgarian nation is regarded as an organic part of several historical geospatial configurations, which have existed on the map of Southeastern Europe for more than a millennium. Furthermore, the intermixing of those elements allows us to define some transitional constructions of the identity such as: Slavic-Bulgarian, Slavic-Orthodox, Balkan-Slavic and Balkan-European (Mihaylov 2012: 224).

5.5. Conclusion

The increased scientific interest towards the issue of territorial consciousness is undoubtedly a favourable condition for further theoretical conceptualization of that category. The presented study was an attempt of refining the category of territorial consciousness and outlining its main components and variety of possible contexts for their application. In this research field, the achievement of a greater methodological clarity will serve as a base for a fuller and more objective scientific study and explanation of the territorial consciousness of the national and ethnic communities in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, where the evolution of spatial perceptions and images remains and will continue to be a real factor in the processes of both political integration and disintegration.
The main conclusions of the provided study can be defined as follows:

1) Unlike other authors, we believe that territorial consciousness is not limited to just studying some “imagined”, “invented” and unrealistic fatherlands, spaces and places which often have nothing to do with the geographical space.

2) Spatial images, perceptions and mental maps, which are the chief components of territorial consciousness, represent psychological constructs of the geographic reality. They have their reason in the real world by reflecting the physical parameters of the geographical space, the natural and anthropological features of a given fragment of the territory, as well as its traditional affiliation to a certain ethnic group or nation.

3) The deviations between the imagined and the real features of a given object in the geographical space may depend on the level of knowledge of the individuals, on the collective nationalistic/patriotic education, and also on the influence of political-ideological manipulations connected to the national geohistory.

4) Territorial consciousness is an irreplaceable component of national identity, while identification with the Fatherland and the representative elements of the national landscape preserves not just emotional and moral-symbolic, but ideological and geopolitical meaning as well.

5) Territorial consciousness is a phenomenon, which is extremely significant for the development and the self-affirmation of the ethnopolitical communities and nations, which have been formed and developed in a competitive ethnopolitical environment of competitive myths, stereotypes and nationalistic doctrines. It can be expected that future disputes and conflicts will rise discussions about the historical borders, the affiliation and the control over border areas as well as territories with heterogeneous ethno-national identity.

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PART II

SUPRANATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE, IDENTITY AND POWER
6
Regionalism and Identities in the Common Neighbourhood: European and Russian Discourses

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV

6.1. Introduction

The voluminous body of academic literature on EU – Russia relations leaves strong impression of crisis both in communication between Brussels and Moscow, and in scholarly discourse covering this relationship. Both Russian and European experts in their analysis usually do not go farther than stating a number of more or less obvious symptoms of political stagnation in bilateral talks such as the lack of mutual trust, dissimilar political vocabularies, divergent material interests, etc. As a rule, most of discourses shaping identities of both actors reproduce the binary logic of these relations either portraying Russia as existentially incompatible with the EU-based normative order, or, vice versa, lambasting contemporary Europe for deviating from its own traditions of democracy, the rule of law and Christian values. In a more academic vocabulary, the EU is characterized as an exponent of solidarist type of international society, whereas Russia adheres to its more pluralist vision (Kaczmarski 2011: 160). These two competing modern discourses, European and Russian ones, produce “essentialized differences between two spatial markers (“Europe’ and ‘East’”), a practice that is heavily imbued with an identity dimension” (Klinke 2012: 930).

What is often missing in the scholarship of EU – Russian communication is the interaction of these two dissimilar political subjects in a contested area dubbed “near abroad” by the Kremlin and – alternatively – „common neighbourhood” in most of European countries. What certainly deserves a closer attention for transcending the logic of binary opposition is both different patterns of communication between the EU and Russia in this vast area consisted of a dozen of countries with post-Soviet legacy, and the process of regionalization within this area.
In the academic literature a number of models of regionalism are widely discussed: regional complex / system, regional society, regional community, etc. (Agh, 2010: 1244). All of them are conceptually grounded in the idea of international / cross-border socialization as developed by both English school and social constructivism. As seeing from this vantage point, two communicative processes take place simultaneously: the EU – Russia interaction, and a more complex regional socialization that involves a much wider array of actors.

Both processes are deeply inter-subjective. Being key shapers of regional dynamics in their common neighbourhood, Russia and the EU are themselves objects of influence from their neighbours. Neighbourhood is a concept against which EU’s and Russia’s identities are constantly (re)articulated. Russia defines itself as an actor able to cope with economic and security challenges originated in adjacent countries, while the EU claims to be capable of effectively using transformative mechanisms spurring normative changes in its neighbours (Joenniemi 2012: 27–38). In this chapter I argue that it is insufficient to uncover the transformative mechanisms that the EU applies toward its multiple neighbours. What is of primordial importance for my analysis is to show that EU’s political subjectivity is to a large extent dependent upon its neighbourhood that is in a position to at least partly streamline the contours of EU’s identity. In this interpretation, the EU is equally a region-maker and a product of regionalization dynamics unfolding in close proximity to its borders (Browning and Christou 2010: 109–118). The same is true for Russia, though it is noteworthy that Russia’s integrative Eurasian Union project is short of explicit normative dimension, which leaves the issue of norms acceptance of rejection beyond the otherwise inter-subjective framework of Russia’s relations with its neighbours.

The study of regionalism in a vast area stretching from Europe’s north to Central Asia is very much correlative to the growing number of studies claiming that the world becomes increasingly less Europe-centric due to the shifting political and economic interests from Europe to non-Western parts of the world (Acharya 2012: 3–15). Apparently, most of the nascent Oriental regional constructs will not be able to replicate the best European experiences of region-building, including the most successful Nordic and Baltic models. In the post-colonial literature one may find multiple regrets about the alleged Western tradition of justifying oppression and eradicating the difference, which, in the view of proponents of such views, requires “critical border thinking” grounded in “the epistemology that was denied by imperial expansion” (Mignolo and Tlostanova 2006: 206). However, the ontological assumption that many regions were “created from the perspective of European imperial / colonial expansion” does not necessarily justify the politically simplistic claims for particular “anti-imperial epistemic responses” to empower regions from being “geographically caged” (Mignolo and Tlostanova 2006: 208). Neither obvious particularities of the regions forming the EU – Russia common neighbourhood nor their dissimilarities from the well stu-
Died European examples of regional integration suggest that Europe-born theories are any longer inappropriate for studying Eurasian regionalism. On the contrary, the practices of regionalism in non-European context confirm the validity of a number of concepts of European pedigree, including inter-subjectivity, identity, institutions, external overlay and many others. The European experience includes both hegemonic and non-hegemonic forms of regionalism; it encompasses both open (Central European Initiative) and a relatively closed (Northern Europe) (Moisio at all 2011: 241–249) forms of region-making.

This chapter addresses the multiple experiences of identity-formation on a regional level in the EU – Russia shared neighbourhood. I will stem from a constructivist presumption that “regions are what states and other actors make of them... Regionness, like identity, is not given once and for all: it is built up and changes” (Fawcett 2005: 26). Accordingly, regional identities – key elements of successful region-making projects – are constructed by both political discourses and cultural practices to be scrutinized in more detail in my analysis.

6.2. Policy framework for analysis

The interest in regionalism in a wider Europe is due to a few factors. First, there is a growing regional momentum within the EU where the financial crisis reactualized a number of regional for(u)ms of cooperation such as the Visegrad Four (V4), the 3+1 (Germany plus three Baltic states) format, etc. This new regional dynamics will have inevitable repercussions for EU’s policies in the east, since many regional projects are designed as “bridges between the internal and external regionalization of the EU” (Agh 2010: 1241). Each of (intra-) European forms of regionalism necessarily has repercussions for EU’s relations with its neighbours: the Nordic Europe has strongly influenced the practices of regionalism in the Baltic Sea region, Central Europe (as exemplified by V4) is instrumental in engaging the countries of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), etc.

Many of the current modalities of European regionalism are quite compatible with the much debated idea of the “Core Europe” as encompassing Germany, Central Europe, the Baltic Sea region and the Nordic Europe. Intrinsically, this alliance can envelop countries with effective and responsible models of social and economic development, as well as a record of successful outward policy transfer practices (Simonyi 2013). The Core Europe, being a product of overlapping region-making projects, will be most likely dominated by Russia-skeptic countries lobbying for a more active engagement with Russia’s neighbours independently of relations with Moscow.

Second, the area known as either “near abroad” in Russia or common neighbourhood in the EU is going through a steady process of regional differentiation. This is to a large extent due to the fact that this neighbourhood spans a series of meeting points between European and non-European practices of terri-
toriality and regionalism. From a practical perspective, regionalization within the area of common EU – Russia neighbourhood questions the appropriateness of applying to it unified political instruments – be it the Brussels-sponsored EaP or Moscow-patronized Eurasian Union. Regional fragmentation opens more space for different identities and institutional affiliations, with borderlines between regions-in-the-making (the Black Sea region and South Caucasus, South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region, etc.) being immanently fuzzy and blurred.

6.3. The neighbourhood regions: an inside – outside perspective

Russia and the EU as two key shapers of regions constituting the area of their common neighbourhood adhere to drastically different attitudes to the mechanisms and institutions of region-building. Russia prefers the concept of “near abroad” to “common neighbourhood” and overwhelmingly perceives this area in terms of zero-sum-game and spheres of influence politics.

For the EU the central question of its policy toward eastern neighbours is how to create a zone of peace and stability at the Union’s borders without offering the prospect of full membership as an incentive (Christensen 2011: 64). By and large, this question is tackled by two discourses – civilizational and geopolitical ones. Civilizational discourse is about the transfer of values in a process of “education“ and norms diffusion with the purpose of transforming the neighbours. In geopolitical discourse, neighbours are viewed as transit countries that constitute a buffer zone (“our backyard“) against the unfriendly Big Other. Russia is accepted as a geopolitical player (Kolvraa and Ifversen 2011: 50–61), which only exacerbates the need for control over resources, security protection and spheres of influence. Against this background, EU’s eastern frontiers are effects of “geopolitical decisions” stemming out of a “battle for Europe” (Bindi and Angelescu 2011: 2) and its borderlines.

Arguably, the key factor that determines EU’s and Russia’s policy tools is their status of either insiders or outsiders in region-making projects developing in the area of their common neighbourhood. In my further analysis I will single out four possible models of EU – Russia interactions based on this criteria: a) Russia is an outsider, while the EU is an insider; b) vice versa, Russia is an insider, while the EU is an outsider; c) both the EU and Russia are insiders, and d) both the EU and Russia are outsiders. Each of these four models will be considered below from the viewpoints of a combination of identities, institutions, and patterns of external overlay.

6.3.1. The four models

6.3.1.1. Model 1 – in which Russia is outsider, and the EU is insider – encompasses two regions – Nordic Europe and Central Europe. Of course, they
differ from each other in many respects, with one of the most striking dissimilarities being a de-securitized nature of the Nordic regionalism, as opposed to the ongoing securitization of energy policy and military matters for Central Europe.

However, both intra-European regions are firmly embedded in the European / Euro-Atlantic institutional structures and produce their own languages of self-description. Their normative coherence is sustained by a variety of cultural underpinnings. In both regions, institutional density fosters effective mechanisms of regional socialization that give spillover effects: the Nordic Europe is keen to project its experiences to the Baltic Sea region, while the Central Europe is eager to share its success stories with Eastern European neighbours.

For both regions Russia is obviously an external force though the inside / outside relationships are not identical – Central European identity, along with the very distinction between Central and Eastern Europe, is grounded in a political set off against Russia, though radicalization of Russia’s alterity is by and large avoided for practical reasons. In the meantime, the concept of Nordicity leaves some routes for Russia to share certain elements of the Northerness. In some cases, Russia tries to pragmatically take advantages of regionalist initiatives undertaken by its neighbours (as it was the case of the Finland-sponsored Northern Dimension program), while in others it chooses to ignore region-building capacities of its western neighbours, which is mostly the case of Central Europe (Zachaczkowski 2013).

In unpacking the Model I I will further focus on the region of Central Europe due to its stronger relevance for the common EU – Russia neighbourhood. Institutionally, this is a very dense region that encompasses the Visegrád Four (V4), the Central European Initiative and the Danube regional strategy. These three institutional frameworks reveal three different facets of Central European regionalism: the Poland-led V4 is focused on tackling energy and military security issues among its member states and is eager to develop flexible communicative formats with adjacent countries; the Central European Initiative extends the concept of Central Europe to the Balkans, and the Hungary-driven Danube-based regionalism is basically about jointly managing a plethora of soft security and transportation projects (www.danube-region.eu). Among the three it is the V4 that has the most immediate bearing for the EU’s relations with Russia in their common neighbourhood area.

The V4 identity discourses focus on two mutually correlative nodal points – the historical trauma of imperial submissions and well articulated democratic attitudes. This is why EU’s core narratives – Europeanization and normative expansion – find a fertile ground here. The V4 strongly positions itself within a trans-Atlantic security community and calls for boosting EU security functions, including conflict management resources: by 2016 the V4 pledged to form a Visegrád battlegroup as a regional contribution to hard security agenda. Cyber-security and energy security – including the mechanisms for mutual support in
case of energy disruptions (*Declaration of V4 Energy Ministers 2011*) – are also matters of key importance, including in the framework of V4’s cooperation with eastern partners (*For a More Effective and Stronger Common Security and Defence Policy 2013 Declaration of the Visegrad Group Foreign Ministers 2013*).

The outward role of the V4 appears to derive from the group’s European commitments. The four Central European countries are eager to engage their East European neighbours by developing “V4 – Eastern Partnership” program. By the same token, the V4 members support the Southern Energy Corridor facilitating the access of countries of Central-, East- and South-East-Europe to gas and oil supplies from the Caspian Sea region and the Middle East thus reducing their dependencies from Russia (*Press Statement of Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai delivered after the Extended Energy Security Summit of the V4 Countries 2010*). They also advocate measures for liberalization of the energy market and competitive energy prices, support the continuing Europeanization of EaP countries; and are critical to the human rights situation in Russia (*Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad, Nordic and Baltic countries 2013*).

Obviously, Russia’s attitudes to the region of Central Europe are drastically different. For Moscow most of Central European nations are culturally close but politically unfriendly. Indeed, the V4 countries share the history of challenging the Soviet Union whose fall in 1991 was characterized by Vladimir Putin as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 21st century. Poland’s role as the strongest lobbyist for Ukraine in Brussels seems geopolitically unacceptable and irritating for Russia.

Thus, as we see, the countries of Central Europe are still in the process of carving out their proper role identities within the EU and simultaneously developing their outreach strategies. They are sources of multiple institutional initiatives aimed at engaging a wider circle of countries into the Europeanization process, yet in the meantime they themselves are objects of criticism from major EU actors for insufficient compliance with the European normative standards (in particular, this is nowadays the case of Hungary, yet the governments of Poland and Slovakia have also earlier had similar problems). Despite those cleavages the attempts to draw political lines between “old” and “new” Europe – initially articulated by Washington and then reinterpreted by Moscow as a distinction between “good” and “bad” Europeans – by and large failed, leaving scarce leverage for Russia to build its European strategy on dividing its neighbours into different identity-related categories. The inception and maturing of the Berlin – Warsaw axis is a game-changing move that not only legitimizes Poland’s role as the key partner for Germany in Europe, but also augurs closer coordination of their policies towards Russia and common neighbourhood countries (*The Visegrad Group and Germany Foreign Ministers Statement on the Eastern Partnership 2011*).

**6.3.1.2. Model 2** – in which the EU is an outsider, while Russia is an insider – embraces two regional cases, non-EU Eastern Europe and the Caspian Sea regi-
This model starkly differs from the first one discussed above. It is characterized by weak – if ever existent – institutionalization: neither of the two regions is cemented by more or less binding institutional commitments. They also lack common identity discourses, as well as external spillover effects – neither Eastern Europe nor the Caspian Sea region think of themselves as model regions eager to project their norms to other regions. In both cases Russia claims to have an upper hand in shaping regional milieux, and takes – sometimes aggressively – protective stand against EU’s attempts to have its say there.

Eastern Europe is a very volatile region, where interests and identities of its key actors are far from fixed. The region is mostly shaped by a competition between Moscow and Brussels, but it cannot be easily divided into “Russian” and “European” segments – in fact, being “pro-Russian” or “pro-European” is a matter of interpretations. The elites in Ukraine, Moldova and – to a certain extent – Belarus often choose to portray themselves as being different from Russia, in the meantime being aware of their dependence on Russian energy resources and military power. Russia, from its part, does its best to present itself as a country belonging to this region that it alternatively might call “a different / non-Western Europe”. However, the very structure of EU’s – as well as Ukrainian and Moldovan – discourses grounded in the inescapable choice between joining Russian or European models of integration ascribe to Russia external characteristics by placing it in the same category of outsiders as the EU.

In fact, it is Eastern Europe’s positioning between the EU and Russia and the structural impossibility to make either identity-based or institutional choice between Moscow and Brussels that constitutes region’s specific role identity. This situation enhances two interrelated foreign policy models: a multi-vectored diplomacy of balancing between the two hegemonic poles, and a zero-sum game bargaining (presuming that the more EU turns out of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, the more they are to cooperate with Russia). As an ideal model for foreign policy, most of the regional actors seem to prefer multilateralism with collective consultations and decision-making by multiple parties (Lo 2011: 369). Yet this is hardly a completely feasible option within the system of spheres of influence that leaves little room for Russia’s Eastern European neighbours’ political strategies of their own. Power-based system of international relations reduces the role of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus to junior partners of great powers, and forces them to the spheres of influence shaped by the EU that will always prevail as a source of normative power, and Russia with its domination in hard security domain.

As seen from inter-subjective perspective, Eastern Europe – with Russia as its element – represents a political challenge for the EU. On the one hand, should the EU opt for consistently playing its cherished “normative power” role, Ukraine under the Yanukovich regime ought to be increasingly marginalized and therefore will most likely fall in the Russian sphere of influence. On the other hand, a more pragmatic attitude to Ukraine would lead to signing the much awaited Associati-
on Agreement in spite of practices of selective justice that irk many Europeans. But should the EU choose to close its eyes on the Timoshenko affair, it would hardly manage to justify its continuing focus on predominantly normative issues in relations with Russia – like limitations of civil freedoms, political repressions, etc.

In the Caspian Sea region Russia’s legitimate belonging to the regional milieu is not contested, but Russia faces a strong competition from external powers, including the EU. Moscow and Brussels take incompatible positions towards the whole set of energy issues: the EU supports Southern Gas Corridor with Nabucco and Trans Caspian Pipeline System as its key elements (http://europa.eu) while Russia develops South Stream project. Besides, the EU has its say in the regional dynamics via EaP (where Azerbaijan is a member) and European energy companies working in the region.

It is the absence of common approaches to the key energy issues – the delimitation of the Caspian seabed and the competition in gas transportation projects – that created preconditions for securitizing the regional milieu (Michaletos 2012). In particular, Russia increasingly considers Astrakhan’ as its military outpost in the Caspian Sea (Hayashi at all 2013).

The Caspian Sea region, as well as Eastern Europe, clearly demonstrates that even being a regional insider Russia has to compete for the influence with the explicitly extra-regional powers (Labban 2009: 1–7). This drastically differs from the regions – like Central Europe and the Norden – that are plugged in the EU project and where no external power has chances for a comparable impact. Apparently, it is the lack of normative resources and soft power traction, as well as institutional weakness that make Russian positions in the two regions of this model vulnerable and unstable, and Russian policies more reactive than proactive.

6.3.1.3. Model 3 – where both Russia and the EU are regional insiders – encompasses the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea regions. It is mainly in these two regions that the EU offered “Russia access to regional-level international societies with a thicker set of institutions than are available in its relations with the United States and Asia” (Aalto 2007: 459). With all controversies, the Nord Stream project can serve one of few examples of economic compatibility between Russia and major gas consuming countries in Western Europe. In the same vein, with all its limitations, the Russian–Polish agreement on visa-free border-crossing regime for the residents of Kaliningrad region (oblast) and two neighbouring Polish voivodeships is a good argument for a more comprehensive visa facilitation bargaining between Russia and the EU (Korejba 2012).

Yet paradoxically, an equal status of the region-shapers, however, is hardly conducive to a fruitful dialogue, since Russia is fully aware that from 1990s Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania perceived the Baltic Sea regionalism as a step to EU and NATO membership, along with Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Georgia for
whom the Black Sea region-making was in one way or another inscribed in their Europeanization drive. Consequently, many of regional actors were redefining “their identities in opposition to an “other” symbolized by Russia – the imperial, barbaric neighbour” (Cuita 2008: 133). From its part, Russia proved unable to counter this negative othering by promoting its own long-term regional projects in either Baltic Sea or Black Sea regions, and has chosen to compensate the shortage of strategy with distancing from the EU and refusing to join the EU-centred normative order. Russia’s – mostly rhetorical – claims for equality in the absence of long-term alternative strategies of region-building were conducive to the reproduction on the regional level of communicative disconnections between Moscow and Brussels.

In spite of optimistic expectations for a thicker EU–Russia convergence on regional levels (Aalto 2007: 471, 747), the two parties are steadily drifting apart from each other. Identity-wise, Russia’s association with the European idea – with all undeniable inter-subjectivity of Russia–EU relations – turn out not that strong. Even the market – as an international institution potentially conducive to a more solidarist type of interaction – played a divisive role in both regions of the 3rd model due to different conceptions of energy transportation routes. Solidarity within the Black Sea region is undermined by a competition between the Russia-sponsored South Stream project and its EU-supported alternative Nabucco. The Baltic Sea region is a home to two other competing approaches to energy business: the Russian–German Nord Stream project that may potentially enlarge to the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and a nascent strategy-in-the-making of a group of Baltic and Central European states eager to rid themselves of excessive energy dependence from Russia by means of diversifying their supplies and investing in alternative sources of energy production (renewables, shale gas, nuclear energy, etc.), on the other. In the Roadmap of the EU–Russia Energy Cooperation till 2050 both parties have agreed on two most important points – energy interdependency (Kaliningrad from Lithuania, the three Baltic states from Russia and Belarus) and diversification of energy supplies, yet these two notions are differently understood by the parties involved. As the head of the Russian Permanent Mission in the EU Vladimir Chizhov argued, instead of interdependence some Baltic and Central European countries are longing for energy independence from Russia, which is hardly achievable technologically. As for diversification, this is exactly what Russia believes to contribute to by developing South Stream and planning for constructing new legs of the Nord Stream (Chizhov 2013).

Moscow often portrays the Baltic Sea Region as one of interfaces where Russia faces serious problems in dealing with the EU. The Kremlin in fact accuses the EU in applying allegedly protectionist measures against Russian investments, impeding Gazprom’s business and derailing for political reasons joint projects like the launching of a unified energy system to embrace Russia, Belarus, Latvia, Li-
thuania, and Estonia. The growing tensions between Russia and the EU (and its member states) in the Baltic Sea region are particularly consequential due to the widely discussed perspectives of the concept of “Core Europe” to potentially encompass Germany, Northern Europe, Central Europe and the Baltic Sea region. Should a new constellation of economic and political forces take a more concrete shape in a long run, the future contours of the EU – Russian relations will to a very large extent be dependent on a number of developments either spurred by countries belonging to these regions or unfolding in their premises. The most important political problem for Russia is whether the potential of the existing mechanisms of Russia’s engagement with its Baltic partners (the Nord Stream project, the German – Poland – Russia triangular diplomacy, etc.) would be sufficient to counter a well pronounced series of opposite moves (such as the legal process against Gazprom spurred by Lithuania and the Czech Republic, the energy security policy coordination mechanisms between the Visegrad Four and the Baltic countries, etc.).

By and large, the future of the Baltic Sea region is defined by the collision between at least two different versions of energy regionalism. One is the model of the Russian–German energy condominium rhetorically supported by Brussels and some Scandinavian countries. Another model is shaped by alternative visions of energy security mainly emanated from the three eastern Baltic states in conjunction with their V4 partners. Their strategy includes heavy accent on practically implementing the idea of energy diversification that presupposes forming coalitions to balance the Russian influence and preventing Gazprom from acquiring new energy assets in the region. For Baltic and the V4 states the Nord Stream project is problematic since it maintains non-competitive prices and technically creates preconditions for disrupting Russia’s energy supplies to the Baltic states while continuing deliveries to Western European consumers (Tarus and Crandall 2012: 77–90). The Baltic countries are also wary of the EU’s policies of introducing stricter environmental protection regulations that can eventually lead to the raising energy prices due to new investments in expensive technologies and potentially to the growing dependence from Russia. This explains the interest of Baltic states in the exploration of shale gas reserves, building of liquefied natural gas terminals, investing in renewables, and the search for alternative transportation routes.

In spite of the tensions between different visions of regionalism in the Baltic Sea, in this region Russia and the EU possess a better record of cooperation than in the Black Sea. As the recent military exercises demonstrated (Weier 2013), for Moscow the Black Sea is mostly a region emanating threats to Russian security than an interface for cooperation. Again, it is the lack of a normative appeal that seriously undermines Russia’s policies in both regions.

6.3.1.4. Model 4 – under which both the EU and Russia are formally outsiders – embraces South Caucasus and Central Asia. In these cases there are po-
tentialities for both cooperation (the EU mediating between Moscow and Tbilisi after the Georgia war in 2008) and competition (basically in soft power domain) between Moscow and Brussels. Multiple external overlays (China, Turkey, United States) are indispensable elements of regional policy constellations, which can be explained by almost non-existent institutional basis for regions’ cohesiveness and the deliberate preferences of regional actors for multi-vectored diplomacies.

It appears that Central Asia and South Caucasus represent a strong challenge for the EU international role identity since the widely used otherwise normative discourse does not bring here the desired communicative outcomes. This is why the EU had to refocus / recalibrate its normative agenda from promoting human rights and civil freedoms to supporting good governance and sustainable development (The EU and Central Asia: the New Partnership in Action 2009).

Yet Russia as well had to partly adjust its policies to the Central Asian regimes. This is especially the case of Russian-speaking population that in most of other post-Soviet regions is elevated to the highest rank in Russian priorities. Yet in Central Asia Moscow has never seriously raised this flammable issue, which might be interpreted as part of Russia’s policy of accommodating the Central Asian dictatorships and avoiding conflicts with them (Malashenko 2012).

As we see, countries of the regions under consideration are reluctant to accept either European or Russian normative supremacy, yet are they capable of producing their own norms instead? Examples of Central Asia and South Caucasus depreciate one of the key claims of post-colonial theorizing, namely that one presuming the ability of non-Western regions not only to reject Western norms, but also to “replace or modify them with ones which are consistent with their interests and identities” (Acharya 2011: 99). The situation on the ground looks less certain: in fact, both Central Asia and South Caucasus are examples of under-regionalized areas that suffer exactly from the lack of norms to institutionally bind the countries. This normative deficit is exacerbated by either inability or unwillingness to adopt European norms and, consequently, to integrate with a Europe-centric normative order.

The experiences of the two regions also question the relevance of the principle of “regional solutions for regional problems” that is portrayed as key to non-Western regional actors’ search for their autonomies in regional settings (Acharya 2011: 102). None of Central Asian and South Caucasian countries seriously stands for keeping outsiders aside as a principle of their policies; moreover, some of them (especially Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia) welcome the actorship of external powers and do their best for taking practical advantages of competition between them (a practice known as multi-vectored diplomacy).
6.4. Conclusions

In the concluding section I would like to briefly compare Russia’s and the EU’s policies as region-makers, bearing in mind their different role identities and instruments.

As an insider to regions of common neighbourhood, Russia faces serious competition with the EU (as well as other major actors) and tries to avoid it by downplaying the dissimilarities between the Eurasian Union project and the European integration. In some cases (like in Eastern Europe) Russia advocates inclusive versions of regional integration presupposing some de-bordering connotations (the rhetoric of closer cooperation and even convergence between the “western” and “eastern” flanks of integrative processes in a wider Europe), while in other situations Moscow sticks with clearly articulated bordered approaches (in the Caspian Sea, for example). Yet by and large, Russia has voluntarily closed for itself the possibilities for both co-making / co-sponsoring region-building projects with the EU, and pragmatically using regional institutions as a means for diversifying its channels of communication with Europe. This added strong notes of conflictuality in Russia’s communication with the EU in various regional formats.

As an outsider, Russia pursues a policy of alluring its South Caucasian and Central Asian neighbours in the Moscow-sponsored integrative project of the Eurasian Union mainly through soft power mechanisms. Simultaneously Russia tries to challenge its status as an outsider by strengthening its military presence in South Caucasus (in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Armenia) and Central Asia (Tajikistan). In the meantime, Russia’s impact on the Nordic and Central Europe is miniscule, which attests Russia’s scarce resources for influencing developments to the west of its borders.

As an insider, the EU hosts a number of regional projects that maintain institutional diversity within the Union, on the one hand, and are instrumental in developing rather variegated policy approaches to EU’s neighbours. In fact, it is countries forming the regions of Nordic Europe and Central Europe that are the most instrumental in shaping EU’s modus operandi in the adjacent regions, with the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea regions remaining the key laboratories of EU–Russia communications with all their complications and inconsistencies.

As an outsider, the EU combines “soft” securitization of its eastern neighbours with attempts to normatively transform them. The key problems are the lack of EU’s security resources in frozen conflicts (Siddi and Gaweda 2012: 23), as well as limited utility of the normative power policy. EU’s normative power projection implies the distinction between European Self and a variety of regional Others with different degrees of adaptability. In some cases the EU has to reconsider the universality of its normative appeal and recognize the limits of its applicability even within the EaP.
The different patterns of regionalism analysed in this paper hopefully can elucidate the variety of role identities between the EU, Russia and their common neighbours. As analytical models, they may be used for better comprehending the dynamics of the inside–outside relationship based on a combination of discursive and institutional practices.

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Uneven Development Spatial Representations. Spatial Planning in Southeastern Europe as Shaped by Supranational Formations

KOSTIS PLEVRIS

7.1. Introduction

Territorial identity in Southeastern Europe (SEE) is shaped by the combined action of several supranational formations. Some of those institutions are more or less directly affiliated to regional planning, whilst others are indeed not, exercising influence on territorial issues mainly through financial paths (World Bank, EBRD, IMF). Furthermore, while some of those institutions actively form the regional agenda of SEE countries – obliging the latter to cooperate with certain directives – others mostly constitute think-tanks exercising social coercion and influencing the region’s leaders.

Without denying that it would be interesting to investigate each supranational body in an ideographic way, this does not seem to us the right path to interpret SEE’s emerging territorial identity and conciseness, resulting from these formations’ action; first, for territorial identities – as shared conceptual representations of a concrete space – to be studied, the totality of social relations is to be posited. This does not mean that we are to engage ourselves in an extensive registration of social activities and interactions that give birth to those conceptions but rather to interpret the process that renders abstract social relations concrete for each spatial context. As Lefebvre has underlined, our object of contemplation lies only in the totality of social relations (1985: 10 but also Gramsci 1972: 359). Second, these spatial conceptions exist as representations of a materially existing world, as objective forms of Being. In our case, I will show that material relations that are represented here derive from uneven development in multiple scales: international, regional, and intra-urban.
Therefore, these supranational formations are not independent bodies, but get articulated to national and local political power relations, constituting a continuum of political power. They reproduce a certain hegemony that enables certain material relationships to flourish, while banning antagonistic ones.

Critical urban studies can offer a certain interpretation of material practices exerted in space, their spatial representations and political forms of power. Space emerges here as the necessary condition for the interpretation of all sociological fields. However, urban studies should not attempt a distinct position compared to the other fields – an inner development of their corpus: what they should do is offer their own epistemology and methodology in the interpretation of the whole social reality. This derives from a certain approach, claiming that space is not the “philosophical stone” of a certain academic field, not even a conceptual tool, but – all along with time – an objective form of Being. Whichever approach attempts to tackle social phenomena without interpreting their spatial and temporal forms inside the totality of social relations, distorts its object of contemplation and interprets social reality only partially, even by claiming to be scientific.

Particularly for the case of SEE it is important to bear in mind that the region has entered the world of commodity and capital flows quite fiercely, in contrast with earlier territorial approaches. Thereby, what takes place here is not only a physical change of the cities (urban sprawl, periurbanization, tertiarization, decentralization, etc.) but a broader change, which is not limited neither to the cities’ built forms, nor to those social relations that are developed strictly on a city-wide basis. Supranational bodies participate in these relationships not as ideographic cases, but as products and active reproducers of them. Certainly, these are not the sole products or reproducers of those social relations, however they provide useful insights in the way capitalist relations are built in the region. They affect ideology, the science of planning and the identity of Southeast European cities. They also provide an example of how the political affects material reality, without losing its organic connection with the latter. Therefore, I shall proceed with their study.

7.2. Spatial representations as social representations

Let us examine the documentation of those supranational bodies regarding spatial planning. What do we see in their cartography? We find of course a territorial nomenclature, a legend, a colour or a hatch which is chosen for “economic regions”, “Trans-European networks”, “growth poles”, statistical “NUTS units”, “suburban belts”, “the fringe” or “functional urban zones”. I claim that these conceptualizations have a double interpretation: on the one hand, they reflect a certain approach for each region, based on a certain accumulation strategy of antagonistic relations. Therefore, the choice of the above spatial representations
is simultaneously a denotation of what qualities of space actually matter. On the other hand, however, the same representations induce a certain distortion: they “fetishize” all spatial relations reducing them to the common denominator of “urban growth”, which now seems the essence of all social interactions.

But the above is not simply a conceptual order imposed upon the material world; besides, every object is first conceived and afterwards realized or, in other words, it is conceived in terms of a realization process following, no matter if this refers to a simple work or a social complex of activities. Therefore, conceptions based on accumulation strategies and antagonistic relations exist by being affiliated to analogous material activities.

But what about the distortions those conceptions bring about? Representations of space are affiliated to a world of capital flows, where circulation and production of values is the dominant social activity. Issues of growth, as expressed in urban development, become the common denominator of all territorial scales: they make space legible mainly through their own truth. In addition, those representations do something more regarding distortions, something that can explicitly be seen in peripheral places: they attribute a false sense of integrity and connectivity. They not only disarticulate their object’s reality from the rest of social relations, highlighting only the economic dimension, but also attribute a false sense of equality, behind a discourse of general connectivity, “openness” and “integrity”. They attempt to convene space in a closed narrative, usually western-oriented (Massey 2005: 71), which is affiliated to neoliberal and uneven development concepts. The latter means that those conceptions hide a significant transfer of value between certain spatial contexts\(^1\).

But what is maybe most important is that the above process is not just a conceptual reality that is simply produced by a social system: capital’s spatiality reduces and distorts reality because this constitutes another condition of its reproduction, all along the necessary material conditions emanating from the market.

That is why political mediation of territorial identity is very important especially in terms of how the latter is formed and socially applied. Dominant representations of space, as expressed in strategic documents or the state discourse, constitute the intellectual order that certain groups in society impose upon the rest. Hence, philosophical conceptions cannot be distanced from politics (Gramsci 1972: 327). Hegemonic concepts of the world influence “common sense”, which is usually not capable of a concrete systematization. Mental maps are never random, because space is not a passive form, but is constructed through human me-

\(^1\) The above-described process of eclecticism and distortion is not delimited only in the field of space: representations of space are also implicitly distortions of time; time as solidified inside space, as the form of temporal ends that such representations of space serve (inversely, temporal representations are also distortions of space, making the latter appear as a timeline of consecutive frames).
Hegemonic discourse is allocated to multiple domains, such as theoretical research, geographical views, sociological facts and psychological impressions. This “logical unity” disguises political questions into insoluble cultural questions (Gramsci 1972: 149) and repels the real, distorts it, and eventually tries to conform it to quantifiable measures, namely market produced forms. These distortions affect the lives of millions of people. They boost certain regions and condemn others. They have an inner scientific organization pattern and are publicly proposed by intellectuals in order to accomplish particular economic and political ends. Therefore, dominant identities and “feelings” of conciseness are also active organizers of the realization of those aims. Political power attempts to achieve hegemony, namely a social reproduction of its ends through both force and consent. This enables material relations and all political institutions to reproduce their domination in a constantly expanding base.

Territorial identities and feelings of conciseness are primarily reproduced in order to serve such a double perspective; they should not be viewed as romantic conceptions, even if they carry multiple layers of a precedent everyday life and symbolic ensembles. Of course, as “identities”, they possess a strong cultural background. They are formed by stapling different partial knowledges of reality, as well as precedent cultural patterns influencing our impression of our world.

But why does partiality prevail? It is because of unequal political participation, labour division and uneven distribution of social wealth: someone may be well acquainted of certain technical aspects of regional planning, for example GIS technology. Someone else may possess legal knowledge, for example regarding the relationship between forms of governance and regional planning. A third one may be specialized into measuring social discrepancies, for example by presenting graphs and spreadsheets. A politician from the majority will inherently understand whether the regional plan’s propositions will enable him to enjoy another four years in the local government. Last, there will surely exist civilians who know nothing about all these, but will be assumed to participate in an “open dialogue”, where the public is able to submit its proposals. Surely, all of the above persons or social groups hold partial or minimal interpretations of the whole reality. Even the professionals, tend to be specialists of a field extremely special.

On the other hand, this partial view of reality and the particular ends it serves, should be acknowledged by geographers and become the starting point of their research. This research should accept reality “as it is”, in order to understand the changing identity of its object; it should accept social relations’ analogues in the material and conceptual world. Geographers should interpret social reality bearing in mind that all products of human thought – especially the institutionalized ones – are characterized by the abstractions of metonymy and metaphor, in which Lefebvre was referring to: metaphor necessitates a distance of human experience from space, even a complete transfer of human bodies out of
their self (Lefebvre 1991: 98). Specialists, most intellectuals and professionals reproduce ideas that are not connected with everyday life inside space. Therefore, they reproduce the deadness of space and that is why we must engage ourselves in an attempt to fill the gap between metaphorical and material space (N. Smith 1984: 224); otherwise any territorial identity proposed will refer only to itself. Metonymy leads to an appropriation of the ensemble through the partial (Lefebvre 1991: 98). As we have just seen, this procedure is reinforced by symbolic dipoles: in our case, SEE’s identity may become “land of Balkan mentality” or “crossroad of civilizations”, “second-class EU member” or “borderland of Europe”, “primitive land” or “area with potentialities” and so on, depending on various political motivations. These dipoles get articulated or disarticulated with local “power relations” and constitute a nexus of social stances that is socially formed, but also socially distorted.

What I have attempted to show in the above approach is that there is no “natural law” for interpreting territorial identity. The latter is not an archaic attribute of a certain region, neither does it derive from ideals that leaders and citizens may pull out from their past, or the perspectives they may adopt, without denying that all the former play a minor role in identity formation; territorial identity is a representation produced by human work in its most general social form, namely a conception born out of the production of a “second nature” (N. Smith 1984) out of the given one.

Thus, territorial identity should be contemplated as being closely connected to the economic and political reality. However, other social insights (historical, religious, imaginary, etc.) should also be taken into account, in order to gradually link our object of contemplation to the totality of social relations. Contrary, all other approaches (cultural interpretations included) shed light to our object starting from pre-defined and static points. Ultimately, they fail to understand the object as it really is. They end up becoming paradigms.

7.3. Planning representations as persisting paradigms

Now that I have reached a critical point regarding identity formation and conceptualization of reality, I shall study certain examples from the documentation and official discourse of supranational bodies – which are involved in regional development in SEE – in close connection to the economic and political dimensions that are brought about by uneven development.

I shall start with the proper definition of the city itself. Many institutions, such as the EU ESPON project (2012), or the World Bank (2009), use a methodology which takes into account the organic relations of districts neighbour to the city’s core. These can be based on commuting to work (Hall and Pain 2006), economic density (World Bank 2009) or other statistic thresholds from economic life. They lead to propose indexes for determining the urban area, such as “Larger
Urban Zone”, “Mega City Region” or “Agglomeration Index”, in order to sketch
the reality that capitalist relations spatially reproduce; a reality reduced to simple
qualitative attributes that can be measured quantitatively. This is the essential
attribute that all the above theories share. Even if they extend urban space further
than its older administrative limits, they do so in the expense of the rich and
complex reality a place may possibly be. Similarly, even if using terminologies
such as “integration”, “space of flows” or “development of place”, they immanently
admit that their logical foundation resides on a certain reduction of space to
the world that commodity circulation implies. The same goes regarding wider
“economic regions” and “transport areas”, namely international territories which
reduce space’s content to market produced forms of “developmental potentiality”.

Ultimately, the reduction of space is simultaneously a process of eclectic
promotion of certain places inside space. The ESPON document puts it this way:
“globally interconnected” cities must be encouraged to further develop their ur-
ban area, by cooperating “with neighbouring territories to release pressure on
housing and infrastructure” (ESPON 2012: 23). This à la carte planning (Giannakourou 2000) has been further implemented with the treaty of Lisbon (2007), in
which the directives of peripheral competition have dominated. Similarly, the
ESDP and the later VISION PLANET (2000) project, introduce the geographical
competition of areas, through the adoption of “dynamic regions”, “gradual city-
ranking”, “gateway cities” and “city clusters” (ESDP 1999: 20–22). At least, the
World Bank puts it more straightforward, without false “polycentric” terms: glob-
al cities must further grow to diffuse wealth, while laggards should structurally be
conformed to a new position, mainly through human migration (World Bank
2009: 231).

However, in all cases, this immanent admittance of a “natural” existence of
laggards and leaders is never studied in its social genesis, but by using hyper-
historical rules. For example, de-industrialization, according to the Council of
Europe, is driven by globalization dynamics, and urban gentrification appears
eclectic just because brownfield sites must change their land use in the new era
(Council of Europe 2000: 16). The World Bank disseminates directives based on
“realistic” attributes, “which depend on the stage of development and the fiscal
institutional capacities” (World Bank 2008: 258–259). The EBRD claims, concern-
ing capital’s circulation, that “lower tariff and non-tariff trade barriers should in-
crease trade and enhance consumer choice” so that “producers within a regional
integration grouping can benefit from increased market size”, while “countries
within a regional integration area can build cross-border production chains by
leveraging each other’s comparative advantages and subsequently exporting the
finished product outside that area” (EBRD 2012). In all cases, hyper-historicity
masks the social production of space and represents space using mathematical,
physical and logical models.
The above definitions are mostly based on particular cities, forming a nexus of commodity circulation and production sites. Thus they may seem to be applied in certain cases only; however, they bring the totality of European space before what Lefebvre proposed: a complete urbanization of society. This means that the organization of space in such patterns, of developed and underdeveloped regions, serves certain economic relations, which necessitate the subordination of the majority of places to the rest. These material relations bear new territorial identities to SEE cities: they achieve for the first time a general urbanization of society, albeit on an uneven development basis. Those relations were able to be generalized only after the fall of older “socialist” social systems. But I shall return to this point later.

I will now study the planning frameworks that such institutions use. There is a certain spatial policy promoted by EU to all SEE countries concerning regional planning frameworks; EU planners demand that post-socialist cities adjust their planning policy in order to convene to the “image of Europe” in a world of capital flows. Strategic plans are “actively being promoted by European Union initiatives” (Healey 2004) and are preferred compared to more detailed urban or regional plans. However, behind the embellished image of a dynamic and adjustable modern plan, there is a certain material reality. That is, strategic plans stand as major tools of space production, without the constraints that detailed urban plans dispose. The latter are reduced to mere physicalist interventions or proposals for the regeneration of city areas. Strategic plans represent a space of multiple locations for capital investment, enabling the latter to choose among a variation of uses. This process is accentuated during economic crisis periods, which upgrade the importance of cities, but also drives them to a generalized competition, into a worldwide quest for capital attraction.

EU policies are in line here with the World Bank’s ones. According to the latter, the master plan’s role should be delimited to a simple indication of public facilities, drastically cutting most regulations (World Bank 1991: 54). It is not accidental that the public call for privatization of housing estates, recreation facilities, garbage treatment, water supply and public transport, but also the turn towards unproductive forms of consumption, follow the introduction of such planning conceptions. This does not only concern the degradation of areas that are heavily charged with urban interventions, but also the selective investment of capital in those urban areas, wherein the investment flows choose to be channelled. Ultimately, an uneven development of the city area unfolds; some areas enjoy direct investments and others are condemned into abandonment, accentuated by the given withdrawal of state from welfare policies. Territorial identity is therefore changing according to a new material reality. However, the state or local authorities, can integrate in their official discourse this selectiveness through a distorted – although hegemonic – conceptual scheme that hides unevenness and projects “urban restoration”, “rejuvenation” or “upgrade” of the whole city,
whilst those interventions are applied to very few locations: consciousness is achieved, albeit through political mediation that curbs – for the moment – centrifugal fragmentation.

Besides, this selective place development refers not only to certain cities, but to wider areas; this can be evidenced through EU’s and European Council’s major strategic spatial document, the European Spatial Development Plan (ESDP). The spatial representations used therein constitute part of hegemonic discourse that expresses, but also actively reproduces spatial polarizations. Indeed, multiple terms used in the plan, such as “polycentric regions”, “balanced spatial structure”, “dynamic zones of integration” and “compact settlements and corridors” do not only imply an uneven development practice, but also render them publicly hegemonic, by giving to EU’s discourse a sense of inner organization and confidence. Through its articulation with political mediation, the plan actually manages to represent European polarization in false terms. “Polycentric” discourse masks material unevenness, but also renders historically natural this particular type of development\(^1\). Particularly concerning SEE, by using spatial metaphors in its institutional maps and framing particular regions as “central” against “peripheral”, the ESDP subverts the initial aim of “European integration” to a “missing networks” discourse and, eventually, ends up to be considered normal to speak about a generalized mobility, where the South has less access to “flows” (Jensen and Richardson 2003). Material practices are obscured through the representations used in the plan, transforming questions of unevenness to issues of accessibility.

Let us now have a look at EU’s ESPON project. When the latter claims that “all territories can be globally competitive”, this comes in conflict with the different projected “integration” that is programmed for North-West Europe, specializing in technological and upmarket sectors, as compared to Eastern and Southern Europe, specializing in labour intensive production (2012: 6, 12). What is masked here is that the latter’s regions will subsist a geographic transfer of value, resulting from mutual differences in productivity and organic composition of capital (cf. Hadjimichalis 1987, chapter 4). But also, their industrial specialization in consumer goods, compared to the productive goods that the core retains for itself, means that part of the value produced in the former will be pocketed by the suppliers of technological equipment\(^2\) (Mandel 1973: 46). In other words some areas will realise less value in situ than they produced, in favour of more capital inten-

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1 In a more general level, the plan distorts the urban problematic per se: especially when it claims that the “anachronistic dualism” of city – periphery has given position to a system of regional integration (ESDP 1999: 19), since there never existed in contemporary European history such a dualism; rather an alternating pattern of developed and underdeveloped places.

2 For a discussion on value transfer resulting from capitalist competition between the two different sectors of industry-productive and consumer goods see: Mandel 1973, Chapter 11.
sive areas. They will also receive much lower inflows of foreign or local direct investment.

Likewise, representations such as “global competitiveness”, but also “poly-centric regions”, “zones of integration” and “developmental corridors” are strongly connected to unevenness. Lefebvre’s argument, that space never exists in itself but always refers to something else, a form seeking for an object to express its content (Lefebvre 2003: 73, 173), holds an exceptional rigour. What is more, according to Healey (2004), is that these territorial conceptions cannot be represented in maps unless in “iconic sketches” they shatter the organic ensemble of what a map used to be. Actually, those particular maps bring the conceptualizations of territorial conciseness before a certain contradiction: national entities, as sketched in traditional maps, come in conflict with the selective reproduction of worldwide economy, regionally planned. Surely, uneven development, especially in a period in which redistributive state policies are absent, cannot be represented by using traditional tools (political maps, graphs and figures on a national level), without putting into question major political foundations. Namely, organization of space into patterns of laggards and winners comes into contrast with the territorial sovereignty of the nation-state, even if the latter’s role is actually forged nowadays. This is why the spatial organization is desperately presented as a bunch of “physical” categories of places: it is the last resort in order to keep together a generalized fragmentation in multiple scales.

But how is this hypothesis particularized in the plan’s content? I claim that what the plan hides is a selective accessibility of wider regions, even countries, to transport corridors and markets for the circulation, exchange and realization of products. If we take a closer look, we will note that European “core” places have a much more upgraded access throughout the continent, while peripheral places are primarily connected coaxially with the core: there is no general mobility equally distributed among all countries. So, if we unveil the narrative of supranational power bodies, we will ascertain that uneven access to infrastructure facilities definitely shapes the material conditions of vast areas of SEE, since it differentiates the distribution of general conditions of circulation and consumption.

\[1\] These arguments seem to be completely absent from the EU documentation. Instead, the latter incites peripheral regions to be specialized in luxury products (while amid economic crisis), in order to assume a distinct position in the world market (ESPON 2012: 12).

\[2\] In an earlier version of European planning, this physicalism was presented through the existence of inter-border situations of “cohesion”, “draining”, “islands” and “exclusions” and the classification of regions as “structurally weak”, undergoing “strong adjustment pressure” and having the possibility to be “climbers through specialisation” (EU 1996: 133–154). In a more modern discourse, this selectiveness is mainly presented through the sites in which transnational companies have chosen to settle their activities. Those host cities servicing global capital are supposed to flourish and drag the rest to prosperity, namely those lying outside the – almost naturally defined – “Pentagon” area (London-Paris-Milan-Munich-Hamburg) or the more scattered “technopole” cities.
On the other hand, hegemonic EU instructions for discipline to the *aquis communautaire* and paternalistic relations between “developed” and “less developed” countries (but the same goes for regions within a nation), shouldn’t distract us from the fact that the “core” needs the “periphery” for its own reproduction. Huge amounts of commodities and FDI flows desperately search to be realised in the European periphery. The growth of public debt in the “periphery” also serves as a condition of accumulation in the “core”. Ultimately patterns of distribution are produced by patterns of production, and vice versa. However, distribution presents a masked “equality” that can primarily be unveiled in the field of production\(^1\).

What is more, given a relative continually shrinking share of EU world trade (ESPON 2012: 8), insufficient infrastructure exacerbates the underdevelopment of peripheral regions. We have to note that all attempts to recover this deficit, through a growing percentage of inter-EU trade, accentuates the crisis of those regions even further: the growth of external trade in order to counterbalance the effects of a falling productivity, given the low level of public and private consumption, results to a development of only those regions that permit capital realisation in times of economic crisis, namely non-peripheral places. Therefore, even if it is a fact that Eastern Europe has slightly elevated its export opportunities (ESPON 2012: 8), these are always distributed unevenly, in favour of cities “anchored” in the world economy. In fact even nations themselves have an inter-

\(^1\) If we would further like to model uneven development, which may be a subject of another article, we should take into account all transfers of value into local relations, which differentiate space. According to Hadjimichalis these concern rates of labour force exploitation, social reproduction values, the organic composition of capital and productivity, turnover time of capital (as being primarily shaped by infrastructures and producer services), labour and capital mobility and, lastly, the possibility of capitalism’s expansion to sectors and areas of non-capitalist spheres. But they also concern direct transfers of financial value, for example through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or state investment, and transfers of living labour (Hadjimichalis 1987: 60–61, 242). External migratory movements, leading to a negative national balance in many cases, or from the periphery to capital cities, should also be taken into account, as they drain from the majority of territories the capital that has been invested there in order to raise and educate the fleeing labour force. However, this explanation is not enough; what is missing is an up-to-date description of capitalist relations, where monopoly capital has ascertained the general organization of global places: values here are not freely exchanged, even at the expense of certain places; big trusts block the road to capital investment in multiple sectors, since this movement can turn commodity production cheaper and lower the profit rate. Places exist as long as they exert an economic activity inside a global division of labour (Mandel 1973: 157), already prepared by the development of capitalism: in its latest version, we should not underestimate the role of multinationals and specifically of monopoly capital, which found a very fertile ground in SEE, since the 1990s. These are the principle relations lying behind the production of a space that provokes a juxtaposition in multiple scales: SEE countries against core ones, peripheries against metropolis and city districts against each other.
est of unevenly developing their region, as this practice orientates economic growth to certain destinations that have a higher multiplier effect per investment. Ultimately we get a pattern of combined development in SEE cities.

The importance of unevenness in the context of the nation-state was underlined by Mandel (1973). The author writes that this process is connected to capitalist extensive reproduction, through the formation of reserve inputs and markets that channel production to selective cities (1973: 56–57). Furthermore, a lower stage of economic development, where petty commodity production prevails and non-economic activities assume a significant portion, enables capital outside this area to start a new cycle of development in the future. This process is further accentuated by the widening of the world market and its competitiveness. Underdeveloped areas stand as potential sites for future development, when certain conditions may permit it: they have cheap labour, low land values and devalued capital. This combined development model suits perfectly to Eastern Europe, material reality and identity, where industrial relics and high rates of unemployment stand throughout its countries’ regions. The above image cannot be given from a worldwide or a nation-wide perspective that supranational bodies’ literature use, neglecting the relation of place formation and capitalism. Contrary, the above process results in all geographical scales to be excessively polarised: “core” European nations against the rest, national metropolis against peripheries, but also wealthy suburbs against degraded districts, where people live on the subsistence level.

But, in order for space to be pitted against each other, it must first be homogenized. Here rests a fundamental point in order to sketch identity formation: homogenization does not refer to particular economic activities, which besides are multiple and follow an international division of labour, but to the reduction of space to a potential locus for extracting a profit rate: a city becomes an agglomerated economy, a natural site is now a potential tourist resort, even a human person actually becomes a factor of production. Meanwhile, however, capital differentiates regions, albeit also in terms of profit rates; it diversifies them into productive and non-productive, high tech or labour intensive, accessible and not so much accessible, protected by trust coalitions and non-protected/“laissez passer” zones. This is the only way for it to guarantee the foundations of its reproduction, which in a general equitation case would not exist, since if global competition would perpetually horizontally push profits downwards, this would undermine capitalism’s own existence.

This is a central problem in capitalism’s reproduction; territorial consciousness and identity are closely connected to this material reproduction of unevenness in multiple scales. I should also add here, that the multiplicity of scales in which capitalist reproduction is to be found, is not just an application of capitalism’s uneven essence in parallel spatial contexts; contrary, the existence of a global, a regional and an urban scale constitute principally a movement inherent to
capitalism, as it steadily transforms from abstract to concrete. Besides, scale is nowhere to be found in nature, it is rather a project of capital (Smith 1984: 229): capital reproduces geographical reality and conceptions into regions, nations and supranational blocs. That is why I believe that those relations attain their full social being only at the end of this process towards the concrete, namely in the context of cities themselves: only here is social labour materialized. Cities shed at the same time insights to the abstract and the concrete.

Therefore, an analytical approach of capitalism is never enough; in this way our contemplation will remain abstract. We have to reconstruct our object of contemplation through an inductive approach that must follow as well: this can take place only in the concrete space of urban everyday life, where all material conditions and representations appear. Only here, can multiple social insights be infiltrated, in order to gradually link our object of contemplation to the totality of social relations. That is why it is important to study urban fragments, since they may enable us to incorporate in our research multiple representational contents, the so-called “minor” ones: residual abstractions of older relations that still live on, albeit distorted and conformed in the contemporary context (e.g. localist and nationalist fragments). Or, others born from the new social context that people live in (e.g. consumer identities, feeling of belonging).

Thereby, the abstract space of international capital flows (by no means less real – actually differentiation is more visible here) cannot be separated from that of regional inequalities and urban differentiations. Cities therefore, as a product of the above essence, contain on a higher level the identity and materiality of contemporary society, in both its abstract and concrete form. The urban environment is not just a built ensemble, but brings together different contents in a condensed form. Therefore, the urban fabric is closely related to the social system in place and cannot be seen outside it, since productive labour is projected into the production of space (Lefebvre 2003: 155).

What derives from such an interpretation is crucial for understanding questions concerning social representations. First, there is a single “urban problematic”, shaped by the combined action of capitalist relations in all scales. All cities and regions co-shape it; there is no indiscriminate application of abstract capitalist relations in the case of each territorial scale. Second, territorial identity should be interpreted as a conceptual representation, deriving from a nexus of social relationships, albeit taking a concrete form affiliated to a particular spatial context.

7.4. Transformation process as necessary to interpret SEE’s reality

In the above passages I proposed a methodological context, in order to sketch the emerging territorial identity and conciseness of SEE cities. I underlined the significance of conceiving a path that can lead through its unfolding to
the totality of social relations of which a certain spatial context takes parts. But is
the totality of social relations identified to a logical process from the abstract
commodity relations to the concrete everyday life in the urban environment?
Gramsci here once again provides valuable insights regarding the bridging of spir-
itual conceptions with reality: according to him, every attempt to contemplate
contemporary relations cannot be separated from an awareness of the historical
development of contemplation itself. He insists that it is not enough to know the
ensemble of relations as they exist at any given time, but “they must be known
genetically, in the movement of their formation” (Gramsci 1972: 353). Therefore,
there is a process of becoming of social relations that must be primarily taken
into account for the approach of our territorial context.

This process cannot fit inside that intellectual discourse which studies SEE
cities in an ideographic way, or which broadly observes and categorises urban
phenomena under morphological, institutional, cultural, technical, behavioural
and so on patterns. Neither can it be studied through those “transitional” ap-
proaches that view SEE countries as social formations moving linearly from the
past to the present, implying that previous influences (usually “totalitarian”) ori-
entate the restructuring of “late modernity” (Tsenkova, Nedovic-Budic, and Mar-
cuse 2006: 10–11). Neither through the “path-dependency” discourse, which is
quite related to the above conceptualizations. These ways of thinking SEE’s cit-
ies, quite paradigmatic, do not enable the interpretation of space through its own
social relations. They rest a “philosophical amputee” that interprets neither mate-
rial reality, nor the production of meanings and concepts deriving from it (Smith

On the contrary, we have to recognize that after 1989 in SEE countries
there happened a social transformation process and not just linear schemes of
transition. Thus, we must interpret the new role of social activities, in order to
understand the shifting of representations themselves. SEE countries until 1989
were hybrid social systems: neither socialist, nor capitalist. Of course, there exist-
ed commodity production, albeit without a labour market, where labourers could
be recruited, sacked and bargained. Social stratification also existed, with an ab-
sence of typical social equality, albeit the higher strata’s advantages lied in the
field of private consumption of consumer and luxury goods. There existed also a
political despotism of bureaucracy in all its forms (party, police, institutions, ser-
vices), albeit it differed from economic coercion (dismissals, wage lowering, bo-
nuses and penalties) that capitalist relations introduced (Mandel 1992: 58–64,
n19). Last, a certain regional and urban polarization, deriving from the above hy-

1 However, the latter at least seek multiple causes for the social passage from the “socialist” to
the capitalist era. Its “overall objective is to conceptualize a model of the “post-socialist city”,
which is interpreted as a “recombination of socialist and capitalist elements” (Wiest 2012).
bridity, already existed and was not introduced by capitalist relations from the ground up.

Uneven development under capitalism, however, has certain different attributes: it derives from full development of a free labour market, a liberalized world trade and a capital market. The social character of labour falls now under the generalization of production of commodities for others; this means that every product is produced for the market, social benefits and subsidies are transformed to commodities which must be bought and each person’s work is a completely social work. SEE countries came into full contact with the global market only after the fall of “socialist” social systems and therefore, they developed fully their “specialized” positions only then.

**Figure 7.1. GDP per capita to urbanization levels (1970–2011)**

![GDP to Urbanization (1970-2011)](image)

Source: Elaborated by the author.

This definitely led to the transformation of the territorial identity as well. Capitalism, as it generalizes commodity and, therefore, monetary relations, also transforms the analytical tools we use to define the SEE city: this transformation process is absolutely necessary in order to spherically understand their hegemonic character that we have already previously seen. Economic definitions (“mega-city regions”, “Larger Urban Zones” and wider “economic areas”) of the city agglomeration are much more important now, than in the “socialist” era. This means that commodity circulation and labour commuting on the urban level are much more necessary to define the “limits” of this agglomeration, than “socialist’s” era administrative borders. We tend to believe that the city was previously strictly delimited because of some inherent attributes of socialist planning. This is
not completely right, since it misses to think of the social relationships into which this very planning was positioned. Therefore, the edge of the city by then was not simply “strictly” drawn, according to a certain planning bureaucracy, but rather served primarily an analogous hybrid social system, where commodity circulation did not possess such a dominant role (although it did possess an upgraded position in social relationships).

Regarding the supranational bodies that we are studying, they enabled in the post-1989 era the general commodification of social activities: for example, the EBRD, which claims to promote entrepreneurship and open-market policies (EBRD 2011: iv), is actually reinforcing the financial mediation of all sectors of economy. This mediation drives multiple social activities into becoming a field of capitalist profitability. However, those supranational bodies can exert their policies, only because there exists the necessary social context for them to be developed; they never act as a *deus ex machina*. As Robert Brenner cites, the capitalist mode of production has been always emerging spontaneously (2006: 33). This is quite different to the approach of regulationist specialists, who see eastern societies as a “concrete”, “natural” place, entering in predefined global relations.

Further, another issue of which we may get insights for the changing identity of SEE’s cities through a historical approach is the evolution of urbanization in its passage to capitalism. This is a theoretical issue that has raised a long debate, concerning the originality or not of “socialist” cities, which is immanently connected to the existence (or not) of a global urbanization procedure. This debate was further developed into a discussion about “over-urbanized” or “under-urbanized” levels of “socialist” cities, which further unfolded to include issues of identity and conciseness. I claim that this question must be answered only by studying the rise of a new social system and an associated urbanization process.

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1 But one could say that supranational bodies already existed before the dissolution of hybrid social systems. Of course, the “socialist” city made also part of international organizations, such as the COMECON or the Independents, for the case of Yugoslavia; nevertheless state-socialism social relationships actually delimited the supposed role of supranational bodies. A global “socialist” market could never have been formed, because market conditions are always affiliated to commodity production; state-socialism however not only did “divide” the world market into two separate spheres (not quite successfully though, thus assuring that the market inherently tends to enfold all global places), but also regulated international exchanges in non-economic ways as well (specific labour or knowledge instead of goods, barter, direct funding). What state-socialism did, thereby, was to retain, albeit partially, commodity production and thus, to postpone the burst of its generalization. Capitalism found existing discrepancies that further polarized, albeit on another basis (of capital valuation): this resulted, according to OECD and IMF, to the Eastern European countries being in the 1990s among the most liberalized countries (quoted in Altvater 1998).


and not as a certain systematization of social relations, which are indeed presented as inescapable ecological relations. Any other approach underestimates space, since it neglects that each society and every urban agglomeration need to produce their social relations.

Concerning the above, I will attempt to show by using a “representative” graph, the evolution of urbanization of SEE cities (Figure 7.1.). I choose to project GDP per capita to urbanization levels, in order to sketch the non-evolutionary influence that social systems exert on cities. Both axis are highly connected to the social system underlying, something that underlines the significance of the latter, albeit in the limited possibilities that a two-dimensional figure may provide. Implicitly, a time dimension is also noted on the graph: the continuous line relegates to the totality of 1970–2011 data, the dash-dot vertical lines correspond to urbanization and GDP per capita values for the year 1989, while the dotted line is the trend line that corresponds to the 1970–1989 data, projected to nowadays. Different colours are used for each set of lines (continuous, dotted, dash-dotted), corresponding to different countries. The demise of SFR Yugoslavia inevitably forces the urbanization-GDP line to be abruptly stopped; even if we do include data for Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1992, we must have in mind that northern former republics had higher GDP and urbanization levels and spatial and economic discrepancies were always high, and even exacerbated during the years before its demise (cf. Samary 1988), so those data are not directly comparable; however we can have valuable insights regarding the perturbation of their evolution. Generally, this admittedly complex graph may help us verify if there exists a certain base for speaking about a transformation process.

What can be clearly noted is a different behaviour of the relation GDP per capita to urbanization levels, after the start of the transformation process1. It can also be verified, that there are no linear urbanization trajectories. This is very evident after 1989 (dash-dot vertical lines) for each country, when the graph changes dramatically. From an almost linear development of both elements, there immediately appeared severe reverberations and drops, at least on a national level. This is affiliated to a different spatial development, where capitalism’s anarchic growth

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1 In the case of Bulgaria this relation followed a significant drop regarding GDP per capita, which in 2004 reached again the level it was “supposed” to reach in socialist contexts and even surpassed it. Bulgaria did not experience a drop in its total urbanization levels. On the other hand, Romania between the period 1992–2005 faced an increase of its rural population and a significant drop of its GDP per capita. Nowadays Romania is slightly lower from the GDP per capita “projected” to reach in socialist contexts. Concerning Serbia (Serbia and Montenegro until 2008) and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as we have foretold, we can note the high regression of their levels after 1992, however this is compared only to SFRY’s average “smoothness”. Lastly, Hungary, one of the “first-wave” “ex-socialist” countries, after a period of economic recession and de-urbanization, reached higher GDP and urbanization levels than it was “supposed” to reach.
is reflected upon both indices (note Eurozone’s line). More than a shock period, what we have here is a capitalist pattern of development. Therefore, capitalist relations have appeared historically in SEE cities and no ecological patterns can justify their evolution.

Surely, what can we learn from such a model is limited. Besides, this figure is also representing social relations as well, therefore projecting a space reduced to variables. Bearing this in mind, I use it only because it is capitalism itself that deals with social reality using simplistic economic dimensions, principally of profit acquisition, after having imposed a general abstract logic into the society that of commodity production. Therefore, all representations used in order to sketch the territorial conciseness of SEE should agree with this concrete reality that the social system itself imposes. Besides, whatever precautions we may take concerning representations, wo/men become conscious of social relations in their spirit, in the field of ideology (Gramsci 1972: 137), therefore we cannot avoid using representations to interpret social reality. What we can do, is to choose those conceptions that can help us unfold the complex social reality.

7.5. Conclusion

If I insisted too much in the material relations unfolded in SEE countries, this was a necessary condition in order to interpret the territorial identity and conciseness of the region. Emphasis on the totality of social relations and the historicity of the transformation process, unveils spatial representations imposed by supranational and national bodies and, through the conduct of an original and contemporary research, it can interpret the actual reality that takes place in SEE.

\[1\] What is also contended in this figure is that for a given urbanization level, “socialist” cities achieved its attainment with much lower GDP per capita albeit in a later period. However, GDP comparison of “socialist” and capitalist countries is not always rational, and I wouldn't suggest a direct comparison of them, since social exchange was not always achieved in the former through the market, but also through family ties and enterprise barter, more or less formal. “Under-urbanization” theories of “socialist” cities do not take into account that the centrally planned economies retained a large number of their social activities outside the commodity sphere. As Andrusz also claims, money played a minimal role, as health, education, leisure, holidays and housing were almost completely de-commodified (2006: 72). Even economic relations within the CMEA were highly regulated through barter. Generally, those de-commodified benefits offered a significant reason for people to move into cities or from one city to another (Andrusz 2006: 72). They boosted urbanization levels and achieved the so-called “over-urbanized” schemes on a lower GDP per capita level. This was explicitly shattered after 1989.

\[2\] I believe that indexes such as GDP per capita, can indeed be carefully used to interpret capitalism’s uneven social production, albeit with important assumptions: they should not be used as a closed system, but as a starting point for unfolding the complex social reality. They are close (but not identical) to a hypothesis that the commodity form contains the whole of social relations.
I claim that this reality is primarily sketched by uneven development commodity relations, but all social relations inscribed in society should frame this fact. We can study and begin reconstructing these material conditions and representations through the everyday space of the city. There, we will find a diversity that constitutes a certain unity, specific for each urban case.

Commodities tend to fragment space through the material imposition of their abstract logic. Hegemonic discourses help them, as we have seen, to socially deploy their logic. But, in the meantime, they also help them to restore a fleeting union of fragments. Besides, if the fragments were allowed to follow their centrifugal path, capitalist relations would not be reproduced: they would fall in rubble. So, fragmentation reminds us that political power holds together those various pieces; therefore we should contemplate on the way those patterns are brought together, namely through power relations. Power relations embody the guarantee that society will be reproduced daily after certain social relations: in our case, relations of dependence and exploitation (Lefebvre 1976: 86) or else, of appropriation and valuation of unpaid labour. Concerning this point, supranational formations are highly interested in social stabilization: they produce extended reports concerning citizens confidence and distrust to the political system, the general political context (minorities, ethnic tensions, etc.), issues of labour rights, social polarization and penal laws, even issues of climate change (EBRD 2011: 62, 75). They also interweave identity formation with the formation of spaces of emotional distance: we can see this in the nomenclature of Europe’s regions, where EU applies a differentiated policy based on each region’s relation to the union’s institutions. Ultimately, these are policies that help national and supranational bodies to draw policies that will assure the reproduction of social relations, thus also forming further than identities, “spaces of representation”, namely everyday social places of a controlled reproduction.

Speaking about identity, I believe that this is also an issue that we must bear in mind when referring to SEE (as also to CEE), when using this particular geographical terminology. Namely, that its genesis is not a product of historical

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For example, the EU substituted the spatial term of the Balkans in 1995 (though historically formed), to that of South and Eastern Europe, relegating to an economic region. However, in 1998 it reinvigorated the old term to describe only those countries of the peninsula that were not in a process of developed dialogue with the community (Kentrotis 2011: 19). “Western Balkans” meant, by then, a more backward level of negotiations with the European “core”. But what takes place here is not just a social division of an once united space, but also the connotation of one of its parts with pejorative attributes, that the term Balkans has acquired; from historical space it ended meaning the powder-keg of its neighbourhood and, after 1989, the cradle of European integration backwardness. Todorova parallels this cultural transformation of the conceptualization of geographical space into a political tool of the West, to that of the image of Europe “from a cultural definition identified with liberalism and democracy into ‘the international solidarity of capital against poverty’” (Müller 1993, cited in Todorova 1997: 159).
space, but a spatial and temporal frame of the current political system. It divides the European continent abstractly, which does not of course mean arbitrarily; it rather produces borders according to the needs of reproduction of capitalist relations.

In conclusion, all hegemonic attempts to organize space nowadays are the spatial analogue of global economic relations in times of crisis, as registered in urban planning policies and the financial programmes recommended by supranational institutions to the region’s governments. Thereby, a new identity emerges, seeking to adopt new spatial representations in planning documentation, in order to assert itself publicly. However, since these social representations are produced images of the real, thereby false images, economic crisis is concurrently a real testing ground for them. Here, the city appears as the main space, which enables us not only to read all past representations that once appeared inside it and understand their adaptations or transformations, but also to testify their social rigour and the conditions of their reproduction. It is in the cities then, that we can restore spatial identities, respecting the particularities of each society, in all scales. Here, the partial potentially contains the whole and the whole gives insights to the partial.

References


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1 However, in order to be as accurate as possible, this does not mean that minor representations are not embodied in the terminology; thus, for example, all those terms that identify themselves geographically to Europe, such as “CEE” or “SEE”, are also products of an emigrés culture, which views itself as returning to the West, after many years of oriental despotism. Writers such as Kudera or Milosz represent this approach (Todorova 1997: 143) and this is also articulated to the new space under production.


8

The tourist image of place

VILIYAN KRASTEV

8.1. Introduction

The development of human geography at the current stage is under the strong influence of the humanistic and postmodern thinking. Quite naturally, this trend spreads on the area of study of tourism geography, where scientific approaches (historical, behavioural, sociocultural, ethnocultural, geopolitical, civilizational, and semiotic) used in humanities’ spectrum have leading positions. That key importance of the images, being used in an increasing number of geographical analyses, requires a qualitatively new envisioning of tourism itself as well, by engaging the researchers into a number of invisible, subjective elements, influencing the development of the tourism space. Such a conscious redirection towards aspects of the reflected sense of the tourist places, which sense affects their soulful, sensual and symbolic characteristics, puts geography into a position where “it is more or less represented by the advertising images, which are often seen as icons of tourist destinations” (Lozato-Giotart 2008: XVII). Therefore, in the development of modern geography of tourism, the purposeful change of the researcher’s attitude is being stimulated. Geographical space, along with its physical parameters and components, is also studied by strong symbolization, metaphorization and symbolic interpretation. Furthermore, the concepts such as tourist image, tourist landscape, tourist myth, territorial tourism marketing, territorial brand, etc., are applied by scientists in their research.

The geographical image is regarded as a keystone concept in the so-called imaginary (cognitive) geography, which deals with the regularities of the formation, structure, modes of representation, modelling and interpretation of that image (Zamyatin 2012: 11). The essence of the geographical image lies in the formalization of typical signs, symbols, archetypes and stereotypes that characterize clearly and simply (in the frames of a compact model) a given place, no matter if it is a locality, a settlement, a region or a country (Zamyatin 2003, 2004). In its genetic aspect, the geographical image is assumed to be a product of culture, since that image characterizes the unique position in public perceptions. The ge-
The geographical image focuses the most common and basic components which participate in the cultural-figurative filling of the geographical space. In this sense, the geographical image is a result of the transformed reality of the territory, but in the same time it is a collective attribute of mental concepts with different variables. In methodical aspect, the purposefully created image of the space is regarded as a “symbol” and as “a sign of the general research attitude”, where the leading role is played not by objectively existing factors, but by subjective ones; therefore, the geographical image in its essence is opposite to concepts such as “scheme”, “formula”, “system” (Mironenko 2001: 51).

Figure 8.1. Basic elements of the tourist image of place

The tourist image is a function of the geographical image. It focuses on the power of the actual impact of the natural, sociocultural and technical realities (resources) of the environment, which realities, by being refracted through the subjective prism of the geographic interpretation, history, mythology, literature, advertising and propaganda, recreate stereotypes of the sensual and inimitable feeling of the place. Built on a wide range of details and sources of information, which influence its functioning, the tourist image is a symbol of the tourism potential of a certain area (locality, settlement, region, country). On this basis, in
the mental-meaningful aspect, the tourism symbolism emanated by the images, and with a considerable selection of the constituent signs in its image representation, has a real ability to direct preferences and attitudes of tourists to specific destinations. Moreover, the tourist images of places by themselves are being increasingly used as one of the means of communication in the field of travel and entertainment (Minca 1996; Hottola 2012). In the process of stimulating tourism demand among certain communities, it is the well-developed image that is the reason for which the notion is seen as more important than the reality, because “what we imagine is often what we want from reality and what we consider real” (Casari 2008: 37). Therefore, the tourist image can be regarded as a very important resource of maintaining the prestige of a given place, while the utilization of that tourist image, its purposeful construction, diversification or its system monitoring of distribution – are seen as a promising field of applied tourist-geographical research.

The current article analyses the creation and the effective operation of the tourist images of the place, with emphasis on its theoretical bases as well as applied functions. Although a certain set of methods in this field has been developed in the existing specialized literature (Minca 1997; Zamyatina 2008; Nikanorova 2009; Kalutskov 2010; Hottola 2012; Chhabra 2012), most of those methods only reflect a private segment of the process of creation or monitoring of the tourist image. Territorial tourism marketing, also known as territorial branding, is regarded as similar to the discussed research problem; in territorial tourism marketing “the potential of the place offered by geography as a perception, contributes to the development of tourism marketing strategies” (Papotti 2001: 39).

As for the development of an integral construction of the tourist image of the place – there is no universal algorithm established in the analyses. The reasons for this are embedded mainly in the specifics of the appointed space for tourism itself, as well as the pursued goal, which is supposed to justify such an activity. Due to that feature, the focus in the present study is aimed at space analysis of the main factors involved in the process of creating and affirming the tourist image of a particular place. In general, those factors can be presented as follows: presence of an attractive toponym, “ensouled (spiritualized)” tourism landscape, an established spatial tourist myth status, VIP attitude position, information channels and cartographic perceptions (Figure 8.1.).

8.2. Toponym and tourist image

The primordial symbolism of the established (enduring) perceptions of a particular tourist destination is almost always associated with a specific toponym (geographical name), which emphasizes its individuality. The geographical space is literally teeming with toponyms, and simultaneously it is being identified with them – these are the names of continents, islands, mountains, rivers, histori-
cal areas, countries, regions, localities, settlements, etc. It is of key importance for the tourist image of place, that the toponymic name is “wrapped” with a semantic coloring, for it to obtain an actual tourist attraction and to grow into a geoconcept – “a place which is significant for a particular community, having a stable image” (Kalutskov 2012: 27). Thus, the place where tourism is being developed, obtains its name personalization, used as a competitive advantage in today’s “ocean” of names, titles and logotypes in the tourist packages and offers. Once well accepted and widespread, the toponym creates a specific “brand” in the status of the place for visiting (Bagnoli 2006: 122). It is sufficient in this context, to mention iconic global tourism geoconcepts such as Dalmatia, Cote d’Azur, the Ligurian Riviera, Hollywood, Savoy Alps, Lapland, the Golden Ring. These bright geoconcepts have become bywords for the respective locations and are the main generators of their evocative tourist image.

On the other hand, when the tourism developing place does not have a well-developed territorial identity, it is quite natural that initially it does not provoke a strong interest among tourists. In such cases, the valorization of the tourist perceptions of a given place is linked to a deliberate creation of a suitable toponym, which corresponds to the most prominent features of the geographical space or its tourism-recourse potential. One of the most simplified options for selecting a toponymic name, which often raises the image prestige of the geographical entity, is the sense of centrality to the surrounding space. It is therefore, why China is “The Celestial Empire”, Varna is “the sea capital of Bulgaria”, Kazanlak – “The centre of the Rose Valley”, etc. While such an approach largely depends on the scale and the cultural-information potential of the site, appropriate “maneuver” in the choice of tourist toponym can also be the “geographical focusing of the information” and the “geographical translation of information” (Zamyatin 2008: 386). The first approach takes into account tourism resources (natural and anthropogenic) of prime value, which focus on the main attractiveness of the locations (e.g. the Italian region of Umbria, which has acquired the tourist toponym “The Green Heart of Italy” due to the high concentration of protected natural areas). The second approach is based on comparing the object (country, region or place) to another one, which has an already established tourist popularity, seeking similarity of forms (homology), as well as similarity of functions (analogy). Tourist toponyms are based mainly on paraphrasing, such as “Little Paris” (for Bucharest), “Bulgarian Cappadocia” (for the Melnik Pyramids), “Aragon Nile” (for the river Ebro), “Eastern Venice” (for Bangkok), etc.

8.3. Tourist landscape and tourist image

The dynamic integration and the synthesis between geosciences are the reasons for which landscape is being identified not only with the distribution of natural complexes, but also with special combinations of the population and its
creations, in close relationship with the environment. This is confirmed by the increasingly widespread use in scientific research of concepts such as anthropological, cultural, natural-anthropogenic, and recently – tourist landscape.

The term tourist landscape possesses enough figurative perception, because a tourist landscape can be any landscape that is spiritualized and aesthetically evaluated for tourism. It is not by chance that the tourist landscape is claimed to be the “frame a very impressive display, which defines one of the geographical features of tourism” (Nice 1964: 252), and “a geographical benefit constructing the DNA of regional identity” (Mazzetti 2005: 282). In a narrow representative sense, tourist landscape can be regarded as “an interpretation of an idealized space for recreation” (Minca 1997: 511). When seen as a spatial system of natural and anthropogenic objects and phenomena (and respectively – tourist resources), the landscape actually fills the contents of a given tourist location. Among all its constituent subsystems, the following can be pointed out: the environment (natural and anthropogenic), society with its ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc. characteristics, economic organization of space, civilizational identity, tourism specialization, the nature of service, etc. The subsystems’ potential for cultural and semiotic interpretations is huge, and therefore it can be programmed, so that figurative sense of the space is achieved.

The representation of the tourist landscape in a symbolic image can be performed in vertical, horizontal, and in complex form (Kalutskov 2010: 75). The first form presents the landscape by its volume, properties and structure, based on a semiotic landscape description; the second representational form is based on the landscape’s spatial dimensions “from bird’s eye” (its projection on a map), while the third form represents the landscape as “map-pictures”, which synthesize the two preceding forms. The number of examples that testify the image force of the landscape is huge: Siberia is identified with its boundless taiga; the Amazon – with its dense equatorial jungles; the cultural landscape of the Czech Republic – with its medieval castles; the natural landscape of Cuba – with its tropical exotics, etc.

In smaller areas (mainly localities and settlements) the mental concepts of the tourist landscape, usually develop around one, or some of the main objects or phenomena that have gained wide popularity and sufficiently strong tourist charge and play a central role in organizing the tourist landscape symbolism. In that respect, it is hard to imagine the tourist image of Rome without the Coliseum or Rio de Janeiro without the Statue of Christ. In such cases, the representation of the tourist landscape is based on an essential element or a subsystem of key importance, around which the rest of the elements of its overall image construction are developed and built on.

In some larger areas, or places with high concentrations of diverse and utilized tourism resources, the tourist landscape acquires a complex morphology and is sufficiently stratified in many directions. In such cases, the image of the
tourist landscape, as a contextual model of various spatial notions, can be realized by the so-called *palimpsest* – a term “composed by multiple geographical layers-contexts”, each of which oriented towards their own characteristic signs (Mitin 2005: 15).

For example, in a classical tourist country such as Italy, separate layers-contexts can be formed by the Mediterranean landscapes along its coasts (presented by date palms, mimosas, cypresses, olives, etc.), the cultural-historical landscapes of the Roman, Renaissance and Baroque architecture of Rome, Florence, Venice, Verona, Naples, as well as the flower gardens of Tuscany, or the pastoral landscapes and patriarchal way of life in the Italian South. Then again, Italy is a country of wine, fashion, culinary tastes, football, which shows that the wealth of its tourist landscape relies on the pluralistic “semiotic game with space” in its tourist image interpretation.

In the course of tourism development, in many places practice has shown that the tourist landscape is often subjected to the test of time, as a result of being saturated with ambivalent, and often – multidirectional signs (in a positive sense), in its tourist legitimacy. On the one hand, that is a logical result of the multifunctional development of tourism, stimulating the expansion of the nomenclature of services offered, and in the same time – this is a result of social processes and phenomena of different magnitude, which additionally saturate the diversity of the landscape. On the other hand, the mechanistic and often unsuccessful imitation of already established travel patterns creates actual conditions for damaging the prestige of the destinations. In many places the uniformity (the banalization) of the offered services, together with the human pressure on the environment, “erodes” the cognitive notions of the positive feeling of traditional tourist destinations. As a result of mass unification and standardization of the tourist services offered, the degree of attractiveness of tourist landscapes in the image projection of the places naturally reduces. The effect of this process leads to a loss of identity, which harms the tourist attractiveness. As far as the anthropogenic interference is concerned, for example, it so happens that “tourists vacationing in winter centres of the Alps, are unable to distinguish the Italian and French resorts from the German or the Austrian ones” (Nikanorova 2008: 37). Additionally, the uncontrolled tourism boom, experienced in a number of destinations, plays its destructive effect on both – the attitudes of the image-positioning and the natural appearance of the landscape. Byword labels, describing the latter process, are terms such as “marbellization” and “balearization” (related respectively to the Spanish tourist areas of Marbella and the Balearic Islands), or more recently – “the effect of Sunny Beach”, all used as synonyms of chaotic development of tourist areas, leading to a rapid saturation and decline. In certain cases the excessive use of uniform, often clichéd, information on TV, the internet, radio, tourism magazines, etc., can also lead to similar degradation of the merits of the tourist landscape. In this case, the accumulation of downsides of
the excessive human impact on the local tourism environment, even in less than apocalyptic situations for tourist destinations, contributes to the transformation of the landscape’s identification, by turning it from “topophilic” to “topophobic”. These examples demonstrate that the process of valorization, aimed at using the spatial myth, is a bright and sustainable model of our notions for the reality. According to the motivational and psychological incentives we have, “tourism rests on the idea of a place that is other, that is different” (Minca 1997: 511). And it is the different which obtains the most durable “mental packaging” and wide popularity, through the mythologizing of space. Myths, being tied to the fabulous beauty of nature, the peculiarities of national character, languages, art, ethical values, aesthetic tastes, lifestyle, etc., are a product of historical events, beliefs, oral tales, and legends. Some of those myths have long been proven to be generally accepted stereotypical signs of a number of countries and regions, underlining a direct explanation for their tourist popularity, and impacting significantly the psycho-emotional perception of the tourists. In today’s globalizing world, there is no doubt that myths have a huge impact on tourists’ attitudes. More so, in its fundament, modern tourism uses more or less well-established spatial myths about certain territories. The recreated images of those myths become some of the most important factors for tourist activity in the different destinations. The reanimation of old myths and the creation of new ones are considered “important factors in determining the resource potential of the country and the development of its tourism brand” (Dewailly and Flament 1996: 163–167).

The landscape as a major asset and resource for tourism development needs to be synchronized with the policies and the activities for its protection (according to the principles of the sustainable development concept). In those and other similar cases, the established notions of the landscapes require contextual “deconstruction”, so that they are recomposed and thus – another form of their cultural legitimacy is obtained (Minca 1997: 520). This can also be achieved through field renovation by stimulation of the “correction of the downsides and repositioning of the advantages in the area of activity” (Papotti 2006: 293). Such approaches could be applied primarily in tourist places that are at a critical stage of humanization of their tourism environment (using the terminology of the J. M. Miosec’s model of tourist areas’ evolution development), and also in countries and regions which are regarded by tourists with a certain dose of negativism. In order to obtain a satisfactory practical success, however, by using the power of cultural-image representation and advertising, “the de-reconstruction” and “repositioning” must be subjected to a specific target, set in a pre-designed program for renovating tourism in particular spatial borders.
8.4. VIP and tourist image

The impact that mass culture has on the formation of the tourist image of different places, is expressed also by the attitude of celebrities from art, business, media, political, and other circles (the so-called VIP) towards tourism, which significantly determine its trends. This effect goes back to the early 19th century, when the royal and imperial personages of many European countries used to visit annually the resorts of the Cote d’Azur in France. Later in the history of tourist preferences, it was exactly the celebrities (such as Oscar Wilde, Sophia Loren, etc.) who promoted the image prestige of resorts such as the Tunisian Hammamet or the Crimean resort of Yalta (promoted by Soviet leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev) until we come to modern examples, where the tourist behaviour of leading politicians and Hollywood celebrities, causes the increased prestige of Acapulco and Cancun in Mexico, or that of the Mediterranean island of Corsica (especially its Emerald Coast), the Swiss Alps, and many others.

Many places where tourism is developed, owe their image-attractiveness or its diversification, to the life and work of famous people, genetically related to or interested in those locations, reinventing them in different stages of their lives. In some cases those are usually birthplaces of personalities who have acquired wide public fame, while in other cases – it is their personal interests turning the visit of a given place into an emblematic cult. Celebrities are attached to many places, by being encoded in the tourists’ notions for those places, but in some cases the tourist image has evolved exactly because of the celebrities. Salzburg, for example, is emotionally associated with the life of Mozart; Verona – with the Shakespeare’s love drama “Romeo and Juliet”; Liverpool – with the legendary “Beatles”, the island of Zanzibar – with Freddie Mercury; California – with the Hollywood movie stars.

The attitude of celebrities, enjoyed by certain destinations, has always been a factor of competitive value for their profitable positioning in the minds of people from the tourist contingent. The preferences of social elites dictate in a special way the fashion trends in the choice of the masses, by keeping those certain destinations on the “crest” in tourism demand. Although most of these passions have only a temporary effect on the development of those places, and the tourist interest gradually subsides, VIP personalities impart a lasting emotional atmosphere in the imaginary aura of such destinations. There are many places which owe their tourist uniqueness namely to the special attitude of writers, artists, musicians, scientists, athletes, politicians, etc., which the latter had during their time. Quite naturally, the subjective attitude towards such destinations builds up on their tourist image, which consciously exploits them in a cognitive plan. Speaking of the famous tourist centres such as Arles (in southern France) for example, which boasts with its picturesque location along the river Rhone, its Renaissance and Baroque architecture and the well-preserved Roman
arena, is in the same time strongly associated with the life and work of Van Gogh, since Arles was the place where he painted some of his most famous paintings. In this respect “to visit Arles is to touch the genius of the famous artist”.

8.5. Tourist images, historical and literary myths

The myth of space, according to Mitin (2005: 18), occurs in two ways: the first one (the myth of the unknown space) is based on imaginary notions developed on the basis of the familiar world around us, and the second one – on the basis of one or several iconic objects around which the whole dimensional image is concentrated. A typical example of mythologization of space which occurred in the first way is the myth of the “mysterious” or “enigmatic India”, based mainly on the unfamiliar to the Western civilization Eastern mysticism and theosophy. On the other hand, the “fabulous India” myth – clearly emphasizing above all its untold and exotic material and spiritual wealth, has occurred in the second way mentioned above. With such a fabulous coloration, India is often present in the tour packages of a number of travel agencies, and thus it obtains a unique tourist image of a distinctly stunning destination. In this case, the successfully imposed tourist myth is very crucial to the overall tourist image, proving how a whole range of existing negative phenomena that make up the modern Indian reality (widespread poverty, starving population, high crime rate, etc.) are deliberately blunted at the expense of its “mythical charm”. Another example of a sufficiently strong mythological perception from history is “the legend of Count Dracula” and its impact on the image of Romania – a legend, promoted in recent years in tourism advertising by the country itself. Another prominent example is the myth of the Cuban socialism, long exploiting the tourist fame of the Caribbean country which made pioneering steps in socialism development in the Western Hemisphere, becoming the “Island of Freedom” – a kind of mythological moniker that has affirmed as a political, cultural, and consequently – as a tourism brand of the country.

A special attitude towards the tourist image of the places is generated by the literary myth. It contributes mainly to fuel the topophilia (love for the place), and the poetics of the places. Focused mostly on the harmony and the unique appearance of the soulful landscape reality, literature-based perceptions, through the mastery of speech, create psychological motives which reinforce the “tourist appetite” for a number of places. Therefore, it is not surprising that it is namely the literary work of a whole range of writers and artists that help the evocation of “experienced moments, which, by bringing spirit to the reality, nourish the desire of millions of people around the world to visit a given place” (Mazzetti 2005: 282).

The power of literature creates myths about the space, through which the tourist looks at it with a special feeling. Fairy tales are a classic example of developing mental concepts of the space as such (Zamyatina 2008). Filled with varia-
tions of stereotypical metaphors for different places, and spiritualized by the supernatural forces of their characters, tales and myths add to space special mood and magical symbolism. Such literature metaphors underlie, for example, the myths of the “Golden-headed Moscow”, based on the golden domes of the Orthodox churches. The wealth of the Arab East on the other hand, enjoys legendary mythology in fairy tales (“In Baghdad, everything is made of gold and silk, and of the fountains – sorbet and honey flowed ...”).

Presented in artistic manner, the mythological sense of tourist destinations is manifested by a kind of spatial metaphors, which give a unique magical aura to mountains, peaks, coastlines, lakes, countries, islands, cities, villages or single objects. The words of Goethe about Venice (“Dream woven from air, land, water and sky”), those of Pushkin about Saint Petersburg (“I love you creation of Peter, I love your strong and consistent appearance; Neva – the state current, its banks of granite...”), those of Shevchenko about Ukraine, Hemingway’s words about Cuba, Gamzatov’s words about Dagestan, as well as many others, are all regarded as emblematic words which have raised the prestige of those particular places.

Big events are especially popular in the mythologizing of space today (Olympic Games, competitions, festivals, world championships, summits, religious ceremonies, etc.). The big event is able to change the identity of the place beyond recognition, creating sustainable spatial myths. According to some authors, “the big event is the basis of the image of modern tourism”, because “the concept of the image and the location is transformed into a product that should be able to shape out the cultural centre” (Montanari 2008: 148). Cities that have acquired the title “Olympic city”, obtain specific mental image because of the Olympic Games held there, or for example – the recently established brand “European Capital of Culture” annually awarded to towns across The Old Continent which have rich cultural and historical potential.

8.6. Information channels and tourist images

The tourist image is directly dependent on subjective interpretations, imposed by dissemination and the influence of mass culture (Internet, television, cinema, show business, among others).

The sources of information contribute to addressing, illustrating and illuminating the tourist image, by a system of orientation signs. The oldest ways of promoting a given destination for tourism developing are the tourist guidebooks and brochures. Providing useful information about the location and the organization of the travel, the guidebook is not only able to acquaint the tourists with the tourist potential of a place, but also to “customize it with typical tastes, aromas, and sensations” (Bagnoli 2006: 129). This whole palette of selected information is
often interpreted in such a way that it raises the tourist image of the place into a cult, thus creating a suitable basis for a territorial brand.

With the development of new technologies, the representation of tourism space is also enriched by virtual simulations, which are already used in online advertising of destinations and tourist services. The focus of most of these is reflected in logotypes and advertising messages that gain strong emotional charge. One of them – “I ♥ NY”, has gained such a wide recognition that it even dictates a trend in the fashion industry, while the image of New York itself in this logotype – with its last-generation urban landscapes, abundant with entertainment and opportunities for social contact, is perhaps the most vivid symbol in the tourist sector of contemporary urban culture.

An important role in shaping the tourist images in a particular place plays the film industry. The reality which has been filtered by the cinematography creates sufficiently stable notions, full of sentiment, typical sounds and memorable atmosphere, all of which are forming a kind of hyper-reality of the place. Some film productions have a strong impact which has created the cult for the exotic tropical island of Phuket in Thailand (“The Beach”); the spiritual and magical power of Tibet (“Seven Years in Tibet”); the inimitable natural beauty of New Zealand (“The Lord of the Rings”); the New York city lifestyle (“Sex and the City”), and many others.

The most obvious evidence of mass-cultural influence is found in visiting of certain tourist destinations by some social groups, among which recreation and tourism are not motivated so much by real needs of consuming certain services, but mostly by prestige persecution and demonstration of a certain way of life. For most representatives of the newly-formed wealthy circles in Russia, for example, the visiting of exotic destinations in the summer (Thailand, the Seychelles, the Maldives, Cuba, etc.), or prestigious alpine resorts in the winter, has become a way of maintaining a high reputation in society. Conversely, mass culture has a definite negative effect on the tourist attendance of countries such as Albania – a country which natural conditions’ qualities can be compared to those of Croatia or Montenegro, but its presentation in the media as a rundown and backward country, blocks the formation of a positive tourist image.

Tremendous opportunities for the dissemination of the tourist image are offered by the Internet. There, the tourist image can be subjected to “ephemeral use” through targeted mental imagination, from various perspectives (tastes, fashion, lifestyles) or by the so-called simulation tours (Giannone 1996: 299).

All these sources of information saturate the tourist notions with different feelings, attractiveness and mood. Some of the tourist images acquire truly sustainable features, or ambiguous mental perceptions in the realization of the tourist comfort, while others acquire quite complex and multiple notions of “the tourism-ability” of the place. The channeling of those notions into a specific focus, which would create an expected tourist effect, could be achieved through infor-
Information clusters (Šakaja 2003; Zamyatina 2010). The mechanism of their formation comes down to gathering of facts and associations existing in public perceptions or as dominant themes in the media, which are grouped by similarity and then used for a given destination. Thus, the systematized information relieves much easier the “birth” of the generalized name, which is actually able to lay the foundations of a strategy, a brand or a territorial image (Zamyatina 2010: 124). In certain cases, where intense competition in the broadcasted information is seen, while the tourist image is supposed to meet the preferences of a specific target group of tourists with diverse interests, the image allows its realization through the so-called method of the collage – a fusion of physical and mental characteristics of the space, through a sociological survey (Hottola 2012). According to this set of methods, the tourist image is being constructed on the basis of facts, which are most prevalent in the minds of respondents in the shape of a stereotypically built model.¹

However, expectations that tourists traveling to one country or another have, are strongly predetermined also by national perceptions and stereotypes (Kryuchkov 2008). It is about spreading of social models, which have been established by certain standards of education and historical perceptions, which orientate the image-sense for certain destinations. Such stereotypes are part of the local or national culture of the given community, and therefore – the process of creating a tourist image of a place should take into account such specificities. On a macrolevel, for example, along with the attractiveness of its tourism resources, Bulgaria’s image in the minds of the Westerners traditionally accumulates significant liabilities of suspicion and negativity (due to the existing social degradation – poverty, corruption, etc.), which affects significantly the tourist’s attitudes and the tourism demand of the country. The reasons usually are of complex nature and are not infrequently directly related to Bulgaria’s peripheral cultural-geographical and economic-geographical location (in the Southeastern corner of Europe and the manifestation of the so-called Balkan syndrome), its socialist past (interpreted in the West in a very negative way), and its economic backwardness. A visual confirmation of such negative sociocultural stereotypes was the symbolic representation of Bulgaria as a public toilet in the European Parliament building in Brussels in 2008 (in the “Entropa” sculptural model by the Czech sculptor D. Černý). And vice versa – the historical perceptions of Bulgaria traditionally cause tenderness and even nostalgia in the minds of the people from the post-Soviet space. Bulgaria therefore is regarded as a close, Slavic and friendly country,

¹ For example, a study of Hottola (Hottola 2012: 555–569), aimed at constructing a stereotypical image of the American way of life in California based on collective sociotypes from the show business, showed that Brad Pitt and Pamela Anderson are dominant in the perceptions of respondents. Those two bright stars of the American film industry serve in this case as a basis for the collage on which base – other key symbols of the Californian style are “implanted” – fashion trends, entertainment, social behaviour, etc.
until recently as “socialist Riviera” or, quite pretentiously, even as “16th republic of the USSR”. Interpretation of one and the same information, causing ambivalence in tourists’ perceptions, is typical for other destinations as well. This requires that in the process of deliberate construction of a tourist image, an appropriate solution is to be found, in terms of neutralization or at least mitigation of the accumulated psychological negatives and respectively – increasing the sustainable positive stereotypes by finding balance in the information being circulated.

8.7. Cartographic image and tourist image

Cartographic images also influence the formation of tourist images of countries and regions. The depiction of space in a geometric shape, together with generalization of information by a system of symbols, creates conditions for the cartographic image to adhere to “temptation of simplicity” and “universal comprehensibility” (Corna-Pellegrini 1982: 573). Geographical maps contribute to the recreation of the authentic image in terms of actual configuration of the space, but also through avant-garde design, elements of the artistic layout, sign symbolism, photos and stylized images. All these additionally saturate the emotional perception, thus contributing to creating real iconographic notions of the tourist destinations. These notions, being permanently encoded into the public awareness, create mental maps, in which space obtains strongly manifested, representative cultural-figurative features.

According to Kalutskov (2010: 58), the geographical map, being a common tool of geography, not only provides objective information about the surrounding world, but “always gives it some image, although its author have not been aiming at that”. In such aspect, any geographical map allows its interpreting as a mental map as well, since through reading it, the map develops the geographical imagination of the researcher (provoking comparisons, associations, and representations). With the development of computer cartography and the three-dimensional images of the space, the term “geoiconics” emerged. Significant achievements in the image perception of space are also provided by the anamorphic mapping. It is identified with the so-called map-like distortions, where the deformation of angles and areas is not based on a cartographic projection, but on a given variable (e.g. tourist attendance, number of tourist sites, share of protected areas, the number of tourist services, etc.). The theme of the maps-anamorphoses illustrates some interesting reconstructions of the space, which in their turn provide a wide scope for image representations (Strelova 2012).

On the basis of an established cartographic image, mental maps give a kind of mental “tourists packaging” to various destinations such as Italy (“the Mediterranean boot”), Finland (“the Top of Europe”), Sri Lanka (“the Tear of Asia”), etc. In those cases, the configuration of the territory and the geographical location (in the case of Finland) are key factors for their metaphorical association.
Similar, but with relatively smaller impact on the territorial semiotics, is also the configuration of Spain (likened to a stretched skin of a bull), Switzerland (to a turtle), Romania (to a fish), Cuba (to a lizard). Those examples participate as signs in the image representation of the tourist space, giving it mostly cultural, rather than physical parameters. Those can be seen as a “stylized spaces” which, being controlled subjectively and being a mental map product, significantly affect the market of tourism demand (Minca 1996: 126). On the other hand, the realistic thematic cartographic image is able to visualize the comfort (the suitability) of the climate conditions, the diversity of the nature complex, the transport accessibility, etc., thus also stimulating a mental image of the space. For example, because of the specificity of their climatic conditions, The Seychelles and The Maldives are almost always associated with “eternal summer”, while Siberia, Alaska or the Canadian archipelago – with “eternal snows and frosts”. A similar analogy, though far from reality, reinforces the general attitudes as well as the image-attitudes among the tourist contingent.

8.8. Conclusion

From the positions of the postmodern thinking, it is asserted that “today’s tourism exists and develops because potential tourists live in an array of images for different destinations and distant situations, which feed the tourist’s desire to experiment, to consume those places and situations” (Minca 1997: 516). Adhering to that interpretation, even in far less extreme position, it is hard to deny that the modern-day tourist constantly requires tourist images. It comes to tourist images that are saturated with clear, individual and recognizable territorial signs, easily identifiable, exotic or not so much – all of those filling the minds of tourists. The originality of the world which we live in, tells us that the construction of the tourist image of a place is a highly individual task and depends largely on its geographical specificity. The tourist image details, subjected to a representative analysis, transform the place not just into a simple commodity, but also into a way of using a number of other aspects of the place – operational, economic, social, aesthetic, cultural, recreational, thus approaching territorial marketing (Papotti 2006: 298). All those tourist image details, which form the image of the place, are sufficiently correlated, overlapping each other, and in some cases – interchangeable. In this sense, the construction of the tourist image is aimed at offering a territorial project that is integrated, flexible, comprehensive, but which is also programmable with emphasis on each separate component, so that an optimal stereotyped pattern is ensured in the expectations of the tourist contingent. Thus, the tourist image plays an important role in the sustainable tourism development of a given destination and is among its top attributes in the maintaining of high competitiveness: i.e. enforcement of regional interests and maintaining of tourism investment climate.
References


PART III

IDENTITY ON A NATIONAL LEVEL. BETWEEN GEOGRAPHY, CONSCIOUSNESS AND GEOPOLITICS
Polish Geopolitical Visions.  
Poland as Intermarium

Everyone has his own map of the world (...) Tibetan who never left his mountains has different than a resident of Manhattan closed in the canyons of his city.  
Hence, we often face the problems with mutual understanding, since while we talk about the world we see different maps, images, visions.

Ryszard Kapuścinski, “Lapidaria”

JAKUB POTULSKI

Contemporary geopolitics, as a multidimensional scientific discipline which analyses the relationship between human, political behaviour and the space has definitely broadened its scope. The revival of research known as geopolitical detected in the last decades, inspires to seek new challenges and new research areas that could contribute to the further development of the discipline and would go beyond the traditional research areas, designated by the traditions of Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen, Alfred Mahan, or Halford Mackinder. One of the key impetus for the development of geopolitical analysis become the changes in the late twentieth century, and associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the European integration and the idea of “new world order” announced by president George Bush. At the same time, the information technology revolution in highly developed societies had a strong influence on socioeconomic and political transformations, that have changed the “spatial” organization of their societies, and led to changes in the distribution and organization of power at all levels of society (local, regional, global). Dominance of nation-states, typical of modern societies has been has been infringed by the emerging global networks and institutions, and by the regional particularisms, and the rebirth of the “tribal” mentality. An existing political order has changed significantly, and the social sciences
attempt to describe and explain a new social and political reality. When attempting to analyse the current state of the world, an attention was drawn to the role of space and it was considered that geography, as knowledge about the relationships and dependencies that occur between man and his physical environment is of great importance as one of the key dimensions of political analysis (Therborn 2006: 512–528).

But also an introduction to geopolitical analysis of elements derived from critical theory, post-structuralism or postmodernism had been an important element of geopolitics development and significantly expanded its research spectrum. The increased significance of interpretive theories is of particular importance for the explanation of political phenomena. Interpretive approach to political science research is focused on the meanings, which define the form of the political actions and institutions, and ways of shaping these activities and institutions. The different types of interpretive theories are based on a common assumption that we cannot properly understand the interpersonal relationships, if we do not understand their meanings. Proponents of this approach put emphasis on beliefs, ideas, perceptions, meanings and discourses (Marsh and Stoker 2006: 131). Interpretive approach provided an impetus to expand geopolitical research areas. Proponents of such analysis began to focus their research on human perceptions of the world. Human actions are based on an individual assessment of a spatial and social situation, and largely depend on different perceptions of the external world and the specific view of human’s place in the world. Every entity creates its own “world map”, which is a set of visions concerning its place and role in the world. The issue of such a “world map” creation, as well as its impact on political behaviour has become one of the fast-growing research areas of contemporary human geography, including political geography and geopolitics.

In accordance with postmodern concepts in geography, making reference to the work of the French philosopher and historian Foucault and the work of the English geographer Harvey’s role, different people and different social groups vary their meaning and perception of space by depending on the social “practice” social, to it is also for political discourse aimed at changing or strengthening of dominant social visions of reality, also geopolitical ones. Political discourse plays an important role in shaping the political map and the “territoriality” of man. Every social or regional group develops some ideas about the surrounding world and its place in it. These visions are sometimes called “geopolitical” and it is believed that they provide a kind of a social group’s map of the world, and thus are part of the cultural and political self-identification and the definition of state, nation and the world. They are, therefore, visions which locate given nation-state and community in global space, and help to understand their definition of national identity and process of determining boundaries, perception of “here”–“there”, “we”–“them” (Tuathail 2004: 84).
Geopolitical visions are a component of knowledge of the world around us, giving us a kind of “the world map” and thereby strongly influencing the actions we take. Socially conscious geopolitical visions constitute the geopolitical culture of a given community. Geopolitical culture is a culture of knowledge, and the “outside world” visions, and the role of a state as an actor in international relations. Geopolitical visions are notions existing in the consciousness of the group (national or ethnocultural) – about the country they live in, and what they represent in relation to the world, their allies and enemies, boundaries, as well as its relation to external forces. Geopolitical visions of the world are a kind of normative, mental, political map of the world or a region affecting political behaviour and foreign policy.

Dijking in his book *National identity and geopolitical visions* when analyzing the issues of geopolitical visions, national identity, geopolitical culture and tradition, has defined geopolitical visions as a set of ideas relating to the relationship between one’s space (place) and the rest of the world, including the feeling of safety / risk, advantages / disadvantages, and / or referring to the idea of national (collective) purpose or foreign policy strategy (Dijkink 1996: 11). Dijkink’s definition is broad and flexible, as the author pointed out that the concept of geopolitical ideas or geopolitical vision, you can understand all the concepts related to the relationship between “own” and the other – “strangers” – spaces and places associated with the feeling of safety / hazard or lead / or weaknesses of ideas about “national mission” undertaken by foreign policy. Finally, the term refers to the distinction between “us–them” and emotional relationship with a particular territory. Visions or geopolitical visions constitute a set of conceptions of how we see ourselves and conceive our position in the world. This knowledge organizes the space we live in, providing us with concepts for describing the environment, as well as providing us with a kind of a “world map”. Therefore they are a part of the symbolic order in a given society.

Geopolitical visions are shaped and influenced by various factors, such as historical tradition, education, literature, art, advertising, film, mass media, that transmit and spread stereotypes and notions of national history and the space inhabited by given community. These visions are disseminated through the geopolitical discourse, which is currently being initiated and maintained primarily through the mass media, which often act in the interests of social and political elites. To a very large extent the knowledge is generated by a specific community living in specific conditions of a particular historical moment and is presenting the concerns, desires and interests that have motivated such a notion. Analysis of geopolitical visions provides the knowledge of attitudes towards the world, giving researchers an ability to identify the reasons for political activity. Each group creates a wide variety of ideas and visions of its own place in the world. The greater and more complex the community is, the more different visions are possible, which can be used, strengthened or weakened, depending on the context and
situation. The issue of geopolitical visions of a given group is an important element of contemporary political analysis. Examples of such an analysis can be found, for instance, in publications of such scholars as Neuman concerning geopolitical visions of the Israel’s society, or Zamyatin – devoted to Russian geopolitical notions.

In the history of Poland’s statehood there were also specific visions of Poland in the world created, playing an important role in the legitimacy of a particular foreign policy. As in any complex group, also in the Polish society we can find various geopolitical visions. One of the most influential and sustainable is the concept of Intermarium, referring to historical traditions. In the Polish geopolitical discourse it is argued that the Intermarium is a historical and geopolitical concept. It refers to the countries of the so-called ABC triangle, the territory situated between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas. Leszek Moczulski is contemporary Polish historian and politician who has undertaken the issue of Intermarium, wrote that Intermarium can be divided into several groups: the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), the eastern regions of the Intermarium (Ukraine, Belarus), West Slavic countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia), Hungary, countries with the majority of Roman origin and Orthodox religion (Romania, Moldova) and the Balkans (Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro). Moczulski also divided Intermarium countries into two subregions divided by the Carpathian Mountains as a borderline. Area of a proper Baltic-Black Sea Intermarium consists of: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. Other areas are called the Danube-Balkan segment (Moczulski 2000: 544). The main idea of Intermarium concept is to create a political entity in Central and Eastern Europe (considered as the lands situated between Germany and Russia), that could resist the expansion of the two neighbours. Its aim is to protect against imperial powers, and to create conditions for the free development of the region. In the Polish political thought of the late 19th and early 20th century the idea as appeared that a natural solution to overcome the external threat is to create a community of Central and Eastern Europe countries, which would be able to effectively counter the German and Russian expansion. This idea, supported by the historical and geographical arguments took the form of geopolitical concept “Intermarium”, which had a very strong influence on perceptions of Polish political elite, as well as Polish society, and has become one of the most sustainable and widely discussed Polish geopolitical visions.

It is to be stressed that, a historic moment plays an important role in the development of geopolitical visions, and it is impossible to understand community’s geopolitical visions without their allocation in a particular moment of history. All human actions are context-sensitive, occurring in a certain place and time, and should not be analysed independently of the situation in which they are located. Cultural patterns, systems of values, behaviour patterns are shaped by his-
tory, tradition, experiences gained in interacting with other entities. They are also a subject to specific interpretations, depending on the external context. Geopolitical concepts serve the objectification of the interests of the community. To a large extent, this is the knowledge socially generated by a particular community at a particular point in its history, and at the same time showing the concerns, interests and desires that motivated such an expression.

Figure 9.1. Popular imagination of the shape of the Polish territory in the 16th century

This picture is taken from a popular web site. This map is typically presentation of Polish borders in the 16th century under the rule of the Jagiellonian dynasty. The map presents popular imagination of the shape of the Polish territory in the sixteenth century. In fact, Poland has never controlled territory like this.

How the ideas about Poland as an Intermarium have developed? Polish perceptions of the Polish state being a “heart” and dominant power of the Intermarium territory are politically rooted in the country’s history. In 1385 the Duke of Lithuania became the first monarch of the united Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Władysław II Jagiello) by the marriage with Poland’s Queen Jadwiga.
The new political entity covered a vast territory that is Polish, Lithuanian, Belarussian, Ukrainian and contemporary Baltic countries’ lands. During the existence of the Polish-Lithuanian state – it aspired to be a regional power competing with Sweden for domination in the Baltic Sea region, with Russia in the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, and with Turkey in the Black Sea region. This competition has involved Polish state in long-lasting wars and conflicts ended in the final defeat and loss of statehood. Nevertheless, in the historical consciousness – this period is often regarded as the period of the greatest political development of the Polish statehood, when the Polish state played the role of regional political power.

The loss of the statehood at the end of the 18th century was a key turning point in the Polish history. Poland ruled by the landed gentry (nobility) was a semi-feudal country that has not been able to compete with centralized, efficiently governed, absolute monarchies in Russia, Prussia and Austria. It resulted in the Polish partitions which took place in the second half of the 18th century and ultimately ended the existence of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569–1796), resulting in the elimination of sovereign Poland, and Lithuania, its partner in the Commonwealth, for 123 years. The loss of statehood led to attempts to restore the independence of Poland. One of the elements of Polish insurgent-independence programs was a vision of the future Polish state. At the beginning the most common idea in political programs was the idea of the restoration of the Polish state within its pre-partition borders. The political program of one of the largest emigrational political factions of the Great Emigration – Polish Democratic Society proclaimed the idea of Poland in the borders of 1772, because “the State needs so much space and air, so that its existence is well established and protected against all threats” (Łukaszewicz and Lewandowski 1961: 540).

Some of Polish political elites, realizing the different ethnic composition of “Lithuania and Rus”, which belonged to the pre-partition Polish state, predicted the ‘liberation of Poland enclosed by the Black Sea, the Baltic, the Oder, Dnieper and Danube’ and the adoption of a federal form of government, in which each province is to keep the right to organize its local relations, but in such a way as the constitutions of provinces do not violate federal order. Federal concepts recognized the differences of the eastern provinces of the former Republic but did not raise a question about the further development of the national consciousness of Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Belarusians (Kieniewicz 1986: 170). Polish political elites, when seeking answers to questions about the future Republic referred to the historical traditions of the Polish state, planning the reconstruction of Poland within its pre-partition borders. In the early 20th century, these political ambitions gained legitimacy and “scientific” basis in the form of geographical concept of Intermarium.

One of the greatest Polish geographers, Eugeniusz Romer is regarded as an author of “scientific” basis to the concept of Poland as the Intermarium. During his studies in Lviv (before the First World War within the boundaries of the Aus-
tro-Hungarian Empire), and later studies in Vienna and Berlin, confronted with the works of German geographers undertaking the problems of Central and Eastern Europe. For many German geographers Central Europe was the territory which “naturally” should belong to the “Greater Germany”, serving as an “agricultural base”. According to the then German geographers – Central Europe (Mittleeuropa) was a part of German “living space” (Lebensraum), with no basis to form small sovereign political entities.

Romer believed that such views have no logical physiographic, ethnic or moral justification, just ideological persuasion rationalizing German imperial ambitions. Romer in his research in the field of human geography was seeking answers to the question concerning a character of the Polish lands. His vision of the physiographic specificity of the Polish state, which was a polemic against the German concepts of “Mitteleuropa”, was presented in his paper *Environmental basis of historical Poland* (1912). Romer proposed a theoretical concept explaining the unique position of the Polish territories on the European continent, as well as the claims for Polish domination in Central and Eastern Europe. Romer introduced to Polish geographical literature – the notion a “bridge-like state”, stretching from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. In this understanding, the specificity of the Polish lands results in Poland’s “historic mission” to create a unified and strong political entity. “Bridging” position predestined Polish state to territorial expansion to the shores of the Baltic and the Black Sea. Romer’s publication was not only scientifically important, but it had political significance as an essential component of the discussions on the future shape of the Polish state. The book published on the eve of the First World War was the justification for claims to rebuild the Polish Republic in the pre-partitions shape (Eberhardt 2006: 66–67).

In the late 19th and early 20th century, the vision of Poland as a state “enclosed by the Baltic and the Black seas, and the Oder, Dnieper and Danube rivers” had to face the problem of Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Belarusian nationalisms, which were clearly in contradiction with Polish historical pre-partition claims. Evolution of the federal concept led to the emergence of the idea of “Polish as the Intermarium” and of the federation of sovereign states located within the former Polish Republic’s territory. The aim of this concept was to reconcile the vision of Polish geopolitical space “from sea to sea” with national claims of Eastern European communities, which had been under Polish domination until the 18th century. The vision of Poland as Intermarium was formed by the end of the First World War, when Poland got the opportunity to regain its independence lost at the end of the 18th century. In 1918, Polish political and social elites faced the question – how to legitimize the rebirth of the Polish state? What is the role to be played by the Polish historical tradition in the formation of the modern state? How to arrange relationships with ethnic groups, which had been under the Polish political and cultural domination before the Period of Par-
titions? How to ensure peace, stability and security of the Polish recovered state in the face of both Russian and German threats?

The geopolitical vision of Poland as Intermarium proved to be very functional in this situation. It has been transformed into a political program for reconstruction of the Polish state and aiming to provide a security to entire Central and Eastern Europe. Geographical Intermarium idea soon became an element of political thought and discourses concerning the shape of the post-war order and the role of Poland on the redrawn map of Europe. Włodzimierz Wakar, Polish political commentator undertook the issue of Intermarium. The starting point for his discussion about the future of the Polish state was its territory in the pre-partitions period. He considered, however, that due to the formation within this area of new nations that aspire to independence, it is no longer possible to return to the previous state. Moreover, Wakar stressed the need to create independent Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus as a guarantee of Polish geopolitical security. He believed that the situation of Central and Eastern Europe territories resulted from the First World War is unique. Three oppressive empires collapsed. In this place a new community of liberated nations should be build, and in this connection, Poland has a major role to play. In the historical essay Jagiellonian idea at the present time (1920) he wrote that Germany and Russia defeated in the First World War will seek revenge and will try to regain the lost territories. In order to achieve that aim, they may try to set at variance among middle and small countries located between these powers. Therefore, establishment of a great community of oppressed nations is the only way to protect against retaliation of Germany and Russia. Wakar referring to the history of the region stated that the Republic of Poland (as situated between Germany and Russia), has managed to maintain its independence, and even gains the status of a regional power through the creation of a large political entity consisting of many nations of Central Europe. Community of Central European countries should not be smaller than the Commonwealth of Poland in the heyday of its power (Eberhardt 2006: 86–87).

The geohistorical concept of Poland as the Intermarium gained its practical dimension in political activities of Józef Piłsudski, Polish statesman, the person most responsible for the rebirth of Poland in 1918. His political project aiming at building an independent Polish state assumed in the initial phase (1918–1921) building of a federal state composed of Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. Piłsudski and his followers proclaimed the slogan of returning to the pre-partition Polish borders. However, they meant the sphere of influence, rather than direct domination over this area. The latter was essentially limited to the ethnic borders. The rest of the former territories of the Republic, which would not become a part of the Polish state, would be organized in the form of small nation states: Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine, united with Poland in a federal state built on formally equal terms. In the ideological dimension it was a return to
the tradition of pre-partition Republic, strengthening the Polish position in Central and Eastern Europe.

Unsuccessful federal attempts evolved this project for the postulate of strict political and military alliance of states located between the Baltic and the Black Sea. This alliance was to be a counterweight to the power of the Soviet Union and Germany. It was a Polish attempt to solve geopolitical problems of Central and Eastern Europe, including the security of the region and regulation of the aspirations of nations belonging to the pre-partition Poland. Pilsudski seeking answers to the question about the place and role of the newly independent Poland in post-war Europe regarded the idea of the Intermarium as the most functional. He believed that not only federal state should be created on the lands of a pre-partition Poland, but also that this federation should have political and military alliances with other European countries. What he meant above all: Hungary, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and even Finland and Yugoslavia. The Republic of Poland would emerge as a geopolitical regional power.

This concept was strongly rooted in the Polish historical tradition and referred to the pre-partitions period. In the minds of Polish people and political elites Republic of Poland was not a new state on the map of Europe. Poles were historical nation and their state had periods of greatness, to which the concept Intermarium refers. Apart from the fact that in the post-war reality the concept was almost impossible to realize (Poland was involved in territorial conflicts with its neighbours, who regarded Pilsudski’s concept in the terms of expansionism) it strongly influenced the international activity of the Polish authorities. After Pilsudski’s death in 1935, a later version of his concept was attempted by interwar Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck, who emphasized the need to consolidate countries of the Baltic and Black Sea regions in a spirit of building a political and ideological counterweight to the communist and fascist states.

During the Second World War, the concept of Intermarium was revived by the Polish government-in-exile, with its Prime Minister Władysław Sikorski, in the form of the idea of the Central European Union of countries located between the Baltic, Black Sea, Adriatic and Aegean Sea. The first step to achieve this vision, were attempts of talks undertaken in 1942 between the Greek, Yugoslav, Polish and Czechoslovak governments-in-exile, concerning the establishment of the Greek-Yugoslav and Polish-Czechoslovak federations. The opposition of the Soviet Union authorities and indifference of the Allies caused the failure of talks. After the Second World War the map of Europe was redrawn, the changes associated with the USSR dominance in the region caused that the concept of Intermarium was no longer an important part of the Polish foreign policy. Nevertheless, this concept has been still strongly present in the Polish political thought, particularly among Polish communities living abroad, which continued an answer to the question concerning the Polish place on the map of Europe and the way to protect the state’s sovereignty against the German and Russian expansion.
The Second World War, as well as the geopolitical situation that followed, caused that all projects of the Central European federation under the aegis of Poland ceased to have any reasonable grounds. The border changes, huge numbers of displaced people, ethnic cleansing, political domination of the Soviet Union, all these elements contributed to the changed geopolitical situation in which ideas of Intermarium were unrealistic. In addition, the post-war Polish territorial displacement and placing its borders on the Oder and Neisse caused that new Polish government attempting to legitimize the presence of the Polish state on the lands formerly belonging to Germany, began to refer to the geopolitical vision of “Poland of Piasts” and not to “Jagiellonian”. Only after the collapse of the Eastern bloc and when countries of Central and Eastern Europe regained their sovereignty, the concept of Intermarium once again emerged in the debates on the role of an independent Polish state in the region, and in Polish foreign policy we could notice inspirations taken from the concept of Intermarium.

Contemporary popularity of Intermarium concept among Polish political elites is related to a particular historical moment in which the idea of Poland being responsible for political organization of the region has again become functional. It justifies political elite’s ambitions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, communities located in the sphere of its influence began to look for new determinants of their identity, in order to redefine their place in the world. In the case of Poland, the process of EU enlargement to the east has also played an important role. Polish political elites felt threatened by the dominance of European tandem France-Germany and have tried to develop and to define the role that Poland can play in Europe, so that its position within the European Union was strong enough. Seeking answers to these questions, Polish political elites arbitrarily assigned the role of the state which, because of its potential should be: 1) a regional leader, who will play a dominant role in Central and Eastern Europe; 2) because of its historical experience should implement Europe’s eastern policy; 3) will be an advocate and mentor to countries such as Belarus and Ukraine, which after the collapse of the Soviet Union remained outside the European Union. All of these elements could be included within the concept of Polish as the Intermarium, which was decisive for its attractiveness for social and political elites. It is in this context also important that the development of the Intermarium concept is attributed to Józef Piłsudski, the chief of the newly independent Polish state, person regarded in historiographical tradition as a creator and defender of Polish independence and reason of state. He is a figure symbolizing such values as patriotism and sovereignty. The reference to the Intermarium idea is therefore, a reference to the strong social authority.

In the early years after the collapse of The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance – Comecon and the “exit” of the Central and Eastern European countries from Soviet domination, the Polish foreign policy was dominated by a strategy focused on a close cooperation between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hunga-
ry. This idea was strongly supported by the government centres of NATO to encourage Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to reinforce this cooperation. Western strategists’ point was to avoid “balkanization” of Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact structures. Encouraging the formation of “new regionalism” they highlighted the three countries with the highest progress of reforms. The West, prompting these states to tripartite cooperation, believed it would be easier to maintain overall stability in the continent and to prevent these countries from competing for the European Union accession (Zięba 1992:28). The spirit of cooperation in the so-called Visegrad Group referred to the historical tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian Jagiellonian dynasty, whose representatives for a short time were sitting on Polish, Czech, and Hungarian throne. In relation to its eastern neighbours new Polish political elites recognized Russia as a main opponent. Lithuania and Ukraine were considered strategic partners. It was also decided to work for the national sovereignty of Belarus. Poland since the “Round Table Agreement” and elections in 1989, which led to the change of power, all the time supported the independence aspirations of Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine. Such a foreign policy was strongly characterized by anti-Russian attitude and the missionary attitude towards eastern neighbours. Only a few political groups, business representatives, creative artists, and cultural operators wanted friendly relations with Russia, with no regard for other nations (Madera 2003: 87–88).

The popularity of Intermarium concept is therefore a result of the traditional concerns and perception of the Polish state as endangered by two great neighbours: Russia and Germany (currently it is mainly the concept of an anti-Russian issue), as well as the result of the Polish political elites’ conviction that Poland has always been, and should be a regional leader, responsible for the organization of the political order in the region. In the consciousness of the Polish political elites, regardless of ideological orientation, dominates the view of the great significance of Eastern Europe in the geopolitical balance of power in the world, and a Polish key role in organizing the political order in the region. One of the Polish foreign ministers, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz on the eve of Polish of UE entry, wrote that the most important strategic challenge for Poland is the issue of the future of Eastern Europe, understood as the area between the current EU border and Russia. Due to European integration processes we face the establishment of geopolitical future of the area. Due to the fact that the “old” EU politicians to a greater extent focused on other issues, such as the future of the Middle East and resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the stabilization of Iraq, so the issue of Eastern Europe is driven to the background and a “strategic vacuum” is created. Western countries are not able to conduct an effective policy of such issues as the autocratic system in Belarus or Ukraine’s deficit of democracy and “drifting” towards Russia. Thus, Poland should take responsibility for the import of the Western model to the East of Europe. Isolation of Eastern Europe would
result in substantial adverse effects on Poland; peripheral position of Eastern Europe would become permanent, putting Poland at a disadvantaged “bulwark” position (Cimoszewicz 2004: 12). Therefore, as the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs believed, modernization of Eastern Europe should remain a Polish “number one” strategic task. In foreign policy, the main objective is to provide Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus – the perspectives of the future EU and NATO membership. The Polish foreign policy is to work towards a system of incentives, which would mobilize Poland’s neighbours to make relevant political choices. At the same time the Polish minister states, that there is nothing that will bring Russia closer to Europe, as Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO structures (Cimoszewicz 2004: 12). In this context, the Polish foreign policy should therefore be to “civilize” of Eastern Europe by transferring West European models. These foreign policy objectives formulated by the minister of the leftist Democratic Left Alliance party, have not changed nor under the conservative Law and Justice party, or under the liberal Civic Platform. The idea of Poland as a key political player in the area of the Eastern European Intermarium is dear to Polish political elites. Hence the subsequent involvement in the so-called “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine, lobbying for the implementation of the Nabucco pipeline and Odessa–Brody pipeline, as well as the personal commitment of Polish President Lech Kaczyński on the side of Georgia in the conflict with Russia.

One of the latest concepts of Polish foreign policy, where one can see echoes of Poland as the Intermarium concept, is the idea of the “Eastern Partnership”. The project initiated in 2009 during the Czech presidency of the EU is an initiative of the European Union addressed to the six countries of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) was established as a component of a functioning since 2004, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) including countries of Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, North Africa, and the Middle East (“near abroad” of the EU). The ENP aims to ensure the safety of the Union by creating a ring of stable and well-governed countries around the EU. Polish diplomacy after the accession to the EU has set itself the goal to play a major role in shaping European policy towards its eastern neighbours. Polish diplomats supported by Sweden initiated The Eastern Partnership, forum for discussing visa agreements, free trade deals, and strategic partnership agreements with the EU’s eastern neighbours. Mainly thanks to the participation of Sweden in the project, the development of separate Eastern policy was no longer seen only as a sphere of interest of the “new” EU member states. France in return for agreeing to the recovery of the southern dimension of the ENP has given its consent for the implementation of the idea of partnership directed towards the Eastern neighbours of the EU. An important role in speeding up the process of institutionalization of cooperation with Eastern partners has also played a Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008.
Poland and Sweden, as the initiators of the Eastern Partnership, proposed in 2008 to deepen relations with its eastern neighbours already covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy. In their efforts to extract the “eastern dimension” of ENP, Poland and Sweden have requested support to Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) and the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary). The aim of the initiative is primarily to strengthen political and economic relations between the European Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Eastern Partnership includes the bilateral legal basis for the development of new relations between the EU and its eastern neighbours in the form of association agreements and the creation of comprehensive free trade areas. This program provides specific forms of political and economic integration with the EU, such as, among others – establishment of political associations and cooperation in the field of energy security. For the Polish diplomacy implementation of the Eastern Partnership will be an introduction to the integration of the countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus with the EU (Cf. Eastern Partnership: The Opening Report 2009; Ananicz 2009).

Polish foreign policy at the beginning of the 21st century proves that Poland still intends to play a role of the Central European region’s leader. The vision of Poland as Intermarium provides support to the ambitions of political elite. It is one of the most sustainable geopolitical visions among political elite, as well as in the social awareness. Poland – Intermarium is therefore one of the major visions dominating in contemporary Polish society. In fact, subsequent political initiatives refer to the historically rooted idea of the Republic as a regional Central-European power, whose sphere of activity and political interests is determined by the territory located between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas.

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10.1. Unicity of the Ukrainian ethnic and political identity and its geopolitical significance

The polarization of the political moods in Ukraine has once again brought the issues of territorial and political integrity of the state which is related to problems of Ukrainian ethnic and political identity as well as to the choice of the country’s geopolitical orientation. In scientific and publicistic literature there have also appeared many analytical materials (by І. Bekeshkina, О. Maiboroda, L. Nahorna, M. Riabchuk, H. Perepelytsia, V. Khmelko, V. Shyshatskyi, etc.) which accounted for the situation from different methodological standpoints, along with various political speculations as to the “immanent division” of Ukraine, “civilizational incompatibility” of its regions, etc. While analysts were trying to perceive the cause-and-effect relationship of territorial and political realia, political strategists and politicians tried to use them while fighting for their interests. That also refers to related external political environments, out of which particularly intense mass information pressure, aimed at regaining and strengthening the Soviet identity in Ukraine, is applied by Russia that considers reproduction of the Soviet political values as a pre-condition for expansion of its geopolitical impact and even restoration of the empire within the former USSR (Dnistriansky 2010: 4–7). Therefore, the Russian political circles that are mainly empire-oriented strive to prevent creation of pre-conditions for the shaping of the new Ukrainian political identity that would be adequate for its state and
political status, and, correspondingly, for regional and political consolidation of the Ukrainian population. Various contradictory influences on the political identity of the residents of the frontier areas of Ukraine are also exerted by the political circles of Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Turkey. Thus, the question as to how far the citizens of Ukraine are associated with the Ukrainian sovereignty, a certain area only or whether they still preserve their former Soviet identity or are associated with the modern Russian state or other neighbouring countries is also the issue that has to do with preservation and strengthening of political and geographical integrity of Ukraine, and determination of the vector of its geopolitical development.

10.2. Factors in the shaping of regional differences in the ethnic and political self-consciousness of the Ukrainians

All the aspects of territorial and political identification of the Ukrainian society are in this or that way related to ethnocultural self-consciousness of the residents. Therefore, in the course of a comprehensive political and geographical consideration of the mentioned issue it is also necessary to analyse ethnocultural identification of different regional groups of the state, in particular, in the context of their assimilation or acculturation. These aspects are of special importance as far as territorial differentiation of the levels of self-consciousness of the Ukrainian nation and a large group of ethnic Russians are concerned.

Since state and political identity of most societies is primarily based on historical and political traditions, in relation to Ukraine it is also important to outline those moments of the Ukrainian state shaping which have stipulated in a proper way the characteristic features of Ukrainian political self-consciousness and its territorial disparities. That is primarily related to the peculiarities of the national and political movement for cultural autonomy and independence of Ukraine that has been the core of its political history over the past two centuries, as well as to the difference in the degree of involvement of the country’s regions into that historical and political process.

Contemporary national movement for political and cultural rights of Ukraine appeared as far back as in the first half of the 19th century. At the beginning of the 20th century, it stood out for its considerable scale and international recognition. It was one of the most powerful ones among similar political movements in Europe. From the standpoint of politics and geography, it must be noted that Ukrainian state-shaping processes of the last centuries, in fact, involve almost all the regions of contemporary Ukraine, regardless of which states they belonged to, though they were involved to a different extent (Skliarska 2011: 47–57). Taking into account such factors as: a) the degree of territorial and political relation with the historical nucleus of the country; b) availability of the historical centres of political struggle for independence; c) formation of the
centres of Ukrainian social and cultural life in the past, only the Crimea is characterized by the lowest degree of integration with the Ukrainian statehood idea since it was the last to enter the Ukrainian SSR and therefore, it was not to a great extent identified with Ukraine even in the Soviet form. The Crimean peninsula, though, was also related to the nucleus of Ukraine almost throughout the whole historical epoch (Oleksyuk 2004: 43). Thus, most state regions were in a certain period either centres of Ukrainian national and political movement or cultural elevation, or in those territories there took place some bright events of the Ukrainian political and cultural history. That refers not only to central Ukraine, Volyn and Halychyna, but also to more distant regions like Slobozhanshchyna, Donechchyna, Odeschchyna, Bukovyna, and Zakarpattia. The regional peculiarities of the Ukrainian state formation got a certain reflection in the social consciousness, but in contemporary conditions they already do not work since they are not stressed in the information policy, and sometimes they have been eradicated by the recent information and political technologies provoking regional separatism, which are particularly actively applied by the pro-Russian political forces.

Contemporary regions of Ukraine used to be a part of several states having different ideological principles: from the end of the 18th century to 1917 within the Russian and Austrian (Austro-Hungarian) empires, during the 1920s and the 1930s – within Poland, Romania, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia. That fact also does not contribute to common political identity of the Ukrainians. Development and total settlement of the southern and eastern regions also took place much later as compared to the central and western parts of the country. The negative consequences of territorial and political disintegration of the Ukrainian lands over the 19th and the first half of the 20th century are particularly notable with account of the fact that in the then Europe there were actively taking place nation-forming and state-forming processes. It must be noted that also after parts of Western Ukrainian historical regions were taken to the Ukrainian SSR, not only did the authorities fail to do anything to overcome the negative interregional stereotypes, but, on the contrary, supported and even strengthened them on the mass level (Dziuba 2001: 25). Only a narrow circle of creative intelligentsia, mainly literary one, was trying to take some steps aimed at consolidation. Unfortunately, in the period of independence as well central political elites quite often used the level of provoking regional opposition. Such a device was applied by both central state structures and separate political forces and politicians, who contributed to further popularizing of biased historical versions. As a result, there took place no serious achievements in the overcoming of historical barriers of mutual perception.

Thus, the Ukrainian state territory is of an integral (composed) nature from the viewpoint of history and geography as well. However, it is an integral formation based on the area of dominating settlement of the state-shaping
Ukrainian ethnic nation that makes up the majority at over 90.0% of the Ukrainian state territory. The polyethnics and biethnic nature is a characteristic of relatively small part of the country (Crimea, Southern Bessarabia and Donechchyna). The share of ethnic Ukrainians makes up over 80.0% in 17 regions out of 25, in four ones it exceeds 70.0%, and only in one, in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, it makes up a minority (Dnistrianskyy 2006: 224–236).

Therefore, it is obvious that the chief factor that has determined uniting of different historical regions within one state formation has been the geography of ethnic Ukrainians, the right of the Ukrainian people to self-identification, sovereignty guidelines of the Ukrainian political circles, etc. Within different states, but consolidated by the ethnic national factor, were also some regions of Poland, Romania and some other states of Central and Eastern Europe. Then, according to the main principle of formation of the Central and Eastern European states, which is the ethno-national one, Ukraine has got all the objective grounds for becoming an integral country. However, territorial and consolidation processes in Ukraine both in the late 20th and in the early 21st century are not quite smooth since the Ukrainian ethnic nation remains unconsolidated mostly being related to assimilation and acculturation in the Russian-speaking milieu of the regional groups of the South and East. In particular, this concerns urban residents. Following the results of the last census of the year 2001, in all Ukraine 14.8% of ethnic Ukrainians acknowledged the Russian language to be their native one, and in the urban surroundings the figure was 21.8%, while in the rural settings it was 2.7%. As compared to 1989, the percentage of Ukrainian residents whose native tongue is Russian in the cities increased by 1.8%, and in the villages – by 0.7%. The largest percentage of the Ukrainians (mainly the residents of regional centres and large cities) assimilated into the Russian-speaking milieu in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (59.5%), Donetsk (58.7%), and Luhansk (49.4%) regions (Natsional’ni sklad naselennia Ukraini ta iogo movni oznaki za danimi Vseukrainskogo perepisu naselennia 2001 roku 2003: 104–114). At the same time, the degree of acculturation of ethnic Ukrainians into the Russian-speaking cultural milieu constitutes an indicator of the state of ethnic national self-consciousness. Ukrainians with the Russian mother tongue have mixed (“Soviet”) national self-consciousness.

A religious factor could improve interregional relationships under certain circumstances. However, the territorial aspect of the religious sphere and its political significance also confirm preservation of considerable, historically stipulated regional discrepancies and insufficiency of cultural combinations. Of particularly negative geopolitical value is the territorial division of the Ukrainian orthodoxy, absence of one, self-governed, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

The situation in the information sphere of the state does not contribute to consolidation of the Ukrainian society since discrediting of Ukrainian national liberation movement, idealizing of the history of the Soviet period and Russian
colonial policy are being implemented with the support of the political forces of Russian imperialism. Systemic attempts to ensure political mobilization of large groups of residents on the principles of Soviet-Russian identity for the sake of reconsidering the state and political status of Ukraine have become a reality. Therefore, due to all the negative moments traced in Ukraine over the period of independence the processes shaping an integral Ukrainian political nation and general state identity that would combine general national unity and regional identity have not been completed.

10.3. The characteristic features of ethnopolitical situation in the social and cultural regions of Ukraine

Regional discrepancies in the formation of Ukrainian political and ethnic identity are properly manifested in the aspect of large sociocultural geographical areas uniting one or several administrative units of the higher level. The territorial entities of the state are characterized by peculiarities of ethnic composition of the population as well as various degrees of assimilation and acculturation of the largest ethnic groups. Primarily, in the cross-section of ethnographic areas of importance is differentiation by the level of crisis in the Ukrainian ethnicity that is manifested in different levels of Russification of the ethnic Ukrainians (Dnistrianskyy 2006: 236–254). Assimilation of the ethnic Ukrainians has a direct impact on their political self-consciousness, since with the increase in the degree of Russification there increases the possibility that residents of Ukraine start supporting marginal political slogans of Russian-Soviet imperialism or the ones destructive in relation to general state interests.

Due to the impact of previous stages of development on the formation of ethnic structure of regions the mapping model of Ukraine by areas must be in this or that way of historical and social cultural nature, reflecting both the main differences in the influence of basic ideologies (Ukrainian national democracy, social democracy, liberalism, Russian imperialism, Soviet communism, and some others) and, correspondingly, the electoral geography of Ukraine. Taking such areas separately also discloses considerable peculiarities of the structure of the religious and cultural sphere, mainly relating to the correlation of Greek Catholics, Orthodox Christians of the Kyiv and Moscow patriarchates, the Protestants, the Muslims, etc., which, in its turn, influences the level of interethnic complementarity (subconscious sympathy or antipathy). Synthesizing a whole range of characteristic sociocultural features, each of the above areas forms its unique political image.

Besides objective historical and ethnic preconditions, the differences in political and ethnic identification of residents of the above areas are in this or that way influenced by external factors (the policy of the neighbouring states) along with some internal preconditions (party and political structure, popularity of
public and political formations that cast doubt on the idea of Ukrainian sovereignty in this or that form).

Thus, taking into account a wide range of factors (the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic minorities, ethnic mosaic of regions, population structure by native tongue, degree of assimilation of ethnic and national groups, election geography), the following groups of regions are taken as separate ethnic and geographical sociocultural areas: 1) the Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi regions; 2) the Volyn-Halychyna area (the Volyn, Rivne, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil regions); 3) the Podillia-Polissia area (the Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi regions); 4) the Central Right Bank area (Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy regions); 5) the Central Left Bank area (the Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv regions); 6) the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv regions); 7) Donetsk area (Donetsk and Luhansk regions); 8) Odessa area (Odessa region); 9) the Central Black Sea area (the Mykolaiv and Kherson regions); 10) the Crimean area (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) (see Figure 10.1). It should be stressed that those groups of regions stand out for the similarity of sociocultural indices but are not integral main areas and cannot be a subject of territorial and political relations.

Thus, what are the basic contradictions in terms of political and ethnic identification of the outlined macroareas of Ukraine?

**The Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia regions** do not form an integral area, but are, nevertheless, similar in the features of geopolitical location, historical and geographical preconditions, some special features of ethno-national structure of the population as well as public and political activity of ethnic groups (Skliarska 2011: 47–57). The ethnic Ukrainian population makes up over 75.0%, and the index of quantitative prevalence of the Ukrainians over the largest ethno-national group is almost the same for both regions (6.7 – in the Zakarpattia region and 6.0 – in the Chernivtsi region). Ethnic minorities are settled to a great extent in a compact way, and directly in the frontier, mainly in rural area (primarily, Berehove district of the Zakarpattia region, Hertsa and Novoselytsia districts of the Chernivtsi region). In those regions in the course of the 1990s, there were actually no interethnic conflict situations; however, a whole range of problems can be traced in the processes of ethnopoltical consolidation. Indigenous ethnic minorities (the Hungarians, the Romanians, and the Moldovans) are quite well provided with a cultural and educational infrastructure, however, they are poorly integrated into the general Ukrainian milieu, also due to their poor command of Ukrainian, since till 1991 no Ukrainian was actually taught at schools where Russian was not the language of teaching. For instance, in Zakarpattia only 45.5% of ethnic Hungarians and 24.2% of ethnic Romanians indicated during the census of the year 2001 that their command of Ukrainian was fluent (Natsional’nii sklad neselennia ta iogo movni oznaki za danimi Vseukrainskogo perepisu neselennia 2001 roku 2003: 17). However, it is not only in cultural but social and economic interests as well that the
residents belonging to ethno-national minorities are more oriented towards the neighbouring national states. In the background of sceptical or protest attitude to the Ukrainian authorities, the communities of ethno-national minorities raise too high requirements causing certain ethnopolitical tension, in particular, with Ukrainian national political unions. Sometimes such actions are combined with incorrect foreign policy steps of the neighbouring countries. As an example here may serve the situation when Romania provided ethnic Romanians, citizens of Ukraine, with Romanian citizenship at the same time constituting a gross violation of Ukrainian legislation that does not envisage any dual citizenship. And the number of citizens of Ukraine who have got Romanian passports, according to some informal data, is quite high – over 500 thousand people, and under certain conditions that can become a factor of regional and political instability. Official motivation of such actions is also politically incorrect since this is accounted for by the regaining of pre-war Romanian citizenship that testifies to a certain extent to non-recognition of current territorial and political realia.

In Zakarpattia, the problem of political rusynism remains topical, its ideology being based on the fact that Ukrainian residents of the region allegedly constitute a separate ethnos. Polls proved from the very beginning that the percentage of persons among the native Ukrainian residents of Zakarpattia that identified themselves with the Rusyns as a separate ethnos is very small. That was confirmed by the Census 2001, the methodology of which enabled all the Ukrainians willing to do this identifying themselves as a separate ethnos. Census results showed that 10,090 people acknowledged themselves as representatives of a “separate ethnos” (a Rusyn / a Ruthenian), constituting less than one percent of all ethnic Ukrainians of Zakarpattia, and 31.0% of them acknowledged Ukrainian to be their native tongue (Natsional'nii sklad naselennia ta iogo movni oznaki za danimi Vseukrainskogo perepisu naselennia 2001 roku 2003: 104–114).

As monitoring of the latest presidential and parliamentary elections of Ukraine shows, the residents of the Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi regions demonstrate specific electoral and political activity. The support of the Ukrainian national democratic forces makes up from 40.0% to 60.0%. The support of the Party of Regions which has been the ruling one since 2010 and that combines liberal and pro-Russian ideological principles here varied from 15.0% to 30.0%. Just 5.0% of voters chose left-wing political parties.

The Western, Volyn-Halytsyna area embraces five regions – Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, and Ternopil. In general, that area has a mono-ethnic nature, and it is distinguished for a high percentage of ethnic Ukrainians (over 95.0%), a small percentage of ethnic Russians (less than 5.0%) and Russian-speaking population (less than 4.0%). The index of quantitative prevalence of the Ukrainians over the largest ethnic minority in this part of Ukraine is the highest and varies from some 27.0 in the Lviv region to over 78.0 in Ternopil one.
Figure 10.1. Social and cultural areas of Ukraine

Legend
- Cities (regional centres)
- Social and cultural areas borders
- Borders of regions
  I - Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi regions
  II - Volyn and Halychyna area
  III - Podilia Polisia area
  IV - Central Right Bank area
  V - Central Left Bank area
  VI - Dnipro-Kharkiv area
  VII - Donetsk area
  VIII - Odesa area
  IX - Central Black Sea area
  X - Crimean area

Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Ethnic Russians are scattered mainly in large and medium-sized cities which are administrative, industrial, and recreational centres. The percentage of urban residents among them exceeds 80.0%. In the regional centres of the area the percentage of ethnic Russians makes up from 3.0% (in Ternopil) to 8.9% (in Lviv). Here, the Russians are quite well adapted to the Ukrainian cultural milieu. From 12.0% to 20.0% of them consider Ukrainian to be their native language, and at the same time among those who consider the language of their nationality to be their native language, as compared with other areas, the percentage of those having quite a fluent command of Ukrainian is quite high. Along with that, the percentage of the Russians who were born directly in the Volyn-Halychyna area is small (less than 2.0% of the whole population born in the area), being one of the factors of reduction in the complementarity of ethnic Russians and ethnic majority. High degree of self-consciousness of Ukrainian residents has also encouraged higher public activity among minorities, that getting manifested in the setting-up of a wide network of ethno-national communities. The degree of support of national democratic and nationalistic forces within the historical Halychyna makes up from 85.0% to 90.0%, and within historical Volyn – up to 75.0%. Some 10.0% of residents are ready to support centrist, left-wing and centrist as well as liberal democratic parties. In Volyn the influence of centrist parties, in particular, the ones supported by the administrative resource can achieve 15.0%.

The high degree of involvement in the all-Ukrainian historical process and quite an integral ethnic cultural environment enables the Volyn-Halychyna area to become one of the leaders in the consolidation of both Ukrainian national state and political nation. However, the poor economic potential caused along with objective preconditions by some subjective factors as well has considerably reduced its social and economic role in the general development of the state. So, in the Lviv region throughout the 1990s (up till 1998) the fall in the scope of industrial production was the largest in Ukraine (with the average figure of industrial production reduction in Ukraine being 51.0%, in the Lviv region it reached 73.0%) (Statistichnii shchorichnik Ukraini za 2001 rik 2002: 514), and due to some objective complexities and management inactivity the work of the largest industrial companies was actually brought to a collapse. Somewhat lower than on average in Ukraine is complementarity of ethnic Ukrainians and Russians here, in particular those of senior residents, this is caused by complex historical issues causing certain mutual mistrust. However, on the whole, taking into account all the objective factors, one may state that in this area there are no serious ethnic political obstacles for consolidation of the whole Ukrainian society. Along with that, due to the high degree of identification of the population of this sociocultural area with the idea of Ukrainian sovereignty, in a case of drastic deviation of the state authorities from the principles of constructing Ukraine as a national state here ethnopolitical riots are possible.
The three areas of the central part of Ukraine – Podillia-Polissia, Central Right Bank and Central Left Bank ones, the same as the Volyn-Halychyna area, are based on the primary area of Ukrainian settlement and nation-shaping. That considerably determines its primarily monoethnic nature: the percentage of the Ukrainians here varies from over 85.0% (only the Sumy region) to some 95.0% (Vinnytsia), and the index of their quantitative prevalence is from 10.0% in the Sumy region to 26.4% in the Khmelnytskyi region, and that is somewhat lower than in the Volyn-Halychyna area. In rural areas, the share of ethnic Ukrainians exceeds 95.0%. The percentage of the Ukrainians whose native language is Russian is a bit higher here than in the Volyn-Halychyna area, and it varies in the right bank part from 1.0% to 4.0%, while in the left bank one it reaches 7.6%. However, in general in each of those three areas the percentage of Ukrainian-speaking residents is a bit smaller than the percentage of the Ukrainians and, what is particularly indicative for ethnic and political identification of residents, assessment of the integrity of Ukrainian cultural milieu is the fact that in all the regions of Podillia-Polissia, Central Right Bank, and Central Left Bank areas the percentage of the Ukrainians with Russian being their native tongue is smaller than the percentage of the Russians with their native tongue being Ukrainian. In that respect, only the city of Kyiv and some industrial cities (Kremenchuk, Shostka) constitute an exception. Though the figures for the majority of indices of ethnic identity of residents of Podillia-Polissia, Central Right Bank, and Central Left Bank areas are similar, there can still be traced a certain trend in sociocultural indices (the degree of assimilation of ethnic Ukrainians, the scope of political forces support) from the west to the east. Unlike the Volyn-Halychyna area, within the central districts of Ukraine more conspicuous are also inner regional differences: the percentage of the Ukrainians whose native tongue is Russian is much higher in the regional centres than in rural areas or even in small and middle-size towns, and Ukrainian-speaking milieu of regional centres and the city of Kyiv is much narrower than the percentage of residents whose native tongue is Ukrainian. Ethno-national minorities (Jews, Russians) in Podillia-Polissia, Central Right Bank, and Central Left Bank areas are mostly settled in a dispersed way (in large administrative and industrial centres). An exception here is the Putylivka district (the Sumy region) where there is a slight prevalence in terms of number (51.6% Russians and 47.4% Ukrainians) in favour of ethnic Russians.

All the three areas of the central part of Ukraine, taking into account both their geographical location and historical importance, and sufficient degree of Ukrainian ethnopolitical identity, they have sufficient grounds to become the core of the consolidation of Ukrainian society following the principles of national sovereignty and conflict-free development of ethnopolitical processes. In particular, the area is characterized by a relatively high degree of Ukrainian self-consciousness and, at the same time, a high level of complementarity with the
largest ethnic national group – the Russians. Therefore, in general, the discrepancies in ethnopolitical development are poorly manifested. Some crisis manifestations of Ukrainian identity (assimilation into the Russian cultural milieu) are characteristic mainly of the capital and regional centres. Rural areas and small town settlements are of quite an integral Ukrainian nature.

All the central areas of Ukraine are in many aspects distinguished for the similarity of voting structure: on average up to 50.0% of residents here are ready to support national democratic forces, from 10.0% to 15.0% – left-wing centrist ones, from 5.0% to 10.0% – communist ones. The degree of support of national democratic and liberal democratic forces is a bit higher in the right bank regions, while that of left-wing and left-wing centrist ones – in the left bank regions. In the central part of Ukraine, the readiness to provide support to effective centrist political forces and the ruling party (up to 20.0%) is felt. Moreover, special place in the electoral ratios goes to the capital, which is characterized by low electoral activity, noticeable variability of political moods. As compared to the neighbouring regions, in Kyiv a slightly higher level of support of national democratic and liberal democratic forces is possible (up to 50.0%) being primarily caused by the concentration of Ukrainian national intelligentsia. However, there can also be traced marginalizing of electoral moods. The immunity to bribery related to voting, particularly manifested in the local election (that of city mayor and city council), is insufficiently high.

The Dnipro-Kharkiv sociocultural area lies completely within the Ukrainian ethnic territory, but it was inhabited by the Ukrainians a bit later than the neighbouring Central Left Bank and Central Right Bank regions. A considerable imprint on the formation of identity in that territory and political self-consciousness of its citizens was made by economic development since a high level of industrial development, considerable land resources constantly stimulated immigration of non-Ukrainian residents, in particular to large cities, administrative and industrial centres. Thus, according to the 2001 census, 9.6% of residents of the Dnipropetrovsk region were born in the territory of Russia. Thus, as of today within this sociocultural area, the percentage of the Ukrainians in the overall population varies from 70.0% to 80.0%, rural – from 77.0% in the Zaporizhzhia region to 90.4% in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Over the period between the two last censuses the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians here increased by 7.8% being considerably higher than average Ukrainian values of the dynamics in the percentage of ethnically Ukrainian residents. In the city of Kharkiv, in particular, it increased by 10.6%. Moreover, 22.0% of all ethnic Russians of Ukraine are focused in the area; their percentage varies from 17.6% in the Dnipropetrovsk region to 25.6% in the Kharkiv region. The index of quantitative prevalence of ethnic Ukrainians varies from almost 3 in the Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv regions to 4.5 in the Dnipropetrovsk region. The percentage of the Ukrainians who consider the language of their nationality to be their native one,
makes up on average over 70.0%. At the same time, there the differentiation in
language assimilation of the Ukrainians between rural and urban residents is
more vivid. Thus, in the Kharkiv region only 66.7% of the urban Ukrainian
residents consider the language of their nationality to be their native one, while
in the city of Kharkiv – only 50.4%. Along with that, in rural areas the Ukrainian
language functions on quite a wide basis. 91.8% of the Ukrainians residing in
villages consider it to be their native one in the Kharkiv region, though over the
period between the censuses an increase in language Russification could be
traced in the region. But at the same time, the percentage of the Russians whose
native language is Ukrainian was rising. All in all, their percentage (4.0–6.0%) in
the area is higher than on average in Ukraine. And the total percentage of
residents (including the Ukrainians, the Russians, and other ethnic groups), for
which Ukrainian is native, makes up from 50.0% (in the Zaporizhzhia region) to
67.0% (in the Dnipropetrovsk region). As we can see, the degree of Russification
of the Ukrainians is much lower here than in the neighbouring Donetsk district,
and that of Ukrainization of the Russians is, correspondingly, higher.

The political-geographical problems of the Dnipro-Kharkiv sociocultural
area that includes the Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv regions are
determined not only by its ethno-geographical structure, geopolitical location,
but a considerable economic, primarily, industrial potential. It is here that
research-intensive competitive productions of strategic importance are
concentrated, some powerful financial and industrial groups have been formed,
and in their struggle for the influences on the national scale they have already
been used and will continue to use ethnopoltical ideas. Whereas within the
structure of business and industrial elite, the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians and
generally citizens related to the Ukrainian cultural and political tradition is
relatively small, the use of slogans representing a liberal variant of “Russian
nationalism” in Ukraine is quite noticeable in social and political activity. Taking
this into account, the struggle of business groups for influence on the general
state level can also cause ethnopoltical clashes. Likewise, a high degree of
assimilation and acculturation of ethnic Ukrainians in the regional centres (in
particular, in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia) constitute the grounds for that since it
causes considerable popularity of regional and Soviet identities. Therefore,
regardless of the fact that Kharkiv was twice in its history in the centre of
Ukrainian national and cultural uplifting (the 1820s and the 1830s as well as the
1920s), and the whole sociocultural area preserves the memory of Cossacks (those
of Sloboda and Zaporizhzhia), the ethnopoltical situation here is still consid-
erably influenced by the frontier location and the consequences of migration
processes as well. Such factors cause certain tension and some threat of riots in
Kharkiv and other regional centres due to granting the Russian language the
status of the state language. In rural areas due to deterioration of the living
standard and social dissatisfaction pro-Soviet ideas are also popular.
The Eastern, **Donetsk area** represents also one of the regions that is completely located within the Ukrainian ethnic territory. However, because of its later mass settlement, a considerable impact of migration and assimilation of ethnically Ukrainian population in the course of economic development has got as of today a largely bi-ethnic, Ukrainian-Russian nature. In the area there reside 34.0% of all the Russians in Ukraine, and over 11.0% of all the residents were born in the territory of Russia. The percentage of ethnic Ukrainians in the population makes up, in general, over 57.0%, and among rural residents – some 73.0%. Correspondingly, the percentage of the Russians in the overall population makes up over 38.0%, and among rural residents it exceeds 20.0%. The index of quantitative prevalence of the ethnic Ukrainian population reaches only 1.5. Ethnic Russians make up an absolute majority in two administrative districts of the rural area – Krasnodon (51.7%) and Stanytsia Luhanska (61.1%). As far as other ethnic minorities are concerned, the Greeks stand out for their percentage (1.6% of the residents of the Donetsk region) and public activity. Residents with the Ukrainian language as native, according to the 2001 census, constitute a minority – only some 27.0%. Their percentage in the period between the censuses has reduced by some 5.0%, i.e. it is in this district that the non-correspondence of the tendencies of dynamics of ethno-national and linguistic groups got manifested the most, primarily in respect of the largest change in ethnic self-consciousness and at the same time stability of language identity. The region is also characterized by a deep crisis of Ukrainian identity, in particular in the centre and in the south, as well as Russification of the representatives of ethnic minorities. At the same time, the high share of the interethnic marriages, along with other factors, caused a certain levelling of ethno-national self-consciousness and a relatively higher popularity of regional identity.

The historical peculiarities of the social and economic development have also determined the main ethnopolitical problems and contradictions of the Donetsk sociocultural area: poor involvement into the all Ukrainian historical and political processes, high regional self-consciousness which is opposed to the general national one, acculturation of the Ukrainian population, popularity of pro-Soviet ideas which is supported by social peculiarities in the background of serious complexities during the period of economic transformation. Likewise, the percentage of the Ukrainian language information as well as social and cultural infrastructure is very low. The relatively higher level of industrial development of the Donetsk region has led to the appearance of powerful financial and industrial groups here, which over the last years have shown ambition of having a dominating position in the political system of Ukraine and have been imposing the model of social and cultural relations formed in the region of the Ukrainian society. That could lead to intensification of interregional opposition. That was most noticeably manifested in the course of the presidential campaign of the year 2004, which, due to provocations of Russian political strategists, became a
generator of the riots in all the newly developed lands (the South and the East of Ukraine) for the reason of dual, primarily Russian and Ukrainian, citizenship and granting the status of a state language to the Russian language.

Due to high regional self-consciousness, the Donetsk district is the area of dominating support of local economic and political elites which in the latest election here associated with the Party of Regions that took over 70.0% of votes. Up to 10.0% of voters support the Bolshevik communist forces. The total support of Ukrainian national democratic and liberal democratic forces is very low (up to 15.0%).

Separation of the Odessa region into a particular sociocultural area is due to the number of objective reasons and, primarily, by the fact that this is the region with the highest ethnic mosaic in Ukraine. That primarily refers to Southern Bessarabia which ethnic structure was formed in the course of several tides of resettlements of the Ukrainians and residents of ethno-national groups taking place as the result of objective settlement processes, and also as the result of a purposeful policy of the Russian government throughout the 18th and the 19th centuries. The factor of settlement and cultural presence of ethno-national minorities both in the historical and modern aspects is also of great importance both for the Odessa agglomeration, and for the northern part of the region. In spite of the absolute majority of the Ukrainian population according to the census of the year 2001 (62.8%), in the language structure of the region residents with the Ukrainian language being their native one make up only a relative majority (less than 50.0%, however that is more than the percentage of residents with Russian being their native language). The number of ethnic Ukrainians is only three times bigger than the number of residents of the largest ethno-national group (Russians), and that figure is notably smaller than in the neighbouring regions. In four out of 26 administrative regions, ethnic groups form the absolute or relative majority: Bulgarians make up an absolute majority in the Bolgrad district (60.8%), and relative majority in the Artszyz district (39.0%) and the Tarutyne district (37.5%); Moldavians make up a relative majority in the Reni district (49.0%). Beyond Southern Bessarabia in all the administrative districts an absolute majority is made up by ethnic Ukrainians. The degree of command of the Ukrainian language among the ethnic minorities is very low. A sociological research by Popova conducted in the Odessa region shows that “among those who consider Ukrainian to be their native language, each fifth communicates in it in the family, while only each third – at work and in public places”. Such discrepancies, in the author’s opinion, are caused by the fact that on a large percentage of the population “the Russian language was imposed by the formed sociocultural milieu” (Popova 1994: 131–135).

Contradictory moments of the ethnopolitical development are mostly focused in the regional centre (the city of Odessa) and in the historical region of Southern Bessarabia. In particular, the historical image of Odessa imposed on
residents by modern mass media, a widespread historical mythology as components of the official ideology of the city and regional elite provide little connection of the city with the Ukrainian cultural and political traditions. Due to this, a whole range of significant circumstances is ignored, since Odessa, in spite of its cultural diversity, in the second half of the 19th century and in the 20th century used to be one of the centres of Ukrainian cultural and partially political movement. In the city there are several groups of openly anti-Ukrainian direction, among which is Motherland (Rodina) party. Also, orientation at cosmopolitical forces which are to a different extent related to local authorities, former nomenclature employees is noticeable in the Odessa region.

In the Mykolaiv region and the Kherson region of the southern, Central Black Sea sociocultural area which has been under Ukrainian cultural and political influences over a considerable period of time, the share of the Ukrainians, according to data from the 2001 census, is almost the same and makes up 82.0%. Similar for the two regions are also the share of the Russians (14.1%) and the index of quantitative prevalence of the Ukrainians – 5.8. Rural population is, as in general in Ukraine, predominantly more of a monoethnic nature: though there are some settlements or separate communities of ethno-national minorities (the Moldavians, the Bulgarians, and the Russians), over 88.0% of the whole population are ethnic Ukrainians. Among urban residents the percentage of Russians is on average 18.0%. Only slightly higher their percentage is in regional centres and in the cities of Nova Kakhovka and Pivdennoukrainsk. Along with ethno-demographic parameters, a qualitative distinction of the Central Black Sea area is a higher proportion of the Ukrainians with the native Russian language than that of the Russians with native Ukrainian reflecting a deeper language assimilation of the Ukrainians of the southern part of Ukraine. Differentiation between rural and urban residents in this respect is higher. Thus, while over 95.0% of Ukrainian rural residents of the Mykolaiv region considered the language of their nationality to be their native one, in the regional centre, Mykolaiv, this percentage made up only 56.0%. Contradictions relating to insufficient Ukrainian national identification are also noticeable here, however, destructive politicization of the residents on the basis of mobilization of regional or Soviet identities has fewer objective grounds that in the neighbouring Odessa region. Correspondingly, it is hardly likely that the conflicts of the whole district with the central authorities will come to the front. The Kherson region is distinguished among the other southern regions of Ukraine for the strongest support of Ukrainian national democratic parties (up to 30.0%).

The most complicated situation is in the Crimean region. Taking into account processes of settlement and interference of the state factor into the ethno-demographic situation starting as far back as from the end of the 18th century (organized re-settlements, deportation of indigenous inhabitants), this region is currently acquiring a more polyethnic nature. Thus, according to the
2001 census, less than a half of the Crimean residents (49.1%) were born in the territory of the peninsula, and some 16.1% more – in other regions of Ukraine. At the same time, 18.8% of citizens were born in the territory of the Russian Federation and 8.1% – in the territory of Uzbekistan (*Natsional’niyi sklad naselennia Ukraini...*) 2003: 19–24). As compared to general Ukrainian ratios, the region stands out for an absolute majority of the ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking population. However, over the period between the censuses, the absolute majority of the Russians reduced considerably: all in all by 11.6%, among urban residents – by 10.9%, and among rural residents – by 13.3%. As the result of higher speed of population reduction as well as taking into account drastic increase in the number of Crimean Tatars, there went down the percentage of ethnic Russians in the peninsula: in the overall population – by 7.3% (from 65.6 to 58.3%), with urban residents – by 5.2% (from 71.1 to 65.9%), with rural residents – by 9.9% (from 55.7% to 45.8%). There also went down the absolute number of ethnic Ukrainians: by 9.5% in general and by 5.1% within urban and as much as by 14.9% with rural residents (*Natsional’niyi sklad naselennia Ukraini...*) 2003: 112–118). That caused (in the background of return of deported residents) reduction in the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians by 2.4% in the overall population, by 0.3% with urban and 6.5% with rural residents.

An unfavourable factor in the course of ethnopolitical processes is also assimilation of ethnic Ukrainians that prevents them from performing cultural integration and state consolidation functions. Particularly high is the degree of linguistic Russification of the Ukrainians in the largest cities: in Simferopol – 70.8%, Sevastopol – 70.1%. And only in the southern districts (Krasnoperekopsk, Pervomaisk, and Rozdolne) the share of the Ukrainians whose native tongue is Ukrainian is higher than 50.0%. The tendencies in the development of ethnolinguistic situation are also negative since over the period between the censuses, the percentage of ethnic Ukrainian residents considering Ukrainian to be their native language reduced by as much as 12.2% (from 52.6% to 40.4%), while the percentage of all the residents considering Ukrainian to be their native tongue – by 3.7% (from 13.7% to 10.0%). Also, the level of command of the Ukrainian language among ethno-national minorities is the lowest in Ukraine, and that creates some additional cultural as well as communication barriers on the way towards their integration into the Ukrainian society.

Thus, the Crimean peninsula remains the main node of contradictory development of ethnopolitical processes in Ukraine. One of the generators of the appearance of such contradictions is activation of Russian imperialism that is manifested in different forms. In the peninsula, the same as in Odessa, there functions a whole range of legal and illegal Russian political unions of openly anti-Ukrainian direction. Till the mid-90s of the 20th century, the authorities of the autonomy were in open solidarity with the political forces of Russian imperialism. That all caused and keeps causing clashes primarily with the central
authorities of Ukraine, general Ukrainian political forces, in particular, the national democratic and Crimean-Tatar movement. The fact that here we have relatively the largest proportion of residents born in Russia does not contribute to the perception of the idea of independent Ukraine by ethnic Russians of the Crimean region. In particular, that refers to Sevastopol which, besides other factors, constantly feels a permanent pressure exerted by the Russian Black Sea Navy and some Russian political forces, which generate additional impulses leading to intensification of contradictions.

The Crimean region has got a specific range of problems relating to the return of deported residents and their integration into the Ukrainian cultural and political milieu, the main of which are as follows: a) social and economic ones (employment, settlement and provision with dwelling space, allocation of land plots); b) political and legal (representation of the Crimean Tatars in the authorities, the status of the Crimean Tatar people and its representation structures); c) geocultural (meeting educational and religious needs, command of the Ukrainian language, religious and political ideology of some Crimean Tatar groups, in particular in the context of dangers of Islamic fundamentalism spread).

A negative factor in the development of ethnopolitical situation is also a low degree of complementarity of the Crimean Tatars and ethnic majority of the region – the Russians, caused by many factors, including quite frequently diametrically opposite interpretation of some historical events.

Along with that, among ethno-national communities of the Crimean region that are in the most discriminating conditions in terms of meeting cultural and educational needs are ethnic Ukrainians, since the share of the cultural and educational infrastructure of the Ukrainian language is much smaller not only in the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians but also in the percentage of residents with Ukrainian being their native tongue. Therefore, creation of the corresponding cultural and educational infrastructure for Ukrainian residents, self-consciousness of which is going to rise due to the politicization of the ethnic Russians and the Crimean Tatars (following the principle of opposition) is not only the issue of historical and social justice but also an issue of national security due to the multi-vectoral nature of ethnopolitical orientation.

The electoral and geographical situation of the Crimean region also stands out for its special features, and within the region it stands out in the city of Sevastopol. Here, quite considerable is dissatisfaction with the political status of the peninsula, therefore particularly high is both the support of pro-Russian parties. Quite influential here are also the parties supported by or that used to be supported by the executive structures, proclaiming pro-Russian geopolitical and geocultural slogans. Such a situation is largely caused by active propaganda activities of Russian mass media and local pro-Russian editions, with actual absence of information influences on behalf of central authorities in Ukraine. Total support of Ukrainian national democratic forces reached 13.0–15.0%, and still
that was mainly due to electoral activity of the Crimean Tatars.

Thus, the obvious leader in terms of complexity of ethnopolitical relations is the Crimean region, including the city of Sevastopol which is also characterized by the highest rating of ethno-national and religious mosaic, as well as a comparatively low level of interethnic complementarity. And due to availability of destructive ethnopolitical factors (external threats, in particular, the location of the Russian Black Sea Navy) appearance of ethnopolitical conflicts is most possible here.

10.4. Prospects of regional and ethnopolitical consolidation of the Ukrainian society

In general, there are enough objective preconditions for shaping of the new Ukrainian political identity in combination with preservation of regional identity and deepening of territorial and political consolidation of the Ukrainian society, however, at the same time the state has got too many factors of interregional alienation created either by way of a purposeful destructive activity, or by cynical inactivity. Therefore, the negative consequences of a durable policy of provoking interregional conflicts which was conducted in the Soviet period and already in the recent times, along with insufficiency of current steps, aimed at strengthening interregional relations, are obvious. Mass media do not bring into focus all the moments of historical, cultural, and spatial unity of the regions with the core of the country. Moreover, the issue whether Ukrainian society will be able to use favourable objective preconditions for political consolidation, whether there will be social determination to implement all the advantages and neutralize negative elements, remain unanswered. The global financial and economic crises represent a threat to Ukraine, along with social problems, in terms of deepening of disproportions of regional development, which may also lead to social and political instability. The economic crisis takes place in the background of unfavourable demographic trends, which are characterized by natural depopulation of residents, large scope of immigration and large-scale going to work abroad, and as the result there takes place a considerable and unavoidable reduction of the state's demographic potential. Along with that, the achievements of the practical policy of Ukraine are not adequate to the growth in the wave of different external and internal geopolitical challenges.

However, some positive elements can also be traced in the regional and political trends. First of all, in Ukraine there have been taking place objective natural processes of citizens’ self-organization on the principles of patriotism, the need to preserve integrity as well as national cultural identity. There is being formed, though very slowly, the understanding of the fact that Soviet identity and independent Ukraine are incompatible things. Furthermore, a certain potential of public counteraction to expansionism on behalf of Russia is felt.
Finally, let us state that elimination of up-to-date threats to territorial and political integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine as well as creation of favourable internal and external political preconditions for its consolidation will depend not only on the Ukrainian politicum, but on a more effective self-organization of responsible citizens of all regions on the basis of general national interests. In order to overcome historical, regional and mental alienation it is also important to make different regional views of perception of the all-Ukrainian historical process closer, removing the manifestations of antagonism and supporting the manifestations of sympathy and mutual understanding. It is necessary, first of all, to ensure cognition, selection and realization of such specific regional and historical features and values which, being distinguished for historical objectiveness would at the same time to be of common national importance, reflecting the involvement of all the regions in the all-Ukrainian historical and political process.

References

11

Dilemmas of Russian Civilizational Identity

GRACJAN CIMEK

11.1. Introduction

The Russian Federation is the legal political heir of the Soviet Union which ceased to exist on December 8th 1991. In the 1990s transformation of the state continued by implementing the concept “Common European Home” initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev. Realization of this project along the western pattern of civilization, brought to Russia the structural crisis in several spheres, in particular in economic, political and ideological ones. This crisis led to the weakening of Russia at the international scale. After the election to presidency of Vladimir Putin the Russian state attempted to recover from this multidimensional crisis. This task demanded modification of the pattern of civilization and reconstruction of the state. As Georg Simmel pointed out “the present, which brings the necessary key to the future, can be only understood by the past, and the past, which helps us to see the present, is accessible only by observation and sensing of the present” (Simmel 1997: 74). Thus, the aim of this chapter is a search for the epistemological key towards the understanding the conceptual basis of the contemporary Russian geopolitical project. In order to realize this task we will concentrate on principal concepts of the Russian civilization which have existed since the 19th century. Moreover, this chapter verifies the hypothesis which states that lasting for several centuries dilemmas of the choice between Western and Eastern model of civilizational and state identity has led to a situation, which imposes onto Russia an active search of autonomous way of development as a foundation for realization of its geopolitical projects.

11.2. The importance of space in the reflection of civilization

The order in space and time as well as domination of these elements represent important functions of each civilization (Piskozub 1994: 49). The climate,
the fertility of land and natural resources, for a long time have been provoking not only modifications of population, but also alternations of the character and spirit of this population. But today, the statement of British historian George Macaulay Trevelyan that “the geography decides about history” cannot be read literally. The geography surely is not ruling the history, but in order to read the history and to predict the future, the factor of geography is necessary to be taken into consideration. Fernand Braudel remarked that the character of each civilization depends, to a large extent, upon the advantageous or disadvantageous geographical position (Braudel 2006: 43). It means that the landscape represents a value for men (Wallis 1990: 19–32).

Russian historian and geographer Lev Gumiliev stressed the role of natural environment. He considered the space to be the first parameter which characterizes historical events. Until now very primitive cultures knew the limits of their settlements. While living in a given natural environment, members of the ethnic group are able to be accustomed to it and to vary their behaviour depending on environmental challenges. This is the origin of appearance of specific types of behaviours called stereotypes. The well perceived stereotypes are creating traditional history of a given nation, which history distinguishes this nation from other ones (Gumilow 2004: 8–9). The activity of the ethnic group depends on climate, landscape, flora, and fauna (Paradowski 1996: 128–135). The dimension, the wealth and the diversity of territories belonging to the Russian state, surely had an influence on the Russian national character. For this reason many scholars frequently repeat, after Nikolay Berdyaev, that the space dominates a Russian soul (Berdyaev 2001: 193–197). The limitless country was at the origin of the fact that Russian man was not able to create institutions, to organize and to form his environment. His energy has been directed principally inwards. Hence, the contemplation, sentimentalism and mysticism shape Russian personality. Due to domination of space over human consciousness several vices of Russians were born: laziness, negligence, lack of creative initiative, the low responsibility. At the same time, in the Russian soul were nesting the humility and the readiness to sacrifice – features which are associated with the grandeur of the earth – and also the calm derived from conviction that the dimension of the natural environment assures the safety to the individual.

The association of Mother Earth, with Maria, Mother of God, has contributed to the ecological and holistic dimension of the Russian mentality. The Marian cult, typical for the Russian Christianity (de Lazari 2000: 58), was creating a conviction that Mother of God will save the world from all evil. J. Kologrivov used to underline that “enormous monotonous flatlands, unending distances, where incommensurable infinity and supernaturalism form a part of everyday experience, denominate the picture of this (Russian) soul and its spiritual elements. Like the dimension of the country, this soul also knows no limits. The sense of strictly delimited forms, of which are so proud both Latinists and Greeks, is alien
to it. It is due to the fact that this soul is very natural and the feeling of the lack of limits and of measure dominates in it. Also this horrible sense of contradictions, which recalls the violent changeability of the weather of the country. In the Russian soul – like over steppes – torment storms and hurricanes” (Lewandowski 2004: 303–304).

The enormous Russian space is one of the main reasons for the civilizational differences between Russia and Western Europe. The lack of this space has liberated in Europeans a tendency for an exterior activity revealing itself in the organization, institutionalization and the dictate of the form. In the European culture we have to do with the obsession of closing (“fencing”) of the space, of its isolation from the neighbourhood, of the dislike of infinity, and of the fear of nothingness. The limited space in Western Europe is a product of the demographic overgrowth. The Western mentality is susceptible to “dissections of space” and of “locking inside”, which permits to believe in the security of the individual. The fear frequently manifests itself in western philosophy. Let us take as an example the statement of Blaise Pascal: “the eternal silence of these unending spaces makes me scary”, or the “fear of nothingness” of Martin Heidegger (Symotiuk 1998: 12–13).

On the contrary, the geographical environment in Russia had an influence onto several aspects of functioning of the individual and the society:

a) In the culture – the location of Russia in space indicates the coexistence with several different kinds of civilization. The formation of the Russian spirituality is connected with the direct relation with its neighbours, and thus with the infiltration, sometimes accompanied by wars (Kotarbiński 1999: 154–158) with very different cultures like the world of Islam, China, Japan, the Balkans, Central and Western Europe.

b) In a spiritual dimension – the extension of the Russian territory provokes that Russia represents, as a value and as a point of reference, the plurality in unity in the Russian consciousness. The meaning given to this value is evidently depending on other factors: the knowledge, the dominating ideology, the historical context, and the feeling of belonging to a given social group, too. The diversity contained in the spatial extension of the country co-determinates, in a particular manner, the way of the perception of the world and of man in it.

c) In an economic aspect – the potential of the Russian economy denomimates capacities and the range of activities of the Russian state and society; natural resources have a particular role in this process.

d) In a political aspect – it brings the cultural, economic and spiritual factors together and directs the goals of Russian politics. Due to its geographic position Russia is condemned to reason in geopolitical categories (Pipes 2006: 1–24).
11.3. Main currents of worldview in Russia

From a historical perspective, dilemmas of the Russian civilizational identity reveal themselves as effects of decisions which were done in a given geopolitical situation, at the level of the state. To historical forms of the Russian political existence belong the Kievan Rus, the period of the rule of Tatars, the Moscow Rus, the Russian Empire, the USSR, and contemporary Russia. The sense of these dilemmas is visible in the discussions which since the 19th century have been contested, from a philosophical perspective, the socially accepted cultural values.

The philosophical and scientific discussion devoted to the identification of the Russian civilization was fully developed only in the 19th century. Historical experiences of this time have brought to attention the essential dilemma of the Russian civilization, namely the choice between the East and the West, and an entirely domestic model of existence. This debate concerns the type of civilization and the conflict about the principles which shall direct the nation and the state (Walicki 2002: 289). Since the 1840s, the discussions about the shape of state and civilization have been dominated by Slavianophilism and Occidentalism.

11.3.1. Occidentalism

The followers of Occidentalism declared that the optimal choice for the development of Russia is the overcoming of the cultural and economic isolation and joining the civilization of the “West”. There were demands of abandoning of the patriarchal socioeconomic system, which was the “Asiatic” heritage of Russia, and even demands of the diminishment of the role of the Orthodox Church. Occidentalists had in high esteem the western system of values, founded on rationality and on individualism. An essential element of this intellectual current is the rejection of the specificity of the Russian history and culture which, in some cases, has led to extremism. They demanded to accept the idea that “Russia is plunged in stagnation, it is the rotting East, a kind of “kingdom of darkness””. It will be admitted to the company of civilized nations only in case when it will become “Europe” (Kara-Murza 2002: 209).

A particular model for this current of reasoning was the period of the political rule of Peter I. The symbol of such occidentalization was the acceptance, by Peter I, of the title of „imperator”, and also of the name of “father of homeland” and “great” (in 1721). These reforms were attempts to break with the Russian tradition. The push for occidentalization originated from an acknowledgement of Russian backwardness in comparison with the West, in particular, in the domain of military, technology, and economy. The ideals of Orthodox Christianity were abandoned in exchange of ideals of European Enlightenment. The reforms of Peter I created the state built on bureaucracy, a system resembling the western absolutism (Serczyk 2002: 27–37). Signs of these civilizational changes appeared
gradually. In 1699 Peter I introduced the European calendar (earlier the year began on September 1st). Furthermore, Catherine II changed the administrative structure of the state by its division into 50 governorates, with governors at their head. The city, instead of the cloister, became a symbol of cultural life, and in architecture began to rule rationalism and uniformity. In this manner the space becomes modified as well. Alexander I ordered to engrave the word „princip” at the reverse of the medal printed at the occasion of his Coronation. The modification of time and space was complemented by the “declaration of life”, which life shall follow the same principles as these in Europe (Czujeszow 2005: 92–93).

11.3.2. Slavianophilism

The second current of thought about civilization was created by Slavianophiles. It represented a whole array of directions, of social movements, and of philosophical reflections in the 1950s and 1960s. Its essence consisted of critics of superficial, devoid of reflection acceptance of the Western European culture, and of transposition of elements of this culture into Russia. Slavianophiles considered the Orthodox Christianity as a base of the Russian autonomy, and thus considered the Russia to be the heir of the Byzantine Empire. They rejected the claim of possessing the truth by the Western Christianity, in particular by the Catholicism. Their characteristic feature was unification of orthodox religious thought with ideas of patriotism. Slavianophiles claimed that both Russia and Western European civilization originated from the same Christian root, but the West abandoned principles of true faith and plunged into rationalism.

The philosophical concepts of Slavianophils were constructed with the help of the German idealistic philosophy, in particular of these of Friedrich Schelling. They considered relations between the whole and individuality as a tool for defining forms of diversity and divisibility. Guided by this reasoning they developed the science of community. According to Slavianophiles the “higher being” is characterized not only by rationality, but also by a reason, feeling and will taken together, it means by the spirituality representing the living whole. They demonstrated the existence of community, understood in this manner, in various forms of Russian history and culture. In particular, they stressed the meaning of peasants’ community (obshchtina). The spirit of wholeness and individuality of obshchtina was the main base of the internal organization and of the principle of unanimous thought but not the principle of majority domination. They were against the law of the strongest, seeing in it the deformation of all laws. The philosophical ideas of Slavianophiles corresponded to particular models of socio-

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1 The principal role in the establishment of the base of this movement played Aleksey Khomiakov, Ivan Kireyevsky, and Konstantin Aksakov.
political life. They were convinced that only peace between different social classes permits the true progress and the evolution of society.

Slavianophiles were convinced that the Western civilization consists of: a) Christianity; b) young barbaric nations; c) leftovers from Antiquity. The two first components are presented also in Russia, but the third one is opposite. The witness of it is the patrimony in the West of Latin civilization. Rome is the expression of an artificial construction founded on formal and entirely external social relations. The social coherence is sanctioned by law using means of coercion. The society is not an organic community, but a mechanical assembly of individuals. Romans become famous only in the domain of law, and thus in the domain of rationalization and formalization of living social bonds. This patrimony inherited Western civilization as well as its spiritual expression – the Catholic Church. In the understanding of Slavianophiles, Russia represents the opposite position. In it dominates the true religiosity, built on the internal morality which represents the true integrity of society. The Russian type of judging all order of things joins in itself the personal autonomy of individuals with goals of community. The unity of the community, which is constructed on agreement and mutual consensus of citizens, is possible thanks to the voluntary acceptation, by very person, of absolute values; principally the love of harmony, the love of the church, nation and of state. Such a polity was obligatory in Russia prior to Peter the Great. “Princes and boyars, the clergy and the people, military units of principalities, of boyars, of cities and of counties, all classes and social layers were filled with the same spirit, with the same convictions, with the same notions, and the same aspiration for the common good” (Walicki 2002: 26).

Slavianophilism stressed the importance of the missionary role of Russia recalling the idea of Holy Rus, and of Moscow the Third Rome. The first one was (an utopian) conception, claiming that in the ideal situation shall tightly coexist the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian people. The term “Holy Rus”, which is connected exclusively with the Moscow Patriarchate, demonstrates the penetration of the Christian ideology into state creating mythology and, from the other side, the intrusion of an earthly imperialism into the body of the local Church (Ławreszczyz 2000: 142–145). The second notion (Moscow the Third Rome) pointing to the universal mission of the orthodox empire, was enounced by hegumen Filotey, and was stressing the Power of the young Russian state. Its message was linked with the fall of Constantinople in 1453. This “Second Rome” 14 years prior to its fall established the union with the Catholic Church, accepting its authority in the domain of faith and dogma. The Patriarchate of Russia did not agree to such an subservience, considering it contrary to its own doctrine. The conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Empire, and the marriage of Ivan III with Sophia Paleolog, the cousin of the last ruler of Byzantium, marked the beginning of the thought about mission, which God ascribed to the Holy Rus.
According to the creators of this myth, it is linked with the defence of the unique orthodox Christian faith – the Pravoslavie.

The Slavianophile concept of civilization was exploited in the geopolitical doctrine of Panslavism which transformed the idea of the peculiarity of Russian culture into the justification of politics of the Russian Empire. With this argumentation was justified the need to control the Balkan region and the Turkish Straits; also the necessity to create, under the leadership of Russia, of the federation of Slavic states, and of an Empire unifying all Slavs, and granting them the possibility of civilizational advancement. The Panslavism was an answer to Western European doctrines of “conquest of space”, and revealed the determinism characteristic for these doctrines.

11.3.3. Eurasianism

In the 20th century, the new current – Eurasianism (from Eurasia, the continental mass of Europe and Asia) was introduced into discussions about characteristics of Russian identity. This concept of civilization aroused in the 1920s, inside circles of Russian émigrés, concentrated principally in Prague, Sofia, and Paris. The premises for the appearance of this intellectual current was the reaction of the part of Russian emigration to several new socio-political phenomena at the beginning of the 20th century: the ideology of communism, the degeneration of the idea of Panslavism, the revolution of 1917, the rise of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR), the crisis of Christianity (both Orthodox and Catholic), the re-birth and the pressure of the East, and visions of the fall of the West ( Oswald Spengler).

The Eurasianism stands against the occidentalist conceptions; against the Panasiaticism of certain Slavianophiles; and especially against the socialist internationalism which became a dominant ideology after the October Revolution. As the base of this ideology was taken the assumption of the Eurasian specificity of Russia, which reveals new quality of civilization in the frontier between Europe and Asia. According to Trubetzkoy “the culture of Russia is neither European, neither one of Asiatic cultures, neither the sum nor the mechanical association of elements of diverse cultures. It is entirely particular, specific culture, which does not have lesser value and lesser historical significance than European and Asiatic cultures” (de Lazari 1999: 172). The leitmotif of Eurasianism is thus the turn towards the East, as a source shaping the Russian culture, this equally in the past and in the future.

1 Panslavists are represented by Mikhail Katkov, Mikhail Pogodin, Konstantin Pobedonostsev and Konstantin Leontiev.
2 To its founders belong: Nikolay Trubetzkoy, Georgy Florovsky, Peter Savitsky, Peter Suvchinsky, Vladimir Il’in, Georgy Vernadsky, Lev Karsavin.
This trend underlined the positive experience of the Tatar rule in Rus (between the 13th and 15th centuries) for the civilizational development. The Tatar Empire was spread over great territory inhabited by numerous peoples. This Empire expressed the common, universal and supranational power. It synthesized diverse achievements and traditions. Tatars were combining the nomadic military habits, the experience of Chinese bureaucracy and the Persian judicature. Due to this experience in the lands of Russia were rooted eastern methods of organization of the army, the tax collecting services, and of the manners of diplomacy. Here, we can also find sources of social solidarism which means the common service to the state of different social groups. And, as the most important became the principle of the individual rule of the tsar, which principle later developed into the idea of Tsarist Autocracy (samoderzhavie), the self-rule of the leader.

The eurasiatic specificity of Russia is visible not only in works of Russians, but also in works of the Western classics of geopolitics like F. Ratzel, R. Kjellen or K. Haushofer. These Euroasianists considered Russia to be the geopolitically non divisible entity, the state-continent of Eurasia\(^1\), differing both from Europe and Asia. They were not determining with precision western limits of the sphere of influence of Russian culture and civilization\(^2\). After the collapse of the Soviet Union there was a renaissance of this trend of reasoning. Among principal theoreticians of Eurasianism are Lev Gumiliev (who became widely known only in the 1990s) and Aleksander Dugin. According to Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, the Eurasianism is an ideology which negates the cultural originality of Russia (Suchanek 2002: 74). Occidentalists, from their part, are pretending that the eurasiatic idea has no chances for realization (Trenin 2001).

11.4. Dilemmas of Russian civilizational identity in the 20th century

While picturing the specificity of dilemmas of Russia’s civilizational identity, one can make an important observation. Namely, different stormy events of the history (the Tatars’ yoke, activities of Ivan the Terrible, the period of interregnum (velikiy smut), religious reforms of Patriarch Nikodem, peasants’ uprisings, reforms of Peter I, etc.) did not permit to reinforce the traditionalism; to the contrary, they were destroying it and cutting its roots. The Russian “evil” – in its ontological sense – social reality was fueling visions of desired new “good” reality. In the 19th century both Occidentalists and Slavianophiles strived to change the social reality in the name of a better future (Jegorow 1993: 367–371). Hence also communism, being a western idea, acquired specifically Russian traits. In Russia

\(^1\) The term “Eurasia” was introduced by the Austrian geologist Edvard Suess, who demonstrated that there is no well marked natural border between Europe and Asia.

\(^2\) The limit of influence of the Russian Empire may be pictured as the line between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, alternatively Adriatic Sea.
the working class was not dominant, and thus there were no conditions for a communist revolution. Nevertheless, the ideology which was appealing to the social justice was eagerly accepted in the Russian’s consciousness formed by anti-occidentalist and anticapitalist orthodox thought. Nikolay Berdyaev points out that the Russian soul was not filled with scepticism and rational criticism, which is characteristic of the Western civilization. It thus easily was susceptible of turning from one extremity to another, taken in totally orthodox manner. Hence Marxism as an ideology of western origin was modified in agreement with Russian values, approaching Russian Slavianophilism, this in agreement with Dostoevski’s call *ex oriente lux*. The light from Moscow began to emanate onto the whole world, illuminating also bourgeois darkness of the West (Bierdiajev 2005: 103–105). This description of the Western civilization was convergent with views of the West appearing from various positions (Walicki 2002: 121–122, 228–229, 404). The Bolshevik state model in several aspects resembled the Slavianophile concept of abolishment of classes. It actualized the model of autocracy in which the power belonged to the “red tsar” (Kucharzewski 1990; Montefiore 2004) ruling over the new Soviet empire USSR, spread over 22,4 mln. km² (15.0% of the Earth’s surface).

The dilemmas connected with civilizational identity were revealed at the full scale in the Soviet communism during the 1980s. The introduction of the idea “Common European Home” by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev meant the occidentalist choice. Alternative values of communism and capitalism were supplanted by common European values.

The president Boris Yeltsin organized the separation of Russia from the USSR, which resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in the domain of civilizational choice, Yeltsin continued principles of Gorbachev. They assumed that the modernization is a characteristic of the Russian Federation. This modernization was reduced to the following principles: a) free market capitalism in the domain of economy; b) democracy in the domain of politics and legislative, and c) “the return to the Western civilization” or to “renaissance of Russia” in the sphere of ideology. The effects of rapid occidentalization have led to the socioeconomic crisis, to the corrupt and ineffective administration of the state, to the weak federal structure, to the polarization of society into the narrow group of rich and of the poor majority combined with the growth of criminality. The fall of GDP reached 40.0% (Stiglitz 2007: 225). As a result, 5.0% of population became owners of key enterprises assuring the continuous enrichment. As the support for new standards of civilization appeared the middle class counting 15.0–20.0% of population. At the same time, about 75.0% of population became poor, out of which one third were people living below the level of possibility of assuring elementary needs (Dobroczyński 2008: 7–8). Robert Daniels demonstrated the ahistoricism of realized changes. The “western model of free market economy, which reforms have been realized in their mindless rejection of everything what
was Soviet, had nothing to do with the Russian conditions” (Bratkiewicz 2007: 251), and it brought Russia to a systemic crisis.

From the middle of the 1990s, the Occidentalism began to be perceived as a bad choice. A certain attempt to revalorization of enthusiasm were the ideas of Evgeny Primakov who became the Minister of foreign affairs in 1996. He proposed the development of multivectorial collaboration with the East, West and Islam, which corresponded to the specificity of the Russian civilization. But only with the presidency of Vladimir Putin the civilizational dilemmas took practical dimensions. The epoch of Yeltsin’s rule got the name of “new sadness”. Such an epoch is associated with the period of crisis of the Russian state at the beginning of the 17th century. There became verified in practice fears of Lev Gumilev who observed that “the mechanical implantation into Russian conditions of Western European traditions of behaviour has not brought much good – and it is nothing peculiar in it. The Russian “superethnos” appeared five hundred years later than in Europe. And Russians, as well as Europeans, always perceived this difference, and they mutually were not considered themselves as “countrymen”. Russians are five hundred years younger, and thus no matter how they studied European experiences, at present they would not achieve the well-being and habits which are typical for Europe (...). To learn from their experiences is possible and necessary, but it is necessary to remember that these are foreign experiences” (Gumilow 2004: 275). Thus, in the 21st century dilemmas with the Russia’s civilizational identity became more strenuous. Until now there was a triple answer to them (Stefaniuk 2004: 102–103):

a) The transcultural answer, which states that Russia and the West have more in common than in difference. We may thus speak about the cultural and historical unity. The ideological confirmation of this position is the universalism, backed on religious universalism built on Christianity or alternatively on the humanism of Enlightenment. This assumption is constructed on the cultural monism which speaks about the unity and non-divisibility of the human world. This attitude is the most fully expressed in various versions of Occidentalism.

b) The isolationist answer, which accepts the cultural and historical difference of Russia and the West. It points to non-passable differences in the eastern and western Christianity, in national specificity, etc. This answer was partly the basis of Slavianophilism, and was wholly the basis of Panslavism and the Soviet communism.

c) The moderate answer is based on a conviction that Russia and the West are characterized both by similarities and differences in culture and history. This is connected with the possibility of mutual “complementation” and even “synthesis” of cultural traits. To this idea referred moderate ideas of Slavianophilism and Occidentalism, as well as Eurasianism. They saw Russia as a bridge between the East and the West.
11.5. Dilemmas of Russian civilizational identity in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century

The epoch of Putin has been a period of systematic shift in the direction of acceptation of peculiarity of Russia and of construction, on this basis, of a new supranational geopolitical project.

The symptom of such a search for conception of civilization was organized, with much publicity, contest for “the name of Russia” in May 2008. During the first stage people voting by internet chose 50 people among 500 candidates proposed by historians from the Russian Academy of Sciences. At the second stage the number of proposals was limited to 12. These candidates were presented at TV “Rossiia” by members of Russian elites each Sunday, in the period of best TV attendance. For example, the personage of Peter Stolypin was presented by a film director Nikita Mikhalkov, who is the follower of Eurasianism. The personage of Lenin defended Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, also known from his euroasiatic convictions, complemented by the idea of collaboration of the Orthodox Church and the state in the domain of social postulates. The personage of Alexander Nevsky was approached to viewers by the Metropolitan of Kaliningrad and Smolensk Kiril (he was not yet elected as Patriarch of Moscow and of All Russia). The contest was won by Aleksander Nevsky (529 575 voices), Peter Stolypin was at the second place (523 766 voices), then was Stalin (519 071 voices), Aleksander Pushkin, Peter I, Lenin, Fiodor Dostoievsky, Aleksander Suvorov, Dmitry Mendeleev, Ivan the Terrible, Catherine II and Aleksander I. Many people had obviously reservations concerning the honesty of results (http://newsru.com).

It seems that the whole enterprise, which evidently was motivated by the need of confirmation of the choice of directions of development in the future, demonstrated the state of the social consciousness of contemporary Russians. The need of realization of a peculiar way of development of the Russian civilization was also confirmed by other events of social life. The president Medvedev in Berlin in June 2008 pointed that as the result of the end of the Cold War appeared a chance of partnership coexistence of Russia, the European Union and North America as three variants of the European civilization. The minister of foreign affairs Lavrov confirmed this thesis, adding to it that is not possible to avoid the competition between these three variants of systems of values, and of models of development.

Russia will strive for the maintenance of correct relations with the West, but at the same time it will reserve to itself the possibility of taking sovereign decisions concerning the development of the state, also in the axiological domain. It means that for the first time, after the collapse of the USSR, the idea of Russian supranational project was revealed. Earlier the similar overtone had followed historical ideas: the one of the Russian Empire based on an official formula of Sergey Uvarov “orthodoxy, autocracy and the people”, the idea of Slavic-Orthodox
civilization, the idea of “panmanhood” of Dostoievsky, and the idea of communist revolution. In the 19th century, Nikolay Danilevsky and Konstantin Leontiev were reasoning in these terms, at present Samuel Huntington and Aleksander Dugin reason in this way, too. Their ideas are not convergent with the neoliberal concept of globalism (Zeveliev 2009). The contemporary idea of “contest of civilizations”, as a form of competition of systems of values, we can consider as a moderate variant of the Russian idea. It rejects the isolationist orientation, which considers the West as an enemy, but also rejects the occidentalist model which is to be imitated. This model was negated with the end of the epoch of the president Yeltsin.

Such a new ideological approach permitted the development of Russian soft power in the form of concept of Russian World (Russkii mir). This world represents two tendencies, which had their origin at the moment of appearance of Putin’s epoch, characterized by a positive junction of elements of the past of Russia and by stressing the cultural peculiarity of the Russian state. The Russian World is not limited neither in time, neither in space. It permits to incorporate into ethnic Russians as well as other nations of Russia and Russian speaking people, including citizens of former USSR. In 2007 by a decree of president Putin was created the state foundation Russian World. It can group not only ethncal Russians having the Russian citizenship, but also Russian natives living in foreign countries, also emigrants and refuges from Russia, as well as foreigners speaking Russian, or learning this language. To this Russian World may aspire all these people who honestly are interested in Russia and in the future of this country.

The Russian World is thus a notion larger than the rossiiskii mir (the world inside borders of Russia). Its root consists of ethnic Russians, while other nations remain in their sphere of cultural influence. The basis of Russian world is the Russian language. All these combined with Russian and Soviet historical memory, complemented with the attachment to the Fatherland. The concept of Russian World has intended to avoid the politicization of the Russian problem in former Soviet Union republics, and to gather in the same category of people descendants of emigrants from the 19th century, the White émigrés and migrants who live in Western Europe, North America, and Israel. This concept is supposed to facilitate the development of equilibrated relations between the “inner” Russia and this “foreign” one – to which are counted Russians, and Russian speaking people, living outside the Russian Federation (Wierzbicki 2011: 219–232).

The beginning of the 21st century is considered to be the positive time for relations between the state and the Orthodox Church. The alliance of the State and Church is strong and stable. The church has become an element of the construction of state ideology, which has a symbolic meaning for Russian rulers. The Orthodox Christianity plays the function of an ideological pillar of the Russian statehood and of essential element of the national identity. The government stresses the role of the Church in filling of the ideological void, which occurred
after the collapse of the USSR. Among the orthodox hierarchy dominates the anti-western attitude, critical to the materialistic civilization and its individualism. Despite the fact that the Church has no institutionalized and no real possibilities to influence state affairs, it favours the propagation of such views among believers – citizens of Russia. Also the tradition of the support for the construction of strong state helps the government in development of the country in the direction of world power.

The Russian state has played an important role in the dialogue of Russian Church with Vatican, and also in the reestablishment of canonical unity with Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia. A particular activity in this domain revealed Vladimir Putin. After the reestablishment of this unity, on May 17th 2007, he stated that the rebirth of Church unity is the basis of community of the world of Russian culture. It permits the reinforcement of collaboration between citizens and religions (www.religare.ru). An important element of this alliance is the support he accorded to the new Patriarch Kiril, who took this position after the death of Aleksei II. Russian rulers appreciated Kiril’s image, his political and diplomatic experience which he gathered as a chief, for several years, of the Department of External Relations of Moscow Patriarchate. This experienced diplomat and politician of the Orthodox Church, introduced to the throne of Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, seems to be a warrant of an effective support of the Church for the regime activities, both in Russia and beyond its borders (Dubas 2009). Hence, the heightening by Kiril of the idea of “Holy Russia” overlapping Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, as a canonical territory where should be realized the symbiosis of religious and political unity. Patriarch Kiril expressed this hope during his numerous travels to Belarus and Ukraine. His idea of “Holy Rus’” is strongly linked with the 19th century pan-Slavic ideology. Orthodox officials are stressing that the Orthodox civilization should take part in the shaping of Europe. This is a model, which proposes an alternative to the post-protestant civilization, which is a motor of contemporary globalization, and dominates in the European Union (Kowalska-Stus 2010: 289–293). Such a conviction reveals a particular thought about the “symphony of political and spiritual power” (the famous alliance of throne and altar) about which wrote Eurasian thinker Lev Karsavin.

The existence of the World Russian National Assembly is also a symbol of this symphony. It has existed since 1993, but become more active only in the 21st century. The active participation in meetings of this Assembly, of ministers referring to the Orthodox civilization, and especially of ministers of foreign affairs, Sergey Lavrov and Igor Ivanov, together with minister of defence Sergey Ivanov, confirms the tendency outlined above (www.vrns.ru). The function of this Assembly is the creation of a life space, which reinforces Russia as the centre of a particular civilization (Russian, Orthodox, Eastern Slavic). It corresponds to the Russian state ideas of multipolar order, and of different models of realization of universal values.
Twenty years after the fall of the USSR, in October 2011, Vladimir Putin in his election program presented the Project of Euroasiatic Union. Its goal comprises the creation of a supranational community, based on the view of Russia as a bridge between Western Europe and the region of Asia and Pacific. The Euroasiatic Union is supposed to follow the development of already existing Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and of the Common Economic Space of these three states, which has existed since January 2012. The declared value for this Euroasiatic Union is the broadening of regional integration backed by freedom, democracy, and common market. It means that this is not an attempt of reconstruction of the USSR, but an attempt to realize a “Greater Europe”. At the same time the very notion of the Euroasiatic Union is a sign that this project will not copy western experience. Its base is the Russian political and civilizing nationalism. It is based on values of the Orthodox Church and on the Russian culture, but it is not stressing interests of Russian nation, considered as an ethnos. Projects of constitutional acceptation of status of Russians as a nation were several times rejected by the State Duma (the lower chamber of the Parliament).

Instead of above-mentioned construction of a community based on a system of spiritual and ethical values, which characterize the multinational Russian political state is being preferred (Wierzbicki 2011: 114–123). In his election program Vladimir Putin pointed out, referring to Dostoievsky, that the Russian civilization, based on the ethnic Russians, has a capacity to create the harmonious supranational community. To achieve this goal the state has the obligation to create the worldview which would integrate diverse ethnic groups. In this way there will be warranted “unity in diversity”, and rejected coercive methods of “being together”. The nucleus of Eurasian integration would be the Russian values (Putin 2012).

11.6. Conclusion

At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century it seems that civilizational dilemmas were solved by favouring a conviction that Russia is a centre of separate Russian civilization, no matter if it is Slavic or Orthodox (Andrusiewicz 2004; 2005; 2009). It differs from the western one by its connection with the Byzantine civilization, by its different religiosity, by the period of 200 years of Tatar’s rule, by its bureaucratic despotism and by a limited contact with Renaissance and Enlightenment (Huntington 1997: 56). There are also indications of limited influence in Russia of cultural values, generated by the Mediterranean culture, by the French Revolution, the social democracy, and positivism (Dobroczyński 1999: 126). At the same time, the contemporary globalization imposes the necessity of participation in global processes linked with the flux of merchandises, of services, of people and of capital. The entry of Russia into the World Trade Organization as well as the Russian regional trade integration initiative indicates that Russia has turned, in a moderate manner, to its own civilizational
problems. Its development, based on peculiar elements of the Russian culture, is associated with an active integration into general human processes and with profiting from achievements of other civilizations.

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The Geographical Position – an Indicator of Turkey’s Geopolitical Identity

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12.1. Introduction

The geopolitical identity of a certain country is directly related to the notion of geographical position. Besides in the meaning of location (Larkin and Peters 1983), it could also be interpreted as an attributive approach, related to an interdisciplinary evaluation of certain geographical space’s potential. The particular spatial definition of the geopolitical position of a given country requires knowledge on fundamental geopolitical concepts on a global scale, including the classical models of the geopolitical structure of the world – see Ratzel (1887, 1902), Mahan (1890, 1892, 1910), Mackinder (1904, 1943), Naumann (1915), Kjellen (1917), Haushofer (1931, 1943), Ancel (1936), Bowman (1942), Spykman (1942), Schmitt (1950, 1959). Among the traditional analytical benchmarks in geopolitics stand out the following ones:

– the main centres (the so-called “Great Areas”) and the main vectors of global geopolitical opposition (East-West, North-South, Thalassocracies¹ – Tellurocracies²);
– established as the most important for contemporary ideological opposition forms of geopolitical consciousness (Atlantism / Mondialism – Continentalism / Traditionalism);

¹ By the founder of the Ionian School of philosophy Thales of Miletus, who claims that water is the most important natural element. The term is used for indication of countries which impose their power by using the advantages of water spaces.
² From latin Telluris – Earth; the Goddess of the Earth. The term is used for indication of countries which impose their power by using the advantages of continental spaces.
– detailizing of the classic and contemporary spatial fragments of the geopolitical cadastre of the world („sanitary” cordons, geopolitical units, key areas, conflict zones);

– relatively dynamic mechanisms for refragmentation the political space in the form of interstate integration formations (NATO, EU, NAFTA, OECD, etc.).

Turkey, comparing to those classic global benchmarks, has unique characteristics of its geopolitical position. Its national space participated actively in the successful Atlantic blocking and destruction of the Soviet Heartland during the Cold War. Turkey is the only country in the global geopolitical space located between the four classic geopolitical knots (the Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, and Middle East knots) and effectively controls the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus – one of the major global naval communications for the key geostrategic spaces.

12.2. Geographical position. Methodological essence and practical importance

The assessment of the geographical position reveals spatial relations, which contribute for a more concrete notion of linear coordinates, configuration, borders and spatial accessibility of areal or point objects, as well as relative natural, demographic, economic and military potential, cultural affiliation, etc. In terms of geopolitical identity, the theory of iconography is very relevant (Gottmann 1952, 1977). Geographical position reveals relations between geospaces on a local, regional, and global scale. It is a main factor which determines the specific historical and spatial fate of the particular countries and nations. Its assessment is directly related to the socioeconomic, cultural and political development of separate settlements, natural and industrial objects and areas, administrative units, states and interstate alliances. In structural terms, it should be seen as a systemic notion consisting of interdependent macro- and subcategories (Figure 12.1).

Directly related to the category of geographical position is the geopolitical position. Its cognitive and scientific essence can be considered in two main aspect. In a more general sense (primarily as geopolitical position) it reveals the relative significance of the country’s traditional international relations, as well as degree of social adaptability to stochastic factors. It is often presented only through the consideration of basic indicators for limited internal processes – for example, economic or electoral cyclical events, results of a particular crisis situation or conflict, sharp ideological, legislative or governmental change. At the same time, the foreign relations have secondary importance. This often creates conditions for signs of alien for the geopolitical analysis subjectivism. In a more concrete (spatial) sense, geopolitical position is the most conceptual part of the systemic category of geographical position (Figure 12.1.). In spite of its chorological static, it must be analysed in terms of its chronological nature.
Figure 12.1. A structure of the geographical position

Macrocategories: I physical (natural) geographical position; II economic-geographical position; III political-geographical position;

Subcategories: 1 astronomic geographical position, 2 geoecological position, 3 watershed geographical position, 4 tourist-geographical position, 5 transport-geographical position, 6 trade-geographical position, 7 ethno-confessional geographic position, 8 military-geographic position, 9 geopolitical position.

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

Geopolitical position is the most conceptual subcategory of geographical position as it predefines the significance of a country in an equal dependence of its natural-resource, social-economic and political-military potential. According to Dergachev (2004), it is determined by the total power (political-military, economic, technological, passionary) of the material and non-material resources in the multidimensional communicational space. It is characterized by the attitude of the state towards the main areas of civilizational development, political-military blocks and conflict zones.

The practical relevance of the Turkey’s geopolitical position is revealed by the following indicators: place and status in the geopolitical structure of the world; rank positions in global and regional cultural, economic and political pro-

\footnote{From \textit{passio} – \textit{passion}. It is used for indication of the changes in stereotypes of behaviour of ethnic groups. Passionarism is a scientific concept introduced by Lev Gumiliev. Through it are indicated main historical stages which are a consequence of post-inertial (passionary) impulses, marking phases of ethnogenesis and interethnic relationships.}

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cesses; political borders; the diffuse contact with adjacent countries, water areas, cultures, and conflict zones. In combination with the inner geographical peculiarities, characteristics of the social-historical tradition and the basic foreign policy vectors, the geopolitical assessment resembles a part of the main research focus of regional geography.

12.3. Components of the geographical position of Turkey

The complex evaluation of the potential of the geographical space of Turkey is a function of specific chorological and chronological features of the natural and social systems in the Asia Minor Peninsula and its diffusive periphery. The modern geographical dimensions of the significance of the country could be considered not only as a reflection of objectively existing relatively static natural conditions, but also as a regular result of its inert social-historical development.

In this section the main components of the geographical position of modern Turkey are analysed. There are specially underlined the cultural, ethno-political and religious aspects of the country’s geographical position which influenced in shaping its geocultural and geopolitical identity.

The physical (natural) geographical position of Turkey is determined by the specifics of its resource potential and is a crucial prerequisite for its socio-economic development. In terms of the territory size it takes the 36th place in the world. In comparative terms, it is approximately equal to the area of Germany, Poland, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium altogether.

The bigger part of the Turkish territory is dominated by mountainous climatic features due to the average altitude of over 1100 m. Subtropical climate is typical only for some relatively small coastal lowlands, where a significant part of the population and the economic potential are concentrated. The High mountain ranges and plateaus prevent plant and modern infrastructure, but have great potential for hydropower, mining and quarrying, forestry, and tourism. Among mineral resources important are the reserves of boron (64.0% of the world), antimony (25.0%), chrome (8.0%), wolfram (7.0%), uranium (5.0%), copper (4.0%), iron, molybdenum, manganese, mercury, bauxite, coal, asphaltene. A significant “disadvantage” is the lack of industrial reserves of oil and natural gas. This is offset by the proximity to the insured in this regard countries in the world and gives Ankara additional geopolitical significance of international energy relations (Figure 12.2).

Formally, only 3.0% of Turkey lies in Europe but this as well as a number of historical factors provide sufficient grounds for the country’s real presence in cultural, political, social, and economic processes in Europe. About 2/3 of the country borders are maritime (7200 km). They play a significant role in fisheries, tourism, coastal water transport, external trade relations, and military strategy of Ankara. More unfavourable are the lands near east and southeast borders with
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, which are characterized by relatively inaccessible terrain. The western lands border the EU (Bulgaria and Greece) are more accessible in socioeconomic terms.

Turkey has a significant potential as a marine area due to the specific configuration and the geographical location of its territory, as well as some features of international maritime law. The UN Conventions on maritime law from 1964 and 1982 do not define a clear limit of the breadth of the territorial sea. During the sixties of the 20th century Turkey established a minimum 6-mile zone for foreign vessels applying the so-called principle of reciprocity – if their country has imposed greater restrictions, they must comply with them and against the Turkish coast. Nowadays, the western territorial waters of Turkey in the Aegean sea are defined by the 6-mile area, whereas the northern and southern territorial waters – by the 12-mile zone. Their total area is about 150 thousand km². In 1978, Turkey signed with the former USSR a bilateral agreement for the division of the Black Sea, which agreement determines its exclusive economic zone on nearly half of its territorial sea. In 1997, Turkey and Bulgaria signed an agreement that solves a part of the disputed aquatories between the two countries.

In the conditional contact areas between natural, economic and political-geographical space there are subcategories such as watershed, ecological, transport, tourist, and military-geographical position (Figure 12.1).

With unique features stands the watershed geographical position of Turkey. From its territory spring Euphrates (length in Turkey – 970 km) and Tigris (520 km). This puts Turkey in a favourable position at the Middle East international relations. The total annual flow of Tigris and Euphrates by Shatt-el-Arab is about 55–60 km³. Only the mouths of the Danube, Volga, Amu Darya, Indus, and Nile have greater average annual flow within the radius of 2000–3000 km². Water sovereignty of the country is determined by the fact that none of the rivers of Turkey springs from a neighbouring country. About 1.3% of the global hydropower resources are located on Turkish territory. The total volume of its renewable water resources is about 235 thousand km³ (The CIA World Factbook, 2011) – about 0.4% of the world water resources.

The assessment of the geoeconomic position of the country is reflected in its spatial relation to cross-border movement of polluted air and water masses, as well as to the deployment of nuclear or chemical facilities. Due to the relatively low level of socioeconomic development of Anatolia, yet the degree of biochemical contamination of large transboundary rivers is minimal and does not significantly affects bilateral relations with Syria and Iraq. Of much greater importance are the disputes and problems associated with their flow.
In ecological terms greater conflict potential create disputes involving pollution of coastal water areas in the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the White Sea, but they are still difficult technologically and legally provable. The ecological state of the marine aquatories and beaches is of extremely important demographic and economic significance. 35 coastal provinces (out of 81) are situated on 36.0% of the territory. What is more, in this zone live 58.0% of the population. More than 2/3 of the national GDP is produced here. Fishing, water transport, foreign trade, and tourism directly depend on the resources and the ecological status of the coast.

Turkey is relatively remote from the main industrial areas of Europe and Russia. A significant negative role plays the movement of industrially polluted air masses from the countries in Southeastern Europe and Ukraine. The country is located in a region with a relatively small share in global air pollution (0.92%).

Figure 12.2. Proven reserves of major fossil fuels in Turkey and neighbouring countries (% of the World)

Source: Elaborated by the authors in accordance with: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2012.
Turkey is one of the first to sign (1979) and ratify (1983) the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution. Relevant to the environmental security of Turkey and its foreign policy is deploying its own or adjacent areas of nuclear and other potentially dangerous objects such as military nuclear arsenals, storage facilities for chemical warfare agents, radioactive, biological, or chemical waste. Among the countries of 1st rank adjacent to Turkey (immediate neighbors) with potentially dangerous objects nuclear, stand Armenia and Bulgaria, and among the the countries of 2nd rank of indirect neighbourhood – Romania, Ukraine and Russia (European part). Further, distribution of radioactive substances is possible to emerge due to numerous nuclear reactors located in other parts of Europe, as well as nuclear plants in Israel, Iran, Pakistan, India, and Kazakhstan. Generally,
within a radius of 4500 km from Ankara operate more than 80 nuclear power plant belonging to 20 countries (Figure 12.3). In 2012 the number of industrial nuclear reactors in this area is 200 with a total capacity of 167 GW which represents 45.0% of the world’s nuclear energy potential. It is important to note that Ankara’s plans are to build nuclear power plants near the common borders with Bulgaria and Greece (10–15 km from the border), 100–200 km from Cyprus and Syria, as well as about 300–400 km from the territories of Ukraine, Russia and Georgia.

Analogous to potential environmental hazards, associated with nuclear power plant sites, are the military warfare agents. In 1997, Ankara ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Among its immediate neighbours of 1st rank, the Convention has not been signed by Syria, which puts Turkey at risk. Although the Convention signed in 1997, Iran continues to maintain its production potential. After the Second Gulf War there is still no guarantee that the chemical arsenal of Iraq is under control.

The economic-geographical position reveals relations, reflecting the production and consummative potential of geospaces, their transport-commercial accessibility and resource-disposal significance, location in relation to main commodity, tourist and communication directions. Transport, trade and tourist geographical position are traditionally pointed out as main research topics tightly related to physical (natural) and political-geographical position.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>million inhabitants</td>
<td>million inhabitants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>71,16</td>
<td>79,75</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours 1st rank</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>145,98</td>
<td>167,37</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours 2nd rank</td>
<td>16.33</td>
<td>471,19</td>
<td>488,47</td>
<td>6.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18.88</td>
<td>688,33</td>
<td>735,59</td>
<td>10.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Composed by the authors in accordance with: The CIA World Factbook (2011). New York.

One of the main indicators which complete the geographical significance of Turkey is the characteristic of its demographic substratum (Table 12.1.). According to the World Bank estimations, Turkey occupies 18th place among the countries in the world by population (almost 75 mln in 2013). Only Russia, Germany, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and Pakistan have equal or larger potential within
the radius of 2500 km away from its borders. It is also worth mentioning that every year the Turkish population increases by around a million.

Turkey is located in the area of interaction between old civilizations characterized by contrasting natural and social features. This determines its potential to integrate countries with different levels of development. In communication terms with the importance of the geographical core of the country are transport corridors from Western, Central and Eastern Europe to the Middle East. After the collapse of the USSR, the territory of Turkey modifies its relevance to new countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The capital city of Ankara is located in approximately equal air distances from cities such as Moscow, Berlin, Tunis, and Kuwait. The geographical accessibility to major port complexes in the Mediterranean basin, as well as to adjacent areas of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, creates extremely favourable trade and economic opportunities for Turkey.

Figure 12.4. Confessional-geographical position of Turkey

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

Turkey is situated among various ethno-linguistic and cultural communities, among nations of Christendom (Cyprus, Greece, the Black Sea countries, and
Armenia) as well as Muslim world (Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Northern Cyprus). Its neighbours represent a huge variety of Indo-European, Caucasian, Altaic, and Hamito-Semitic peoples. In comparison with the total number of Turkish people in Turkey and in neighbouring countries, the most important “opponents” in the surrounding countries are the Kurds, the Persians, the Arabs, the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Punjabi people, and the Pashtun people in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the neighbour regions a larger number, in comparison to the Turkish community, have only the Punjabi people and the Arabs (Table 12.2). A large conflict potential for the internal geopolitics and foreign relations of Turkey and for the space that surrounds it is created by the location of the Kurds in four neighbour states (Figure 12.5.).

Figure 12.5. Territorial distribution of the Kurds in Turkey and the Middle East

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

These features are directly related to the conditions of communication or confrontation between the peoples of Asia Minor, the Balkans, Eastern European Plain, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. Relatively more favourable to Turkey’s national security is its location towards major religious areas in Eurasia and Afrasia (Table 12.3.). In the neighbouring countries, for instance, about 80.0% of their population are represented by the Muslims. The majority of them
(about ¾), however, are Shiites (mainly in Iran and Iraq) which creates prerequisites for certain conflicting cultural and political opposition to the prevailing in Turkey Sunnism. In the neighbouring countries of the 2nd rank the relationship between the two main branches of Islam is in favour of the Hanafi Sunni Islam (approximately 9:1).

Table 12.2. Ethnic structure of Turkey and neighbouring countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/area</th>
<th>Main ethnic community, in millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours 1st rank</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours 2nd rank</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in the region</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Turkish population = 100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data for Russia are only for the residents of the Southern federal districts and Northern Caucasus.


What has an essential influence on the ethno-confessional geographical position and foreign policy of Turkey is the relative proximity and accessibility to religious centres such as Beirut, Athos, Damascus, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Kiev, Samara, Karbala, Baghdad, Nadzhav, Ur, Qom, Rome, Moscow, Medina, Mecca, Mashhad, etc. (see Figure 12.4.).

The contemporary Turkish national economy is characterized by great potential and plays a significant role on a global and regional scale (Table 12.4.). Macroeconomic indicators in the last 2–3 decades are characterized by stable growth rates. In 1990–2011, the share of the country of the world GDP increased from 0.6% to 1.4%. Currently, it is worth almost 1.1 trillion US dollars (16th place in the world; 6th place in Europe). Within a radius of 2000 km from Turkey with greater economic potential differ only in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Russia.

The specific features of the natural and transport geographical position, as well as the demographic and economic potential of Turkey, redefine its commercial attractiveness and its active participation in the international economic relations. With regard to this, an important role plays transport corridors between Europe, the Black Sea Basin, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East,
the Eastern Mediterranean, and North Africa. Today, Turkey is among the 30 largest exporters of goods in the world (about 1.0% of world exports) and the 20 largest importers (about 1.4% of world imports) (UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2006–2012). The average volume of foreign direct investment in the country is around 29 billion US dollars (about 1.8% of the World’s FDI) (World Investment Report 2006–2012).

Table 12.3. Confessional structure of Turkey and neighbouring countries (in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/area</th>
<th>Muslims - Sunnis</th>
<th>Muslims - Shias</th>
<th>Orthodox Uniates</th>
<th>Judaizers</th>
<th>Protestants</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours 1st rank</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>100.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours 2nd rank</td>
<td>258.1</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>366.5</td>
<td>142.7</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data for Russia are only for the residents of the Southern federal districts and the North Caucasus.


The enlargement of the potential of the economic-geographical position of Turkey is multiplied by its tourist geographical position. It is justified by a growing tourist attractions and activities. On its territory are located two of the “Seven Wonders of the World”, remains of ancient and medieval villages, monuments, religious centres, unique ethnic communities, natural phenomena, attractive bays, beaches and modern resorts, attractive mountains, etc.

The political-geographical position represents relations of a country to different states, nations, international unions, ideological and cultural centres, armies, military infrastructure, etc.

The Turkish statehood and cultural tradition in Asia Minor is a successor of different civilizations. The crossroad geographical position is the reason why on its territory run processes directly related to the historical events significant for the European East and South-East, Middle Asia, Caucasus, the Near and Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and North Africa. One of the oldest cultural political layers of the peninsula consists of the Hittites (the 17th–13th centuries B.C.). After that alternate events related to the settlement of Greeks, Assyrians, Phrygians, Armenians (the 13th century), and Persians (the 5th century). A significant political legacy left Alexander the Great and his political successors – Seleu-
cid (the 4th–1st centuries). Subsequently, a new era began with the powerful influence of Rome and lasted to the 14th century A.D. domination of its eastern geopolitical shape – Byzantium. The most major cultural change in Asia Minor begins with the advent of the Arabs (the 7th century) and their mercenaries – the Seljuq Turks (the 9th–10th centuries). They gradually eliminate the Arabs, and after destruction of the Byzantine state they created the core of the Ottoman Empire. It reached its apogee during the 16th–17th centuries with the conquest of vast territories in Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea Basin, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, with a total area of 5 million km². In the 18th–19th centuries the empire stagnated and suffered huge territorial losses.

Table 12.4. Comparative demographic, economic and military potential of Turkey and its neighbours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>million troops</td>
<td>Billion $ % of the World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>18.3 % of the World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours 1st rank</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>32.5 % of the World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours 2nd rank</td>
<td>6.96</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>132.4 % of the World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10.48</td>
<td>9.83</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>183.2 % of the World</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The modern geographical shape of Turkey was formed after the wars of 1912–1919, when the country lost almost all of its possessions in the Balkan Peninsula, the Caucasus, and the Arab countries. Its modern development began after the War of Independence (1919–1922). With the foundation of the Turkish Republic (1923) the institution of the Caliphate – one of the main mechanisms for influence over Sunni Islamic communities in the world – was removed. During the next decades the borders of Turkey remained unchanged, but the relations to the neighbours are in the shadow of the historical events of the 19th–20th centuries.

The military-geographical position is one of the chief indicators of political-geographical and geopolitical position. It expresses relations between the military potential of the countries; their natural conditions; funds allocated for military purposes; the foreign relations and external guarantors of national security.

In accordance with the indicator “number of troops” (670 thousand), the regular army of Turkey takes the sixth place in the World; amount of the average annual military expenditures (18 billion US dollars) – 15th place; the average volume of imports of military equipment (about 650 million US dollars) – 8th place;
number of military aircrafts (1500) – 8th place; number of battle tanks (4500) – 5th place. There is indeed a military leadership position in a regional aspect (Table 12.4.). Traditional guarantor for these positions is the membership in NATO.

**12.4. Geographical position and geopolitical consciousness**

The geopolitical consciousness is a complex result of social and psychological processes of spatial perception of the environment. It makes possible the construction of a common cultural, ideological, political, and economic system and social values as well. Spatial aspects of social consciousness are often refracted through the prism of civilizational identity and mentality. They are designated as behavioural, civilizational or geopolitical codes.

Core of the geopolitical consciousness is the will of a particular community for power over particular territory. It is a rational mechanism which directs power impulses in order to promote optimal living space. To denote authoritative belonging to a part of the geographical space many ancient Eastern nations use the term “Saraksh” (sarakt) – the space of the state organism. Terms with synonymous meaning, such as “Lebensform”, “Lebensraum”, “Nomos”, “Boden”, “Почва” (soil), etc., are introduced to classical geopolitical theory by authors such as Ratzel (1887), Kjellen (1917), Schmitt (1950), and also the Russian Eurasianists.

In a historical perspective, the Turkish geopolitical tradition and perspective tolerate gradual transformation from a typical continental eastern power that has long been the primary carrier of the Islamic idea to faithful Atlantic ally in the Eastern Mediterranean. According to Dugin (2008a) “Turkey – this is the East that moved to the West, but remained deep in ourselves, namely East”.

Regardless of Atlantic solidarity manifested in recent decades, the traditional Turkic, Ottoman and Islamic grounds of the Turkish society continue having notable influence on significant elements of its modern east-continental geopolitical consciousness. This causes centrifugal trends and significant contradictions between social-class groups, cultural, economic and political elite in the country, and create unfavourable dissonance between the main vectors and challenges in government policy.

The geopolitical consciousness / code of the Turkish society and state is a result of a complex combination of geographical environment, ethnogenetic features, cultural traditions and dynamic spatial diffusion of internal processes and external influences. The most significant currents of the contemporary Turkish geopolitical consciousness are Turkic Eurasianism, Ottoman nationalism, Islamic traditionalism, and Kemalist type of political secularism. Closely related to them are the typical forms of patriarchal Turkish conservatism of social relations as well as political and economic authoritarianism.

The multicultural dynamics within Asia Minor is the basis of preserved over the centuries a strong state and a stable socio-political hierarchy both creating
potential opportunities for personal passionarity, spiritual unity of the formed Turkish nation and ethno-confessional complimentarily against country surrounding geographical space. Alongside this, Turkish geopolitical consciousness noticed rational and gradual changes that result from globalization, modernization of information, communication and transportation technologies, as well as intensive migration processes and tourism. Cultural identity, social and geopolitical consciousness of the country change, but it does not cause fundamental transformations to the Turkish identity and creates conditions for flexible solving of the development problems.

Regardless of the diversity of traditional and contemporary manifestations of the Turkish geopolitical consciousness, it could be presented as a specific type of south Eurasianism. On the one hand, it serves as a kind of general traditional basis of internal development, and on the other – it acts as a corrective in the foreign policy that periodically reminds the pro-western political elite to its Asian roots. From this perspective, Eurasianism can be seen as the antithesis of Atlanticism. It finds favourable ideological environment among left Kemalists, left-socialist circles, nationally oriented military elite and middle bourgeoisie.

From geopolitical point of view Eurasianism represents tellurocratic continentalism, counteracting to some clear political-military geostrategic trends of thalassocratic nature (euroatlantic foreign policy, island disputes with Greece, Mediterranean naval ambitions, etc.). Ideologically Turkish Eurasianism is associated with the so-called Third way and is often referred as “Turkish Gaullism” (Taşpınar 2012; Bechev 2013). It is created by means of cultural political diffusion between the principles of Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism. During the last decade it acts as a common denominator in convergence of positions between the government and opposition on key state issues related to national security and strategic concepts for its prospective development. A proper example for this is the growing consensus convergent social opinions that the pursuit of full euroatlantic integration should not come at any cost and to Turkey has sufficiently effective foreign policy alternatives. Neo-Ottomanism offers more liberal and pragmatic view of the world than traditional Kemalism. In this way a modern Turkish national ideal is proclaimed. It is able to cross the narrow limits of domestic social divide between Islamists and secularists.

In general terms, the essence of the Turkish Third way is to find an optimal combination of market mechanisms and social protection, liberal conservative modernism and traditionalism, moderate and active atlantism, continentalism, secularism and political Islam, internal multiculturalism and assimilative nationalism. The Third way has been a characteristic of Turkey since the establishment of the Kemalist state and accompanies all its subsequent development in historical maneuvering, simulating seeking for ideological balance between projecting global geopolitical orientations of the East and the West.
According to Dugin (2008b), the intellectual efforts of Turkish society in the pursuit of balance between Atlantism and Eurasianism are enormous and mark the development of the country at each historical stage. First Eurasian forms of consciousness manifest and declare mainly leftist social circles and political movements in an attempt to adapt the less attractive communist ideological formulations to historical reasons of the Turks potential for spatial solidarity with neighbouring peoples and cultures. Subsequently, more conservative right-wing circles of Turkish society are also interested in this idea. Open sympathy to the Eurasian idea is also demonstrated by the representatives of the new country’s political elite (Erdogan, Güll, Davutoglu), as well as by the traditional secular Kemalist doctrine (Akcali and Perincek 2009). Furthermore, Friedman (2007) refers to modern Turkey as the country with “the most stable geographical position among all Eurasian countries”. This we believe is the most significant feature of its geographical and geopolitical position, as well as an evidence of the Eurasian geopolitical identity of Turkey.

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PART IV

OLD AND NEW IDENTITIES AS FACTORS OF TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRIES, REGIONS AND METROPOLITAN AREAS
13

Ethnic and Cultural Patterns of Regionalism in Russia

VLADIMIR STRELETSKY

13.1. Introduction

The subject of this paper is a brief description of ethnic, cultural and identity patterns within the space of the Russian Federation at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries.

The concrete topics of research are as follows:

1) Historical framework of ethnic settlement patterns in Russia and their dynamics;
2) Linguistic diversity of the country and spatial linguistic distinctions within the Russian Federation;
3) Confessional landscape of Russia; mosaics of confessional groups within the Russian Federation in spatial dimension; their spatial redistribution;
4) Phenomenon of regional / local identity as one of the key driving forces of cultural regionalization in Russia.

On the one hand, the historically inherited and evolved spatial structures are considered; on the other hand, the emphasis is made upon changes at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries.

13.2. Ethnic settlement patterns in Russia and their historical dynamics

Ethnic diversity and the spatial configuration of ethnic differences are among the main driving forces determining the cultural-geographical variety of Russia. Namely, the ethnic differentiation of the country’s space is reflected especially evidently in the regional consciousness of people living in different parts of the country. The base for research of ethnic settlement patterns is official data of the Population censuses.
According to the Population census data 2010, there are about 160 different ethnic groups in the Russian Federation; there are about 40 peoples among them with the population number more than 100 000 persons (Itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniia 2010 g.). The ethnic Russians account for about 77.7% of the total population of the Russian Federation. This share is, however, gradually decreasing. In 1959 it was 85.0% (in the former RSFSR), in 1989 – 81.5%, and in 2002 – 79.8% (Table 13.1.).
The specific cultural-geographical feature of Russia is an enormous space corresponding to the so-called Russian ethnic mega-core, both in European and Asiatic parts of the country. The ethnic mega-core of the country includes the majority of Russian administrative units (so-called “oblasts” [regions, districts] and “krays” [provinces]) where the share of ethnic Russians in total population is much more than the average index for the whole Russian Federation (more than 80.0%). Exclusions are relatively rare; some examples are the Orenburg region and the Astrakhan region where the share of ethnic Russians is below the average. The Russian ethnic mega-core of the country is much more than the ethnic peripheries of the Russian Federation, both in surface and in demographic potential. The situation like this is extremely rare for multiethnic and multicultural countries.

On the other hand, the share of ethnic Russians in total population is less than 80.0% (the average for the whole country) in almost all national republics of the Russian Federation. The only exclusion among national republics in Russia is the Republic of Khakassia where ethnic Russians account for 81.7% of its population (2010). Outside the Russian ethnic mega-core there are three large cultural regions within the Russian Federation characterized by striking ethnic specificity: the North Caucasus (to be more precise, its highland part populated by so-called mountain peoples), the Volga-Ural multicultural area and the Turkic-Mongolian belt of Southern Siberia (Buryatia, Tuva, Khakassia, Altai).

The most important changes in the ethnic structure of the Russian Federation at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries are presented below.

The first tendency is a gradual and slow transformation of the ethnic structure due to demographic changes and migration processes. The ethnic groups with high birth rates increase their total number and their share in total population of Russia. And vice versa.

The second tendency is a rapid growth of the share of “titular” (indigenous) ethnic groups of national republics of the Russian Federation in the total population of those republics. Therefore, the share of Tatars in the Republic of Tatarstan has increased since 1989 until 2010 from 48.0% to 53.0%, the share of Kalmyks in Republic of Kalmykia – from 45.0% to 56.0%, the share of Ossets in Republic of Northern Ossetia – from 52.0% to 65.0%, the share of Yakuts in Yakutia – from 33.0% to 49.0%.

The third tendency is a growing concentration of “titular” (indigenous) ethnic groups within “their” national units (national republics, first of all). The concentration rate of “titular” peoples within the national republics is very different for various ethnic groups. Some cases illustrate the examples of high concentration rates. So, 94.0% of Tuvinians live in Russia within the Republic of Tuva (2010), 89.0% of the Komi people – within the Komi Republic, etc.
Table 13.2. Concentration rate of “titular” peoples of the national republics of Russia within “their” national administrative units (according to censuses 1989 and 2010), in thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Titular” peoples of national republics of Russia</th>
<th>Total number within “their” national administrative units, 1989</th>
<th>Total number within “their” national administrative units, 1989, %</th>
<th>Total number within “their” national administrative units, 2010</th>
<th>Total number within “their” national administrative units, 2010, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karelians</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komi</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>336</td>
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<td>Yakuts</td>
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Signatures: * in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR; ** in the Republic of Ingushetia; *** in the Republic of Chechnya; **** in the Buryat ASSR; ***** in the Republic of Buryatia; taking into account the former Aginski and the former Ust-Ordynski Buryat autonomous districts as well, the concentration rate of Buryats within “their” national administrative units in 2010 should account for 84.0%.

Contrary cases illustrate the dispersal settlement patterns of ethnic groups. For instance, 62.0% of Tatars live in Russia outside Tatarstan, 55.0% of Mordvins – outside Mordovia. Nevertheless, the general trend is now a growth of the concentration rate within the national republics for prevailing majority of ethnic groups who inhabit Russia. This is a relatively new trend. Before the disintegration of the USSR, the concentration rate of some “titular” peoples decreased (in many cases), nowadays it is increasing overall (Table 13.2.).

13.3. Linguistic diversity and spatial linguistic distinctions

The configuration of linguistic distinctions within the Russian Federation is very similar with that of ethnic differences. There is an evident contradiction between exclusive linguistic diversity of the Russian cultural area and predominance of the Russian language in the country overall. According to official data of the Population census 2010, approximately 98.0% of people living in the Russian Federation understand and speak fluently the Russian language (Itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniia 2010 g.); this share exceeds 95.0–96.0% for majority of ethnic groups of the Russian Federation. The presented figures illustrate the enormous importance and integrative part of the Russian language in the Russian culture area.

Three clusters of ethnic groups are less integrated into the Russian culture area in linguistic respect; they demonstrate the level of knowledge of the Russian language much below the national average.

First cluster is represented by some small-numbered aboriginal nationalities living in the Russian North, Siberia and Far East (for example, Yukaghirs, Teleuts, Telenghits etc.). But it should be emphasized that the opposite, contrary situation among small-numbered peoples is also frequent. Many of them know their own languages much worse than the Russian language. The oblivion of native languages, ethnic traditions and customs, the inherited land use and nature management patterns are the “reverse” of a long-term social integration and cultural assimilation of small-numbered peoples of the Russian North and Siberia.

The second cluster includes the former migrants (or their descendants) from some Asiatic and other Non-European countries outside the CIS region. The impressive examples of that group are, for instance, the migrants of Chinese or Vietnamese origin living in the Russian Federation. As a rule, that cluster does not cover the migrants from the former Soviet republics, involved and integrated for several decades or even centuries into the Russian linguistic space.

The third cluster embraces some small-numbered ethnic groups of the North Caucasus, particularly in Dagestan (for example, Ghinoukhs, Andians, etc.).

To be compared to the national average in the Russian Federation, this
share is relatively low for some more numerous peoples of Eastern Caucasus; it varies between 80.0–90.0% among Dargins, Avars, Lezghins, Chechens, Ingushs, being a little bit higher among Laks and Kumyks.

More than 80 among 150 main languages of ethnic groups living in the Russian Federation represent the cluster of the so-called “literary languages” (or, in other words, written languages). Approximately 1/3 of a total number of ethnic languages in the Russian Federation are specific for ethnic groups which have the main area of their settlement outside the country. 94.7% of inhabitants living in Russia have their own ethnic native languages as mother tongues.

The main focuses of linguistic assimilation in the Russian Federation (including substitution of native languages for the Russian language) are the following:

1. Disperse ethnic groups in cities.
2. Ethnic groups living outside “their” national units (republics, autonomous districts) surrounded by other (and quantitatively prevailing) ethnic groups.
3. Small-numbered aboriginal (native, indigenous) peoples in the areas of their settlement.

The “titular” ethnic groups inhabiting the areas of national republics in the Russian Federation preserve their own native languages, as a rule, more effectively and steady than other ethnic groups. So, the ethnic native languages are mother tongues for 98.0–99.0% of Karachais, Kabardians, Ingushs, Chechens, and Tuvinians. This share is much lower for some “titular” peoples constituting ethnic minorities even in “their” national republics. It accounts for approximately 70.0% among Udmurts, Komi, and Mordovians; 60.0% among Bashkirs, and less than 50.0% among Karelians.

### 13.4. Confessional landscape of Russia

The principal features of the Russian confessional landscape are the following: 1) Exclusive confessional diversity (heterogeneity); 2) Predominance of the quantitatively prevailing confession (the Orthodox Christianity) on the major part of the country’s territory; 3) Confessional cleavages and gradients as basic elements of the Russian cultural space; 4) Sustainability and historical continuity of main spatial patterns of confessional landscape; 5) Different ways of spatial self-organization by various confessions (Streletskiy 2011: 164–170).

The revival of religious life in Post-Soviet Russia and the growth of confessional consciousness of various population groups have moved the confessional issues into the foreground in cultural studies. A lot of scientific papers have been published since the early 1990’s focused upon the geography of the leading Russian confessions, local and specific ethnic religious groups, holistic and complex studies of confessional regions. Some research works were devoted
to principal patterns of confessional space in contemporary Russia as a whole (Krindach 1996a, 1996b; Safronov 2001a, 2001b).

The description of Russia’s confessional landscape cannot be based on official statistical data. It is necessary to use the indirect indicators and results of various scientific reconstructions. Sociological polls show that the religious people (believers in traditional sense) account for from 6.0–8.0% to 13.0–15.0% of the total population; religious people are the people going to the religious service, at least, once a month (the share of the so-called passive believers is much higher). The share of the absolutely religiously indifferent people is about 11.0–15.0% (Streletskiy 2011: 164). At the beginning of the 21st century it is slowly decreasing (at the end of the 20th century it abruptly reduced).

From the point of view of cultural geography it is important to emphasize that different confessions have different patterns of spatial self-organization. On the one hand, there are confessions closely connected in Russia with the ethnic composition of population, predominantly spread in areas inhabited by corresponding ethnic groups. On the other hand, there are also confessions whose geographical distribution is not ethnically determined.

Examples of the first group are confessions traditional for Russia: Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism. The Russian Federation ranks the first place in the world in number of Orthodox Christians (up to 65 million believers, according to calculations of Service Orthod oxe de Presse, 2011'). But at the same time, the share of Orthodox Christians in total population is in the Russian Federation the lowest among all countries of the so-called Orthodox realm (i.e. the states where Orthodox Christianity is a quantitatively prevailing religion).

The ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians account for about 95.0% of disciples of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Russian Federation; their ancestors were converted into Christianity as far back as on the eve of the second millennium. The Finno-Ugric peoples of the Russian Federation are predominantly Orthodox Christians as well (up to 3.0% of the total amount of Orthodox Christians in Russia). The Finno-Ugric ethnic groups were converted into Christianity considerably later; the Orthodox faith has struck root among the Karelians and Komi-Zyrians since the 13th–14th centuries, among Komi-Permyaks since the 15th century. Peak of conversion of the Volga-Ural Finnish peoples (Udmurts, Mari people, Mordvins) as well as Ob-Ugric ethnic groups (Khanty and Mansi people) took place in the 18th–19th centuries. The Finno-Ugric peoples have preserved their Pre-Christian beliefs for a long time; patterns of revival of paganism as a new trend in the religious life in Russia became evident at the end of the 20th – beginning of the 21st centuries. The Orthodox Christianity

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1 It should be mentioned that, according to alternative calculations, this figure might be overestimated or, vice versa, underestimated.
is also the traditional confession for Ossets, Georgians, and some groups of Abkhazians. The Orthodox Christianity is widely spread among some peoples of Turkic origin – Chuvashs, Yakuts, Altaians, Shors and partly Khakasses. As a consequence of Russian colonization, the Orthodox faith was also adopted by Samoyedic ethnic groups, including the biggest among them – the Nenets people and some dispersed small-numbered groups living in different areas of Siberia, Russian Far East and Eurasian North.

The second widespread confession in Russia is Islam. The Muslims inhabit, first of all, the North Caucasus and the Volga-Ural region. Islam has been penetrating into the Volga-Ural region since the 10th century, but became firmly established in the 14th century (in the Golden Horde). It has conserved up to now as a traditional confession for Tatars and Bashkirs. Tatars are the biggest ethnic group among peoples of the Islamic cultural realm in Russia. In the North Caucasus Islam has been partly rooted since Arabic invasions of the 7th–8th centuries; but, nevertheless, the Islamization of aboriginal mountain peoples lasted until the 18th century. Most peoples of the region are of Mohammedan confession nowadays, except for Ossets keeping on the Orthodox Christianity. The majority of Muslims in the Russian Federation confess Sunnism. Shiism is less spread (first of all, among Azeri people living in Russia); small groups of Shiites also live in Dagestan, in towns of the Lower Volga, in Moscow.

The main regions of Buddhism in Russia are Kalmykia (the only compact area of Buddhist culture in Europe) as well as Tuva and Buryatia in the Asiatic part of the country. Buddhism is represented in all three regions in the form of its northern derivate – Lamaism. In confessional dimension, Buryatia is more heterogeneous than Tuva. The western Buryats have been already practicing a settled way of life for a long time; there is a considerable proportion of the Orthodox Christians among them. Unlike them, the eastern (Transbaikal) Buryats, nomads in the immediate past, are keeping on Lamaism.

The list of confessions closely connected to the ethnic composition of the population has to be supplemented by Catholicism. It is predominantly confessed in the Russian Federation by ethnic Poles, Lithuanians and partly by Germans (about 1/3 of a total amount of Russian Germans are Roman Catholic). To be continued, some Protestant denominations have to be mentioned as examples of this group as well. So, Lutheranism is confessed in Russia mainly by ethnic Germans, Estonians, and Finns.

As for confessions whose geographical distribution is not ethnically determined, their examples are predominantly some other Protestant denominations (Baptism, Adventism etc.). So, the Baptist communities in the Russian Federation are multi-ethnic, they are not strictly bound on any ethnic areas. The increased concentration rate of Baptists is registered in large cities of Russia.

The most important changes in the geographical distribution of confessions in the Russian Federation at the end of the 20th – beginning of the 21st cen-
turies should be elucidated in this framework. The first tendency in transformation of the confessional landscape of the Russian Federation is a rapid expansion of Islam due, predominantly, to demographic shifts. According to some estimations (Malashenko 1998), the total number of Muslims in the Russian Federation exceeded at the end of the 20th century 15 million people; nowadays it should amount up to 20 million persons. The second tendency is a long-term revival of paganism (including shamanism) in some areas of Russia. This trend is typical not only for small-numbered indigenous ethnic groups in Siberia, but also for some peoples (of Finnish origin particularly) in the European part of the country (in Republic of Mary-El, Udmurtia, etc.). The third tendency is reinforcement of some Protestant denominations, especially in Siberia and in large cities of the European part of Russia.

13.5. Cultural regionalism development patterns in Russia

Cultural regionalism is a historically rooted phenomenon in Russia. Its study has a long-standing scientific tradition. The famous historian Kostomarov described the deep originality of the historical Russian regions as far back as in papers published in the 19th century (Kostomarov 1860, 1995 [1863] et al.); the cultural peculiarities of the “parceled” Russian lands have emerged and developed under conditions of political division processes in Eastern Europe as long as since the medieval age of feudalism. The similar point of view was shared by many other outstanding Russian historians (Shchapov 1861a, 1861b; Milyukov 1896; Lyubavskiy 1909) and geographers (P. P. Semenov Tian-Shanski 1892; V. P. Semenov Tian-Shanski 1910). According to this standpoint, cultural regions in the historical core of Russia are predominantly successors of ancient Russian lands. It means that cultural regionalism is an old phenomenon in Russia, at least in its European part; the historically rooted regional identity is a striking distinctive feature of its cultural-geographical space.

Nevertheless, to be compared with other countries, other nations, other cultures, various regional identity patterns are in some cases overlapped in Russia by national and ethnic identity patterns. Some authors (Smirniagin 1999) argue that the Russian culture is, in a certain sense, “a-spatial” (that implies the absence of significant regional cultural contrasts within the space of the Russian ethnic settlement structure and, as a result, weak point of local patriotism). The Russian people settled within the enormous space, on the vast territory with relatively small natural barriers and borders. Russian people did not have to change fundamentally their way of life in process of long-distance migrations. Among those conditions the cultural traits did not change significantly from place to place, from area to area. In other words, the Russian culture remained to be relatively uniform in spatial dimension, “a-spatial” in terms of the aforementioned concept (Smirniagin 1999: 110–111).
This concept has its “pro” and “contra”. On the one hand, the arguments in favour of this concept are predominance of all-Russian cultural features on a huge territory of the ethnic mega-core of the country and its relatively small variability among Russian cultural regions. In comparison to other cultural realms, the distance between contrast cultural regions in Russia is very long; the vast and relatively homogeneous cultural areas in Russia could exceed, sometimes, the aggregate surface of several European countries with the striking different cultural patterns.

The Russian geographical space is also characterized by strong “vertical” sociocultural differences: urban areas – rural areas, big city – small town, etc. Emerged long ago, these distinctions have significantly strengthened during the 20th century, under the conditions of the Soviet over-centralization. The “vertical” sociocultural contrasts are marked in the Russian geographical space more strongly than the “horizontal” distinctions between various cultural regions of the country. Sometimes the over-centralization really hinders cultural regionalization of society, erodes the territorial integrity of local communities, entails slackening of regional consciousness, and even contributes to “frustration” of certain regional identity patterns, especially at a local level. People living in large cities (like Omsk and Irkutsk, Perm and Vladivostok, etc.) often have much more common cultural features between themselves as urban residents than between them and inhabitants of surrounding rural areas located close to the corresponding big regional centres.

The excessive, hypertrophied significance of administrative division in various strata of Russian society is also to be mentioned in the context of the “a-spatiality hypothesis”. Administrative boundaries often divide into parts the organically evolved cultural and historical regions of the country, strongly determining regional development processes. In some terms, administrative division is a phenomenon that significantly influences regional consciousness and regional identity patterns in Russia.

But on the other hand, the historical experience of development of cultural regionalism in the European part of Russia contradicts, in a certain sense, to the hypothesis of “a-spatiality” of Russian culture. The cultural originality of historical Russian lands, emerged still in Medieval times, is a real and strong precondition of Russian regionalism. Spatially changeable patterns of the role of traditions are found to shape the contemporary regional identities of Russians (for example: Krylov 2010: 103–107). In my view, the real phenomenon interpreted sometimes as “a-spatiality” is not a “genetic”, ancestral, inherited feature of Russian culture. It is rather one of results of deformation of traditional rural culture during the Soviet period (Streletskiy 2011: 172).

The basic factors determining cultural regionalism development patterns in Russia have to be mentioned in this respect:

1. The crucial role of the inherited cultural-geographical distinctions
within the historical core of the European part of Russia.

2. The long-distance transfer of people and their cultural traits from historical core in Eastern Europe into Northern Asia; impact of that process on regional identity patterns.

3. Cultural borrowings from the aboriginal peoples.

4. A continuing cultural interchange between the ethnic mega-core of the country and the ethnic peripheries of the former Russian Empire.

5. Draastic social transformations during the Soviet period and their impact on erosion of local consciousness, regional identity and cultural regionalism patterns.

Two decades of the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century form, in my view, a new historical period in cultural regional development in Russia. This new period is characterized by evident revival of regional and local identity in various parts of Russia, including both the European part of the country and Siberia.

A trend of great importance is a gradual increase of cultural-geographical distinctions within the space of Russian ethnic settlement. The revival of regionalism in the Russian Federation in the last decades was accompanied by strengthening comprehension of regional interests by the local populations. Slogans of regional interests were broadly adopted by local authorities and regional political elites; the transition from the unitary and centralized state to the federal political system also influenced the upsurge of regional consciousness in ethnically “Russian” regions and provinces. The constitutional fixation of “titular” distinctions between “ethnic” republics and “Russian” regions stimulated the search for their own regional identity in areas that were devoid of specific ethnic patterns and attributes.

Cultural regionalization of Russia embraced after the breakdown of the USSR, first of all, two vast areas (macro-regions). One of them is the European South of Russia (predominantly belt of steppes and forest-steppes) where some groups of population have been preserving their local consciousness even during the Soviet period. The Steppe Caucasus as a part of European South of Russia is at the same time a spacious and extended contact zone that links cultural “heartland” of the country with diverse and mosaic cultural realm of Caucasus Mountains. Ethnic and cultural interaction of both realms was also promoted by their economic complementary reciprocity.

In a historical retrospective, the interactions between North and South in European part of Russia were always complicated. Traditionally, the South of Russia accepted endless streams of fugitive peasants from the historical core of the country, becoming refuge and asylum for different groups of religious and political dissidents and being at the same time the main hearth of disturbances and revolts. The political culture in the so-called “Cossack regions” of Southern Russia has been for a long time determined by ethos of military democracy, and
the social institutes have been based there, to a certain extent, on principles of self-organization.

During the Civil War 1918–1920, the Cossack population in the European South of Russia was politically divided: numerous groups of Cossacks were involved into the Red Army and fought for it, but the majority of them (especially in the Don region, the Kuban region and the Terek region), on the contrary, participated in the White movement. The policy of so-called “decossackization” (in Russian language – raskazachyvanie) pursued by the Communist authorities in Soviet Russia and the USSR after the Civil War was aimed at the extermination of Cossacks as a separate subethnic, cultural and military entity. According to some historical interpretations (Holquist, 2002 et al), the Cossacks disappeared as a relatively secluded regional entity in the late 1920’s – early 1930’s. The collectivization campaign of 1920–1930’s, pursued by Bolsheviks on fertile Cossack homelands of the European South of Russia, should be regarded as a turning point. Nevertheless, the Cossack identity has been survived, in latent forms, for several decades of the Soviet epoch.

The rapid revival of Cossack consciousness appeared only at the end of the Soviet epoch. Several groups of Cossacks are tending nowadays to position themselves as apart ethnic entities; according to the Russian Population censuses in 2002 and 2010, some of them were registered as ethnic groups (nevertheless, being included in generalized statistical data into total number of ethnic Russians). According to the last Population Census, more than 95.0% of the Russian Cossacks live in the European south of the country (in the Southern Federal District and North Caucasian Federal District); the share of the Rostov region (which embraces the Don area – the traditional and most important territory of Cossack settlement) in the total amount of Cossacks in Russia accounts for 62.5%.

On the other hand, the deep cultural peculiarity of European South of Russia is not reinforced by the common and broad indivisible regional identity of “Southern Russians”; in the European South of Russia local consciousness patterns rather prevail over the “common” (for a whole region) regional identity patterns. Furthermore, the crucial cultural-geographical feature of the European South of Russia is the lesser integration of ethnic minorities in the regional society in comparison with the situation in the Russian North.

The other macro-region, permanently generating its particular and specific identity, is Siberia. Being an important part of Russian cultural space, Siberia belongs, at the same time, in terms of geopolitics and geoconomics, to Asiatic-Pacific area. Historically, it has experienced, in its essential territorial parts, the deep cultural influence from civilizations of Central Asia, China, Korea, and Japan. The deep originality of ethnic and cultural processes in Siberia, due to intensive mixture between Russian colonists and aboriginals, became a mighty driving force for consolidation of regional identity of population, rooting of cul-
tural regionalism, strengthening of the so-called “regionalistic tendency” (in the Russian language – *oblastnicheskaia tendentsiia*, in terms of Russian geographer and ethnologist Potanin [Potanin 1906]). Potanin and other Siberian regionalists (*sibirskie oblastniki*), for example, Yadrintsev, author of the book “Siberia as a colony” (Yadrintsev 1882) which was very popular among the Siberian intellectuals on the eve of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, connected the future welfare and prospects of development of Siberia with its autonomization. Separatist aspirations of certain groups of Siberian intellectuals as well as representatives of some other estates (landowners, Cossacks, merchants, entrepreneurs) continually gained in scope at the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century; that process was not without importance for a course of the Civil War in Siberia and Russian Far East. The particularistic tendencies became apparent again in Siberia towards the end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The unity of the country was reinforced during the socialist period, not to the last extent, by the so-called “iron curtain” which separated its regions from external cultural, economic and political impacts. Under the new conditions of the global oriented and market economy, the so vast macro-region as Siberia should focus its outer linkages, to a certain degree, upon neighbouring countries. Simultaneously, their cultural expansion into Siberian geographical space is gradually increasing. And last but not least: the crash of the communist project entailed searching for alternative “modus” of public consciousness, and in this context the “Siberian idea” has chance for success.

So, the revival of cultural regionalism is a new and extraordinary important trend of regionalization of Russia in the 1990–2000’s. It should be especially emphasized that cultural regionalism is something quite different from regional separatism. Despite several forecasts of disintegration of the Russian Federation, frequent in the 1990’s, it can be ascertained that the secession of some regions with the ethnically predominating Russian population (in Siberia etc., close to scenario of self-determination of settlers of Anglo-Saxon or Spanish origin in the New World in the 18\textsuperscript{th}–19\textsuperscript{th} centuries) is rather unlikely in foreseeable future.

Regional and cultural diversity, multiculturalism, the historically rooted regional identity, territorial solidarity, local patriotism are important links of sustainability of society. Political separatism is rather pathology of cultural regionalism, but on no account a natural stage or grade in its development.

### 13.6. Conclusion

To be considered as a whole, the geographical space of Russia is characterized in ethnic and cultural dimension by evident patterns of steadiness and sustainability. The inherited spatial patterns predominate both in ethnic settlement structures and in configurations of linguistic, confessional and regional cultural distinctions.
Nevertheless, the cultural-geographical changes and shifts in Russia were also important at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 21st centuries. On the one hand, some spatial shifts and the newest trends are accounted for their demographic background. The deep differences in reproduction of population (and correspondingly in demographic dynamics) among various ethnic and confessional groups living in the Russian Federation are becoming more and more important factors of its ethnic and cultural transformation. On the other hand, the cultural-geographical transformation of the country is caused by processes of modernization of society. The up-growth of social mobility of population entails erosion and destruction of ethnic and cultural barriers, formation of zones of cultural diffusion and ethnic contact areas as well as reveals focuses of heterogeneity of ethnic and confessional structure of society.

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Globalization and New Ethnic Minorities in Romania

RADU SĂGEATĂ

14.1. Globalization and urban systems

The concentration of population and of economic-financial resources in certain areas has in the course of time led to an uneven development of regions on the Globe and to the emergence of new civilizations acting as nuclei of the future globalizing process (Barnet and Cavanagh 1996). In terms of historical evolution, there are two types of globalizing nuclei: primary and secondary, corresponding to two distinctive stages of globalization.

The primary nuclei are represented by the old maritime civilizations of Europe (England, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands). These were the first foci wherefrom the whole world started being “Europeanized” through colonization (Zainea 2000).

The secondary nuclei were the outcome of economic and technological developments that got momentum especially after the Second World War, and represented the diffusion of transnational companies which extended their economic-financial activities beyond the borders of their countries of origin. Statistics about the origin of the main transnational companies show them to be concentrated in the US, EU and South-East Asia, wherefrom the capital would spread out to all the corners of the world. The upsurge of the South-East Asian economies, and later on of some Latin American ones (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, etc.), of China or India, or of certain African states (mainly South Africa and Libya), was based on the influx of European or North-American capital (Săgeată 2009). At present, these countries have become fresh nuclei, distributing capital and technologies to peripheral or underdeveloped regions, and actually representing a third generation of globalizing cores. A drawback to the progress of developing and underdeveloped countries is not the presence of transnational or national companies but rather their absence (Appadurai 1990). Mutual efforts might help transnational companies to accelerate economic development in the
countries where subsidiaries are opened by attracting investments and creating jobs.

The concrete expression of the direction and intensity of globalizing fluxes are the so-called globalizing vectors. The configuration of these vectors is intimately linked to the configuration of globalizing nuclei and areas, on the one hand, and to the characteristics of globalizing processes, on the other (Beauregard 1995). While the first globalizing stage was characterized by diffusion and relocation, once high-tech got momentum, globalizing fluxes were diffused through the intermediacy of telecommunications and mass-media. Transnational companies have a considerable impact on the world’s economy in that they direct the transfer of technology, the creation of new jobs, and assist in the improvement of the professional qualification of some social categories and in the efficient use of local production units as well (Short and Kim 1999).

The simultaneous existence of two generations of globalizing nuclei generated two types of globalizing fluxes of a different structure and consistency. The first globalizing fluxes, which were the outcome of colonization, had a radial pattern, emanating from Western Europe, basically from the area of the old maritime civilizations. These fluxes traded mainly in raw materials and low processed goods that incorporated little labour, shipping them to the parent states. At the same time, some technologies, necessary for primary exploitation and processing, would also be “exported” to the colonies (Claval 1995; Huntington 1998; Buzducea 2001).

The effect of these fluxes was the globalization of Western European companies that reflected also great ethnic diversity, with deep-going economic and cultural implications. Cities like London and Amsterdam grew into multinational ones, while the proportion of Arabs and Africans in Marseilles and in Paris, or of Indians in the British towns came close to that of the autochthons (Johnston, Poulse, and Forrest 2006). As a result, a better understanding of and greater opening to other peoples’ cultural values, as well as more interethnic tolerance emerged, simultaneously with nationalistic and extremist tendencies, social and cultural segregation, and inherent fragmentation (Sklair 1995; Stiglitz 2005).

The 19th and the early 20th centuries were marked by the American economic “miracle”, the American nation being the first global nation formed of colonists and immigrants arrived from every corner of the world. The same refers to the Canadian, Australian, or of some South American nations such as Brazilian, Argentinian, etc. (Schnapper 2001).
Figure 14.1. Globalization and the cities
While in the stage of Fordist industrialization, development in the United States relied on fluxes of capital and labour from Europe, after the Second World War the situation was reserved in that the US lend their support to the European economies; at the same time, a second nucleus of technological dissemination emerged in the Far East, namely Japan (Bennett 2000).

What spurred the processes of globalization was the internationalization of trade and of investments. In the age of globalized information, transcontinental financial transactions and cooperation agreements are swiftly concluded. As a result of international exchanges, commodities and ideas alien to a community are rapidly assimilated. The Information Revolution has produced radio and TV networks, Internet and satellite communications. New polarization nuclei would emerge, and the redistributions of globalizing fluxes, represented by the expanding economies of South-East Asia or Latin America is underway. So, connections and interdependences among all countries in the world are likely to become irreversible, while a key phenomenon of the postmodern culture, namely the global culture, has been surging. Thus, people tend to dress alike, eat alike, and have the same values and moral norms. Blue-jeans, sneakers or pantyhoses, are elements of clothing seen in New York, Paris, Milan, Berlin, Istanbul or Hong Kong, and not the least in Bucharest; the American hot dog, the French croissant, the Italian pizza, the Turkish shaorma or kebab stand side by side with elements of the Chinese, Lebanese, or Moroccan cuisine, and the values of Western democracy have become universal norms of reference. However, there is no doubt that local cultural traditions, a people’s or a community’s historical past has a lot to say, and the stronger local values, the greater one’s awareness of belonging to them, possibly exacerbating anti-globalization feelings and eventually growing into a fundamentalist stance, likely to breed terrorism. It is a warning of how far globalization may go, the limits beyond which it may lead to fragmentation (Sanguin 1989).

Another trend also shapes out. The many-sided conditionings between economic and cultural globalization have reduced the political power and the state's control tools. The proliferation of transnational institutions has increased the number and volume of global interactions (economic, political, technological, legislative, communications, etc.), of transparency, so that the capacity of states to create the political implements capable to seriously control globalizing fluxes has notably diminished. Towns, therefore, have become nuclei polarizing these fluxes. The importance of national capital cities tends to be shadowed by metropolises discharging international functions and hosting international institutions and organizations (Bonnet 2000).

The weakness of the state appears to attract globalizing fluxes; multilingualism encourages employment with multinational organizations. Cities such as Geneva, Vienna, Strasbourg, The Hague, Luxembourg, and others have become international services cores. A second category of political centres comprises large
international cities in which the political function is associated with the economic one. In some cases (London, Paris, and Madrid) the political function has been internationalized, given that those cities had been centres of colonial empires; others (New York, Shanghai, Calcutta, Lagos, Dar es Salaam, etc.), though not national capitals, have nevertheless grown into global cities with complex functions. A third category of metropolises (Tokyo, Beijing, Seoul, Bangkok, etc.), favoured by geographical position and the dynamism of some Asian or Latin American economies, has transcended the status of national capitals and developed continental or even global functions (Bastié and Dézert 1980) (Figure 14.1).

The national administrative centres are cities built for the purpose of assuming the function of political capital, preserving the status of economic-financial metropolis of the main urban nuclei. These new capitals would act as mediators between urban systems and the top of the urban hierarchy (a position constantly held by the hypertrophic economic metropolis). Washington was the first city of this kind and the first capital to become a global metropolis. This model enjoyed large-scale expansion, being adopted by Asian, Latin-American and recently African states (Reynauld 1981; Ianoș 2006).

14.2. Globalization of the Romanian urban system

The downfall of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe and the abolishment of ideological barriers have created the premise for closer globalizing links within the urban systems from this part of the continent. On the line of former experience as COMECON members, the first half of the 1990s witnessed, after the dissolution of that organization, a rise in the volume of trade exchanges, of imports in particular; services and investments were aimed at developing small and medium-sized enterprises. Towns acted as nuclei, polarizing and re-directing fluxes in the territory. However, development, as it was, could not compensate for industrial decline and its demographic and especially social consequences. Romania could not avoid these evolutions. After over fifty years of politically-forced industrialization associated with hypertrophic development, the Romanian urban system has been experiencing a radical transformation, basically de-urbanization both as regards town population and quality of life, its functional attributes undergoing substantial changes. Thus industry, which was the main factor of urbanization for almost all of Romania’s towns, has been overcome by the tertiary sector, a phenomenon specific to large cities, the capital, and the regional centres strengthening their coordinating positions in the territory (Ianoș and Tălăngă 1994; Ianoș 2005).

These cities tend to take over some of the attributes of cosmopolitan cities, a move facilitated by the growing ethnic diversity and development of the services sector. The settlement in Romania of the Arab, Turkish, or Chinese immigrants engaged in trading or in small industrial businesses, the presence of
foreign citizens comes to study here, of the personnel of diplomatic missions, of multinational firms, or NGOs has diversified the services sector (Chinese, Lebanese, Italian or Greek restaurants; French or German bakeries; African, Indian or Latin-American artisanal shops, etc.). With the concentration of incomes in the capital and in the large cities, commodity markets, or specialist service units ended up in big commercial complexes (Chipea 2000). Their localizations are seemingly a result of increasing social segregation, tending to limit the area in which this type of goods and services are likely to be spread, because demand rests with a specific segment of users. Hence, a new type of urban-rural externalities, directly proportional to social and cultural segregation, is dependent upon the capacity of the Romanian urban system to absorb the globalizing fluxes.

The severe financial disparities affecting the urban population in the wake of industrial restructuring filter the penetration of globalizing fluxes. At local level, although the items produced by the culture of consumption are somehow easily penetrating, they are not very accessible (Ianoş, Pumian, and Racine 2000). Thus, the combination of global culture with endemic lack of culture grafted on poverty is a fertile ground for the recrudescence of urban subcultures and organized crime.

The political and economic opening of the early 1990s has created the premise for a change in the ethnic structure of Romania by the massive departure of ethnic Germans and the arrival of allochthonous ethnic elements from Asia and Africa (Tátrai 2011).

Perceived as a bridge between Western Europe, and as an outlet for Asian products (especially from China and the Near East), Romania has become a point of immigration and transit for population flows from Asia and Africa. These fluxes came in mainly by two routes: the Russian Federation – Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova – border checkpoints at Romania’s eastern border, and Turkey – the Balkan Peninsula, border checkpoint Giurgiu.

The phenomenon is by no means a new one, it is deeply rooted in the communist period when the policy of “left-wing internationalism” promoted a vast campaign of attracting foreign students, especially Arabs originating from countries recently orbiting around the socialist sphere, or who espoused socialist views (Palestine, Syria, Algeria, Libya, etc.) to study in Romania. Besides, a number of foreigners had refugee status (Greeks and Poles arrived at the beginning of the Second World War, Marxist Chileans who fled Pinochet’s dictatorship after the fall of Salvador Allende’s regime in the early 1970s; Kurds, PKK members who chose Romania to struggle for a Marxist-type national identity; refugees from Somalia and North Korea, etc.).

In the 1980s, Romania proved a haven for Arab youth who wished to enrol in higher education establishments. The big university centres of Bucharest, Iaşi, Cluj-Napoca, Timișoara, or Craiova registered significant numbers of young students from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or Jordan (see the registration books of the time).
According to some informal figures (no official data on this migration phenomenon were available at the time), in the 80s and early 90s of the 20th century there were nearly half a million Arab students in Romania. They contributed to strengthen the good relations between Ceauşescu’s regime and the Arab states, also representing an important income for the Romanian state. The majority were sponsored (scholarships) by their states of origin to obtain a physician’s or engineer’s diploma in Romania.

After 1990, foreigners would focus on commercial activities, small entrepreneurshipships booming in the proximity of student campuses and further growing into commercial complexes of the Sir on IDM type (in Bucharest). The number of Arab students dropped sharply, with only some 900 being registered over the 1990–2010 period. At the University of Medical Sciences and Pharmacy in Timişoara, from 117 students (a constant number until 1997), no more than 55 remained in 2003. After the 1989 Revolution, the University of Craiova numbered 90 Arab medical students and only 3–4 years would currently enrol (Ladislau 2005). Many of the former students married in Romania and settled here, others returned after 1989 to take advantage of the new opportunities offered by the country’s political and economic transition (Popa 2000).

According to estimates, Romania has 35,624 Arab businessmen (Source: Office for Foreigners, Ministry of Internal Affairs). However, the number could be higher given due to the fact that these people usually hold other citizenships, as well. In the period between 1990 and 2007, 1,227 Arab citizens applied for a residence permit, 449 asked to settle in this country for reasons of family unification and 3,150 requested temporary residence. Arab investors put their money mainly in commercial activities and in the food industry, 10.0% in housing and real estate. An example is Sir Hotels and Commercial Grouping with two locations in Bucharest (Lujerul and Orhideea zones). One in 10-15 major housing investments are made by Arab citizen; the majority of Arab businessmen come from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt and live in large cities (Bucharest, Constanţa, Cluj-Napoca, Iaşi, and Braşov).

A relatively new phenomenon is the Chinese immigration, which got momentum after 1990s as a part of a strong Chinese diaspora worldwide. The majority of the 4,200 Chinese who live in Romania is engaged in commercial activities concentrated in the Colentina-Voluntari-Afumaţi area (“China Town” – north-eastern of Bucharest), but also in some production activities such as: bicycle factories – in Afumaţi, Ilfov; Deva, Petroșani; wood processing industry – in Pârscov, Buzău; construction materials – in Saligny, Constanța; print technology – in Ploiești; recycling – in Buzău, etc. (Figure 14.2.).
Turkish and Greek migrants are also pursuing commercial activities: in 2007 there were over 6,000 Turkish firms and some 3,600 Greek firms. A number of political refugees have come from conflict zones in Asia (the Near East, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Uzbekistan), Africa (Somalia, Eritrea or Nigeria), or from the former Yugoslavia.

14.3. Case-study: Bucharest City

An extremely hypertrophic capital compared to the other regional metropolises, with a macro-territorial position rather remote from similar-sized cities (Budapest, Kiev, Odessa, Athens, or Istanbul) account for Bucharest being a metropolis that discharges intra-continental functions. In this way, it can better take in globalizing fluxes and accommodate more rapidly to the attributes of a cosmopolitan city (Ianoș and Heller 2006).

In 2010, Bucharest hosted about 20,000 foreigners, who chose to group into zones by ethnic criteria, thereby contributing to socio-spatial segregation within the city. It was not by chance that the Chinese gathered in the Obor–Colentina–Voluntari zone, given that their businesses were linked to commercial
activities there; for similar reasons the Arabs opted for the Grozăvești-Regie student campus area where they did business (Figure 14.3.).

Figure 14.3. New ethnic minorities in Bucharest

Figure 14.4. Cosmopolitan landscape in Bucharest: Chinese symbols


Figure 14.5. Cosmopolitan landscape in Bucharest: Lebanese symbols

Source: Radu Săgeată.
The majority is located in the centre of the capital, but also in the centre of residential zones, and act as nuclei that relocate globalizing fluxes inside the urban through commercial activities discharged in the big vegetable markets and in supermarkets. They add specific culinary elements to Bucharest’s cultural landscape, but also an original toponymy and symbols which tend increasingly to enter the autochthonous cultural heritage. The Chinese Dragon, the green of Islam, the Indian orange, or the Lebanon cedar are only a few of the symbols visible in the city landscape (see Figure 14.4. and Figure 14.5.); words like tavern, pub, pizza, shawarma, croissant, hot dog, or hamburger have already entered the Romanian vocabulary. The Islamic veil or elements of the traditional Indian or Japanese garment are quite commonly seen. In addition, one finds traditional elements of architecture specific to various cultures, strikingly obvious in the built-up area, creating in Bucharest that “cosmopolitan landscape” characteristic of the big metropolis (Voiculescu and Creţan 2005).

But what particularizes them in Bucharest’s architectural landscape is their being grafted on allogenous elements borrowed from the Soviet cultural model of the 1950s–1960s and still obvious also in the other large cities. It is the case of the Free Press House in the capital inspired from Moscow State University “M. V. Lomonosov”, or the Soviet-type apartment-blocks in the Bucureştii Noi residential zone. In the 1980s, political opening to the North-Korean brand of communism, the only one still compatible with that in Romania, meant embedding architectural elements from that country, for instance – House of the People (presently housing the Parliament) and whole the ensemble of constructions lining Blvd. Libertăţii – Blvd. Unirii – Unirii Square – Alba Iulia Square (Săgeată 2009).

Most foreigners in Bucharest live now in Sector 2, mainly in the Colentina residential zone. The commercial activities run by the Chinese within Dragonul Roşu, Europa and Niro complexes have proved very profitable, rapidly developing over the past few years. This location boosted demand for Chinese goods in the Romanian market, so a “China Town Romania” with Chinese capital is aimed at enlarging to commercial area in the Colentina-Voluntari perimeter. This six-year project includes China Business Centre and a residential complex (“China Towers”) formed of 12 blocks with 600 flats. But the main problem which Sector 2 authorities have to cope with is the integration of these people, who often pretend that they are not familiar with the Romanian language which prevents them from understanding the Romanian laws.

The heterogeneous ethnic picture of Sector 2 is completed with the presence of Turks in the Pantelimon residential district. Moreover, having initially come to study here, the Arabs settled in the Grozăveşti-Regie student’s campus area, and started many businesses, restaurants, in particular, based on their native traditions and cuisine (Săgeată 2006). Being better off, the Greeks chose to live in the northern zone of the capital. On the other hand, the Africans, originat-
ing mostly from Somalia, Nigeria and Eritrea, are inhabiting the poorer districts in the south of Bucharest (Giurgiului Avenue) and Baicului area, in the east. Most of them lived, or still do, in special centres.

The foreign personnel of embassies, diplomatic missions, or economic representations complete Bucharest’s cosmopolitan ethnic landscape. Foreign libraries, schools, and cultural centres represent as many elements of cultural globalization.

Future evolutions tend to further these trends. Romania’s accession to the European Union makes it an attractive destination for immigrants from less developed countries outside the EU space (Săgeată 2010). As the Romanian legislation still poses few restrictions on the labour force coming from countries other than EU ones, Romania might become not only an immigration destination, but also, and more especially, a gateway to the European Union.

References


**Internet sources**

Spatial Diversification of Territorial Identity of the Residents of the Rybnik Conurbation (Poland)

MONIKA KURPANIK

15.1. Theoretical foundation

Territorial identity can be defined in various ways. It is linked with determining one’s own place in the relation “familiar” – “unfamiliar”. The underlying principle of establishing a border between “familiar” and “unfamiliar” was local and regional identity shaped in one’s own homeland, that is to say hometown (Śmielewska 1999).

Exceptionality of geographical space allows comparatively easily determine identity or in other words “familiarity”. The “familiar” are the residents from the neighbourhood. With geographical distance, the sense of “unfamiliarity” increases and the sense of “familiarity” diminishes. Local identity, which is experienced this way, can turn into regional identity.

Territorial identity emerges as an entity which members can perceive differences between their own place of residence and surrounding places (Runge 1988). Consequently, these places are compared as well as their inhabitants and institutions located there.

Territorial identity depends on the space where it is built. Such space can be either stimulating or hindering. The sent codes are influenced by a raft of processes such as perceiving, classifying, sorting, appraising and assessing. As a result, people take decisions concerning their actions in daily life and thus they affect identity positively or negatively (Szczepański 1998). Spatial behaviours, which are influenced by attitudes, impressions, values and the significance of environment, illustrate human emotional state (Kollár 2001). K. Lynch (1960: 2) points out the fact that “every citizen has innumerable associations with a given part of his or her town – the image he or she carries – is soaked with memories and pictures”. As far as the closest space is concerned, either local or regional, the
closest space is assessed positively by its inhabitants. Outsiders who live in a giv-
en area are a special case since they are faced with the task of getting to know the
advantages of the new place (Posern-Zieliński 2005) while they have memories
concerning a previous place of living.

15.2. Geographical peculiarities of the Rybnik Conurbation

The area of the Rybnik Conurbation is located in Poland, in the south-west
part of the Silesian Province. It is bordered by the Katowice Conurbation to the
northeast, the Opole Province to the west, and the Czech Republic to the south
(Figure 15.1.). Rybnik – the capital city of the conurbation is the 6th largest city in
Upper Silesia (within the boundaries of Poland).

The Rybnik Conurbation is not a precisely delimited area. After 1945 it has
been identified with the area of the Rybnik Coal Region (ROW), but its borders
have been modified many times, and this term has referred to the economic
structure of the region rather than to settlement structure.

The author of the research follows R. Krzysztofik’s description of the Ryb-
nik Conurbation (2007, 2008). The conurbation is composed of 27 communes
including 8 municipal, 3 municipal-rural and 16 rural ones (in total 11 towns). The
area of the conurbation is 1470 km² (i.e. 11.9% of the Silesian Province) and was
populated by 670,928 inhabitants in 2012 (i.e. 14.4% of the Silesia’s Province
population).

The Rybnik Conurbation is the area of traditional agriculture, which is
experiencing important social-industrial transformations these days. These
changes have been exerting a significant impact on the residents. Almost up until
the 1950s a dominant economic sector in the area of the current Rybnik Conurba-
tion was mining. Later industrial development has changed the character of this
urban complex. The possibility to mine cooking coal, crucial for metallurgy,
turned out to activate the development of ROW. 90.0% of national resources of
this coal was accumulated in the area of the described region (Czechowicz 1976).
77.0% of all employees used to work in mining in 1920’s and 1930’s, which proves
that this sector was leading (Pakula 1970).

Not only did Silesian mines create workplaces but they also served other
functions. First and foremost, they extended state’s social function because they
satisfied the needs of the employed and their families. Besides, they improved
living standards of miners in destitution. In addition, they integrated and united
mine staff and motivated them to increase their efficiency (Pilny 1988). They also
organized their employees’ spare time by arranging, for example, holidays, trips
or outings to the theatre. Furthermore, they supported the school system since
they supervised institutions training future workers.
Except for mines, there were manufacturing sectors in ROW, which started to appear in the early 20th century. Firstly, these were plants directly linked with coal preparation such as coking, briquetting and power plants; secondly, there were additional segments like food and timber industries (Pakula 1970). Also, machine and metal industries were developed in order to maintain mine operations and at the same time make mines independent from importing spare parts for their machines.

Developing industrialization resulted in the population growth in the Rybnik Conurbation (Table 15.1.). The most considerable increase took place in Jastrzębie-Zdrój and was caused by a residential base being erected for employees of neighbouring mines. Industrial investments led to population migration.
Table 15.1. Population changes in the Rybnik Conurbation, 1960–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Main administrative units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jastrzębie-Zdrój</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2 870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>42 368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population dynamics [%] 1960–1970</td>
<td>1 476.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>98 462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>103 734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population dynamics [%] 1980–1990</td>
<td>105.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>97 537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>92 462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population dynamics [%] 2000–2010</td>
<td>94.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


60 thousand newly opened workplaces were filled by migrants from other regions of Poland (Rajman 1988). The migration rate for the Rybnik Commune was 7.2%, Wodzislaw – 9.0% whereas for the entire Katowice Voivodeship – 5.1% (Gorywoda and Subaczowa 1970). Additional information was provided by the 1978 National Census of Population. It demonstrated that Jastrzębie-Zdrój native population, i.e. born in this town, constituted 28.1% of all residents while in Žory – 37.9% (Frąckiewicz 1988).

The 1980’s were not a favourable period for the Polish economy. Since mining was to become a key element of the proposed economic reform, it was supposed to obtain considerable funds despite the lack of investment resources (Albinowski 1988). In the case of the Rybnik Coal Region the money was to be spent on expansion of new mines. However, higher and higher costs of mining coal, which were due to the necessity to reach deeper coal seams, were not predicted. Apart from them, expenses arising out of mining damage repairs and environment protection were not to be overlooked. The turbulent political situation did not favour new investments. All those factors exerted an impact on limiting expansion plans (Frużyński 2011). After the restructurization, the economy of the Rybnik Coal Region has still been bound with mining. Nonetheless, it has not been a foremost sector any more and the industry of the entire region has become more diversified.
15.3. Research units

Territorial identity of the residents of the Rybnik conurbation was explored by means of a questionnaire. This is the most common research tool (e.g. Dolata, Konecka-Szydłowska and Perdał 2009; Dubcová 2002; Gracová 2006; Kłosek 1995; Kulczyńska and Matykowski 2011; Libura 1988; Malikowski and Pokrzywa 2010; Rykiel 1985; Sitek 2010).

The selected towns (Rybnik, Żory, Jastrzębie-Zdrój, Radlin and Wodzisław Śląski) and rural areas (Marklowice, Świerklany, Jankowice Rybnickie, Mszana, Połomia) of the conurbation (Fig. 15.2.) were the subject of the study. 70 questionnaires were administered to each of the research units, giving a total sample size of 1190 questionnaires. Research units were:

- housing estates (Rybnik-Nowiny, Żory-Osiedle Pawlikowskiego, Wodzisław Śląski-Osiedle XXX-lecia, Jastrzębie-Zdrój-Osiedle Arki Bożka, Radlin-Biertułtowy) – (Figure 15.3.);

Figure 15.2. The research units

Signatures: I – state border, II – border of administrative unit, III – border of research unit;

Source: Elaborated by the author.
- old workers’s settlements (Rybnik-Niedobczyce, Radlin-Marcel) – (Figure 15.4.);
- areas with rural architecture (Figure 15.5.).
More importantly, the last category was divided into:
- urban areas (previous village communities) – (Rybnik-Radziejów, Żory Osiny, Wodzisław Śląski-Kokoszyce, Jastrzębie-Zdrój-Ruptawa, Radlin-Głożyny);
- rural areas (Marklowice, Jankowice Rybnickie, Świerklany, Polomia, Mszana).

Figure 15.3. Housing estates

Figure 15.4. Old workers settlements

Figure 15.5. Areas with rural architecture

Photographs by Monika Kurpanik
15.4. Territorial Identity

Identification with inhabited space is an essential element of territorial identity. “Identification with the site is a result of a long lasting, spontaneous process of dwelling in space. That process is conditioned by external factors, i.e. type of building” (Gawryszewska 2011: 236).

Almost 78.0% of respondents answered positively to the question: “Do you feel attached to your place of living?”. Only 7.6% gave a negative response. The rest was undecided as far as this question is concerned.

Identification with the living place is the highest in districts which used to be independent suburban towns: Rybnik-Radziejów – 94.3%; Wodzisław Śląski-Kokoszyce – 89.1%; Jastrzębie-Zdrój-Ruptawa – 92.8%; Żory-Osiny – 90.0% (Figure 15.6); with the exception of Radlin-Głożyny (30.0% of respondents did not feel attached to their place of living). The majority of rural areas residents also feel connected with the place where they live (Markłowice – 77.2%; Jankowice – 80.0%; Świerklany – 82.8%; Połomia – 74.3%; Mszana – 78.6%).

Figure 15.6. Identification with the place of living

![Identification with the place of living](image)

Signatures: I – state border, II – border of administrative unit, III – border of research unit

Source: Elaborated by the author.
Figure 15.6. shows that residents of housing estates rather weakly identify with the area they dwell in (especially Żory-Os. Pawlikowskiego, Rybnik-Nowiny, and Jastrzębie-Zdrój-Arki Bożka). Simultaneously, Jastrzębie-Zdrój, and Żory have shown the highest population outflow (Kurpanik 2012). Undoubtedly, the attachment to the place of living, which is also a principal part of regional identity, plays a significant role while taking a decision about leaving.

The research confirmed the common conviction that attachment to the living place grows with age. Above all, it is related to the length of residence and the increase in issues which link us with a particular area. Clearly higher percentage of respondents admitted to forming a stronger attachment to their hometown. It is rather natural. This town constitutes the background of our daily existence and bonds us with our nearest and dearest. Local matters touch us directly evoking positive or negative emotions. Rarely, we are indifferent towards our hometown. The respondents who claimed that they identify with a larger space often found defining this space difficult. Those who pointed out particular areas mentioned a region or a place bordered by certain towns because it facilitates spatial imagination.

Table 15.2. Attitude to place of living vs. the age of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>The percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16–25 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>very positive</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positive</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indifferent</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>very negative</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>difficult to tell</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated by the author.

A vital component of identity is the attitude towards the place of living. For the majority of society this attitude is positive. The distribution of answers among age groups is comparable (Table 15.2.). A small percentage of the residents remained indifferent to their place of residence. Even fewer people were negative or very negative towards it. Such responses were mainly observed among people aged 16–25 and 56–65 years old.

Most of respondents regard their attitude towards the living place as favourable. The young are more cautious about offering positive assessment. The older the age group, the more positive approach and smaller distance to the area.
Territorial identity is founded on emotions, hence they decide about attachment to the place of living. They are built through fostering relationships with family, neighbours or entire local community in general. A sense of togetherness, built this way, underlies identity. The sense of belonging is different in various age groups because each group finds other issues and needs vital and they in turn form a personal connection with the place of residence.

The question: “What do you associate with your place of living?” brought various answers. Among 1190 questioned, as many as 565 (that is 47.5%) had associations with industry, e.g. coal mining, coal, mines, heaps. 20.0% of respondents could not come up with any answer to this question.

Figure 15.7. Residents’ responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental quality</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Quality of the landscape</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Religiousness</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Diligence</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>very good</td>
<td></td>
<td>very good</td>
<td></td>
<td>very good</td>
<td></td>
<td>very good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1- very bad; 2 - bad; 3 - average; 4 - good; 5 - very good

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Less popular responses are as follows:
– characteristic elements (e.g. important buildings, “Silesian” dialect, landscape, tradition, meaningful places, characteristics of area residents) – 17.3%;
– emotions (e.g. affective value, family, place meaning, home, attachment to the area) – 7.1%.

The respondents assessed given features of their living space (environmental cleanliness, wealth, economy, landscape beauty) as well as characteristics of the residents (religiousness, diligence) – Figure 15.7. Most of findings fluctuated around average 3.0%. Religiousness and diligence scored the highest, respectively 3.7% and 3.8%.
Environmental cleanliness scored the lowest (2.5%). The main reason for this situation is industry. In 2012, eight coal mines worked in the Rybnik Conurbation. That is six times less in comparison to the 1980’s. Nonetheless, it is planned to open a new coal mine in 2017.

There is also electrical engineering industry based in the conurbation. Moreover, the Rybnik Conurbation partly belongs to the Katowice Special Economic Zone with Jastrzębie-Żory subzone, which in particular comprises automobile and building companies.

**Figure 15.8. The characteristics of living space by the residents**

The “Silesian” dialect is the most characteristic of the Rybnik Conurbation (Figure 15.8). Almost 80.0% of the respondents chose it. This dialect is basically Polish, but it has also been influenced by, for instance, the German and the Czech language (Siwek and Kaňok 2000a). It is not spoken by everybody but it is important for most of the residents, the immigrants as well as the natives. Table 15.3. reflects the percentages of answers regarding age distribution. Regardless of age, the dialect is of crucial importance.
Table 15.3. Dialect as a characteristic element vs. age distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialect</th>
<th>The percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16–25 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The most important</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less important</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The least important</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non selected</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Figure 15.9. Percentage of residents who do not wish to leave their living space

Signatures: I – border of administrative unit, II – border of research unit.
Source: Elaborated by the author.

Religiousness is on the second position (50.1%) among noteworthy features of the living place (Figure 15.8.). It is also a crucial element of regional identity (Nijakowski 2002). As Siwek and Kaňok (2000b: 191) pointed out, “the
Silesian territorial identity has never been supported by other identity components such as a common language or religion”. Respect for work is a distinctive feature of the living place for 32.6% of the residents (Figure 15.8). There used to be discrepancies in the attitude towards work between the native population and immigrants. Silesian population was strongly attached to a coal mine, which traditionally supported their family and influenced their daily and weekly rhythm. The inflow of a large number of immigrants led to the loosening of these bonds (Świątkiewicz 1993).

The overwhelming majority of the residents (87.8%) stated that they do not wish to leave their current place of residence. Most of them come from areas with rural architecture such as Świerklany (8.6%), Mszana (94.3%), Jankowice Rybnickie (92.9%), Rybnik-Radziejów (92.9%) – see Figure 15.9. For this reason, several generations frequently reside in one family house. This phenomenon was observed by Jałowiecki (1980) who focuses our attention on the fact that the house, whose erection we contributed to, has a greater significance in the common conviction.

Table 15.4. Percentage of residents who do not wish to leave their living space and the reasons of it

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I live here well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16–25 years</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26–35 years</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36–45 years</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46–55 years</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56–65 years</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 years and over</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Attachment to the place seems not to be crucial for the inhabitants of housing estates. Most of them more often declare the willingness to move out. The highest percentage (35.7%) is among the residents of XXX-lecie Estate (Figure 15.9.). A large number of them left for the Rybnik Conurbation. Almost half of them moved from village to town (Paździor and Stachoń 1975). Rarely did
social interaction between the immigrants and the natives take place, which triggered off conflicts, distrust and even hostility in these two groups.

Among the respondents, irrespective of their age, there are two reasons provided for willingness to stay in their current place of residence: satisfaction with it and family and friends who live there (see Table 15.4.). The group aged 26–45 when asked about factors preventing them from leaving their present area of living, indicated slightly more often a job than personal reasons. This factor declines in importance with age mainly owing to a large group of retired miners. It also explains the increase in percentage among people aged 46–55 who expressed their willingness to leave and return to their previous hometown outside Silesia.

15.5. Conclusion

The Rybnik Conurbation is a perfect example of an area of traditional industry where many socioeconomic transformations have taken place as a result of industrial restructurization. In the past, because of a large number of people who settled in the conurbation, it was said that immigrant community was being formed. The area of the Rybnik Conurbation has become the place integrating people from different parts of Poland, who often showed striking cultural differences. The process of assimilation was hindered due to the lack of social facilities in newly built housing estates. It was caused by hasty estate construction and constantly changing spatial management plans.

The residents of Upper Silesia, which is a border region, are particularly attached to their traditions and cultural heritage. Traditional Silesian uniqueness has been based on industry. Mines created a physical foundation for territorial identity. The Silesian self has been inseparably bound with coal mining. As soon as the importance of traditional industry diminishes and its physical products disappear, spatial identity is weakened. Consequently, it is searching for a new foundation. The process of territorial identity is shaped by factors typical of traditional industrial regions which have become objects of intensive migratory movements. The outcomes of this process are clearly visible in researched units; in particular, housing estates and districts mainly inhabited by native population. A different approach towards inhabited space as well as related values is noticeable. Considering transformations affecting Silesia, the future will bring a new face of territorial identity which is undergoing a continuous evolution.

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The concept of regional identity is inherently a cross-disciplinary notion relating to different scientific fields such as sociology, political science, and geography. In general terms, the regional identity can be defined as condition of a person based on the reflexive perception of the personal identity and affiliation to this or that territory. At the same time, the regional identity has a significant influence on the way that a person transforms the space around him/herself. Herewith, the regional identity has a clear structural arrangement, which forms a series of defence mechanisms aimed to counteract the outside influence. It is assumed under this phenomenon that the person is involved into a regional social medium without losing his/her personal identity (Goncharik 2011b).

The mechanism of formation of a kind of a “regional self” is the same for each person in a specific moment of time. An important issue here is that territorial images are present in the society, the former being the bases for a person to associate him/herself with a particular territory. The main point here is the way that the person interprets the territorial entity and its population as something congenial to him, and feels immersiveness to its history. Otherwise, the person may also consider the territory or its population hostile to him or to the people whom the person identifies himself with. The spatial scale and its interpretation by the person are also important. It can be a relatively small area or a large space limited legally, or a kind of unlimited “cosmopolitan” entity. So, in fact, the regional identity is a peculiar form of self-expression in which an individual or a group of individuals assess their spatial location relative to other individuals or groups of individuals, as well as to the world in a whole (Goncharik 2011b).

The study of regional identity belongs to a range of different disciplines, and consists of humanities, social sciences and philosophy. Disciplines that traditionally pay considerable attention to the regional identity are: political sciences,
economics, sociology, geography, ethnology and ethnography, psychology, history, regional studies and other independent and secondary sub-disciplines of sciences. All of them, in this or that way, use the scholarly apparatus of the identity theory in their own scientific discourse, and also make use of appropriate terminology typical of any regional studies (Smirniagin 2011b).

The study of regional identity as well as the formation of concepts and theories may have a significant impact on the state’s policy line. Implementation of the theory in practice can improve the state policy efficiency in a particular sphere of life. For example, the regional identity can play a crucial role in rallying the people around a political leader or any reforms, and in stimulating the public will and social processes. Numerous studies of regional identity are also conducted towards studying its impact on society, the causes of group formation, and further enunciation of the corresponding concepts and action plans. Thus, I can ascertain that a specific character is typical to the regional identity studies, and that this kind of study is of great importance (Smirniagin 2011a).

Several levels of regional identity study can be distinguished. Each of them is characterized by its own type of scientific language and methodology: 1) The studies relating to the impact of physical area on the collective consciousness of the people of the region, their outlook and attitude to the territory; 2) the study of the history of land invasion and development in the region, its cultural and social level, as well as the value and emotional attitudes concerning the region. Besides, it is the study of collective history and cultural characteristics of the population. On the basis of these data, the scientific pattern is formed revealing the distinctive features of the study area; 3) The axiological studies should be distinguished considering the dynamics of the impact of culture on the development of the regional identity and political attitudes towards the territory; 4) The study of the symbolic area emerged in the region, i.e. representation of symbols which attach the inhabitants to the region; 5) The forecast of the region’s future (Goncharik 2011b).

One of the key concepts of the regional identity study is the notion of area. It is the differentiation of area that serves as a basis of the regional identity formation, promoting the formation of the distinguishing features of a particular territory, as well as different ideas about it. In this case, the regional identity of population (as any other) is acquired as a result of proper identification, which is important for understanding the features of their “own” area and “territorial” community that serves as a basis of the sense of belonging to a particular place and awareness of themselves as a part of a group living in the region. In addition, the significant role is played by the symbolic significance of the territory itself, its image on the local and global levels (Gritsenko 2011).

As for the regional community living in a given territory, it is firstly consolidated by some unified views, which also play a significant role in the regional identity formation. Such views are formed in the process of changing the social
environment and the surrounding world, as well as accumulation of experience. Altogether it leads, in this or that way, to the formation of solidarity in interests and consciousness, as well as the feeling of unity with the “territorial” group and fellow-feeling with its members (Goncharik 2011b).

The notion of the region is also important for the study of regional identity. The region to a wide extent can be defined as any territorial entity having a set of unique characteristics and similar geographical and cultural settings, which greatly affect the structure of the relationship between groups of people living in this area. Herewith, the border regions can be characterized by both preciseness and diffuseness with regard to any changes (political, ethnic, economic, and other), which can result in a conflict of identities and difficulties in the regional identification. In addition, the region can be characterized by having or not having such features (by which the arbitrary area can be classified in the regions) as: the unity of the historical fate of the territories that make up the region, unique cultural characteristics, ethnic community of the population, the territory of the community, similar economic and political ties. An alteration of any of these parameters can lead to major changes in the regional identification. In addition, these changes can be used in a social engineering by elite groups willing to make such changes in the objective reality in order to create a favourable situation for themselves (Goncharik 2011b).

Thus, the defining point of regional identity is the condition and quality of territorial interactions and the ties created on the basis of cohabitation of members of various social groups, each of them having a different type of identification. The development of different kinds of territorial interactions largely depends on the regional interests that may be present in any of the four areas of human activity (economic, political, social, and cultural). In this case, the regional interests are determined not only by the control of local and global structures, but also by the interests of the population. For example, in a case of harmonious interests of the population and public authorities, a positive type of identity can be formed contributing to the development of the region, as well as interaction with other regions and the state as a whole. Otherwise, the opposite type of identity is formed. It is characterized by introversion of the region’s population on “their” territory, the abandonment of any interaction that may ultimately serve as a starting point for the formation of a fully independent type of identity that can “grow” in the local level, which will eventually lead to the rejection of the region (Goncharik 2011b).

An important factor in the regional identity formation is that it can be generated not just by the territorial community itself, but also by external factors, as well as other types of identity. In addition, along with the dominant type of identity, there can also be an auxiliary type of identity in the region. All of these options are interrelated and mutually influence each other. As for the formation of identity, this phenomenon can be defined rather differently. On the one hand,
the subject forms his/her own identity independently, while on the other hand, the identity formation is the process of constructing a certain identification system at instigation of social groups, professional associations, political elites, etc. This article is devoted to the study of regional identity formation in the federal subjects of Russia. Here, the concept of regional identity formation shall be deemed in its second meaning (Morozova 2011).

In the Russian sciences, substantial attention is paid to the study of regional identity formation in the federal subjects of Russia. In this regard, a review on the Perm province case performed by Fadeyeva is a quite stunning example (Fadeyeva 2012). At the present stage, when a new type of Perm identity is under formation, the administrative authorities of the Perm province take active actions in searching for new cultural symbols and identity markers. In the meantime, two antagonistic communities have arisen in the region – “locals” and “outsiders” (i.e. local specialists and metropolitan experts). In the course of conducting an image-building politics of the region, the government authorities resort to the services of the latter, which tend to build a new Perm identity based on the contemporary postmodern culture. Nevertheless, there is also a traditional industrial image presented in the region, which is manifested by the “locals”. To reach the stated objectives of a new identity type formation, the “outsiders” establish the relevant cultural institutions, organize mass cultural events, and implement certain image-building symbols, which the Perm province should be associated with in the future. It is also planned to transform Perm into the Russian and European Capital of Culture (Fadeyeva 2012).

Altogether, it leads to the conflict between the “locals” and the “outsiders”. The former assume that the indigenous cultural tradition of the region are neglected or violated, while under the guise of original solutions, secondary cultural patterns and image plagiarism are implemented representing a sort of pabulum and eyesore, which lacks popular support. In the meanwhile, the focus on the traditional labour values during identity formation process is not absolutely correct, as the industrial rhetoric combines both positive and negative issues in the light of plight and hard working conditions of the working men, social inequality, absence of social protection, etc. Furthermore, the Soviet Union legacy in the labour discourse has a negative impact on the image. Owing to the presence of antagonistic forces, in fact, there is no consistent system of identity markers for the Perm province population due to inefficient identity building without regard to the region peculiarities (Fadeyeva 2012).

Kuveneva and Manakov (2003) also claim that one of the decisive factors in the regional and national identity formation is played by characteristics and historical maturity of region’s borders and the degree of border barrier and permeability functions. This includes state and administrative borders, as well as ethnic borders. Therefore, a balance between intraregional and extraregional peculiarities is an important condition of pursuing the identity politics. In this
regard, the scientists provide an example of the Pskov region, which has some cultural and historical grounds for a strong local identity. Furthermore, the region borders three countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Belarus) and has some common features with them (Kuveneva and Manakov 2003).

Avdonin provides a review of regional identity formation in the context of political and cultural aspects in the Ryazan region (Avdonin 2011). The scholar defines the region under research as a federal subject in depressive social and economic situation, with agricultural specialization of economy and, as a result, featuring high importance of agrarian elite. At the beginning of the 21st century, the formation of regional identity in this region is under the influence of clerical and conservative elements and unstable political context. Presence of two approaches to identity formation largely correlates to the “urbanization/ruralization” disruption. Besides, the political situation in the region has contributed to depoliticize the above mentioned approaches and to integrate them into the cultural and religious discourse. This, in turn, has caused the “religious/secular” disruption, which has brought the regional identity issue again to the sphere of policy and led to the further politicization of this discourse. Eventually, two kinds of political and cultural dominance have been formed – a clerical and conservative dominance, and a scientific and progressive one, which, altogether, have become new guidelines within the field of regional identity. At the same time, the first dominance has a more privileged status in the social field, which is peculiar to the agrarian oriented territories (Avdonin 2011).

Goncharik studies a variant of regional identity formation in the Chuvash Republic. As the author stresses, this process takes place amid a polycentric cultural policy model being conducted in the region (Goncharik 2011a). The main problem here is stated in the search for the ethno-confessional basis of the region’s policy. The basis of regional identity formation is built up of “giving attention to the interests and encouraging the initiatives of various local communities”, as well as of developing interactions between the subjects based on the equal opportunities in using resources for transforming, conserving and reproducing the heritage. As for the political practices, it is deemed important to preserve and enrich ethnic and confessional heritage, to present the Republic as the Volga region, to create an image of a fast developing federal subject on the basis of regional development prospects and cultural landscape transformation (Goncharik 2011a: 25).

Zakirova deals with regional identity formation in the Republic of Tatarstan in the terms of cultural policy and cultural environment in the republic as a whole (Zakirova 2011). The government authorities of this federal subject of Russia put a premium on the formation of the dominating type of identity, the basic features of which include affiliation to the Tatar ethnicity, its language, traditions, and faith. Such tendencies are typical of the policy of any level and contents performed by the government of this republic, and the cultural policy in
particular. However, such tendencies may become destructive for this region. Representatives of the Russian ethnicity and Orthodoxy have lived together in peace with Muslim Tatars for ages and have interacted with the latter in various ways. Therefore, the “tatarization” policy may be harmful for their relationships. At the same time, basing on the ethnic factor of regional identity formation, the government authorities do not provide a clear image of “them”, or an out-group, which, in turn, may lead to the diffusion of the identity matrix and, further, to the upset of ethnic and confessional balance in the region. All this may bolster segregation (Zakirova 2011).

An interesting research has been made by Kislitsina (2011) towards cultural policy and brand-building in the Kirov region and its influence on the structure of regional identity. In the policy of the region, traditional and innovative approaches are combined. It is expressed in various image-building, symbolic, cultural, tourist, investment, and other activities and projects implemented in the region. Because of diffused identification markers, a question has arisen as to building a well-defined structure of regional identity in this federal subject of Russia. The government of the region and its population have obtained a number of good results in this issue. However, in spite of these results, the region is not associated with something exact, and the greater part of the population is still indifferent to the programs of identity formation. This is a large part of the reason for identity matrix incompleteness and necessity of further implementation of projects in a somewhat different format (Kislitsina 2011).

Kol’ba goes through the process of regional identity formation in a rather peculiar region with mosaic structure – the Krasnodar province (Kol’ba 2011). In the author’s opinion, the regional identity is expressed here in both consolidating and conflict aspects. The reason of its conflict aspect lies in an elaborated structure of this federal subject. A considerable number of independent ethnicities live in this region, and the influence of their diasporas is very high. The cultural policy of the region is mainly based upon its traditions. At the same time, there are also a number of innovative projects, which are aimed at bringing new traits to the regional identity structure. For example, to such projects belongs an attempt to manifest the region as a cultural and sports centre. It facilitates the development of various trends in art and sports, and encourages attracting investments and carrying events. However, the politics of regional identity is mostly based on the pre-revolutionary traditions, and within this framework the emphasis is given to the past of the region. The brand-building activities in the rural areas are hinged on the traditions of Cossacks, who claim recognition of the Cossack community as a separate ethnicity, which is deemed not to be identical to any of ethnicities living in the region. Such tendencies have given birth to a considerable number of opponents who aim at preserving the existing cultural self-determination of the region. The cultural policy being conducted exclusively to benefit of the Russian speaking population and Russian ethnicity confronts re-
sentiment from the representatives of other diasporas and immigrants. The region’s neighbourhood with the Caucasus is poorly manifested within the politics of identity. All that is also supported by the ever-growing xenophobia, migrant-phobia and intolerance leading to ethnic and confessional conflicts, as well as social clashes (Kol’ba 2011).

In his research, Kulesh implies inefficiency of the politics of identity conducted in the Tomsk region and point out the multiplicity of identities in this region (Kulesh 2011). There is no single direction in the region’s cultural policy. The cultural life in the regional centre and regional districts are not interrelated. In the meanwhile, the actors of the cultural policy tend to combine traditions and innovations in their activities. The majority of the projects implemented in the region are outside directed. The latter fact causes the prevalence of the economy-oriented events in the region. The differentiation in the cultural life of the regional centre and regional districts also results in various problems in construction of a single identity matrix (Kulesh 2011).

Moskvin marks a multi-vectoral nature of cultural policy the in Sverdlovsk region, too (Moskvin 2011). This region is characterized by a number of policy lines existing within one frame. Both, the multi-vector nature of cultural policy and multiplicity of conducted policies, cause a mosaic and synthetic interpretation of the cultural policy in the region. It impacts a considerable influence on blurring the regional identity structure due to the absence of a unified concept and a single direction. Traditional and innovative trends can be observed in the cultural and image-building policy of this region. The traditional trend is revealed in the existing interpretation of the Urals as an axial region (from a geographic and economic point of view). From a geographic point of view, this statement is based on an elaborated myth that the Sverdlovsk region is a frontier between Europe and Asia. This belief has a great effect on the mental and sociocultural environment of the region. As a matter of fact, the idea of the region’s transcontinental location has a great influence on the identity matrix. As for economy, from the earliest time, the Urals have been considered as “mining civilization” having its own cultural and historic peculiarities and supplying the state with the required resources. Another variant of regional identity formation in this region follows from the latter statement; it consists in building up the regional identity on the basis of raw material and industrial orientation of the region. However, the peculiarities of the industrial discourse having some soviet industrial, Russian re-industrial and post-industrial traits cause a series of inaccuracies in the sphere of cultural relations, in particular. Such a situation furthers problems in the field of regional identity formation. Therefore, the region should encourage creative self-realization of its citizens, should be full of various cultural events and attract financial investments not only in the region’s economy, but also in the spheres of science, culture and information technologies. Nevertheless, this kind of politics is not properly completed, and it also puts obstacles in the way of building an
appropriate variant of regional identity in the Sverdlovsk region (Moskvin 2011). It is also important to mention a research of the Tyumen region identity performed by Mashnina (2011). She notes that currently a transition to a new basis of regional identity structure formation takes place, the latter explaining the digression from oil and gas constituencies of the region’s image and the introduction of new symbols and innovations. Among new bases of regional identity Mashnina singles out the interpretation of the Tyumen region as a sports, tourist and recreation region rich in cultural, historical and natural sights. An emphasis is also given to the rapidly developing business sphere, which is deemed ideal for making career and implementing national projects, and to the innovative appearance expressed in emergence of new buildings and other cultural objects. All this explains all those positive results achieved in the process of forming a new type of regional identity in this federal subject (Mashnina 2011).

A research of regional identity in the Altai province carried out by Chernyshov (2011) is also worth noting. The scholar claims a relationship existing between the regional identity and the region’s image. In the author’s point of view, it is that image efficient, which is duly harmonized with the regional identity at all levels, from the elite to the masses. The region’s elite and its self-image are often manifested as a sort of a “pretty sight” with all negative traits removed and having little relation to the actual situation in the region. Nonetheless, such kind of identity building is not actually efficient, because of both positive and negative traits and events existing in the cultural code and historical memory and impacting its influence on the structure of regional identity and image of the region. In this connection, it is definitely necessary to take into account the situation in the region, its cultural peculiar traits and traditions, and the population opinion. Herewith, the scientist notes that all grounds for forming relevant regional identity are present in the Altai province; although, the peculiarities of the formation process itself do not allow us to consider it completed (Chernyshov 2011).

Speaking about the influence of political elites on the structure of the regional identity, it is worth mentioning the research made by Gel’man (2003). The scientist gives consideration to the development of the political elite in the Novgorod region since 1991, when M. Prusak became the governor of the region and initiated co-optation of former elite to a new system of administration. A part of the former elite, which did not join in the new system, lost all its resources and offices. Besides, in 1994, a policy was adopted aimed at increasing economic efficiency and attracting investments. However, such processes took place along with monopolization of the political power by the ruling elite, which established a direct control over the significant subjects of the political process in the region (Gel’man 2003). An intelligent policy line carried out by the government authorities within the symbolic policy and management has contributed to the Novgorod elite achieving success and gaining popular support. This policy has been performed on both internal and external political markets and aimed at building up
the regional identity loyal to the power authorities and typical of the popular majority of the region. As for the external political market, the region’s image appears as a combination of three main constituencies: success in development, integration and rehabilitation of the historical tradition. It has facilitated attraction of investment assets in the region. As for the internal political market, the success here has been gained owing to highlighting of the crucial problems existing in the region and their solution in the frame of the above mentioned constituencies. Moreover, the elites have also encouraged a symbolic citizen engagement in the region’s policy by developing local and territorial public authorities, and have established stable relationships with business entities. Alongside with that, in the Novgorod region considerable attention has been paid to the sphere of culture having a beneficial effect on the symbolic policy. As a result, the scientist acknowledges that the elites have created an identity type as desired for them; therefore, in the short term, such kind of a political program is rather efficient (Gelman 2003).

As far as I see it, the studies of the regional identity are rather popular in Russia, as it has been claimed above. To summarize the conclusions on the issue under consideration, it should be noted that the bases of the regional identity formation have a number of similar traits peculiar to the neighbouring federal subjects. At the same time, the main basis of the regional identity formation in a particular region has its own distinctive features due to the presence of various trends in different federal subjects of Russia transforming the environment and having both endogenous nature and influencing the region from outside.

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PART V

CONSCIOUSNESS AND IDENTITY OF THE POPULATION IN MULTICULTURAL REGIONS AND BORDERLAND TERRITORIES
17.1. The concept of regional identity in Russia and Ukraine

The consciousness of population, regional identity, and cultural differentiation of society have traditionally been contentious issues in Russia. It is difficult to speak about prevailing trends in Russian scientific researches of the matter, because approaches to the studies vary depending on research interests and scientific schools established in Russian science (Krylov 2005, 2009, 2010, 2012) (Smirniagin 2011; Kocheliaeva 2012; Nazukina 2012; Gritsenko 2011; Gritsenko and Krylov 2012; Pavlyuk 2006). The authors believe that the main theoretical problem of regional identity is the question of priority in research and in real processes of the “natural” self-organization of people or identity construction. The authors believe that position where identity is interpreted only as the result of people’s identity “construction” (also politics of memory, etc.) (Gel’man 2003; Musikhin 2012) is quite wrong. “Constructivist” approach implies the possibility of total subordination of people of political engineering that occurs due to a lack of people allegedly sustained ideological, moral, cultural, and other preferences. These preferences, according to the logic of the “constructivists”, have to be found by people from outside and create identity and historical memory as a supposedly areas of policy, but not personal or collective choice of the people themselves, or tradition.

The authors try to analyse the sociocultural processes from the perspective of spatial effects and cultural heterogeneity of the territory with special attention to the evolution and modern forms of identity, including in connection with the profound political changes after 1991.

It is very important to know the retrospective ideas about the regional identity in Russia that represents a traditional matter of discussion, just from the
middle of the 19th century. The doubts about Russian regional identity are based on the superposition of a group of unfavourable circumstances, such as characteristic for Russian history strict measures of region culture eliminating and local self-government profanation, immediately from the period of ancient and medieval Russia; the well-known tendency of the “permanent colonization” of the Russian territories. Besides, there is a concept (from the middle of the 19th century, by M. P. Pogodin and S. M. Soloviev) that tries to explain the weakness of the Russian regional identity by the homogeneity of the landscapes of the Russian plain (Eisenstadt 1978).

According to such mainstream concepts, in 1933, Spengler wrote: “A true Russian is still a nomad in his sense of life like a Northern Chinese, a Manchu, or a Turkmen. His homeland is not his village but the endless plain, his Mother Russia. The soul of this boundless landscape spurs him to aimless wandering. “Will’ has he none” (Spengler 2006: 64) (this means, according to Spengler, the degradation of the Russian society due to hypertrophy of the spatial mobility and weakness of the territorial rootedness).

As an exception to that, it is necessary to point out a rather old point of view of the Russian and Ukrainian historian and ethnographer Kostomarov (1863) (Kostomarov, 1995: 436–437), who argued that territorial differences in the life and culture of the Russians (not only peasants, but noblemen and townsmen as well) are quite considerable. This concept has not received further systematic development and conceptual formalization until nowadays. Kostomarov’s idea is verified by some past and some following events in the Russian history that proved the existence of self-organization in the Russian regional (local) societies, i.e., the “Time of Troubles” 1601–1613), the “Cholera Riots” (1830), the “Antonovshchina” (anti-Soviet revolt in the Tambov region headed by A. S. Antonov, 1920–1922), self-defence and many other events that happened during the Civil War (1918–1922) and the Second World War (partisans, rebel groups, and even self-governing republics, like “Lokot’ Free Town” in the Briansk region).

After 1988–1991, we can witness the overall increasing processes of the mass regional self-identification in Russia. This means a pride in the native land, a sense of ownership of the native land and its problems, interest in the history of the native land and homeland and, as a result of all this, this means the growth of the various manifestations of the local initiatives that are based on the love of the native land and the desire to live there. The initiatives are based on the will of the people to live in their homeland. Among such local initiatives, based on the identity, are attempts to create and develop the local “green” and heritage protection movements, attempts to create and develop the local free press and new museums and universities, and many others.

The above-mentioned processes are considerably more independent from the fiscal (official) patriotism, than it was before, during the last part of the “Soviet” period, and more widespread and deep, including much more people, than
the narrow section of local lore activists (краеведы). The modern Russian regional identity includes both local historical memory, and features of the present regional social and cultural development.

In contrast to Russia, Ukraine is characterized by an increased ethnic and cultural spatial diversity (“geographical fragmentation”). The network of historical (former political) boundaries, preserving ethnic and cultural differences in Ukraine, represents the important reason for such diversity.

The level of spatial cultural diversity of Russia and Ukraine is often used to assess these countries in the context of the standard of politics. The spatial and cultural uniformity of Russia is often regarded as one of the important causes of the weakness of the Russian democracy, in contrast to Ukraine. At the same time, the evidence of existence of a developed regional identity in Russia, despite the outward signs of cultural homogeneity, can be a serious argument in favour of the possibilities of democratic development in Russia. On the other hand, a high level of spatial cultural diversity in Ukraine determines, maybe, the existence of the risk of disintegration of Ukraine. That is why it is important to analyse the all-Ukrainian identity as one of the elements of the connection and interrelation of the Ukrainian regional identities.

The main specific problem of Russian-Ukraine borderland identity in our investigation is the following: whether the modern division of Russia and Ukraine into two independent states is natural or artificial? One version (and the kind of identity as well) sees Russia and Ukraine as a historically formed, but destroyed now, entity. Another version (and identity), on the contrary, sees Russia and Ukraine as culturally and ethnically divided lands, temporarily united by the Russian Empire and the USSR. Such identity may be both anti-Russian and Russia oriented (Russia is a separate, but friendly state). The positive or negative interpretation of the Russian-Ukrainian state boundary by people living in the wide borderland of Russia and Ukraine is used as one of the main indicators of such identity.

There are two historical and cultural areas that are situated on the territory of Left-Bank Ukraine. “Slobodskiaia Ukraine” existed in the Moscow and Russian state as its autonomic part (17th century – up to 1765–1779), while “Hetmanate” (“Getmanshchina”) was allocated from the Polish part of the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth (after the Khmelnitsky uprising 1648–1654) and remained afterwards as the Ukrainian state under protectorate of Russia (nominally until 1783, actually until 1722–1765). “Hetmanate” was the Cossack Ukrainian formation, while “Slobodskiaia Ukraine” was more complex, consisting both of Ukrainian and Russian and also Cossack formation.

Nowadays, the territory of Slobodskiaia Ukraine is divided by the state border of Russia and Ukraine, while the most part of the Hetmanate remains in Ukraine. It is also important that the Russian-Ukrainian borderland represents
itself as part of the historical and cultural heartland of both Russia and Ukraine at the same time.

17.2. Basic assumptions and research organization

The scientific objective of the authors was to collect in the field and to carry out the subsequent empirical generalization of the collected materials in order to identify the main characteristics and patterns of regional identity in the considered territories.

The theoretical scheme for the study of regional identity was a set of values associated with the relation of individuals to their small homeland, historical memory, assessing the effects of neighbours (pressure, cultural contrasts, etc.) on their territory.

We consider that through detecting different features of the regional identity of the population (“locals”), the researcher can reproduce cultural specificity of places and areas and thus he can understand the structure of geographical and cultural space as a whole and its structure on different hierarchical levels – from the local to the macro-regional and subregional – as well. We base on the position that cultural (mental) region is not an external initial datum, but it represents the desired object (the unknown quantity), which should operate in the analysis and decision making in the field of cultural and national policy.

We also believe that the processes associated with the construction of identity (identity politics and the politics of memory) are sufficiently autonomous in relation to the historical (initial) identity. However, the researchers need to consider, that meanings and values, promoted by political strategists and image-makers meanings, specify certain external conditions for the historical (initial) identity. Thus, the same type of identity politics usually can transform in different regional cultural contexts that determined by regional identity.

The attitude of the population (“locals” and “un-locals”) to the “small homeland” is quite measurable. As specific indicators the authors suggest interrelated and interdependent values of “spatial rootedness” (that contrast with the spatial mobility), “local patriotism” (more or less “force”) and “mental expansion” (comparative value of the square of mental regions). Local traditions, stereotypes, foundations maintained and protected by generations of complementary forms of identity – “I am – local by birth” and “I am local by conviction”.

Ethnic-cultural and confessional markers are becoming important to the identity of borderlands and areas of ethnic contact zone where the spatial localization of the “other” is difficult because there is a mixed type of ethnic groups and the long-time duration of historical ties between people from the different groups.

Above-mentioned assumptions constitute the basic framework for our study of regional identity. The initial area of the regional identity study, where
the method and technique were originally approbated, was the homogeneous (according to ethnic criteria) territory of Central Russia (Historical Core, or the Historic Heartland of Russia), excluding national-territorial entities (“republics” – Tatarstan, Mordovia, Chuvashia, and others) (Krylov 2005; 2009; 2010). Later that technique was modified accordingly to the conditions in Russian-Ukraine borderland and Left-Bank Ukraine (Gritsenko 2011; Krylov and Gritsenko 2012).

The author’s approach proposes describing the phenomenon of regional identity by a system of proper indexes (Krylov 2005; 2010). The system is tested in the respective polls and interviews (mass inquiries, using “face to face” technique; special written forms for experts). The mass inquiries were organized by the special institutes, using common unified technique: Vologda Scientific Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences (in Vologda), Public Opinion Institute “Qualitas” (in Voronezh), Research Company “Socis” (in Yaroslavl’), “TverCIOM” (in Tver’). The research concept, program, and toolkit were developed by the author. The research involved a quota sample of 3050 respondents; in Tver, a probabilistic quota sample of families (510) was used. Moreover, the author personally conducted questionnaire surveys of 800 experts in 23 cities (Krylov 2005; 2009; 2010).

Since 2008 until now the authors have worked in the field of borderland identity basing their works on the concept of regional identity (according to the framework of author’s publications), including the methods and techniques of previous regional identity researches in Central Russia.

During the expedition to Russian-Ukrainian borderland within Russia (2008 – 2010, the Belgorod, Briansk, Kursk and Voronezh regions) 400 questionnaires were obtained and 75 in-depth interviews were conducted. During the last expedition into Left-Bank Ukraine (2012, the Chernigov, Kharkov, Poltava and Sumy regions) more than 600 questionnaires were obtained.

17.3. Search for patterns of regional identity on the materials of the historical core of European Russia

17.3.1. Ethnic features of town people identity

Among the main problems of regional identity in the historic core of the European Russia are the following: 1) the expansion of patriotism or an inferiority complex, and 2) the presence of ethnic characteristics and the nature of their combination with the characteristics of modern culture. Here, we are to note that the often expressed view that the Russian ethnic processes are very weak and are not represented in the identity of the population, in contrast, in particular, from Ukraine, due to the spread of Russian “imperial identity” (Pirozhkov 2001).

The research in the historic centre of the European part of Russia shows a significant presence of “folk”, ethnic features of town people in the historic core
of European Russia that proves the existence of identity in traditional and even ethnic forms (Krylov 2009; 2010).

Within the framework of regional identity studies, the main interest was the town residents' self-evaluation of what they consider their most significant (dominating) traits of character and lifestyle, which is often ironical or even negative. People see such traits in their countrymen as selfishness, meanness, diligence, and quick-wittedness (the towns of Novokhopersk and Borisoglebsk, Voronezh region); collectivism, aggressiveness, impudence, insolence, and sullenness (Tambov city); tendency to heavy drinking (the town of Michurinsk, Tambov region); curiosity, enviousness, patience, and heavy drinking (the town of Bogoroditsk, Tula region); insularity, enviousness, rancorousness (the town of Nizhnii Lomov, Penza region); compassion (the town of Serdobsk, Penza region); softness and kindness (the town of Morshansk, Tambov region and the town of Balashov, Saratov region); benevolence and enviousness (the town of Plavsk, Tula region); enterprise, stinginess, openness, laziness, and kindness (Novomoskovsk city and Tula city in the Tula region); pragmatism (kurkul's, i.e., money-grubbers), benevolence, inclination to gossiping (the town of Arzamas, Nizhniy Novgorod region and the town of Murom, Vladimir region); kindness and inertia (Kostroma city); fussiness, anxiousness, and diligence (the town of Galich, Kostroma region).

The greatest diversity of individuals' regional self-identification was observed in the experts' questionnaires, for example (about the Tambov region):

- “I live in the Tambov region, but I am not a Tambovian (my minor homeland is in a different place)”;
- “I am a Tambovian (and what else?!), but everything a Tambovian irritates me – the dialect, ecological situation, behaviour stereotypes, etc.; there is no doubt that the population of the Tambov region differs from those of the neighbouring territories to the worse” (negative regional identity);
- “I am a Tambovian, but I would prefer not to live in the Tambov region, because I don’t like it enough and would like to grow fond of some “other region” (exploring self-identification with weakened rootedness);
- “I am a Tambovian; on the one hand, I would like to live in a different and more prestigious place; which exactly? I don’t know; on the other hand, although I don’t like the Tambov region much, I’m used to it, and maybe I will stay here (weakened regional identity)”;
- “I am a Tambovian and like the Tambov region very much, but I would like not to live there permanently” (local patriotism combined with spatial mobility);
- “I am a Tambovian and like the Tambov region very much, and I am going to live only here” (local patriotism combined with rootedness).

These examples combine the declining affection for one’s native land with an increase in potential spatial mobility; however, in reality love for one’s native land and spatial mobility are not in strict correlation.
Approximately 3.0% of the respondents identify themselves as “citizens of the Earth” and “citizens of Russia”. Let us give some examples of mentions within the framework of that specific pattern of regional identity (“cosmopolitan identity”): “I consider Russia as my minor homeland and the Earth as my Motherland”; “I had the opportunity to travel across Russian towns, and I can say that they have a similar number of common and different points. I don’t have any really warm feelings towards my native town (region). In my view, generally speaking, people don’t differ much from one another in all places”; “I don’t like my town, but I like Russia. I don’t like Tambov for the grave ecological situation, the behavioural stereotype of the local people, and for the technocracy. I’d like to live in a remote village, in the woods, far from technocracy, and factories, which is better than in Tambov” (Tambov city) or “My small homeland is Russia” (Novomoskovsk city).

17.3.2. Russian patriotism and spatial mobility

In all regions we have registered an approximately similar share of those willing to emigrate from Russia (it shows a weak dependency between emigration and local conditions). Those who would like to leave their place but do not have this opportunity, make 9.8% in the Yaroslavl’ region, 11.0% in the Voronezh region, 11.7% in the Vologda region, and 13.6% in the Kostroma region. Those who are searching for this opportunity account for 0.7% in the Voronezh region, 1.7% in the Vologda region, 3.2% in the Yaroslavl’ region, and 5.0% in the Kostroma region. Nevertheless, local background factors bring adjustments to the level of potential emigration. In Cherepovets, the share of those willing to emigrate and making attempts to do so amounts to 14.9% and 2.3%, respectively; in Vologda – 10.8% and 0.9%; in Velikiy Ustyug – 6.8% and 0.0%; in Yaroslavl’ – 9.0% and 5.1%; in Rybinsk – 9.8% and 1.9%; in Tutaev – 14.1% and 2.0%; and in Voronezh – 12.0% and 0.7%. We can see that “cosmopolitan” Cherepovets and partially marginalized Tutaev stand out from the group.

17.3.3. Cultural trinity of regional identity

The authors have substantiated the existence of the cultural trinity of regional identity, i.e., three autonomous aspects of regional identity that characterize society’s attitude towards tradition in three different ways (Krylov 2009; 2010). We have singled out transtraditional, traditionalist, and nontraditional types of regional identity (Table 17.1.). The term transtraditional means going beyond the traditionalism framework, yet not breaking with tradition, but developing it. Nontraditional means going beyond the tradition. Transtraditional regional identity includes characteristics such as love for the native land, town, region, Russian patriotism, and attitude toward sayings (as
described in the works of Z. V. Sikevich) “Die but don’t leave your homeland” and “One can live anywhere as long as one’s stomach is full” (we do not consider sayings-indicators mutually alternative). The level of consent with the first saying (“natural patriotism”) correlates with lower level of education, the level of disagreement with the second one (“enlightened patriotism”) grows with the level of education.

**Traditionalist regional identity** includes the sub-ethnicity (measured by answers to the question “Do you agree with the statement: ‘One should do everything possible to preserve the local differences in dialects, behaviour, nutrition, etc.’?” and by taking into account the results of polls conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (Moscow) and off-economic thinking, which correlate with each other (off-economic thinking as the Russian antithesis to the protestant ethics, i.e., the attitude to the saying “Poverty is no disgrace”, used by Sikevich). The intensity of regional identity as shown by these indicators decreases with an increase in the level of education.

**Nontraditional regional identity** has a “futuristic” character. It grows in accordance with the level of education and self-assessment of respondents’ incomes, as well as town size, and is revealed externally in the feeling of superiority over poorer and less educated neighbours in other regions that seem not to be progressive. Within the framework of nontraditional regional identity, one can get evidence of the hypothesis proposed by a number of authors on the formation of a new identity in modern Russia. This identity characterizes residents of the biggest cities and representatives of the most educated and wealthy strata. The futurism of nontraditional regional identity reveals itself in the absence of correlation with other aspects of regional identity (transtraditional and traditionalist). This type of identity fits well into the idea of “network society” (by M. Castells), which ignores the traditions of the past and where historical and geographical factors do not play their former role and the new cosmopolitan citizens are distanced from their own culture and inclined towards “new nomadism” (changing places of residence).

It is interesting that according to the calculations conducted on the basis of our data, on the settlements of the Vologda region, by V. Popov (Cherepovets, Institute LINK) the aspects of regional identity demonstrate a significant positive correlation with a number of social and economic indicators. For example, the transtraditional aspect of regional identity is connected with the indicators that characterize the “central places” (by W. Christaller), namely, the number of medical doctors, per capita turnover and paid services, the number of population of a town in 1897, and the extent to which elections were considered democratic in the 10 year period (1996–2006). The nontraditional aspect of regional identity has a significant positive correlation with the indicators of industrial development, labour compensation, the secular dynamics of the number of settlement’s population, telephone penetration and a negative correlation with the extent to
which the elections are democratic. The traditionalist aspect of regional identity correlates with the indicators of adherence to the law and high demographic load, i.e., a significant share of pensioners in comparison to the working population (Krylov 2010: 132–133).

Table 17.1. The main indicators of regional identity by settlements in historical core of European Russia, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Trantraditional identity</th>
<th>Traditional identity</th>
<th>Nontraditional identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kirillov</td>
<td>Integral index: 53.4</td>
<td>Love for the native city: 91.2</td>
<td>Traditionalism as an average between sub-ethnicity and non-economic thinking: +66.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vozhega</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>+33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gryazovets</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>+52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velikiy</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>+44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ustyug</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>+44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babaevo</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>+5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnogskiy</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>+42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorodok</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>+5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheksna</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>+14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vologda</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>+55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherepovets</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>+42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tver</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>+4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>+58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiluki</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>+27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaroslavl'</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>+90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rybinsk</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>+90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutayev</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>+33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostroma</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>+29.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

It seems to be very important, that the forms of identity depend on the level of education (Table 17.2.). Therefore, some contradictions are possible, especially between pure ethnic (“ethnocratic”) forms of identity, and other forms, that can interpret cultural traditions wider. It is also important, that the forms of identity, that express the “National Renaissance”, can be quite different. That is, maybe, the most probable precondition for development of the main difference be-
tween the models (the history, the policy of identity) of Empire nation-building and Empire nation development (for example, Russian), on the one hand, and ethnocratic nation-building, on the other hand (for example, in Ukraine; while the interpretation of the real history of the Ukrainian nation is partly under discussion) (see also: Pirozhkov 2001). The concept of the cultural trinity of regional identity shows that the ethnocratic form of “nation building” is not progressive.

The assimilation of “nonlocals” who have become “locals by conviction”, as well as of those who live beyond the boundaries of their minor homeland, goes on within the framework of transtraditional regional identity and partially within the framework of traditionalist regional identity. Thus, the local cultural tradition contributes to regional assimilation.

Table 17.2. The education level influence on the development of the regional identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions (areas)</th>
<th>Nontraditional identity</th>
<th>Transtraditional identity</th>
<th>Traditionalist identity: sub-ethnicity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Love for the native city, region</td>
<td>Russian patriotism</td>
<td>Rootedness as a sum of natural and enlightened patriotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vologda</td>
<td>+11</td>
<td>+11</td>
<td>+19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaroslavl</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>+22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostroma</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

17.3.4. The role of the economic factors for regional identity

The role of economic factors in regional identity may seem paradoxical; i.e., the self-perception of the individual’s material well-being strengthens his/her identity by a number of parameters. At the same time, the identity of local communities as a whole, determined by long-term local specific features, is indifferent to the level of the region’s social-economic development at the current moment. In general, mass polls do not collaborate the idea that regional identity is determined by the socioeconomic well-being of a territory (Krylov 2009; 2010).
Individual identity is strengthened within various forms of regional identity, including those differing in attitudes to traditionalism, modernization, etc. We think that the main sense of this dependence confines itself to the formula: “Proletarians do not have a fatherland”. It is most vividly revealed for many regional identity parameters in the Vologda region. In a hypothetical situation, their native settlement is chosen by groups different in terms of their material well-being (“destitute” “poor” “rich or middle-class” based on self-evaluation): 20.6%, 38.4%, and 47.2%; love for their town or region: 59.0%, 71.0%, and 72.0%; Russian patriotism: 18.0%, 30.0%, and 35.0%; and sub-ethnicity: 9.0%, 19.0% and 27.0%. The most apparent is the growth of nontraditional regional identity with the growth of incomes: 2.0%, 10.0%, and 19.0%.

While affiliation with the “destitute” social strata seems to fairly convincingly confirm the above formula of proletarians, the oppositely directed affiliation with the rich stimulates regional identity strengthening only for indicators that do not imply constraints on spatial mobility (the indicators bearing this meaning are enlightened patriotism and natural patriotism). This circumstance points to the “selfish” or “opportunistic” character of the patriotic choice by the well-to-do classes. At the same time, the strengthening of traditionalist regional identity among the rich can be observed with the recently observed taste for “traditional” and “old” as elements of prestige and fashion typical of the well-to-do strata. Hence, there is, in fact, no paradox; i.e., the absence of correlation with economic factors at the regional level and the presence of the tendency to its occurrence at the individual level do not exclude each other. In separate regions, we observe a different ratio of “patriots” to “nonpatriots”; these discrepancies are preserved despite the observed weakening of identity (by a number of parameters) with the growing destitution of the population. Similarly, in terms of welfare, groups living in different regions and towns are characterized by a different level of patriotism and different strength of identity.

17.4. The Russian-Ukrainian gradient

The research program in Russia (2008–2010) (Gritsenko 2011) and in Ukraine (2012) (Gritsenko and Krylov 2012) was based on the methods and results of previous research in Central Russia (Krylov 2005; 2009; 2010). The approved techniques were slightly modified due to the requirement to take into account current national contexts of these countries, as well as historical context in which identity has evolved over the 20th century. This revealed an asymmetry in the regional and ethnic and cultural identity of population relative to the state border of Russia and Ukraine, and made it possible to determine the existence of different forms of identity.
Figure 17.1. Russian-Ukrainian ethnocultural gradient
As a result of the division of historical regions – Slobodskaiia Ukraine and Hetmanate, which are inhabited by the Ukrainians and the Russians at the same time but in different proportions – by Russian-Ukrainian border (first administrative border between the neighbouring republics of the USSR, which was later transformed into the state border between the Russian Federation and Ukraine) the former ethnocultural identity has undergone erosion by going to a hiding place and by realizing through the less politicized regional identity or actually being replaced by it.

According to the results of field research, the authors managed to make the ethnic and cultural map (Figure 17.1.), which summarizes the situation on the Russian side and the Ukrainian side. The ethnic and cultural map is a model proposed by the authors. It reflects the historical and ethnocultural interference, the degree of presence of modern Ukrainian and Russian culture in the consciousness of the population of the Russian-Ukrainian borderland. We proposed to name this model “ethnocultural gradient” (the connection between identity and mapping, according to examples of Ukraine, Poland and Belarus, is shown by Seegel (2012) in the aspects of history and historical cartography).

17.4.1. Ethnocultural gradient in Russia

A certain ratio, which can be described as harmonious, between landscape and mentality of people, by the natural and cultural landscapes, as well as elements of Ukrainian culture in the language and architecture, in the physical and mental landscape was discovered during the research.

The authors considered components of landscapes that participate and are significant for worldview and identity of the local population. In general terms, these components are shown in Table 17.3.

Calculating the frequency of occurrence of Ukrainian cultural elements in the above components of Russia, we found three zones of the gradient. The generalized results are shown in Table 17.4.

We came to the conclusion that the assimilation of local indigenous Ukrainian population was occurred in Russia in the vast borderland area. The process of this assimilation is natural, gradual and not completed to date. It should be noted that elements of Ukrainian culture are organically included into the regional identity of the inhabitants of territories bordering Ukraine. This organic is enhanced by the preservation of traditional elements of Ukrainian culture in the landscape (authors prefer to talk about the “historical-cultural landscape”, in connection with the question).
Table 17.3. The components of the regional identity (RI) and ethnic culture (EC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Components of RI and EC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Language (dialect), which is spoken by the majority of the population, and cultural and historical preferences of the population, reflected in the peculiarities of the local urban and rural architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Awareness of the population specificity of their place of residence (“the spirit of place”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Memory of territorial entities of the past (the historical provinces, etc.), including Ukrainian (Hetmanate) and Russian-Ukrainian (Slobodskaiia Ukraine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Memory of Ukrainian roots and the territories of origin of his family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ethnic Identity (What man himself “believes” to a greater extent?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Self-identification in the polls (What man himself “called”?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the components are down from more stable, long-term to less stable.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.

In Russia, the gradient is characterized by the spatial order of distribution of the elements of Ukrainian culture in the consciousness of the Russian inhabitants, and their presence in the landscape, in the presence of inhabitants of the “Ukrainian roots” and the spatial orientation to Ukraine, expressed through a consideration of the neighbouring Ukrainian regions as areas where the countrymen live (regardless of ethnicity belonging in both Russian and Ukrainian territories). The appearance of the gradient goes back to the existence of Slobodskaiia Ukraine – a kind of a Russian-Ukrainian formation inside Russia. A feeling of closeness and belonging continues to be strong in Russia and Ukraine within the limits of the once united Slobodskaiia Ukraine (and conjugated with her historical territories). Outside the Slobodskaiia Ukraine the effects that are associated with mental closeness of citizens of Russia and Ukraine are considerably weakened (more precisely, to a small extent feelings of closeness remained, but they are less sustainable, as they are no longer a part of the regional identity).

17.4.2. Ethnocultural gradient in Ukraine

Elements of Russian culture in Eastern Ukraine as ethnic culture (the culture of “Great Russians”) are quite clear, that was shown in the recent past in the classic works of Chizhikova (1988). However, the gradient in Ukraine can hardly be considered to be sufficient, because they are more turned to the traditional culture and do not relate to many aspects of modern “ethniciize” regional identity of the Russian-Ukrainian borderland, particularly in the cities. However, in general the problems of the Russians in Ukraine and the Ukrainians in Russia are not symmetric.
Table 17.4. Ethnocultural gradient zones of the Russian-Ukrainian borderland in the territory of Russia (% of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Zone I (%)</th>
<th>Zone II (%)</th>
<th>Zone III (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do you live here?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Yes, I am local</strong></td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Yes, I am convinced that local</strong></td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>I am not local, but have lived here for a long time</strong></td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Would you like to live in another place?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Maybe</strong></td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do you consider yourself a resident of the wilderness?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Not answered</strong></td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is your nationality?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Russian</strong></td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>92.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Ukrainian partially or completely (p/c)</strong></td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do you know the place of birth or burial of your ancestors?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Among Russian in Ukraine</strong></td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Among Ukrainian p/c in Ukraine</strong></td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In which cities have you got fellow countrymen?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ukrainian cities</strong></td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Cities of former Slobodka Ukraine within Russia</strong></td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How would you react to the unification of your Russian region with neighbouring region of Ukraine?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Positively</strong></td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Negatively</strong></td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Indifferently</strong></td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Not answered</strong></td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What do you think of how the Ukrainians speak about you?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Positively</strong></td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Negatively</strong></td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Differently</strong></td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>I don’t know</strong></td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do you regret that the border between Russia and Ukraine was appeared?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Not answered</strong></td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated by the authors.
In Ukraine the gradient is determined primarily by the nature of the relationship with Russia as a whole (in Russia – with respect to neighbouring regions of Ukraine as their own). This ratio depends on many factors, including various opportunistic – often spatially differentiated. Relationship with Russia can be described as “sister relationship”: friendly, but sometimes as unfriendly. The stereotype of this attitude to Russia is largely made up of local circumstances and revealed through indicators that reflect different aspects of distancing or closeness (cultural, ethnocultural, ethnopolitical) to Russia. Therefore, cultural (ethnocultural, ethnic and political) distance between Russia and Ukraine can be considered to be a model of the gradient, indicating its dependence on the spatial factor.

As well as in Russia, the gradient reflects the nature of spatial variation in the ratio of “Ukrainian” and “Russian” identity component of the population. The components considered are:

- understanding of their roots and area of residence of “fellow countrymen”;
- images of neighbouring country;
- reviews of natural or artificial new state border and the feasibility of strengthening the bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine;
- feeling the pressure exerted by the neighbouring regions of Russia and Ukraine;
- personal relationship to Russia (Ukraine), including the joint interpretation of the past;
- relationship to the idea of Slavic unity, and to the division of the Russian Orthodox Church;
- social interaction associated with the use of the Ukrainian language, or one of the variants of the hybrid Russian-Ukrainian dialect (“surzhyk”).

One should pay attention to the fact that the increase of the degree of “Ukrainianization” on territories, according to the model of the gradient, in general are not spatially correlated with the historical borders of the Hetmanate and Slobodskaiia Ukraine, although in the long run tends to that. Perhaps this is affected by an ancient “single Slavonic” nature of the population of Severskaia land (Novgorod-Seversky, Chernigov).

17.5. The regional identity and the contemporary “nation building” in Ukraine

In the early 1990s, as it is known, the strategy of the “nation-state construction” has been adopted in Ukraine (Smith 2000) (Kas’ianov and Miller 2011) (Gritsenko and Krylov 2012). The basic principle of such strategy represents the following imperative: “one country – one nation – one language”. At the same time, there is no theory that would prove the universality of application models of
“nation building” in various ethnocultural and historical conditions. In particular, the specific after effects of “nation building” strategy are really unclear in the case of Ukraine because there are many regionally contrasting matrix of regional identity. In addition, the mechanisms of different transformations of “nation building” in the conditions of spatial cultural diversity are not clear too, for example, in the field of electoral behaviour.

Nevertheless, a number of authors, for example, Miller and Dmitriev (Miller 2003) suppose that the “Ukrainian national project” was completed even before the Soviet “Ukrainanization” (about “Ukrainanization” see: Borisenok 2006) (therefore, adherents of the concept “Ukrainian national project” consider the results of the contemporary “nation building” in Ukraine as quite predictable and they are to be out of discussion). However, the current cultural and political reality in Ukraine shows rather the opposite situation. The most evident is the well-known opposition of the Russian-speaking Donbass (Donetsk Basin Area) and West (Europe) oriented Galicia that have mutual exceptive models of the electoral behaviour of the population and alternative conceptions about the role of the Russian and Ukrainian languages.

It is very interesting that using the Russian or Ukrainian languages in different regions of Ukraine cannot always serve the cause of a clear political choice between “pro-Western” and “pro-Russian” electoral behaviour as it is often considered. Thus, for instance, this kind of scheme is contrary to the tendency when the residents from the Sumy and Chernigov regions are constantly supporting the Ukraine oriented political actors. Apparently, cultural correlates of electoral behaviour are necessary to search in the prevailing regional identities based on national political context.

We have considered Left-Bank Ukraine (former “Malorossia” that can be understood as “Little Russia”) as a model by which one can characterize the whole-specific “Ukrainian – Russian” dichotomy of contemporary Ukraine in the natural processes of self-identification, the use of language in the common life of population, and within the historical memory.

Left-Bank Ukraine is a vast transition gradient zone, the population of which is characterized by cultural proximity to Russia, while differing in the degree of natural ambivalence of attitude to it. Thus, Russia, as a “significant other” is perceived here as positively and negatively. At the same time, the population of Left-Bank Ukraine usually tends to bilingualism, at least at in the household condition. In this case, the motivation to using the Russian or Ukrainian languages in private life shows regional variation. Note that within Left-Bank Ukraine historically even recorded two versions of the Ukrainian literary language (I. Kotlyarevsky and G. Skvorodora), which assumed different degrees of its differences from the Russian language.

We believe that the framework of Gradient (see Figure 1) shows the spatial structure of “nation building” in Left-Bank Ukraine. We assert that Gradient
shows the Ukrainian “nation building” process at the grassroots (local) level, as the natural (non-artificial) process.

Generalizing in this way forwarding materials (surveys and interviews of the expert community of cities from the local birth or belief, field observations), we have tried to present a general picture of grassroots (local) “nation building” in Ukraine, according to, first of all, the aspect of historical memory (Table 17.5.).

It is remarkable that the residents of Left-Bank Ukraine perceive that the Ukrainian culture has two centres – in the Poltava region and in Western Ukraine. The perception of Western Ukraine and Russia as the most culturally contrast (among the nearby for Left-Bank Ukraine) regions was a common for Left-Bank Ukraine. In this case, the population almost universally felt pressure from Russia (“disrespect for our identity”), as well as from Donbass. The interpretation of the 2004 Orange Revolution is very interesting. According to respondents’ understanding, it was not directed specifically against the “Moscow”, but against the Ukrainian authorities (“Kiev”). This shows that the process of Ukrainian “nation-building” in many cases has “his own way” (through self-organization of the population), with the active role of regional identities.

But the logic of “nation-building” is still largely dependent on political technologists directing. The logic of modern “Ukrainian national project” dictates a certain distancing from Russia and/or Russian culture for the regional identity. Consequently, the distancing from Russia and Russian culture that found in a local manifestation of this identity should reflect the level of development and the nature Ukrainophile moods and feelings of the communities and individuals.

We have identified a number of integrated systems of gradation for Ukrainian territories (they are correlated with Gradient, Figure 17.1, and are illustrated by the specificity of regional identity in some cases in Ukraine, Table 7.5). The gradations are as follows:

– Identity does not detect differences from Russia, circulated a “Soviet mentality”;

– Identity is similar to Russia in terms of future projects (“the political, cultural and economic unity of the Eastern Slavs”, “the perversity of the existence of Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church”, etc.) and the importance of a common past, but it has some specific features, for example, related to the interpretation of unpopular in Russia Ukrainian historical figures (here, they are the countrymen, for example, Ivan Mazepa);

– Identity is associated with the spread of negative “defensive” of emotions in relation to Russia;

– Self-consciousness of the population is often resistant to anti-Russian emotions (“Russia – the enemy number one, the Empire of Evil”);
Table 17.5. Historical and cultural self-identifying of respondents from Left-Bank Ukraine: the case of Glukhov, Sumy and Poltava cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>The most common answers</strong></th>
<th><strong>Rare answers</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Which of the nearest regions are of the greatest difference?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Western and Central Ukraine, Russia, Poltava</td>
<td>the Kharkiv region, the Chernihiv region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S: Western Ukraine, Poltava region, Russia</td>
<td>the west and east of the Sumy region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P: the Kharkiv region, Western Ukraine</td>
<td>Donbass, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do you feel any pressure, competition from neighbouring regions of Ukraine or Russia? In what forms is shown that pressure?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Russia (Moscow): Information, linguistic, political</td>
<td>the Chernihiv region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S: Russia: economic, political, informational</td>
<td>Donbass: political; Kharkov: economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P: Russia: economic, cultural and information (&quot;contempt of our identity&quot;); Kiev: economic, political</td>
<td>Western Ukraine (Lviv); EU; USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What events are distant and recent past you find interesting, meaningful, turning?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Times Hetmanate, the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945)</td>
<td>Recognition of the independence of Ukraine in 1991; Famine (1932–1933); The Revolution of 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S: The Orange Revolution of 2004 (&quot;the spirit of revolt against the young Ukrainian Genocide&quot;); Konotop and Poltava battle; The Great Patriotic War; The collapse of the USSR</td>
<td>Education Sumy region in 1939, Times hussar regiments (19th century); Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) and the Hetman Skoropadsky Power (1918–1919)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P: The Battle of Poltava against Sweden (1709); Hetmanate period, its elimination</td>
<td>The Battle of Poltava against Sweden (1709); Hetmanate period; Recognition of the independence of Ukraine in 1991; Famine (1932–1933)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Which region do you associate with Ukrainian traditions?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Western Ukraine, Transcarpathia, the Poltava region, Severschina</td>
<td>Sloboda Ukraine, Kyiv, Volyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S: the Poltava region, western Ukraine, Kiev</td>
<td>the Chernihiv region, Volyn, Kharkiv region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P: the Poltava region, western Ukraine, Kiev</td>
<td>Central Ukraine, Left-bank Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What events of the past, local history related to Russia or the Soviet Union, in your opinion, should evoke a sense of pride? ...</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Victory in the Great Patriotic War; Achievements of the Soviet period</td>
<td>Hetmanate's period; Recognition of the independence of Ukraine in 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S: Victory in the Great Patriotic War; Achievements of the Soviet period</td>
<td>The victory of the Ukrainians in Konotop battle (against Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P: Victory in the Great Patriotic War; The victory in the Battle of Poltava (1709)</td>
<td>Recognition of the independence of Ukraine in 1991; 1654 – Treaty of Pereyaslav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>... And which - feeling anger or resentment?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Famine of 1932–1933; The repression of the Stalin era (1930s); Losses in the Great Patriotic War; the policy of centralization and Russification</td>
<td>The destruction of the Hetmanate capital; Chase Hetman Mazepa; Religious pressure from Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S: Famine of 1932–1933; The repression of the Stalin era (1930s); The collapse of the USSR;</td>
<td>The Orange Revolution in 2004; The gas conflict with Russia; 1654 – Treaty of Pereyaslav</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant</td>
<td>The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant; The Revolution of 1917; The loss of independence of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) in 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tell me, please, what first comes to your mind, what thoughts, images, associations, when you hear the word “...”?**

### “Russia”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G: Great neighbours (neighbours), Muscovites, the force, the Kremlin</th>
<th>Friends (brothers), the enemy, “Asian country”, “wicked aunt” (witch)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S: Moscow (Kremlin, Putin), a large neighbouring state</td>
<td>Friendship, Motherland, “enemy №1, the evil empire,” “aggressor”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P: Gas, power (Moscow), the neighbouring country, the empire, the great</td>
<td>Rodney (sister, brother), corruption, enemy aggression</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### “Soviet man”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G: The man who lived in the USSR, history, order, work</th>
<th>Communism, standard, fear, poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S: The man who lived in the USSR, the workers, the slave (captive)</td>
<td>Nostalgia, parents, multinationality, “sovok”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P: Poverty, communist past, honor and conscience, work</td>
<td>Negative, stable, standard, forced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### “People of Sloboda Ukraine”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G: “No association”, Ukrainian (“they are also the Ukrainians”), Eastern Ukraine</th>
<th>“Our Land”, a free settlement, the Chernihiv region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S: Population of Sloboda Ukraine, Motherland, countrymen</td>
<td>the Ukrainians, “henchmen of Russia”, rabble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P: Residents of the Kharkiv region, Sloboda Ukraine, the Ukrainians, countrymen</td>
<td>Traitors (“Renegade”), border, brothers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### “Little Russia”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G: Ukraine (part of it), the old Russian term, insult</th>
<th>Hetmanate, “ignorance of history”, “Peter’s stupidity”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S: Ukraine</td>
<td>History, offense (humiliation, insult)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P: Insult, belittle Ukraine and the Ukrainians, Ukraine and the Ukrainians</td>
<td>The past (history), “involuntary life”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

- Identity has some individual cases of the appearance of anti-Russian emotions (“Russia – the aggressor”); it is characterized by the active presence of another understanding of “common (with Russia) history”, compared to the Russian version of the history; the inhabitants of Slobodsaia Ukraine are sometimes perceived negatively as a kind of defective Ukrainians (“Russian henchmen”, “renegades”).

The gradations of identity may change towards greater Ukrainophile trends in the case of political techniques. The results of our study illustrate the
internal inconsistency of the contemporary Ukrainian identity formation especially because of the factor of spatial cultural diversity and the regional identity first of all. Therefore, we consider the absence of concrete predetermination of specific forms of Ukrainophile trends in the regional and all-Ukrainian identity. It is obvious, in this connection, the especially significant role of various forms of political technology. A more detailed analysis of the materials showed that the area near the Russian-Ukrainian border, for example, in Sumy and Kharkiv, is exposed to greater impacts associated with the construction of identity (identity politics), judging by the reaction of residents to various imposed stamps. At the same time, in “deep” Ukrainian territories such as Poltava or Nezhin, the manifestations of this policy are very low.

17.6. Main conclusions

The article demonstrated the results of the application of the method developed by the authors. It was shown that the Russian regional identity has a significant amount of hidden, from the eyes of an outside observer, features. Russian regional identity demonstrates a sufficient level of development and is associated with different, often mutually exclusive forms of cultural tradition that combine in the Russian local life. Ukrainian regional identity, in contrast, is characterized by greater uncertainty associated with the context of “nation building”.

Acknowledgment

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18

Selected Problems of Regional Consciousness and Identity in the Areas of Historical-geographical Borderland – a Case of the Silesian Province (Poland)

JERZY RUNGE

18.1. Introduction

One of the aims of national general census carried out in Poland in 2011 was the identification of ethno-national structure. In the whole country, 739 thousand inhabitants declared other than Polish ethno-national identity, including 394 thousand declaring both Polish and other identities. The most frequent identifications other than Polish include Silesian and German identifications. Especially the former one aroused and still arouses some disputes concerning the methods, history and the way of taking the census. Simultaneously, social emotions and the activity of political parties and associations hindered a totally objective look at problems of social-ethnic identification. The aim of this paper is to pay attention to the most important problems of distinguishing the consciousness, identity and nationality in the former area of historical-geographical borderland, which is at present the area of the Silesian province.

18.2. Ethnos, nationality, nation: criteria and identifiers

One of the main objectives of science concerns alignment and systematization of terminology. Unless we precisely define the object, we in fact do not know what we are talking about (Apanowicz 2003). Because these problems are located at the borders of demography and geography, the phenomenon of vague-
ness is well visible. The example of this type is identification of ethno-national differentiations in the frames of the recent general census in European countries.

According to valid research arrangements in science, consciousness is a term meaning the state of perception of surrounding reality. It represents a consequence of individual biological and psychological development of a human, and it has been shaped since the moment of birth. Consciousness is formed with a little influence of emotional factor.

In contrary, identity is an emotional relation of a man with a place, social group, idea, etc. Identity is a derivative of educational-cultural development; it appears since social-cultural diversity is perceived in relation to further located areas, other social groups or ideologies. Inasmuch as you can be aware of some facts or phenomena, identification with them has always emotional dimension of different intensity of expression (A. Runge and J. Runge 2008). Both consciousness and identity are social terms.

The third of the basic terms is nationality understood as historically developed community of people distinguished by national consciences i.e. consciousness of membership of a certain nation. Membership of a nation is a derivation of meeting seven conditions (Obyczaje, języki, ludy świata. Encyklopedia PWN 2007; Rykiel 1996, 2006). They include:

a) existence of a territory which belongs to the nation (homeland). Symbolism and conviction about common origin is connected with the territory;

b) continuity of history – and also knowledge of their own history by the members of a nation. Integration of personal fate with the fate of the whole nation reveals sense of responsibility and duty in threat situations (patriotism);

c) political tradition, which is a consequence of individual state existence. The society which has never had a statehood or it became deprived of it is not a nation but only an ethnic group;

d) cultural community – the output of which represents a reason of pride and lets one nation to be distinguished from others;

e) language – sometimes a nation does not have its own language or it has several languages (e.g. Helvetians, Canadians);

f) religion – strongly unifying element because it determines certain system of values, regulations of behaviour, and sometimes it is a basic identification criterion (e.g. Jews);

g) economic community.

If these identification criteria are not met by a certain social group, it cannot be treated as a nation but only as an ethnic group.

Identification of national-ethnic differentiations always raises intense interest of various environments, starting from science world and ending on political world. Therefore conduction of national general census makes it possible to identify these social groups and also to discuss them. General censuses as the most complete statistical investigation started as early as in ancient times because
central authority needed information concerning human recourses for military
requirements, as well as potential level of taxes. Basic standards of general census
were elaborated by Belgian statistician A. Quetelet in 1846. They include:

a) commonness – all the citizens of a given state are subjected to census
investigation;

b) simultaneousness – because of considerable changeability of population
characteristics (e.g. births, deaths, migrations) the investigation should be con-
ducted in a shortest possible time and at the precisely determined moment of
time, especially when migration scale is the smallest during the whole year (end
of December), which restrains the influence of seasonality of population phe-
nomena. Also the same years should be selected in individual states (preferably
years which end with zero), which makes it possible to compare international
statistics.

c) directness – individual obtaining of data from a respondent, which
makes it possible to verify answers, to settle questionable issues (especially in
case of older people), and to reduce mistakes. As it is often stressed, census ques-
tionnaire generates incompatibilities between what people think, what they de-
clare, and how they really behave (Runge 2006). Therefore, the condition of di-
rectness of general census is getting most and most essential;

d) personalness, which is an adjustment of particular data to a particular
person.

If these standards are not met, the obtained material cannot be called
a general census, at most a partial census, a micro-census or other category of
statistical survey.

Political-economic transformation and social modernization of the Central
European countries followed by the accession to the European Union and other
organization of supranational importance caused also changes in public statistics.
Side by side with activities of unification and systemising character, there are also
“soft” activities leading to weakening of previous arrangements and commit-
ments. It is well visible taking into account the range of recent national general
censuses. This concerns not only the conformity of years and months, but also
homogeneity of methodological standard of census conduction. This may be con-
firmed comparing national general census in Poland carried out in 2002 and 2011.
Taking into account ethno-national issues, in the questionnaire in 2002 the fol-
lowing two questions were present: a) Which nationality do you include your-
self?; b) Which language(s) do you usually speak at home?

These questions were addressed to everybody (Quetelet’s standards).

In turn, in optional (Internet) questionnaire in 2011 the following ques-
tions occurred: a) What is your nationality? Respondents could choose any op-
tion from a broad list which included both the names of nations and ethnic
groups (without distinction!), such as Lemko nationality, Liberian nationality,
Silesian nationality (sic!); b) Do you feel the affiliation to other nation or ethnic community?

According to the terminology mentioned at the beginning of this paper, you may feel the identity but not the affiliation to the nation. Not only were these concepts confused with each other but they were treated as equivalents. These drawbacks and fulfillment of only one standard by the general census of 2011 (personality), as well as strong political emotions articulated by leading representatives of political parties and regional associations just before the census undoubtedly influenced the results of ethno-national identification of the 2011 general census. It is enough to compare declarations of the Silesian option in Poland and the Czech Republic (including proportionality of regional communities). Therefore, the problems of ethno-national identification in the area of the Silesian province should be considered differently.

18.3. Complexity of ethno-national identification in Silesia

The described above facts show necessity of multidimensional understanding of problems of Silesia and Silesian identity. The basic dimensions of these problems include: space, population, and culture.

Spatial dimension. In administrative terms Silesia includes the present Lower Silesian province, Opolskie province and almost half of the present Silesian province. Lack of consequence in preparing administration division of Poland in 1999 is remarkable. The names of the provinces are derived either from the name of historical-geographical region (Lower Silesia, Silesia), or from the name of a city (Opolskie – Opole). This is not all of it – the most general name – the Silesian province should suggest centrality, the essence of Silesian identity. In fact, we deal here with transborder location in a historical-geographical sense (Silesia, Siewierskie Duchy, Lesser Poland, Prussian, Russian and Austrian and partitions, Germany, Poland). At the same time, the transborder character of Silesian identity is present in the south (Polish and Czech Silesia).

The application of the name Lower Silesian province sets the authors of the administrative reform in non-win situation, as it is illogical. If you stress the presence of Lower Silesia why not Upper Silesia? Moreover, if you divide Upper Silesia into two parts, their names should follow the same key, thus it should be Opolskie and Katowickie (not Silesian) provinces. Unfortunately, the administrative map of Poland is full of such kind or other inconsistencies in names of provinces.

Population dimension. The Silesian identity of the region should be understood as an attempt to answer the question concerning the intensity of Silesian identity in Silesia. Historical facts clearly show that peripheral areas, located far from the capital were the most externally influenced. At first, Germanization of Łużyce, then Czech influences, Austrian influences (as well as political weak-
ness of this region) led in 1526 to formal annexation of Silesia by Habsburgs and then in 1741 by Prussia. The presence of metal ores and rich resources of black coal represented main premises to transform eastern far peripheries of Silesia into the largest in Central Europe economic region. The unusual feature of the former 18th century Europe, was the fact that structural changes in economy (transition from the feudal system to early capitalism) required intensive secular changes in the society (secondary in relation to structural changes). Small population size of the borderland and, at the same time, poor resources of labour force made it necessary to get them from closer and further distances. At this moment, the process of multi-sided differentiation of the society started. This differentiation included the area of origin (local people and immigrants), the rate of the income (factory owners, engineers, foremen, workers), religion (Catholics, Protestants, members of the Orthodox Church, Jews), place in the social hierarchy (aristocracy, middle class, peasantry). The language brought by the migrants becomes an element of “a melting pot” where all languages mix together and a dialect develops. It is an effect of human contacts. With the years the dialect and its regional varieties become not only a distinguishing feature of the Silesian identity but also a specific kind of identification barrier – local, stranger. Saying “we are local” in Silesian dialect is nothing else than double closing towards others – both in territorial and linguistic terms.

This closing, with a continuous inflow of immigrants caused at least reluctance to strangers. The neighbourhood of the border at the Przemsza and Brynica rivers favoured the creation of stereotypes of Gorol (stranger) and Hanys (local). The turn of the 19th and 20th centuries is a clear decrease of Silesia attractiveness. From one side more rapid development of the Ruhr region and other industrial regions of Western Europe and on the other side wide immigration opening from the United States caused intensive emigration movement from Silesia. This is the reason of the presence of the Silesians in America or other countries of the western world. The attempts to stop this stream of emigration are districts Nikiszowiec and Giszowiec in Katowice.

The most essential, however, population changes in Silesia occurred after 1945. As a result of political arrangements between the former great powers, the German population was forced to leave not only Silesia. The inflow of immigrants from the former Eastern borderlands of the Republic of Poland caused that in fact Lower Silesia – apart from its geographical location – has nothing to do with Silesian identity. Simultaneously, the division of Upper Silesia into two provinces (apart from the unsuccessful experiment with the Silesian-Dąbrowskie province in the period of 1946–1951) and intensive inflow of migrants in the 1970s to work in industrial investments of Silesia and Zagłębie increased the scale of differences in the structure and dynamics of socioeconomic transformations between them.

A demographic dimension of these activities is a population increase of the province from one hand and decrease of the percentage of inhabitants who
were born here and have lived here for many generations. Many towns and villages which had shown so far a high autochthonic closing started to differentiate towards community of different origins. The materials of the general census 2002 clearly show that urban centres of the western part of Katowice conurbation record at the most 50.0–60.0% of autochthonic population. This is why side by side with the process of “town shrinking” and its influence on the decrease of the number of the Silesians and others, also post-war urbanization processes revealed regression trends in the structure of participation of the natives among the inhabitants of Katowice conurbation and its surrounding. In fact, since the 1980s, the towns of Katowice conurbation started to be less attractive for the potential immigrants. Gradually an outflow started to predominate the inflow. Since 1992 the towns of the Silesian province have registered a permanent negative migration balance, and rural municipalities showed a positive balance. This can be recognized as a beginning of suburbanization. According to the prognosis of the Main Statistical Institute up to 2035 the size of absolute decrease in regional scale is going to account to the value 350–400 thousand people, which means that each town is going to lose about 10.0–15.0% of its population. Most of all, this will concern the western and central parts of the Katowice conurbation, Częstochowa subregion, and the smallest changes will occur in the southern part of the province.

Sociocultural dimension. This element represents the greatest research challenge, as it is not as simple as it appears at the beginning. First of all, it is necessary to answer the questions how much Silesian identity occurs in Silesia, what the relation between the Polish identity and German identity exists, and what the sociocultural characteristic of this area is. But the basis is a thorny for some people ethno-national identification of the investigated social group. Recognition of nationality in international law and political and social sciences is clearly codified and legible. According to this, the Silesians represent an ethnic group. Lack of political autonomy (Silesian state) in any part of the history is the most important issue among the group of seven factors determining a nation. Location on the borderland, external political influences, and increasing in the history socioeconomic differentiation of this area – these are only some of disintegration factors. In turn, cultural closing (especially language) represents an integration factor. It is self-evident that because of migration movements and the inflow of many young people in different periods, the spatial structure of Silesian identity is like a Swiss cheese. In the social space of the region you can easily distinguish houses, housing estates, districts populated mostly by the Silesians, but there are also such places where people of many different origins live side by side. You can just visit blocks of flats in Katowice, Bytom, Chorzów, Gliwice, etc., or read suitable sociological papers. This differentiation contains three categories of inhabitants: *pnioki* (trunks), *krzoki* (bushes), and *ptoki* (birds) – which are natives, old immigrants and new immigrants. The investigations carried out recently
on the transborder character of marriages (Silesia – Zagłębie Dąbrowskie) clearly indicate the presence of mixed marriages, residence at both sides of the former border and fact of their permanent representation in the total number of couples. Also intraregional migrations, and policy of housing associations in the 1970s (offers of flats or houses on the other side of the Przemsza and Brynica rivers) resulted in the decrease of native people among the inhabitants of individual towns.

Taking into account the discussed above facts, i.e. blurriness of external territorial borders and non-homogeneity of internal structure, in a mathematical sense we deal with a fuzzy set. This term does not have any pejorative features; it reflects the features of population according to the theory of sets.

Another problem is the relation to the German language. Basing on the long-lasting historical and sociological investigations Rykiel (1988: 163–164) indicates: “In the 19th century, Upper Silesian regional community developed – it was relatively homogenous in class, ethnical and cultural terms and closed in a social sense. This social closing resulted from traditionalism which bordered the Upper Silesian regional community from everything which was new, and also strange (foreign), because historical experiences showed that everything which was strange endangered social existence (...). This attitude, which in the 19th century’s Europe was rather a rule, than an exception, entered the conflict with developing at the end of the 19th century nationalistic movements. The Upper Silesians were required to declare unequivocally whether they are the Germans, the Poles or the Czechs. This triggered two opposite processes – from one side intensification of isolationism, and from the other – incorporation of the Upper Silesians into the adjacent nations – mainly Polish and German, which resulted in disintegration of Upper Silesian regional community”. A further consequence of these changes was development of vast spectrum of attitudes towards Polish identity and German identity: from full acceptation and patriotic commitment, through ambivalent relation, to denationalization and acceptance of strange (foreign) cultural standards. This disintegration was reinforced by the Second World War – side by side with a Silesian – an active soldier of the Polish Army who defended the state against the invader, there was also a Silesian – a soldier of the German army. Lack of understanding or lack of willingness to understand a complexity of Silesian reality ended in 1945 and further years in tragedies, action of family consolidation, work emigration, etc., or a 700 thousand migration wave to work in towns of the former Katowice province in the 1970s.

18.4. Recapitulation

This brief touch of problems of Silesian identity revealed that there is no a homogenous image of both Silesia and a standard of its inhabitant. Silesian identity has a broad spectrum of consciousness. It should be remembered, however,
that in historical sense this spectrum was much larger. The presence of material
culture of the Jewish community, the Germans, the Russians can be easily even
now documented in the town space of our region. The question is: what is un-
doubtedly an element of Silesian identity in present cultural differentiation? In
social sciences this element is a dialect, but the respondents have problems with
other distinguishing features. They mention Silesian cuisine (Silesian dumplings,
roulade, red cabbage, blood sausage, clear soup with potatoes in Cieszyn Silesia),
or Silesian laboriousness. Material culture and traditional rituals have disap-
peared in terrifying rate together with globalization. To see them it is necessary
to visit a museum or go to the south of the region. Containment of the process
of folk art everywhere in the world is a backbreaking task, especially there where
external influences are strong.

The ongoing discussions on autonomy, nationality, or language may be inter-
preted from different points of view – as an idealistic willingness of return to
the 19th century traditions of isolationism, liquidation of historical division into
Upper Silesia and Silesia in frames of future one province, or a wish of political
self-existence as an option in favour of autonomy, language, etc. Despite the fact
which option we support, the activities in favour Silesian identity should be con-
centrated at: creation of regional education which in fact does not exist, and there
is no one to do it for us; promotion of up-to-date education at all levels together
with preparing jobs at regional job market in order to limit the scale of migra-
tions. According to different estimations about 250 thousand people from the
Silesian province are abroad; formation of social and intellectual capital for the
needs of future generations, which should especially activate local communities;
development of medical service and social services for the needs of ageing society.
Difficult access both to medical consultants and psychiatric and fitness centres
should be one of the priorities in the region.

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19

Territorial Identity in Upper Silesia and its Political Significance

MATEUSZ HUDZIKOWSKI

19.1. Introduction

Silesia and Upper Silesia, in particular, over the centuries have been an arena of struggles for centres of power and subject to international politics. Setting of borders in Europe after the Second World War and the annexation of almost the whole territory of Silesia to Poland did not change this state of affairs: from time to time Polish politicians raise the topic of German revisionism treat. The desire to legitimize the status of “Silesian speech” as a regional language, inspiration to gain recognition of the existence of Silesian identity and to achieve autonomy for Upper Silesia become an excuse to politicize discourse on Silesia. Arguments about the threat to Poland, breaking the state and nation, separatism, anti-Polish activities are being revoked. Although such words are used in a Polish political and public debate for the use of internal policy, they have an international context.

Along the evolution of concepts of nation and national identity in the 19th century, Silesian identity and national consciousness of the inhabitants of Upper Silesia became a sphere of German-Polish competition. The reaction to the Germanization and anti-Polish policy in times of Bismarck and his successors was cultivating the myth of the Piast roots of Silesia and its ethnic Polishness. In Poland, this issue continues to generate controversy and political disputes. Silesianness, Silesian identity, territorial and national awareness of the inhabitants of Upper Silesia and the related concept are a series of complex and extensive research issues in which the scientific discourse is often linked to the political one.

Territorial consciousness contains commitment to a “small homeland”, the memory of tradition and complicated history, difficulty in identifying nationality, regional culture, political demands. All those elements can be featured as Upper Silesian identity. As shown, all of them are traceable to the sphere of politics; they are objects of politics and provide political arguments for participants of the Polish political scene.
The thesis of this study is that the concept of territorial (regional) identity of Upper Silesia, regardless of the scientific dispute about it, has a political context given to it by all parties. It is not the author’s intention to dispute on the existence of Silesian identity and related phenomena (such as Silesian nationality or the Silesian language) as these are the problems of a complex nature which require a separate study. Thus, the main purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how phrases like “Silesian identity”, “Silesianness”, “Silesian nationality”, “autonomy of Silesia” or “Silesian language” are being used in Polish political debate and media discussions about Upper Silesia often without proper defining or explanation. Referring to international political arguments is common, which is understandable given the history of the region (frequent changes of state jurisdiction) and its geographical location (proximity to the territories of the contemporary Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Germany).

Since this is an extensive topic relating to history and geography as well as policy “in the moment of its nascency” its comprehensive exhaustion is impossible. Therefore, the author only intends to signal some research problems as a contribution to further research.

Territorial identity means the attachment to territory. It is based on emotional ties to a particular territory, community, products of material and non-material cultural heritage, symbols, values, and norms. It can be perceived in varying dimensions such as individual, social, cultural or as a group. An example of territorial and regional identity is the Silesians’ identity (Rybarska-Jarosz and Barylski 2012: 6–9).

The identity of Upper Silesia refers to several factors: geographical isolation of the Upper Silesia (terms: “small homeland”, “Kleine Heimat”; territorial approach), turbulent history (frequent changes of state jurisdiction; historical approach), former cultural meeting point, modern “small Renaissance” of local culture (cultural approach), Silesian dialect, ethnic and national identity (social and linguistic approach), the autonomous aspirations (political approach). Further parts of this paper will briefly discuss these issues as well as their political significance.

19.2. The territory

We can see how emphasizing manifestations of regional identity and the use of this issue in the political struggle (by either party) leads to a discussion about the territory (and power over it). First of all, it must be underlined that the term “Silesia”, as well as “Silesian” and many others, derivated words seems to be used in Polish political debate without deeper understanding and in various contexts. Moreover, it is a little bit inconsistent of the autonomy’s supporters in The Silesian Autonomy Movement to talk about the autonomy of “Silesia”, because, in fact, what they mean is Upper Silesia. Silesia is defined by Encyclopaedia Britanni-
ca as a historical province located mostly within the Republic of Poland. Part of the former Silesia is also located on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czech Republic. Initially Silesia belonged to Poland, then was taken over by Bohemian Crown (1335), Habsburg Monarchy of Austria (1526) and Prussia (1742). After Second World War (1945) it returned to Poland. Silesia is mainly based in the river basin of the upper and middle Oder River, being bounded on the south west by the Sudety mountains, to the south by Beskidy mountains. Similar definition gives Polish PWN Encyclopaedia (“Polish historical district in the basin of the upper and middle Oder”), mentioning Cieszyn Silesia, Opava Silesia and Upper Silesia as integral components of Silesia.

The eastern part of Upper Silesia, including the city of Katowice, found itself back in Poland a little earlier than the rest of Silesia, already in 1922, as a result of the decisions that were made among the victors of the First World War ended in 1918. Of key importance were the three Silesian Uprisings (1919, 1920, 1921), in which the pro-Polish forces fought with the pro-German forces. The Upper Silesian plebiscite on the state belonging of the territory (1921) was a significant event: unfavourable for the Polish option outcome contributed to the outbreak of the last uprising – as a result Poland gained part of Upper Silesia.

The issue of geographical and historical boundaries of Silesia is a separate research issue. Simplified assumption that the Silesia region extends to the borders of other Polish historic provinces: Lesser Poland to the east and Greater Poland to the north. The terms “Silesia” is also commonly used in relation to Upper Silesia, or even the Silesian Voivodeship which together with a part of Lesser Poland covers only part of Silesia. Silesian boundaries: geographical, historic, politic and administrative overlap, which complicates the studies and obscures ongoing discussions.

Discrepancies in terminology are also frequent. There are terms determining, not always correctly, “components” of Silesia: Lower Silesia, Upper Silesia, Opole Silesia (Opole region), Cieszyn Silesia, Opava Silesia, and Czech Silesia. Lower Silesia (with Wroclaw) and Upper Silesia (with Katowice) is commonly accepted division. Taking into account different fates of individual subregions of Silesia, Polish historians generally distinguish Lower Silesia, Upper Silesia and Cieszyn Silesia (Czapliński, Kaszuba, Wąs, and Żerelik 2002; Popiołek 1984).

Lower Silesia is the subregion of Silesia which was the longest outside the Poland – until 1945 it was German lands (formerly Prussian). A small part of Upper Silesia, as already mentioned, went from German to Polish hands earlier, after the First World War. The rest of Upper Silesia became a part of Poland after the Second World War, together with the Lower Silesia lands. Cieszyn Silesia, named after the main city in this area – Cieszyn, till the end of the First World War was under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Then Poles regained large part of this region. The rest of Cieszyn Silesia (called in Polish: “Zaolzie” which means “lands beyond the Olza River”) became part of the independent Republic of Czechoslovakia.
Quite clear and rather beyond arousing controversy are terms Lower Silesia, Czech Silesia and Opava Silesia. However, even here there are some complications. The term “Lower Silesia” can mean: (1) the current Polish part of the historical Lower Silesia, (2) the whole historical Lower Silesia (now mostly in Poland, partially in the Czech Republic), (3) colloquially Lower Silesia Voivodeship in Poland (nota bene Lower Silesia Voivodeship does not include the whole Polish Lower Silesia, as some of its parts are in the Lubush Voivodeship and Opole Voivodeship). Term Opava Silesia is commonly used for the parts of Lower and Upper Silesia lying in the Czech Republic, centred around the town of Opava. Czech Silesia is a broader term which includes these lands of historical Silesia that today lie in the Czech Republic (Opava Silesia, the above-mentioned part of Cieszyn Silesia that is Zaołzie and part of Lower Silesia in historical meaning). These issues are a subject of scientific dispute.

Vivid discussions, including journalistic and political polemics, arouse the usage of terms Upper Silesia, Cieszyn Silesia and Opole Silesia. The House for Polish-German Co-operation (HPGC), based in Opole, issued a map showing the boundaries of the historic Upper Silesia which also includes Cieszyn Silesia and Polish Cieszyn Silesia, however, it does not distinguish them as subregions. The Silesian Autonomy Movement, acting in Upper Silesia and aiming to restore the autonomy of Upper Silesia, does not recognize the term “Opole Silesia” (or in other words: the Opole Region) claiming: “The so-called ‘Opole Region’ was invented in the second half of the twentieth century to describe the western part of Upper Silesia, in order to divide our land. For centuries, Silesia was divided geographically into two natural parts in accordance with the course of the Oder River – Lower Silesia and Upper Silesia. The Upper Silesia consisted of the Duchy of Opole; Opole for centuries was the most important city in Upper Silesia, its capital. This traditional term “Upper Silesia”, preserved until the twentieth century, survived even the Nazi regime. By 1950, there was Silesian Voivodeship called then: śląsko-dąbrowskie (due to Dąbrowa Basin, Zagłębie Dąbrowskie, not belonging to historical Silesia, but included to Silesian Voivodeship) and only the communists divided it into Katowice Voivodeship (temporary Stalinogrod Voivodeship) and Opole Voivodeship”. Consequently, reflection on the history and geography of Silesia (including Upper Silesia) is a matter not only scientific but also a political one.

The Silesian Autonomy Movement (RAŚ) despite the fact that its efforts are based on the history of the region, takes into account administrative, political and social reality. According to RAŚ, the new autonomy’s borders would not be the same as in the interwar period. It cannot be limited to the current administrative division, as this leaves a large part of the historic province of Upper Silesia beyond the Silesian Voivodeship and includes areas which historically and culturally lay outside Silesia: Częstochowa, Zagłębie Dąbrowskie, and Żywiec. Therefore, RAŚ calls for a debate on the geographical (and ethnic) dimension of autonomy. However, it does not give a definitive answer to the question of how the boundaries of
autonomous voivodeship should proceed. Moreover, starting from the historical experience of Upper Silesia and using the term “Silesian identity”, RAŚ de facto suggests alteration in the model of the state and the introduction of autonomous regions throughout the country. RAŚ proponents is a sign of responsibility and modern thinking about Poland and Europe. For its opponents such logic is evidence that the autonomists do not only seek to weaken ties between Upper Silesia and Poland, but also to break down the state, because that is how the change from a centralized model to a regional or federal is being interpreted.

19.3. The history

Development of interest in the cultural heritage of Upper Silesia, its history and distinct identity began already in the Third Polish Republic, after nearly half a century of the existence of a centralized communist state (1945–1989).

Earlier – before The Polish Round Table Agreement – Upper Silesia was the most important element of the socialist economy and in the general opinion, the most prosperous part of the country, where heavy industry workers enjoyed privileges granted them by the communist authorities. On the other hand, a traditional “Silesianness” was a threat to the communist authorities, it was pushed out of a public life and therefore has survived only in “family homes, private homelands” (Szczepański 2011).

History provides many examples of power struggles within Silesia. Since the beginning of the Middle Ages, Silesia was the area which attracted and for which competed various centres of power. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) is considered a key date for the emergence of modern states and the construction of the contemporary international relations system (Gałganek 2009; Czaputowicz 2011). Regional powers fought a war in which, for various reasons, Silesia was at stake. Therefore it can be concluded that Silesia, and in particular the most developed part, the Upper Silesia, was for centuries the subject of political competition in Europe. The economy, geographical location of Silesia, culture, religions, and population potential – all these factors had political significance for countries that ruled Silesia, as well as for those who wished to rule it. Therefore, from the point of view of political realism, which assumes the unchanging Machiavellian nature of politics, the phenomenon such as the “Silesian identity” – if indeed there is such a thing – would also have had a political dimension and, moreover, political dimension of international importance. Thus, in the Polish debate on the Silesian identity, nationality, language and autonomy, there are arguments and terms concerning foreign policy such as “German option”, “anti-Polish activities”, “threat to Poland”, “separation of Silesia”.

A series of wars between Austria and Prussia, the so-called Silesian Wars (launched in 1740) was for a fledgling Kingdom of Prussia struggle for survival among the great powers of Europe. Silesian wealth accounted for its importance
(Czapliński at all 2002: 194). After the era of the Napoleonic wars, as a result of the reforms, Silesia was unified with the Prussian state and lost its some kind of independence, which – to some extent – has cherished so far. Social and economic progress, rapid industrialization as a result of the industrial revolution, the transition from feudalism to capitalism caused Silesia to become one of the most industrialized regions in Germany and in Central and Eastern Europe as well. About its wealth decided coal, zinc ore, and iron ore. Mining, metallurgy and modern railway network developed. However, in a whole scale of Prussia, Silesia lost its importance because as a result of the Congress of Vienna Prussia obtained the resource-rich and economically developed land of Rhineland and Westphalia. The economic centre of the country has shifted to the west and deprived of the status of the most valuable of the Prussian province, Silesia became for Berlin quite wealthy but only peripheries (Czapliński at all 2002: 250–251).

After the First World War, the most industrialized part of Upper Silesia was – as a result of the Silesian Uprisings and the plebiscite – attached to the Second Polish Republic by decision of world powers. The greatest support for this approach showed France, aiming to maximize weakness of Germany and strengthen Polish independence at the expense of its neighbour. Less developed German part of Silesia – though much more extended territorially – was less important to the economy and society of the Weimar Republic, and then the Third Reich.

The problem of Polish-German rivalry for Silesia does not end with the regain of independence by Poland and the final incorporation of Upper Silesia in 1922. The functioning of this part of Poland in the years 1922–1939 is related to the existence of the Autonomous Silesian Voivodeship, on the status which refers to contemporary Silesian autonomists. Autonomy has been later limited due to internal conditions: suppression of democracy in Poland resulted de facto in a centralization of the country.

During the Second World War, Silesia (with Polish part annexed to the Reich) regained a very important position and strategic economic and military importance because of production for military purposes (Czapliński at all 2002: 471–472). Not without significance was the geographical location of this industrial centre: far enough from the ongoing military operations (till the end of 1944) to ensure the safety of production, and at the same time advantageous enough to facilitate transportations of supplies to the front.

A particularly complex issue is further recovery of Silesia by Poland, this time both the Upper and Lower (with the exception of the lands remaining in Czech) at the end of the Second World War. Reaching Berlin Soviet Red Army – till today having an ambiguous opinion in Poland (both liberators and successive invaders of Poland) treated Silesia as German land and the local population as the Germans and generally did not distinguish people of Polish origin (or Polish nationality), or those of indeterminate national awareness from ethnic Germans. Soviet actions, usually described as a manifestation of the war chaos or attempts to
retaliate against the German invaders hit the civilian population of Upper Silesia, regardless of language, origin or identity. The so-called “Upper Silesia Tragedy” then manifested itself in the fact that in Upper Silesia different security services were installed: in the form of the Soviet NKVD and Polish Department of Security and Civil Militia (also recruited from among the native people). Authorities continued to repress people regardless of their nationality and regardless if somebody committed fault or not, but “the greatest intensity related to the land owned before the war by Germany and has affected mainly Germans and Silesians (especially those who have not declared themselves clearly and strongly for Polish option)” (Woźniczka 2010: 15).

The Second World War brought significant changes to the map of Europe. Even before their being sanctioned by the victorious powers, Polish politicians imagined taking over from the German Eastern Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia. Lower and Upper Silesia was to be connected to the Polish state through the western border on the rivers Oder and Lusatian Neisse. Poland was to base its border on natural barriers: the Oder River and the Sudety Mountains. In favour for this solution arguments of strategic, economic and historical nature were raised. Silesian industry and natural resources were to be the main drivers of the Polish economy and the planned reforms. Silesia was portrayed as “historical-geographical, economic and ethnocultural entity which once belonged to Piast dynasty” (Czapliński at all 2002: 426–427).

19.4. The culture

After 1989 broadly defined “Silesianness” became a media object such as texts written by the and researcher Michał Smolorz, author of a treatise on the culture of Upper Silesia (Smolorz 2012). Nota bene, back in 1987 under the name Stefan Szulecki he described the governments of Zdzisław Grudzień, the First Secretary of the Communist Party in Katowice (Smolorz 1990). Achievements of film director Kazimierz Kutz (Deputy and Senator) focused on Silesian topic, cannot be underplayed (Klich 2009). However, journalistic writings of the latter are sometimes referred to as “virulently anti-Polish” by his political opponents (Raport o stanie Rzeczypospolitej 2011).

Both authors alluded not only to the culture, but also to the Silesian history and politics: the Silesian uprisings, massacres in the Wujek coal mine in 1981, the Communist era, antagonism between regionalism and centralism as well as to the controversy regarding the Upper Silesia (Smolorz 2011).

At the same time both writers criticized the identification of Silesian culture and traditions with the products of popular and “low” culture. It is safe to assume that in the first decade of the 21st century, prevailed in the region of Upper Silesia specific “trend fashion for Silesianness”, reflected in the growing number of scientific and non-scientific publications about Upper Silesia and the formation of
organizations and websites promoting the culture and history of the region. An example of such an activity is association *Pro Loquela Silesiana* for the codification of “Silesian speech” (as yet perceived as a dialect of the Polish language or local subdialect) and its recognition as a separate language.

The continuing interest in the subject of “returning Silesia to the Motherland” shows, for example, a study on heritage and importance of the Silesian uprisings in school education, analysing the perception of this issue on the pages of school textbooks in Poland after 1989 (Białokur 2011).

### 19.5. The language

Scientists’ opinions about whether the “Silesian speech” is justified to be called language are divided. Efforts to give “Silesian speech” status of language have political context. Often polemicists intertwine political and scientific arguments, confounding issues of language, nationality, identity and statehood. According to Professor F. Marek, Silesian dialect is a part of the Polish language and cannot have the status of a regional language in Poland. Recognition of such status would open the way to support actions “which would lead to smashing the unity of the state and nation”. The same expertise raises the problem of autonomy (political activity of RAŚ) and statehood (“RAŚ activity is clearly anti-Polish political subversion” as well as national identity: “(...) the spoken language is what decides about national identity, not a will of a man” (Marek 2012: 3–9).

Authors of revision of the existing law aimed at inclusion of the Silesian language as a regional language under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages explicitly admit connecting scientific and political arguments.

The European integration process has to be the one that changes the perception of the problem of regions, their differences and heritage. The term “regional language” does not function in linguistics – it is an artificial concept that takes into account scientific premises on a par with the socio-political. The existence of a regional language, according to the authors of the project, should be based on the will of the people who use it and on the state authority’s acceptance.

Mentioned document minimizes the linguistic argument by focusing on other premises (such as occurring on Upper Silesia: “language group identity”, “cultural autonomy”, etc.). Supporting thesis of the Silesian regional language is also the fact that during the National Census over 847 thousand persons declared Silesian nationality (*Projekt ustawy o zmianie ustawy o mniejszościach narodowych i etnicznych oraz o języku regionalnym, a także niektórych innych ustaw 2013; Przynależność narodowo-etniczna ludności – wyniki spisu ludności i mieszkań 2011 2013*).
19.6. The nationality

The issue of “Silesian nationality” (which is to exist regardless of Polish or German nationality) causes even more controversy. Founded in 1996, Fellowship of the Population of Silesian Nationality unsuccessfully sought to be registered as an association: the courts have questioned the wording “Silesian nationality”. The case ended unfavourably for the Fellowship before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

However, in December 2011, the District Court in Opole registered another entity – Silesian Nationals Association, which was received as a step forward to confirm the existence of Silesian nationality, both by proponents and opponents of this idea. The appeal of the Public Prosecutor had been dismissed by The Regional Court in Opole, which upheld the decision of the District Court. Due to the cassation appeal of the Public Prosecutor to the Supreme Court, the positive decision of the registration was revoked in December 2013. This launched a discussion on the issue once again.

The most famous formulation was uttered by Jarosław Kaczyński, the head of the largest opposition party Law and Justice, who quoted national report published by his party: “(...) Silesianness, which rejects Polish nationality is simply a way of cutting off your identity from ["Polishness"] and presumably assumption of a camouflaged German option” (Raport o stanie Rzeczypospolitej 2011: 34–35). Being confronted with criticism from pro-Silesian activists and political rivals Jarosław Kaczyński repeatedly tried to explain his words, but he never withdrew them. According to the media (both left-wing and right-wing), he changed the rhetoric only before the by-election to the Senate in 2013, when visiting the Silesian city of Rybnik, when he “softened his views” and “put an equal sign between Silesianness and Polish character”. He changed then his mind about the Silesian Autonomy Movement; thereafter his party does not feel hostility toward them. This is a clear example of the instrumental approach to the Silesian subject by the current political activists.

19.7. The autonomy

The Silesian Autonomy Movement is the most influential organization that postulates the introduction of autonomy in Upper Silesia. The organization was founded in 1990, and in 2001 registered as an association. Candidates supported by the RAŚ in the local elections in Silesian Voivodeship gained the support up to 10.0% of the votes (mainly in the area of the historic Upper Silesia). In the Opole Voivodeship the results were much weaker. RAŚ introduced three councilors to the Silesian Regional Assembly and created a ruling coalition in the voivodeship with the Civic Platform and Polish People Party until April 2013.
The Silesian Autonomy Movement’s main purpose is strictly political: it is to “retrieve pre-war autonomy of Upper Silesia”. It does not conceal the fact of being inspired by regionalism in Western Europe and that it strives to introduce to the entire country, “strong, autonomous voivodeships”. Draft Statute of the Autonomous Voivodeship states that it will be “an integral part of the Polish territory” and the Statute of the Silesian Autonomy Movement says: “The actions of the Movement for the autonomy of Silesia are not intended to change the state borders”.

In the debate, however, arguments that the Silesian Autonomy Movement tends to detach part of the country and therefore constitutes a threat to Polish are often raised. Such formulations are falling from both sides of the political spectrum. However, according to the RAŚ, the attainment of the program will involve benefit for many sides: not only for Upper Silesia but also for other voivodeships and the whole Polish state. Moreover, The Silesian Autonomy Movement’s activity has a positive cultural and social dimension.

19.8. Multiculturalism and identity

Frequent changes of state jurisdiction resulted into a cultural and religious melting pot. Upper Silesia was inhabited by the Poles, the Germans, and the Czechs who consider themselves as Silesians associated with any of these national options or Silesians without definitely formed national identity. It cannot be forgotten about the Jewish minority, which played an important role in the development of the region in the 19th and 20th centuries (Kalinowska-Keller and Wójcik 2012). Next to Catholics lived here Protestants and Judaism followers. Is it then multiculturalism of Upper Silesia an argument for the existence of “Silesian identity”, or rather is it a premise saying that the Silesian identity does not exist, and there is only the identity of the Polish, German or Czech? According to RAŚ, multiculturalism attests to the rich heritage of Upper Silesia.

Ethnic issues are of particular importance in the analysis of the problems of the Silesian Uprisings that led to the return of Upper Silesia to Poland after centuries of isolation. Grześkowiak and Mikitin (2013) show Silesian Uprisings from a Polish perspective. They are, however, aware that this point of view is significantly different from the German perspective. For the authors essence of dispute of Upper Silesia after the First World War was the fact that these areas are inhabited in 70.0% by the Polish population, which despite Germanization policy and anti-Polish actions taken by the German authorities sought unification with Poland.

The civilization potential of Upper Silesia was seen as a major boost to the country’s position, which after years of occupation and regained independence was mainly based on an agrarian economy. Hence, Polish initiative to bolster there “Polish element”. It is emphasized that the Polish national consciousness survived and is numerically dominant in Upper Silesia, despite the fact that for centuries
Silesia did not belong to Poland, and despite the fact that the intellectual and material elites of the Upper Silesian society were predominantly German nationality (teachers, clergy, civil servants, professionals, industrialists). Peasants and workers were – according to the authors – of Polish nationality. In the Silesian Uprisings occurred national element (the Poles against the Germans) and social one (non-owning class against owning class). The uprisings were motivated by the hope of improving the livelihood and material interests of the lower strata of society after joining Poland (Grześkowiak and Mikitin 2013: 9–15).

The theme of the Polish population response to violent and continuous Germanization and social inequality is also often emphasized in the reference literature (Popiołek 1984). Little attention is paid to the Polish–Czech–Slovak conflict of Cieszyn Silesia. However, the dispute was far more limited and does not arouse strong emotions. Polish-German controversy has been described by the authors of the History of Upper Silesia, examining the Polish, Czech and German prospects. They pose the question: “Who is Upper Silesian?” indicating that the responses were and still are used as an instrument of political struggle: “the scientific discourse too often has been treated as an extension of the political discourse” (Bahlcke, Gawrecki, and Kaczmarek 2011: 409–474).

Since connection to Prussia in the 17th century, Upper Silesia was treated as a province and it did not change after the subsequent industrialization. “Slavic speaking inhabitants of the region were considered as socially crippled, but loyal “Polish” Prussians, and not – as opposed to part of the population of the Province of Posen and Western Prussia – for “Prussian Poles”. “Anti-Polish and anti-Catholic policy of Bismarck launched the “Polish-German rivalry of Upper Silesia” and tried to create an image Upper Silesian as a German (Bahlcke at all: 470). In German society, after the Second World War the image of Upper Silesian became gradually more of a Pole (optionally, with a German passport).

After passing under the Polish control, German history of these lands ended. Even the famous German football players Miroslav Klose and Lukas Podolski (who originate from Opole and Gliwice, but have little to do with Poland) are considered the Polish. In German study of Upper Silesia there is an image of Upper Silesians as a group with identity associated with the “little homeland” and the Catholic faith. The national consciousness (Polish, German, or Czech) would be of secondary importance to them (Bahlcke at all: 470–472). On the other hand, in a Polish perspective image which was held for a long time is that of Upper Silesian-Slav as an ethnic Pole to the lands of Polish root who opposed German element even if he was unaware of his Polish identity but through language, culture and customs became a Pole.

In the Communist era, a vision of an ethnically Polish Silesia and Upper Silesians – the Poles against the Germans – was created. After the fall of communism started to use a lot of new terms: German and Polish speaking Upper Silesians (Silesians); Upper Silesian-Pole; Silesian-German; etc. There was also a new method
of determining nationality: not on the basis of objective factors (such as language or culture), but on the basis of a conscious statement, which of course does not find widespread scientific and political acceptance (Bahlcke at all: 473).

Local view differs from the perspectives of dominating nations, meaning the Germans and Poles. K. Kutz in the partially autobiographical novel shows Silesia as the “fifth side of the world”, unique, centrally located place at the crossroads of nations, cultures and countries, a mixture of Polishness, Germanness and Silesianness. The fate of Silesia was influenced by the fact that it was always ruled by foreign authorities and foreign powers rolled over it, treating the Silesians instrumentally. Silesia has not developed its own elite, who wanted something to do for the region and for the country, had to leave (Kutz 2010). However, most Silesians were too attached to their “little homeland” to emigrate.

On the other hand, native of Zabrze, German-speaking writer Janosch (Horst Eckert’s pen name) draws a different landscape of Silesian society. Thoroughly modern, using the achievements of civilization even as far back as at the beginning of the 20th century, this society was with bourgeois hypocrisy and opportunism towards any power. In the Silesians’ life, there were no ideals or patriotism, they were guided by the practical sense and the desire to secure existence. Also in Janosch works appears motif of omnipresent, dynamic history (in the form of national and international policy), which ruthlessly affects the fate of individuals and Upper Silesian society (Janosch 2011).

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Territorial and Ethnic Identity Issues in the Zakarpattia Region

ROMAN LOZYNSKYY

20.1. Introduction

Ukraine as an independent state emerged only in 1991. Earlier, in the 20th century there were several unsuccessful attempts to restore its sovereignty. After the decline of the Ukrainian Cossack state during several centuries the lands inhabited by Ukrainians belonged to different states, such as Russia, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. Such a situation favoured forming numerous regional identities among the Ukrainian population. Whereas every of these countries conducted its own policy towards Ukrainians, in every state the Ukrainian community underwent a whole set of influences – political, economic, social, and cultural.

In spite of its small territory, the Zakarpattia region (Zakarpattia oblast) is treated as one of the most diversified regions of Ukraine in ethnocultural aspect. This feature very evidently shows up from the results of Presidential and Supreme Council elections. The population of Zakarpattia used to vote not as other neighbouring regions like Halychyna, Volyn or Bukovyna in particular. Not so long ago at the Parliamentary election of 2012 a relative majority of the Zakarpattia population supported the Party of Regions unlike other lands of Western and Central Ukraine. The main electorates of this party (whose candidate was a president Viktor Yanukovych) are concentrated in the East and South of Ukraine. Almost at every election, the Zakarpattian population is distinguished with specific political preferences or with small show up at the polls. In many situations Zakarpattians keep a distance to other regions being guided by their own leaders and these leaders who are guided by the central authority.

According to its ethnocultural features, Zakarpattia significantly differs from other Ukrainian regions. From the 90s of the 20th century in this territory there grows the activity of “Rusyn” organizations. Their representatives suppose that people of Zakarpattia are a cohesive Eastern European nation different from
Ukrainian one. On the contrary, nationalistic and national-patriotic parties and movements of Ukraine support the opinion that “Rusyns” represent an ethno-graphic group of Ukrainians who formed as a result of long-term processes. This detachment shaped up because of natural and political preconditions: natural – because Zakarpattia is separated by the Carpathian Mountains, and political – because it was a part of Hungary and later, during the interwar period, of Czechoslovakia.

The ambiguity of the present ethnocultural status quo in Zakarpattia is caused by the fact that its territorial identity is still affected by various factors. These are geographical location, natural conditions, ethnic and linguistic structure of population, foreign policy of neighbouring countries, and activity of regional elites now and in the past. Moreover, the choice of people’s self-identification is impelled by a combination of these factors. Each of them taken apart does not enable to determine the modern peculiarity of the ethnocultural situation in Zakarpattia definitely.

The objective of this article is a research of the main trends in forming territorial and ethnic identities of the population in Zakarpattia on the base of analysis considering the interaction between different ethnocultural and ethnopolitical factors. The source base of the article were the results of Ukrainian and USSR censuses, in particular ethnic and linguistic data; results of polling on the territory of Zakarpattia; materials of dialectological research; investigations of leading Ukrainian analysts, political geographers, and historians.

20.2. Historical background

The Zakarpattia region is a province of Ukraine which in the first half of the 20th century had been slightly integrated in the all-Ukrainian ethnocultural and ethnopolitical process.

Zakarpattia was annexed by the Soviet Union only in 1945. Till then it was a part of Czechoslovakia, and earlier – of Austro-Hungary (Hungarian province) and Hungary itself. At the beginning of the 20th century, Zakarpattia belonged to poorest European outskirts. The oldest Slavic settlements in this land probably belonged to southern Slavs, which appeared here at the time of the First Bulgarian State. The archaeological findings in the flat part of Zakarpattia are an evidence of it. But after the Hungarian invasion of Europe and the expansion of Romanian settlers, Slavs of Zakarpattia turned to be cut off other southern Slavs. Through the centuries, the Slavic population of this region was gradually replenished at the expense of eastern Slavs, which were migrating across the Carpathian ridge. Mostly these were peasants who fled from serfdom of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita), but sometimes among them there were representatives of Ukrainian gentry. Till the second half of the 19th century, the Slavs of Zakarpattia, represented mostly by peasants and clergy, had not
formed sheer ethnic identity. They identified themselves as Rusyns (ancient name of Ukrainians) very likely to Ukrainians of neighbouring Galicia (Halychyna) who considered themselves as Rusyns (Ruthenians) as well. However, at the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century in Galicia there formed up Ukrainian self-identity finally. It was promoted significantly by activity of public figures from central Ukraine and short-termed existence of the ZUNR (The West Ukrainian People’s Republic) in 1918–1919, mass involvement of Galicians in the social and political process nationwide. Nevertheless, in Zakarpattia, which after the First World War had become a part of Czechoslovakia, the identity of population remained uncertain. Among the political parties and the civil movements of this province there were adherents of separate Rusyn identity, pro-Ukrainian organizations and also “moskowphils” looking towards Russia.

Zakarpattia’s joining the totalitarian Soviet Union in fact became a perforce gift to J. Stalin. Czechoslovakia had to put up with it as far as became a satellite of the USSR after the Second World War. The Sovietization of the Zakarpattia region (created within Subcarpathian Rus which existed as a part of Czechoslovakia in the interwar period) followed total contempt for human rights of local population. The total non-admission policy of locals to regional administration was committed as in neighbouring Galicia in the first half of the 1940s – at the beginning of the 1950s. To some extent just the deformations of public relations as result of the Soviet totalitarianism and autocracy have become one of the reasons sustaining Zakarpattian Rusyn’s movement nowadays.

Democratization of public relations in the 1980s and 1990s, both in the USSR and independent Ukraine revived interest of local inhabitants in their historical past. In front of them the problem of national identity arose again – “who are we?”: either ethnographic group within the Ukrainian ethnos or a separate ethnic community. At once several Rusyn public and political organizations with different acuteness of the national issue have turned up.

20.3. Ethnic and linguistic composition of the population

As previously mentioned, the ethnic and linguistic situation in a certain territory is an important factor in forming people’s identity. Zakarpattia is one of the most diversified regions in terms of ethnic composition (Table 20.1.). The reasons for it were historical and geographical features of state Ukrainian border’s forming, territorial settlements on this land, especially main cities. The modern Zakarpattia region of Ukraine mostly inherited borders which had been established after the First World War when this area belonged to Czechoslovakia. Its territory comprised a significant part of ethnic Hungarian lands (southern flat part), Slav lands and besides small but densely populated a Romanian area.
Table 20.1. Ethnic composition of the population of the Zakarpattia region, according to 2001 census, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative unit</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Hungarians</th>
<th>Romanians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Romanians</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uzhhorod city</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>town of Berehove</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>town of Khust</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>town of Mukacheve</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berehove district</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irshava district</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khust district</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizhhiria district</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukacheve district</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perechyn district</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakhiv district</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svaliava district</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiachiv district</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzhgorod district</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velyky Berezny distr.</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volovets district</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vynohradiv district</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zakarpattia region</strong></td>
<td><strong>80.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* – “...” – less than 0.1%


After the Second World War when Zakarpattia joined the USSR, the Russians started moving to biggest cities and towns of the region such as Uzhhorod, Mukacheve, Khust, Berehove and Vynohradiv. The favourable conditions for such displacement appeared after mass annihilation of Jews during the Second World War and resettlement of Czechs and Slovaks which compounded majority of local administration back to homeland in the first post-war years. One of the most numerous ethnic groups of this area are Romanians.

The last census on the territory of Ukraine held in 2001 showed that the number of Hungarians in Zakarpattia made up 151,000 residents. Most of them live near Hungarian border areas, namely in Berehove, Vynohradiv, and Uzhgorod (partly) districts (Figure 20.1.). In the Tiachiv and Rakhiv districts near the Romanian border over 32,000 Romanians reside. Hungarians and Romanians settle fairly compact in rural areas, mostly in monoethnic Hungarian and Romanian villages.
A high social status of the ethnic minorities is one of the most important peculiarities of Zakarpattia. Accordingly, Hungarians and Romanians have significant support from their homelands – Hungary and Romania. The majority of them have dual citizenship: passports of Hungary or Romania except Ukrainian one. Despite of the official prohibition in having dual citizenship, the central Ukrainian authority does not have any mechanism to affect its spreading. Feeling back-up from their countrymen in the European Union and possessing a passport of EU countries, the Hungarians and Romanians of Zakarpattia have essential economic and social advantages in comparison with the Ukrainian population of the region.

The social status of Russians in Zakarpattia, which made up 31,000 residents in 2001, is also pretty high. As an inheritance from Soviet times, they mostly live in large cities and occupy certain prestigious fields of social life. Both in Zakarpattia and other regions of Ukraine the role of the Russian language in ethnic relations used to be raised. Under the Soviet rule, the Ukrainian language had
never been taught in Hungarian and Romanian schools in Zakarpattia. Therefore, older and middle-aged generation of Hungarians and Romanians do not use the Ukrainian language; they prefer Russian as a language of interethnic communication. As a result, the Russian still occupies a leading position in the region (Lozynskyy 2008: 316–319). It is especially felt in the largest cities – Uzhgorod and Mukacheve where segment of Russian speaking residents accordingly made up 12.5% and 10.7% in 2001.

20.4. The Rusyns and the Rusyn language

As above-mentioned the revival of the Rusyn movement in Zakarpattia was caused by non-involvement of this region in the consolidation process nationwide which embraced the rest of Ukraine before the 20th century. The residents of Zakarpattia preserved the ancient ethnonym of “Rusyns”. The Ukrainian national identity among Zakarpattians formed up after the annexation of the region by the Soviet Union in the middle of the 20th century. Several dozen thousand people considering themselves as Rusyns live in the neighbouring Slovakia, and a few thousand do in Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and indeed it cannot help promoting the Rusyn identity. What is more, the significant part of the numerous Zakarpattian Diaspora in the USA identifies itself as a Rusyn nation.

After Ukrainian Census Nationwide in 2001 there appeared an opportunity to reveal the prevalence of the Rusyn identity at first time. In the census program unlike the USSR censuses there emerged an issue about ethnographic groups within the Ukrainian ethnic community. Together with Hutsuls, Lemkos, Boykos, Polishchukies, and Litvins, the Rusyns were determined as one of the numerous ethnographic Ukrainian groups. However, the issue about the ethnographic groups was included in the Census – 2001 program at the last moment. That is why Rusyn political and civil organizations did not have sufficient possibility to agitate for the Rusyn identity. Hence, probably the data of 2001 Census about Rusyns in the Zakarpattia region of Ukraine is understated. But even this data enables to make interesting conclusions about regional Rusyn identity prospects.

On the basis of Ukrainian Census Nationwide in 2001, 10,183 citizens defined themselves as Rusyns. 10,090 of them live in the Zakarpattia region (0.87% of its total population). Their share was pretty big only in Svaliava district (5.5%). The Perechyn payon as well as three big cities (Uzhhorod, Mukacheve, and Khust) had counted 1.0% of Rusyns but no more than 3.0%. In all other administrative regions and towns of Zakarpattia, the share of Rusyns was less than 1.0%, in many of them even less than 0.1% (Table 20.2., Figure 20.2.).
Table 20.2. The Rusyns and the Rusyn language in the Zakarpattia region, according to 2001 census, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territorial unit</th>
<th>Rusyns</th>
<th>People with native Rusyn language</th>
<th>Rusyns with native Rusyn language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uzhhorod city</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>town of Berehove</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>town of Khust</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>town of Mukacheve</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berehove districts</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irshava districts</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khust districts</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizzhiria districts</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukacheve districts</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pechelyn districts</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakhiv districts</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svaliava districts</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>84.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiachiv districts</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzhgorod districts</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velyky Berezyni distr.</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volovets districts</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vynohradiv districts</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakarpattia region</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On the basis of Ukrainian Census, data about the Rusyn identity were published per administrative units but materials about the Rusyn language were provided for every locality. Materials’ analysis about the Rusyn language’s spread even narrows down its data. As a total in the Zakarpattia region around 200 settlements were detected in 2001. Their residents defined the Rusyn language as their native one. But in only one locality (the village of Hankovytsia in the Svaliava district) most of people spoke the Rusyn language. It is 90.5% of the rural population (500 people). In three other villages this index made up over 10.0%: Nelipyno (22.3%) and Sasivka in the Svaliava district (21.8%), and Romsochevtia in the Mukacheve district (20.4%). In other three villages this index made up 5.0–10.0%, in 28 localities – 1.0–5.0%. The localities with population over 100 speaking the Rusyn language as a native were only nine (Figure 20.3.).
It means that in 2001 a continuous area of the Rusyn language spread in Zakarpattia was absent. Only in several localities its share was statistically significant. An area in which over 100 persons considered the Rusyn language as their native was restricted by 4 (of 13) administrative district of Zakarpattia. These were Uzhhorod, Perechyn, Svaliava, and Mukacheve districts.

Except ethnic and linguistic identity the program of 2001 Census contained the issue of place of birth. Census data indicated that 92,500 persons were born in Zakarpattia but lived in other regions of Ukraine as a result of migration. Just 93 of them (or 0.001%) declared a Rusyn identity. Therefore, beyond Zakarpattia borders the Rusyn identity of natives almost has not displayed.
Figure 20.3. The Rusyn language in Zakarpattia, according to 2001 census

![Map of Rusyn language distribution in Zakarpattia, 2001 census](image)

Source: Elaborated by the author.

### 20.5. Dialectological peculiarities

After a deep analysis of the Rusyn language spread, on the base of Census-2001 data there emerges a question – what is this language as a linguistic phenomenon? The territory of Zakarpattia is well explored from a linguistic point of view. In the 1950s and 1960s, the dialectological research was held by Dzendzelivskyy. It was put later in the base of “Atlas of the Ukrainian language” creation. But even earlier, the linguists were baffled what is a subdialect of Zakarpattian Slavonic population – either it is a separate language or Ukrainian subdialect.

Today Ukrainian linguists suppose the Rusyn language to be one of the variants of the Ukrainian literature language and attempts of its introduction to Zakarpattia had begun in the 20th century yet. The dialects of the Rusyn language
are divided into Carpathian (Ukraine, Slovakia, and Poland) and Pannonian or Bachvanian (Serbia). The Carpathian dialects are closer to the Ukrainian language, while the Pannonian ones are closer to the Slovak language. Nowadays, there is no single codified Rusyn language. Although local codified versions exist, they significantly differ from each other and that complicates a single language codification.

In order to reveal the essence of language-geographical setting in the Zakarpattia region, it is important to define the territorial distribution of subdialects, in particular the availability of the so-called dialectological cores. The research by Dzenzelivskyy revealed that on the territory of Zakarpattia there are five cores and five groups of subdialects (Figure 20.4).

The subdialects of the eastern part of Zakarpattia which are spread on the territory of Rakhiv and partly of the Khust district are the most specific ones. Here, there are common so-called Hutsul and transitional to Hutsul subdialects (Dzendzelivskyi 1966). Therefore, the population of eastern Zakarpattia relates to Hutsuls – a peculiar ethnographic group of the Ukrainian population which formed in mountainous areas. The Rakhiv district of Zakarpattia and the Nadvirna district of the Ivano-Frankivsk region are connected by Yablunytskyj Pass, one of the most comfortable in the Ukrainian Carpathians and a cross which the Hutsuls moved to Zakarpattia. The linguists do not bind Hutsul subdialects of Zakarpattia with Zakarpattian dialects at all.

The Hutsuls, compared to other Ukrainian ethnic groups in Carpathians (Lemkos and Boykos), preserved their ethnographic features in the best way. Some scholars suppose them to be a sub-ethnos within the Ukrainian one. Except Zakarpattia, Hutsuls live in the Ivano-Frankivsk and Chernivtsi regions of Ukraine. There are also several Hutsuls villages in Romania. Hutsuls including those who live in Zakarpattia very distinctively identify themselves as a part of the Ukrainian nation despite of their ethnographical differences. Between 1918 and 1919 at the territory of the Hutsul part of Zakarpattia did existed the so-called “Hutsul Republic”, a half-state formation following pro-Ukrainian policy and supporting the ties with the West Ukrainian People’s Republic which existed in Halychyna at this time. Hence, the wide spread of the Rusyn identity in eastern Zakarpattia seems to be unlikely.

One more dialectological core was revealed at the highlands of northern and northeast Zakarpattia. These are the Volovets and Mizhhiria districts. Here the so-called highland (or “verhovynskyi”) subdialects are common. By many signs, they are closer to Boykos dialects and spread from the other side of the Ukrainian Carpathians to the territory of Lviv and the Ivano-Frankivsk region. So, population of the Volovets and Mizhhiria districts ethnographers refer to Boykos, one more ethnographic group of Ukrainians. Unlike Hutsuls, Boykos much less preserved their own ethnographic features and local identity. Both Boykos and Hutsuls very clearly identify themselves as Ukrainians. Accordingly, in the
Volovets and Mizhhiria districts of Zakarpattia, the Rusyns have not gained a large spread.

Figure 20.4. Isogloss and dialectological cores in the Zakarpattia region (according to Dzendzelivskyy, 1966)


Other dialectological cores define three more dialect groups – the subdialects of the central area (Irshava and Vynohradiv districts), eastern Zakarpattian area (Khust and Tiachiv districts), and western Zakarpattian (Uzhhorod and Mukacheve districts). Their distinction and borders are not random. These dialect borders are the frontiers of three ancient administrative and territorial units called “zhups” (comitatus) which existed on the territory of Zakarpattia while it was a part of Hungary: Ung (with centre in Uzhhorod), Bereg (centre in Berehove), and Maramuresh (Marmaroshchyna, centre – Khust, later Sighetu Marmației). Every of these comitatus existed during many centuries which explains the frontiers of their dialects.

Among three above-mentioned subdialects it is worth paying special attention to the subdialects of Khust and Tiachiv. These subdialects speakers are
rather inclined to Ukrainians, but not to the Rusyn identity. The modern Khust and Tiachiv districts of Zakarpattia together with the most eastern one (Rakhiv) were a part of Maramureş zhupa differing in its historical development from the rest. Marmaroshchyna was supporting very tight political and economic relations with Moldova state although used to be autonomy of Hungary. Unlike other Zakarpattian zhups Marmaroshchyna kept in touch with Ukrainian land behind the Ukrainian Carpathians. It is explained by its geographical position and Ukrainian ethnic Hutsul settlements mentioned above. At the beginning of the 20th century, the population of Marmaroshchyna displayed a pro-Ukrainian policy. After the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire it is initiated on January 21, 1919, in Khust Hungarian Rusyn Congress nationwide (Zakarpattian peoples' assembly). 420 delegates from 175 localities of Zakarpattia took a resolution about reunion of the region with the Ukrainian People’s Republic which unfortunately has not been implemented. In March of 1939 Khust became the capital of the proclaimed, but not implemented Carpathian Ukraine.

So, the dialectological peculiarities of Zakarpattia’s population to a great extent explain the territorial base of the Rusyn phenomenon and the Rusyn language. Of five dialectical cores on the territory of Zakarpattia one even does not belong to the Zakarpattian dialects. Other two rather focus on the Ukrainian identity. The difficulties of the Rusyn language in Zakarpattia become clear. In this context the famous Ukrainian historian Y. Dashkevich stated the following: “if we codify the literature language on the basis of Zakarpattian dialectical groups which are definitely well explored in science as a result we will have... a Ukrainian language” (Dashkevich 1994: 69–74).

20.6. Electoral peculiarities

In order to reveal the extent of Ukrainian or Rusyn identity’s probable spread, we should analyse the election data to the Supreme Council of Ukraine in autumn 2012.

As a whole, the voters in Zakarpattia supported pro-governmental Party of Regions – 30.9% of the votes, opposition All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna” (leader Yulia Tymoshenko) – 27.7% of the votes, opposition party “UDAR” (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform, leader Vitaliy Klychko) – 20.0%, Ukrainian opposition formation nationwide All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda”/“Freedom” (leader Oleh Tyahnybok) – 8.3%. As total three opposition parties received 56.0% of the votes.

The Party of Regions which represented authority to February 2014 mostly supports the Rusyn idea. Thanks to it in 2012 the Rusyn language was included in the list of regional languages in the Law of Ukraine “Principles of the state language policy”. According to chapter 7 of this Law the state authority, local governments and people communities must implement measures of development,
usage and protection of regional languages. Whereas opposition parties are rather rivals of the Rusyn movement defining Rusyns as a special ethnographic Ukrainian group.

The governing party’s support of the Rusyn idea has not provided absolute adherence of electorate at the polling. Moreover, the Party of Regions has got a back-up not even in localities of active Rusyn movement but on the territories inhabited by ethnic Hungarians. However, it is worth stressing that many other factors affected electoral choice of Zakarpattia residents. There are no sheer evidences that policy of different parties to the Rusyn movement was a main factor for such electoral choice.

Further, it is worth paying attention to the 2012 Ukrainian parliamentary election results of Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” in the Zakarpattia region. This nationalistic party very actively opposes against the Rusyn movement in Zakarpattia. About 8.35% of Zakarpattia electors supported “Svoboda”. It is lower than in Ukraine as a whole (10.44%). If we take the results of “Svoboda” in Zakarpattia only considering the Ukrainian population without ethnic minorities (according to 2001 Census data) we will get 10.35%.

From a geographical perspective, the results of voting had significant distinctions. In the Rakhiv district and regional centre of Uzhgorod, “Svoboda” received over 14.0%. In other big towns (Vynohradiv, Mukacheve, and Khust) and also in the Irshava district received over 10.0%. In some localities of Zakarpattia the voter support for “Svoboda” approached to 30.0%. The lowest (3.1%) was the support in the Berehove district where the majority consists of Hungarians (Figure 20.5.). As we see the support of “Svoboda” is pretty high in the east and in the largest cities of Zakarpattia. Relatively high level of nationalistic party’s back-up is in the Rakhiv district populated by Hutsuls. And that is very predictable. So far let us stop at the peculiarities of large cities electoral preferences in details.

After the Second World War, different groups of population took part in the big cities’ forming. Unlike rural locations and small towns of Zakarpattia the share of resettlees from other regions in the biggest urban settlements – Mukacheve and Uzhgorod – is high enough. The most of them moved from neighbouring Galicia although the new settlers from other regions are present too. Galicia as we know is the most nationalistic area of Ukraine. At the election-2012 “Svoboda” received a support of over 30.0% of the voters. Probably just migrants from Galicia voted for “Svoboda”.

The electoral preferences in the largest Zakarpattian cities and towns are affected also by heterogeneous ethnic composition of the area. The political and economic activity of Hungarians and Russians in the largest cities sustains the nationalistic mood of their Ukrainian counterparts. Very exponential in this aspect are the 2012 Election results in the district centre Berehove where majority consists of Hungarians and the share of Ukrainians makes up 40.0%. In this town “Svoboda” received 10.0% of the votes. If we assume that this party is exclusively
backed up by Ukrainians the data that every fourth Ukrainian in Berehove voted for this party seems to be much unexpected. The support for “Svoboda” was twice and three times bigger than average in the region in the Ukrainian villages located to the south of Zakarpattia where Hungarians and mixed Hungarian-Ukrainian settlements prevail.

Figure 20.5. Results of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” in the 2012 elections

Actually, in all the parts of Zakarpattia that have a complex ethnic structure there is a certain competition between the separate ethnic groups. In that context, the idea of “rusynism” loses its relevance. Within strong social positions of Hungarian, Romanian and Russian ethnic groups, the Rusyn identity is clearly losing importance at the expense of Ukrainian identity.
20.7. Conclusion

The Ukrainian population of Zakarpattia has significant ethnocultural features compared to the Ukrainian population of other regions. Forming these features was favoured by historical development of Zakarpattia, its geographical position and some other factors. These peculiarities together with outer political influence promoted the Renaissance of the Rusyn movement in the 1990s.

The most radical Rusyn organizations advocate the acknowledgement of Rusyns as a separate Slavic ethnic group and even stand for detachment of Zakarpattia from Ukraine. The moderate Rusyn organizations are satisfied with the recognition of Rusyns as an ethnographic group of Ukrainians standing for saving and support of ethnocultural originality of Zakarpattia’s population.

The research of 2001 Census data which outlined the Rusyn identity the first time shows that at the beginning of the 21st century a number of people identifying themselves as Rusyns was insignificant – only 10 thousand. Only in some localities the share of Rusyns exceeded 10.0%. The localities in which 1.0% of residents recognized the Rusyn identity concentrated only in 4 of 13 administrative districts – Svaliava, Mukacheve, Uzhhorod, and Perechyn.

The analysis of the Zakarpattia population’s dialectological peculiarities shows that only in five districts (including Irshava one) there is a favourable environment for significant spread, development of Rusyn identity and the Rusyn language.

The analysis of 2012 election results indicates rather strong nationalistic moods among the Ukrainian population of the region, especially in the east and in the largest cities. The ethnic composition heterogeneity in Zakarpattia, especially in the cities and plains, as well as certain social benefits of ethnic minorities (Hungarian, Romanian, and Russian) contribute additionally to the spread of nationalist sentiment; neutralize the idea of the Rusyn identity.

However, some external and internal factors essentially promote the development of the Rusyn movement. These are as follows: recognition of the Rusyn identity in the Slovak Republic, Serbia, the Czech Republic, and Croatia; the presence of pretty active the Rusyn movement among immigrants from Zakarpattia in the USA; support from Russia; declination of some local Zakarpattia political authorities and leaders towards Rusynism; support by the previous Ukrainian government, represented by the Party of Regions.

Besides, the general European trend used to include a favourable attitude to the development of various regional and local identities. This should be considered in the context of the Ukrainian aspirations to sign Association Agreement with the European Union.

The current round of censuses being held in Europe showed an evidence of rapid increase in the number of some regional identities’ representatives in Central Europe. In particular, in Poland in the period between the 2002 and 2011
censuses the number Kashubians and Silesians increased several times. In Ukraine a new census is planned in 2016, but is likely to be postponed. In the Zakarpattia region the considerable boost of Rusyns number by new census is quite expected if we take into account a flurry activity of Rusyn organizations.

However, the Rusyn movement does not embrace the entire territory of Zakarpattia. It is hampered by many factors that constrain the scope of this process and limit the territorial growth of Rusyns within several districts of the region.

References


Closing remarks

The central line of this book was drawn by the complex problem of identity and its relation to the geographical space which can be either real or imagined, symbolically evaluated and appropriated, sacralized by a given ethnic group, objectively described or subjected to political modelling. In respect to the spatial scale, the volume was dominated by issues of regional identity in chosen countries, multiethnic territories and border regions. Discussions about the nature as well as geopolitical dimensions of territorial identity and consciousness were also broadly highlighted in various chapters.

The contributors applied wide range of analytical approaches to the study of interconnections between the collective consciousness, imaginative geographies, and geographical reality. Not surprisingly, territorial identities were treated by means of old and new approaches and methods in human geography, political science, sociology, geopolitics, international relations, and studies of nationality affairs. Some of the collected chapters were based on humanistic way of thinking and/or postmodernist interpretations, whereas others preferred positivist methods, and third relied on structuralist research traditions. A few authors applied a critical approach to the issues of territorial self-identification of individuals and groups (Zamyatin, Mihaylov, Potulski, Hudzikowski, Krylov and Gritsenko, among others) or tried to verify the adequacy of external perceptions, images and stereotypes about various spaces and places (Makarychev, Plevris, Krastev). Besides the pursuits of critical reflection or ambitious deconstructions of established spatial images and stereotypes by and for different territorial communities, the book also contains attempts to comprehend the identity in terms of social constructivists norms. All these circumstances have confirmed the stance from the Introduction that the scientific views of the geographical space and the place of human identities in it are not fixed and coherent. Besides, they are in constant progress.

As a consequence of the above-mentioned heterogeneity, the collected book contains both attempts for “objective” empirical description of territorial identities and for critical analysis of “subjective socio-geographical reality” (Shmatko and Kachanov 1998), to which territorial communities are physically and/or mentally attached.

We must keep in mind that we deal with a transformed former socialist space, divided into three separate, and also not fully coherent in respect to their geopolitical orientation, regions. As regards the national level of territorial identity, the volume does not cover all the countries from Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Simultaneously, it comprises studies of key aspects of the identity of Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Turkey. These countries, despite their different geopolitical and geocultural identity, are the largest in that part of Eu-
rope/Eurasia, and they will continue to play a significant role in the constantly changing nature of international relations. We believe that the published results will help for better understanding of contemporary geopolitical and geoeconomic processes related to defining and re-defining the identity and the priorities of these countries, considered important for regional and even global geopolitical configurations.

As the collected case studies have shown, the territorial consciousness and identity of the socio-territorial communities are not just temporary fashionable passion that fascinates certain scholars from East-Central Europe. Hence, the published studies enable the outlining of several contradictory trends which have a considerable influence on the processes of spatial consolidation and cohesion or, in a few cases, disintegration of the countries in Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe.

On the one hand, as some studies on regional scale have shown, the sense of territorial identity, the geospatial self-categorization and differentiation of the various human groups represent the driving forces for the regional communities to pursue wider political-administrative, financial and budget decentralization of the countries which they inhabit. The affirmation of territorial identity is closely related to the cultivation of local traditions, regional education and upbringing, which are influenced by the transformation of memory and by the search for stable value orientations under the condition of radical ideological, political, administrative, and economic transformation.

On the other hand, the preservation practices of the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of the national territory have been continued by intercepting the aspirations of local communities for more rights or for institutionalization, in one form or another, of their territorial identity. In Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the severity of these issues varies according to the specific geographical combinations of a certain set of factors which differ according to the social traditions and the degree of democratization and pluralism of internal politics in the different post-socialist countries.

A third trend also shapes out. It is represented by the collision of the two above-mentioned options, which is expected to underpin new internal contradictions with resonance in geopolitics and international relations, including real possibilities for new redrawing of political boundaries. This applies mainly to territorial and political manifestations of ethnic and national identity. The disturbing events of 2013 and 2014 in Ukraine show that a new complex East European discourse of the relations power – territory – regional and ethnic identities – political representation – historical policy is being added to the cases of former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus region and Transnistria. This is a geopolitical discourse formed in an underdeveloped civil society and on the background of interventions of external forces. Although debates about the status of Kosovo and the ways to achieve it have not subsided yet, the agenda of politics and science
with great sharpness was again affected by the problem of balance between the rights of nations and peoples to self-determination, and principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of internationally recognized states.

The book does not generalize the discussion on the relations between territories and identities in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, neither it represents in a comprehensive manner all possible points of view on the issues raised by the contributors. However, the collected volume reaffirms the importance of the geographical space as a source of identity and as a factor in the cultural, social and political life under conditions of globalization and the influential postmodern turn of social sciences. The reader could find plenty of discourses, concepts, facts, and criticisms about territorial consciousness and identity, which most likely will be grasped through its own prospects on the issues discussed. Thence, the main hope that we could express at the end of this book is in regards to the opportunity to stimulate the interdisciplinary and the international debate on territorial identity among researchers throughout the studied regions, or in other words – the opportunity for new intellectual encounters between imagined geographies on the one hand, and the different-sized countries, regions and places in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe on the other.
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